So, why do you meantain that causality is required for reason? I do not think any Rationalist / philosopher would maintain that position...so I am curious as to why you do.
Well causality is big issue in rationalist mechanics. For instance, if there is no Aristotelan substantial form (it is in the nature of a rock to move down) (cf. Disc.Metaphysics X-XV) and we adopt Galilean/Cartesian mechanics in which their is nothing essential about mechanics outside of the action and reaction of extension, form, and motion, then we need to address causality. If what we come to know from a body is a result of mechanics, then how can we speak of its cause.
This is why Leibniz's solution is pretty great: cause and effect is only an epistemological problem, and it might be where we come to heads, _J_. You see Rationalism as an epistemic project, and I see it as an ontological one. Simple Substance cannot act on one another, but it is via the mechanical interaction of aggregates that we get infinitesimally small differences, and the calculus.
I prefer Irrationalism. Life is so much more interesting when you act solely out of emotion.
So, If one acts emotionally Then life is interesting?
Things like this are why non-rationalism or "irrationalism" are nonsense; they all rely upon reason or, at least, systematic structures.
I HATE YOU
You used the law of identity twice in that statement.
:^:
LoserForHireX on
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
I prefer Irrationalism. Life is so much more interesting when you act solely out of emotion.
So, If one acts emotionally Then life is interesting?
Things like this are why non-rationalism or "irrationalism" are nonsense; they all rely upon reason or, at least, systematic structures.
I HATE YOU
You used the law of identity twice in that statement.
Neither of us exist, so I disagree.
come on now...
now you're just being silly
LoserForHireX on
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
So, why do you meantain that causality is required for reason? I do not think any Rationalist / philosopher would maintain that position...so I am curious as to why you do.
Well causality is big issue in rationalist mechanics. For instance, if there is no Aristotelan substantial form (it is in the nature of a rock to move down) (cf. Disc.Metaphysics X-XV) and we adopt Galilean/Cartesian mechanics in which their is nothing essential about mechanics outside of the action and reaction of extension, form, and motion, then we need to address causality. If what we come to know from a body is a result of mechanics, then how can we speak of its cause.
This is why Leibniz's solution is pretty great: cause and effect is only an epistemological problem, and it might be where we come to heads, _J_. You see Rationalism as an epistemic project, and I see it as an ontological one. Simple Substance cannot act on one another, but it is via the mechanical interaction of aggregates that we get infinitesimally small differences, and the calculus.
Yeah, I'm still not sure as to how it can be constured as an ontological problem, unless you are doing your Heidegger "olol they're all ontological problems!" schtick. The main contention between the Rationalists and the Empiricists in the Modern era is HOW WE KNOW. That is the defintion of an epistemological contention.
Of course, all of the rationalists do ontology; but they do so as a means of articulating their epistemic concerns.
And, yes, Leibniz is fucking win. His is the best solution to the causality problem.
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KageraImitating the worst people. Since 2004Registered Userregular
edited March 2010
Is he silly or is he brilliant beyond measure?
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
Why are we assuming that logic is correct? Is there any way to actually demonstrate the correctness of logic without resorting to begging the question?
It's been a few months since I read a book on Gödel, but basically first-order logic is sound and complete. There are no logically true statements which logic cannot prove to be true. However, mathematics is incomplete. One can create mathematical statements which are true and yet unprovable.
To engage philosophy? I think so, yes. I do not know what it would be to actually be neither rationalist nor empiricist.
Another that would come to mind, at least in methodology not presented here, would be phenomenology. It can be loosely categorized as an empirical approach but that doesn't go together with the historical usage of the term empiricism.
Why accept the proposed rationalism if, as Kant had noticed, it has yet to truly have expanded our knowledge.
Expanse of knowledge is not the point. The point is not to expand knowledge, but rather to Know with Certainty that which can be Known.
Expanse at least in expanding what we can hold to be certain. We've had many rational systems but have yet to feel that we have truly answered questions such as the existence of God or the question of free-will. Often, each century's answer has been dismissed by the next century's thinkers. Descartes thought he proved the existence of God but we certainly don't believe he did.
