So I have a question about a random theory I have heard. I have no clue to its validity. Well thats not true I assume it to me borderline complete bs. Anyways I am sure some of you have heard about it. I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
String theorists argue this I believe, but there is no real way of testing this hypothesis. That and it's always sounded arrogant to me: every action we individually perform results in a Universe entirely devoted to our action? Seems a bit far fetched and "centre of the Universe" silly.
It has nothing to do with string theory. It's a philosophical interpretation of basic, undergraduate quantum mechanics. And the 'theory' stated above is the usual silly-goosed-up layman's misunderstanding of the actual theory. The universe does not split whenever you (or some other thinking individual) makes a choice. The universe exists as a superposition of discrete energy states. For every state which it is possible for any particle in the universe to occupy there is a finite probability that it will do so. This can be viewed as the particle existing in every possible state simultaneously with a 'probability density' related to the likelihood it will be observed there. When an observer observes a particle the quantum system of the observer becomes coupled to the quantum system of the thing being observed, causing the superpositions of possible states of both systems to become intertwined in such a way that for every possible state of the observed system there is a state of the observer which sees that state. Under the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics this doesn't happen and, instead, one state is selected by unknown means and the observer sees that one state. The universal wave-function hypothesis (or 'many worlds theory' as it is popularly known) says that there is no selection mechanism because the observed system continues to exist in every possible state; our consciousness is just only aware of one. Presumably our consciousness 'splits' when systems become coupled such that there are 'copies' of us that are aware of every possible state.
tl;dr: There is only one universe. We are just incapable of accurately observing its probabilistic structure.
If what you mean by "consider" is "think about", then by choice you mean that an entity thinks about X prior to doing X, as opposed to a rock, which simply does Y absent any thought.
So, my thought process is determined and comes to be as a result of a causal nexus of events, but I have choice in that I think about X, which is to say that I subject X to mental scrutiny the structure of which is determined by the causal nexus of the universe.
So, to think is to have choice; to not think is to not have choice.
So all you mean by "X has choice" is "X is a thinking thing"? And we say that "thought", as it occurs in rational agents, is different than the "processing" which occurs in computers because, well, we want to be special?
You've changed what I said and vastly oversimplified it. I did not say X is a choice if one thinks about it. I said X is a choice if one considered D and E, and that this consideration of D and E, and his preference for one over the other, were major causal forces leading to X.
But I'm already aware that, even without you trying to change what I said and oversimplifying it, this discussion can certainly raise questions about computers. You seem to have no problem saying that a computer "thinks," you treat it as if it were obvious, but then you also seem to assume we (or I) couldn't possibly say it has "free will" in the way a human might. The common sense that you are employing seems to contradict itself. In other words, it would seem that your blanket assumption that a computer couldn't possibly be said to have free will might also easily apply to saying that a computer thinks. I don't believe you've got a solid point here yet. More on this below.
Well, it wouldn't conflict with determinism...because you are arguing for determinism...but are calling it "free will" for some reason.
Actually we were specifically talking about "choice," but whatever. I don't understand what you trying to say. When you say "you're calling it free will for some reason," you are not making an argument of any value. I'm calling things exactly what they are.
Typically, "free will" means "could have done otherwise". So, we justify punishing a robber for killing X as a result of that robber having free will, which means it could have done otherwise; it could have not killed X.
If you're completely dismissing the option of "could have done otherwise" and are saying that we can punish robbers because they think, and can't punish rocks because they can't think...well...ok.
But that's weird.
Only weird in that you have tried too hard to oversimplify and change what I said. Anyway, you are invoking an incoherent and unacceptable notion of what "could" and "otherwise" actually mean, and I don't know I'll able to respond in a way that accepts your understanding of them. What if I said that, "if the causal chain of events hadn't been such that it included me choosing X, then otherwise it could have included me choosing Y." Does that work for your "could" and "otherwise?"
Part of the incoherence of your position is that you are defining the universe in such a way that words "could" and "otherwise" can't possibly have any meaning at all. The universe is a single, closed, predetermined set of events that might as well have already happened, we're just experiencing them in a time dimension. In the frame of reference from which your argument is launched, the words "could" and "otherwise" are therefore equivalent to "nonexistent;" or rather worse, these words are quite literally meaningless, impossible words that can't even have a conceptual definition. And yet then you are trying to use those words to define free will, which means you are defining free will with a divide-by-zero, DNE and DOA and N/A by your very (unaccepted) definition, and then trying to argue why it therefore doesn't exist. On the other hand, the very fact that you are using words "could" and "otherwise" in your definition requires a frame of reference in which such things do have meaning, else you wouldn't be using them. And in that frame of reference, the one you are speaking from and defining free will from, one in which we imagine possible futures or past mistakes in our mind, where we conceive of that which could have otherwise happened, there is choice and free will.