Must the world be rational and can it be brought under a unity of indubitable principles? Maybe this entire way of thinking is a dead end.
I think a wealth of arguments can be given for why the world must be rational or, said better, rationally intelligible. While it may be possible to tell a coherent narrative for how the world is not rational, I think the telling of the coherent narrative would be proof against itself.
Why should we expect that we will be able to describe the entire universe in one self-consistent and closed system? Either way, we must make some assumptions to even begin. Would it be possible for a system based on those to, at the same time, justify those assumptions?
Rationalism also brings to mind the principle of sufficient reason which is not one I would subscribe to.
How can we say that x exists and x also doesn't exist?
Simple. X exists and also doesn't exist.
If you knew of its existence, how would you know of it's non-existence?
Why wouldn't I?
Because its existence has already been posited. X exists. You have validation of its existence, it existence is possible and thus its existence is possible necessarily. If its existence is possible, by what possible virtue could you know of its non-existence? It is present; if it is present, how could it also be absent? I'd like it if you gave actual reasons and arguments and not "olol whey?!"
@_J_: Because rationalism is a reaction to the fallout of scholasticism. If the book of nature is written in mathematics, how are we to do away with substantiative form? It is a new way of looking at the world: what exists?
if a thing does not follow the rules of causality, then it is violating the rules of reason. you can't have reason without causality.
This is false. Or, at least, this is not how Rationalists understand things to be.
One of the points of contention for Hume and Kant, for example, is the tension over whether or not there is such a thing as causality. Hume maintains that it cannot be known. Kant argues, via reason, for there being causality.
Leibniz dismisses the notion of causality completely and opts for universal pre-established harmony.
So, why do you meantain that causality is required for reason? I do not think any Rationalist / philosopher would maintain that position...so I am curious as to why you do.
I am certainly not a rationalist, as I do not believe one can reach any conclusions about reality using reason alone
if causality is not true, ie, if events can happen without causes, then there is no means by which reason can encompass those events
this is even true if causality is only partially true; anywhere where it is not true, reason cannot act upon those entities
and of course, inductive reasoning of any kind relies on causality
how can we be certain that reality follows the rules of logic or reason?
2) Mathematics.
- Reality is lawful; this lawfulness is replicated in mathematics.
Just wondering, but can this be a rational point? I'm interpreting this as the uniformity of nature. This idea can only come from experience; however, according to Hume this itself cannot be justified on that basis. The propositions of mathematics can be proven but can it be rationally justified that reality must conform the same way?
edit: It would be much more interesting and productive to at least give a summary rather than simply drop links to materials that nobody is going to have the time to read in order to continue the discussion. At the very least, give some kind of reference to where it might be found in the work.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
This discussion has pretty much been over since the 1800's. This whole "rationalism v empiricism" thing. Kant came along, joined the two together (which doesn't really make it fair to claim him as a rationalist), and that was that.
It is true that modern philosophy in the US and England does rely heavily on Empirical evidence, they aren't properly described as "empiricists" in the same sense as David Hume. Nor are there any people that can reasonably be following in the footsteps of Descartes.
This discussion seems to suffer from a lack of 20th century philosophy. Which really, is the good stuff. I mean, it's not too much fun to talk about 17th century physics is it?
LoserForHireX on
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Another that would come to mind, at least in methodology not presented here, would be phenomenology. It can be loosely categorized as an empirical approach but that doesn't go together with the historical usage of the term empiricism.
Phenomenology takes Kant's mistake and runs it to its illogical extremes.
Expanse at least in expanding what we can hold to be certain. We've had many rational systems but have yet to feel that we have truly answered questions such as the existence of God or the question of free-will. Often, each century's answer has been dismissed by the next century's thinkers. Descartes thought he proved the existence of God but we certainly don't believe he did.
The issue I would take is with your utilization of the term "feel". "Feel it is true" and "rationally discern that it is true" are two different things. We priviledge "rationally discern" because reason > emotion. See Plato.
Why should we expect that we will be able to describe the entire universe in one self-consistent and closed system? Either way, we must make some assumptions to even begin. Would it be possible for a system based on those to, at the same time, justify those assumptions?
Rationalism also brings to mind the principle of sufficient reason which is not one I would subscribe to.
The entire universe is a self-consistent and closed system. So, a rational self-consistent and closed system would mirror that reality.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
if causality is not true, ie, if events can happen without causes, then there is no means by which reason can encompass those events
What if event happen without cause in their happening due to rational necessity?
Causality is an interraction between substances. Absent causality, those particular substances could still act in accord with the rational necessity of their acting.
So we do away with causality, maintain actions, and make those actions beholden to reason.
Problem solved.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
This discussion has pretty much been over since the 1800's. This whole "rationalism v empiricism" thing. Kant came along, joined the two together (which doesn't really make it fair to claim him as a rationalist), and that was that.
It is true that modern philosophy in the US and England does rely heavily on Empirical evidence, they aren't properly described as "empiricists" in the same sense as David Hume. Nor are there any people that can reasonably be following in the footsteps of Descartes.
This discussion seems to suffer from a lack of 20th century philosophy. Which really, is the good stuff. I mean, it's not too much fun to talk about 17th century physics is it?
I actually find it extremely stimulating, and would like to avoid this becoming a general philosophy thread. As I've said before, I'm probably best described as a Derridean existentialist or a deconstrive Heideggerian. Rationalism is quite the opposite of what I believe. However, I think that 17th century mechanics sheds ENORMOUS light upon how we view the world. For instance, we still hold an atomistic view of the world -- that there is some sort of definite matter which exists next to pure space, or a vacuum. That matter interacts in a solely mechanical way, and not according to some sort of substantial form that dictates that rocks go down whereas balloons go up.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
I assume that my senses reflect reality. This is self-evident; ie, I feel that there is ground beneath my feet. Therefore there is ground beneath my feet.
Yay sense data.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
how can we be certain that reality follows the rules of logic or reason?
2) Mathematics.
- Reality is lawful; this lawfulness is replicated in mathematics.
Just wondering, but can this be a rational point? I'm interpreting this as the uniformity of nature. This idea can only come from experience; however, according to Hume this itself cannot be justified on that basis. The propositions of mathematics can be proven but can it be rationally justified that reality must conform the same way?
edit: It would be much more interesting and productive to at least give a summary rather than simply drop links to materials that nobody is going to have the time to read in order to continue the discussion. At the very least, give some kind of reference to where it might be found in the work.
Rationalists, such as Spinoza, will argue that one can understand the uniformity of nature via reason and not empirical experience. I do not "experience" uniformity, but can reason to its necessity.
You have a reasonable point on the link to the Principia Mathematica. But, explaining that in a short post would be nigh-impossible.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
I assume that my senses reflect reality. This is self-evident; ie, I feel that there is ground beneath my feet. Therefore there is ground beneath my feet.
Yay sense data.
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.
-Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
I assume that my senses reflect reality. This is self-evident; ie, I feel that there is ground beneath my feet. Therefore there is ground beneath my feet.
Yay sense data.
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.
-Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
By what means did Descartes determine that his senses were misled?
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
if causality is not true, ie, if events can happen without causes, then there is no means by which reason can encompass those events
What if event happen without cause in their happening due to rational necessity?
Causality is an interraction between substances. Absent causality, those particular substances could still act in accord with the rational necessity of their acting.
So we do away with causality, maintain actions, and make those actions beholden to reason.
Problem solved.
redefining the terms does not solve the problem. rational necessity is a cause, because it is an answer to "why did this occur?"
or, if you prefer, if events occur without rational necessity, then reason cannot act on them. there are events which occur, according to our current understanding, without rational necessity, at the microcosmic level.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
I assume that my senses reflect reality. This is self-evident; ie, I feel that there is ground beneath my feet. Therefore there is ground beneath my feet.
Yay sense data.
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.
-Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
The irony being, of course, that he then goes on to say "lol, naw, it's all good u guyz" after his whole cogito rigmarole (might not have the translation perfect).
i am curious as to whether _J_ is actually a full-on rationalist
like, do you believe that any knowledge can be gained through rational work upon axiomatic premises? do you believe that any knowledge gained in a different manner is false, or not knowledge? if i say "gravity is a force that acts upon me at approximately 9.8 meters per second squared," is that false? if it's true, how would one arrive at it through reason alone?
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
i am curious as to whether _J_ is actually a full-on rationalist
like, do you believe that any knowledge can be gained through rational work upon axiomatic premises? do you believe that any knowledge gained in a different manner is false, or not knowledge? if i say "gravity is a force that acts upon me at approximately 9.8 meters per second squared," is that false? if it's true, how would one arrive at it through reason alone?
A rationalist doesn't deny sense-data. However, if sense-data contradicts reason, a rationalist will always try to show that the sense-data is in some way contradictory with itself.
i am curious as to whether _J_ is actually a full-on rationalist
like, do you believe that any knowledge can be gained through rational work upon axiomatic premises? do you believe that any knowledge gained in a different manner is false, or not knowledge? if i say "gravity is a force that acts upon me at approximately 9.8 meters per second squared," is that false? if it's true, how would one arrive at it through reason alone?
A rationalist doesn't deny sense-data. However, if sense-data contradicts reason, a rationalist will always try to show that the sense-data is in some way contradictory with itself.
J continuously rejects sense data as valid grounds for any knowledge whatsoever, as far as I've seen.
Another that would come to mind, at least in methodology not presented here, would be phenomenology. It can be loosely categorized as an empirical approach but that doesn't go together with the historical usage of the term empiricism.
Phenomenology takes Kant's mistake and runs it to its illogical extremes.
Expanse at least in expanding what we can hold to be certain. We've had many rational systems but have yet to feel that we have truly answered questions such as the existence of God or the question of free-will. Often, each century's answer has been dismissed by the next century's thinkers. Descartes thought he proved the existence of God but we certainly don't believe he did.
The issue I would take is with your utilization of the term "feel". "Feel it is true" and "rationally discern that it is true" are two different things. We priviledge "rationally discern" because reason > emotion. See Plato.
Why should we expect that we will be able to describe the entire universe in one self-consistent and closed system? Either way, we must make some assumptions to even begin. Would it be possible for a system based on those to, at the same time, justify those assumptions?
Rationalism also brings to mind the principle of sufficient reason which is not one I would subscribe to.
The entire universe is a self-consistent and closed system. So, a rational self-consistent and closed system would mirror that reality.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
Pretty much. Sense data is a portion of classic empiricism which closes off the world so I am not as favorable toward it.
So, you want an open system?
I wasn't referring to feel as in emotion. It could have been better to say then that they find the answers provided to be inadequate or invalid even though they have been the result of a rational system. How can the rationalist verify the certainty of his propositions? Aside from some notion of self-existence, there is little I would truly call self-evident.
Sorry, I missed the inconsistent use of words when I wrote that. When I mentioned closed at the end, I meant that it leaves us enclosed within our mind, as though we are in a mental theater, and thus easily susceptible to solipsism.
I think that 17th century mechanics sheds ENORMOUS light upon how we view the world.
This.
20th Century Philosophy is, of course, a reply to Descartes and Kant. So by understanding this argument we can better understand contemporary issues and any areas in which they fail to truly address the issues raised by the Modern project.
so particles which defy the logical properties of identity are not real?
So, if i understand properly. There are individual particles, separate entities, but have no identity criterion? I mean, if you say that there are "particles" you are claiming that there are many objects, there must be identity criterion for them or else you would not be able to say "particles"
particles which can be in multiple locations at once, particles which do not follow the laws of causality, particles which arrive at their destination before they are emitted from their source, etc
basically, why do many logical rules seem to break down at the subatomic level?
Sorry, I had to respond to this:
Yes, subatomic particles are NOT real in the way you suppose they are. They are predictions of mental events. Mental events obey the law of the excluded middle; physical events in general do not.
LoserForHire: Specifically, quantum mechanics is built on the ability of particles to be in multiple mutually exclusive states at the same time. Schrodinger's Cat is just an example of this amplified into macroscopy in such a way that the logical contradiction is obvious.
Consider an arbitrary constant P. It can be assigned either T or F. Now consider the ¬ operator. It is a function which accepts constants (among other things), and which returns T or F. The ¬ operator is defined by its truth table. Namely,
if P = T, then ¬P = F
if P = F, then ¬P = T
for any P.
& is also an operator, and also defined by its truth table:
if P = T and Q = T, then P & Q =T
if P = T and Q = F, then P & Q = F
if P = F and Q = T, then P & Q = F
if P = F and Q = F, then P & Q = F
for any P and Q.
So consider the formula "P & ~P:"
if P = T, then P & ¬P will be T & F, which returns F
if P = F, then P & ¬P will be F & T, which returns F
This is just a consequence of the above truth tables, and the fact that P is either T or F. But those truth tables are just the definitions of ¬ and &, and the fact that P is either T or F is just the definition of P. So, I need some clarification on what we are considering when we consider whether P & ~P could be true, while ostensibly still using those very same definitions.
Another way to put this point is to claim that logic doesn't have independent content: that it is simply a clear articulation of some sort of laws of language. Some empiricists liked this line of thought, as it let them account for logical knowledge without assuming some spooky contact with supernatural entities like "&" and "¬." I don't particularly favor this approach, however.
Finally, Godel's completeness theorem is itself a proof given in first-order logic. If you don't accept first-order logic, then the proof won't do that much for you--its' interest lies in showing the agreement between semantic (truth-functional) and syntactic (proof-theoretic) accounts, not in convincing skeptics of logic that they are wrong.
Oh, and also: J is, as always, is presenting philosophy as seen through a funhouse mirror. It bears just enough resemblance that you can recognize the origin, but the transformation is deeply disturbing.
redefining the terms does not solve the problem. rational necessity is a cause, because it is an answer to "why did this occur?"
Philosophical understanding of causality is that it is a relational interraction between two discrete particulars. This is why, for Leibniz, universal pre-established harmony is not "causality". Monads do not interract, so there is no causal relation.
Your definition of causality is not the philosophical definition, so it is not relevant to the thread.
The irony being, of course, that he then goes on to say "lol, naw, it's all good u guyz" after his whole cogito rigmarole (might not have the translation perfect).
There is no "irony" involved. Descartes articulates the manner by which one can trust one's senses (God loves us). Prior to that, one cannot trust one's senses.
i am curious as to whether _J_ is actually a full-on rationalist
like, do you believe that any knowledge can be gained through rational work upon axiomatic premises? do you believe that any knowledge gained in a different manner is false, or not knowledge? if i say "gravity is a force that acts upon me at approximately 9.8 meters per second squared," is that false? if it's true, how would one arrive at it through reason alone?
I think that anything which can be known can be known via rational deduction from axiomatic premises.
That which is gained via sense data is not false. Rather, it is not Knowledge qua Knowledge as it is not Certain. So, one can have sense data and operate based upon sense data. But as this sense data is inductive or abductive, rather than deductive, it is not certain.
How can the rationalist verify the certainty of his propositions? Aside from some notion of self-existence, there is little I would truly call self-evident.
Consistency of deduction through the operative rational schema; self-consistency of deduction from a priori, self-evident truths.
It is present; if it is present, how could it also be absent? I'd like it if you gave actual reasons and arguments and not "olol whey?!"
Well, I'm looking for something a little less tautological than "logic is logical because logic dictates it."
Tautologies are kind of the point for Rationalist philosophy. That is to say that one only ever gets, via deduction, that which is contained within the premises.
So, reason is reasonable since it accords with reason is entirely fine.
Oh, and also: J is, as always, is presenting philosophy as seen through a funhouse mirror. It bears just enough resemblance that you can recognize the origin, but the transformation is deeply disturbing.
so what useful knowledge, J, can be obtained and known as certain through rationalist inquiry?
do you disagree that the vast majority of decisions and actions are performed based on uncertain knowledge? do you disagree that the vast majority of important information, whether that is for pragmatic concerns or otherwise, is not anchored (and is impossible to anchor) to rationally valid axioms?
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
It is present; if it is present, how could it also be absent? I'd like it if you gave actual reasons and arguments and not "olol whey?!"
Well, I'm looking for something a little less tautological than "logic is logical because logic dictates it."
X is present, which establishes its existence. X's existence is continent upon it having some attribute, be it even pure extension or action, whereby it can discern itself from the void. If it discerns itself from the void, how then is it not different from the void?
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So, If one acts emotionally Then life is interesting?
Things like this are why non-rationalism or "irrationalism" are nonsense; they all rely upon reason or, at least, systematic structures.
I HATE YOU
You used the law of identity twice in that statement.
Well causality is big issue in rationalist mechanics. For instance, if there is no Aristotelan substantial form (it is in the nature of a rock to move down) (cf. Disc.Metaphysics X-XV) and we adopt Galilean/Cartesian mechanics in which their is nothing essential about mechanics outside of the action and reaction of extension, form, and motion, then we need to address causality. If what we come to know from a body is a result of mechanics, then how can we speak of its cause.
This is why Leibniz's solution is pretty great: cause and effect is only an epistemological problem, and it might be where we come to heads, _J_. You see Rationalism as an epistemic project, and I see it as an ontological one. Simple Substance cannot act on one another, but it is via the mechanical interaction of aggregates that we get infinitesimally small differences, and the calculus.
:^:
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Neither of us exist, so I disagree.
Why wouldn't I?
Why not?
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
come on now...
now you're just being silly
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Yeah, I'm still not sure as to how it can be constured as an ontological problem, unless you are doing your Heidegger "olol they're all ontological problems!" schtick. The main contention between the Rationalists and the Empiricists in the Modern era is HOW WE KNOW. That is the defintion of an epistemological contention.
Of course, all of the rationalists do ontology; but they do so as a means of articulating their epistemic concerns.
And, yes, Leibniz is fucking win. His is the best solution to the causality problem.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel's_completeness_theorem
It's Gödel's lesser-known theorem, which he published before his two incompleteness theorems
It's been a few months since I read a book on Gödel, but basically first-order logic is sound and complete. There are no logically true statements which logic cannot prove to be true. However, mathematics is incomplete. One can create mathematical statements which are true and yet unprovable.
Another that would come to mind, at least in methodology not presented here, would be phenomenology. It can be loosely categorized as an empirical approach but that doesn't go together with the historical usage of the term empiricism.
Expanse at least in expanding what we can hold to be certain. We've had many rational systems but have yet to feel that we have truly answered questions such as the existence of God or the question of free-will. Often, each century's answer has been dismissed by the next century's thinkers. Descartes thought he proved the existence of God but we certainly don't believe he did.
Why should we expect that we will be able to describe the entire universe in one self-consistent and closed system? Either way, we must make some assumptions to even begin. Would it be possible for a system based on those to, at the same time, justify those assumptions?
Rationalism also brings to mind the principle of sufficient reason which is not one I would subscribe to.
Pretty much. Sense data is a portion of classic empiricism which closes off the world so I am not as favorable toward it.
Because its existence has already been posited. X exists. You have validation of its existence, it existence is possible and thus its existence is possible necessarily. If its existence is possible, by what possible virtue could you know of its non-existence? It is present; if it is present, how could it also be absent? I'd like it if you gave actual reasons and arguments and not "olol whey?!"
@_J_: Because rationalism is a reaction to the fallout of scholasticism. If the book of nature is written in mathematics, how are we to do away with substantiative form? It is a new way of looking at the world: what exists?
edit* Wow I screwed up my "its" usage
Principia Mathematica
I am certainly not a rationalist, as I do not believe one can reach any conclusions about reality using reason alone
if causality is not true, ie, if events can happen without causes, then there is no means by which reason can encompass those events
this is even true if causality is only partially true; anywhere where it is not true, reason cannot act upon those entities
and of course, inductive reasoning of any kind relies on causality
Just wondering, but can this be a rational point? I'm interpreting this as the uniformity of nature. This idea can only come from experience; however, according to Hume this itself cannot be justified on that basis. The propositions of mathematics can be proven but can it be rationally justified that reality must conform the same way?
edit: It would be much more interesting and productive to at least give a summary rather than simply drop links to materials that nobody is going to have the time to read in order to continue the discussion. At the very least, give some kind of reference to where it might be found in the work.
Dude, we were just bringing up Gödel, and you bring up Russell as evidence?
You got some cajones, hombre. Estupido, pero los cajones del toro
This discussion has pretty much been over since the 1800's. This whole "rationalism v empiricism" thing. Kant came along, joined the two together (which doesn't really make it fair to claim him as a rationalist), and that was that.
It is true that modern philosophy in the US and England does rely heavily on Empirical evidence, they aren't properly described as "empiricists" in the same sense as David Hume. Nor are there any people that can reasonably be following in the footsteps of Descartes.
This discussion seems to suffer from a lack of 20th century philosophy. Which really, is the good stuff. I mean, it's not too much fun to talk about 17th century physics is it?
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Phenomenology takes Kant's mistake and runs it to its illogical extremes.
The issue I would take is with your utilization of the term "feel". "Feel it is true" and "rationally discern that it is true" are two different things. We priviledge "rationally discern" because reason > emotion. See Plato.
The entire universe is a self-consistent and closed system. So, a rational self-consistent and closed system would mirror that reality.
We do need to start with assumptions, but if those assumptions are self-evident, a priori truths then there is no problem.
So, you want an open system?
What if event happen without cause in their happening due to rational necessity?
Causality is an interraction between substances. Absent causality, those particular substances could still act in accord with the rational necessity of their acting.
So we do away with causality, maintain actions, and make those actions beholden to reason.
Problem solved.
I actually find it extremely stimulating, and would like to avoid this becoming a general philosophy thread. As I've said before, I'm probably best described as a Derridean existentialist or a deconstrive Heideggerian. Rationalism is quite the opposite of what I believe. However, I think that 17th century mechanics sheds ENORMOUS light upon how we view the world. For instance, we still hold an atomistic view of the world -- that there is some sort of definite matter which exists next to pure space, or a vacuum. That matter interacts in a solely mechanical way, and not according to some sort of substantial form that dictates that rocks go down whereas balloons go up.
I assume that my senses reflect reality. This is self-evident; ie, I feel that there is ground beneath my feet. Therefore there is ground beneath my feet.
Yay sense data.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
Rationalists, such as Spinoza, will argue that one can understand the uniformity of nature via reason and not empirical experience. I do not "experience" uniformity, but can reason to its necessity.
You have a reasonable point on the link to the Principia Mathematica. But, explaining that in a short post would be nigh-impossible.
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived.
-Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
By what means did Descartes determine that his senses were misled?
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
redefining the terms does not solve the problem. rational necessity is a cause, because it is an answer to "why did this occur?"
or, if you prefer, if events occur without rational necessity, then reason cannot act on them. there are events which occur, according to our current understanding, without rational necessity, at the microcosmic level.
The irony being, of course, that he then goes on to say "lol, naw, it's all good u guyz" after his whole cogito rigmarole (might not have the translation perfect).
like, do you believe that any knowledge can be gained through rational work upon axiomatic premises? do you believe that any knowledge gained in a different manner is false, or not knowledge? if i say "gravity is a force that acts upon me at approximately 9.8 meters per second squared," is that false? if it's true, how would one arrive at it through reason alone?
A rationalist doesn't deny sense-data. However, if sense-data contradicts reason, a rationalist will always try to show that the sense-data is in some way contradictory with itself.
J continuously rejects sense data as valid grounds for any knowledge whatsoever, as far as I've seen.
I wasn't referring to feel as in emotion. It could have been better to say then that they find the answers provided to be inadequate or invalid even though they have been the result of a rational system. How can the rationalist verify the certainty of his propositions? Aside from some notion of self-existence, there is little I would truly call self-evident.
Sorry, I missed the inconsistent use of words when I wrote that. When I mentioned closed at the end, I meant that it leaves us enclosed within our mind, as though we are in a mental theater, and thus easily susceptible to solipsism.
edit: Which do you believe to be Kant's mistake?
This.
20th Century Philosophy is, of course, a reply to Descartes and Kant. So by understanding this argument we can better understand contemporary issues and any areas in which they fail to truly address the issues raised by the Modern project.
Sorry, I had to respond to this:
Yes, subatomic particles are NOT real in the way you suppose they are. They are predictions of mental events. Mental events obey the law of the excluded middle; physical events in general do not.
LoserForHire: Specifically, quantum mechanics is built on the ability of particles to be in multiple mutually exclusive states at the same time. Schrodinger's Cat is just an example of this amplified into macroscopy in such a way that the logical contradiction is obvious.
Well, I'm looking for something a little less tautological than "logic is logical because logic dictates it."
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
Consider an arbitrary constant P. It can be assigned either T or F. Now consider the ¬ operator. It is a function which accepts constants (among other things), and which returns T or F. The ¬ operator is defined by its truth table. Namely,
if P = T, then ¬P = F
if P = F, then ¬P = T
for any P.
& is also an operator, and also defined by its truth table:
if P = T and Q = T, then P & Q =T
if P = T and Q = F, then P & Q = F
if P = F and Q = T, then P & Q = F
if P = F and Q = F, then P & Q = F
for any P and Q.
So consider the formula "P & ~P:"
if P = T, then P & ¬P will be T & F, which returns F
if P = F, then P & ¬P will be F & T, which returns F
This is just a consequence of the above truth tables, and the fact that P is either T or F. But those truth tables are just the definitions of ¬ and &, and the fact that P is either T or F is just the definition of P. So, I need some clarification on what we are considering when we consider whether P & ~P could be true, while ostensibly still using those very same definitions.
Another way to put this point is to claim that logic doesn't have independent content: that it is simply a clear articulation of some sort of laws of language. Some empiricists liked this line of thought, as it let them account for logical knowledge without assuming some spooky contact with supernatural entities like "&" and "¬." I don't particularly favor this approach, however.
Finally, Godel's completeness theorem is itself a proof given in first-order logic. If you don't accept first-order logic, then the proof won't do that much for you--its' interest lies in showing the agreement between semantic (truth-functional) and syntactic (proof-theoretic) accounts, not in convincing skeptics of logic that they are wrong.
Oh, and also: J is, as always, is presenting philosophy as seen through a funhouse mirror. It bears just enough resemblance that you can recognize the origin, but the transformation is deeply disturbing.
Philosophical understanding of causality is that it is a relational interraction between two discrete particulars. This is why, for Leibniz, universal pre-established harmony is not "causality". Monads do not interract, so there is no causal relation.
Your definition of causality is not the philosophical definition, so it is not relevant to the thread.
There is no "irony" involved. Descartes articulates the manner by which one can trust one's senses (God loves us). Prior to that, one cannot trust one's senses.
I think that anything which can be known can be known via rational deduction from axiomatic premises.
That which is gained via sense data is not false. Rather, it is not Knowledge qua Knowledge as it is not Certain. So, one can have sense data and operate based upon sense data. But as this sense data is inductive or abductive, rather than deductive, it is not certain.
Consistency of deduction through the operative rational schema; self-consistency of deduction from a priori, self-evident truths.
That one can never know the noumenal realm and always only ever knows the phenomenal realm. Via reason one can know the noumenal.
Tautologies are kind of the point for Rationalist philosophy. That is to say that one only ever gets, via deduction, that which is contained within the premises.
So, reason is reasonable since it accords with reason is entirely fine.
Wikipedia page for Logical Tautologies
Tautologies are not problematic.
zuh?
do you disagree that the vast majority of decisions and actions are performed based on uncertain knowledge? do you disagree that the vast majority of important information, whether that is for pragmatic concerns or otherwise, is not anchored (and is impossible to anchor) to rationally valid axioms?
X is present, which establishes its existence. X's existence is continent upon it having some attribute, be it even pure extension or action, whereby it can discern itself from the void. If it discerns itself from the void, how then is it not different from the void?