And the real kicker is that, for the purposes of this discussion, I'm fine with your censure of the universe. I'm offering a definition of free will which is entirely useful and coherent and fits into your universe and into both frames of reference we want to speak from; and it means what people think it means and doesn't require misleading incoherent concepts that we already know can't exist in your universe and particular frame of reference.
When I say "deterministic" I am specifically addressing the determinism of self and a structural (or post-structural) theory of identity. Talking about the universe etc is unnecessary and irrelevant. What I am talking about is the theoretical framework for our concept of self and action. Your final comment seems to imagine determinism as a force; it is the name of a theory or position.
The possible consequences you describe do not follow from that theory. At best they are examples of people acting in bad faith or with poor or incorrect information; this always leads to poor results.
Again, this is not justifiable. How can you claim that addressing the many causes of a crime beyond that individual is more "deterministic" than is considering the many effects of retribution beyond that individual? If you think someone has poor information, fine. But it is poor information, not determinism, that is their problem. Determinism supports anything anyone wants it to.
But that is not what "choice" is; that is the feeling of choice.
As you must know, I can claim that anything that you say exists is actually only your feeling that it exists. That is not an argument at all, it is meaningless solipsist confusion and a flawed and unusable way of looking at ontology.
Someone calls you and asks "Do you want to go to the movies or the park?" You think about it and then say "park". That does not prove that you had choice.
in the same way, one could argue, that Deep Blue "chooses" which move to make in a game of chess.
Well, yeah, does it not make a choice? If that bothers you, it's likely only because of the extremely limited situations and inputs and outputs in which Deep Blue is capable of making a choice, compared to you and I. And also the numerous debates we could have over desires, preferences, etc., and whether or not Deep Blue used those in making it's choice. But the simple answer is that it did make a choice, and that's exactly the word we'd use to describe it.
The question of whether you were determined to say "park" or chose to say "park" is the topic of this thread. If you are simply going to say "I chose park" without ever proving it, then that seems unhelpful.
Perhaps you are unaware that compatabilism, one of the three in the trilemma and the correct answer per the OP, is the position that determinism and choosing something need not be contradictory under a coherent understanding of each. It is you who are not being helpful by attempting to force everyone to accept them as mutually exclusive as a precondition to the discussion.
I proved that I chose X because X was caused predominantly by that process which is meaningfully called a choice. Like I said, this is really not complicated. Choice is a thing, I said what it is, there's nothing wrong or incoherent or unusable or contraditory about my definition. It describes what goes on when we make a choice. Your definition relies on sci-fi theories about parallel timelines and such in order for choice to even be on the table for consideration. That is needlessly complex, it isn't a sound representation of how reality works, and it doesn't reflect what we actually do when we make a choice.
The "self", in effect, is slave to the passions festering within the self, and "slavery" is not "freedom".
How is something a slave to itself? What is the self there that is enslaved?
If you recall, when we did this years ago, it was on this point where you eventually lost and acknowledged that your understanding of the universe was dualist and both did and didn't include free will.
Premises:
the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation.
the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to folk understanding
We're both trying to come to an understanding of free will - but we're also arguing over the definition of the phrase. If you grant me the previous premises it follows that the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to the meaning of the phrase 'free will'
I would like to add a third statement, that the deterministic definition of free will can be shown to be self-contradicting and relies on incoherence.
And many actions are freely-made choices, a truth completely unrelated to the fact that they were caused by something.
Let me try another tactic here:
Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
That shouldn't be possible based on our understanding of science as long as those causal events are the interactions of matter from a subatomic scale and up. Of course measuring those is impossible, preventing the paradox.
I'm still unclear how anyone can believe there is such a thing a choice on a physical level without outright rejecting our understanding of the universe so far. Even with randomness at a subatomic level built in, humans can't control that, it's random. Like everything else in the universe, human action is dictated by the interactions of the matter that we comprise of with itself and all external matter.
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That shouldn't be possible based on our understanding of science as long as those causal events are the interactions of matter from a subatomic scale and up. Of course measuring those is impossible, preventing the paradox.
If I'm reading you correctly, you're saying it's necessarily impossible to ever observe or prove that there is a causal chain of events that lead to an event. You are certain of determinism, though simulataneously certain that no one could ever demonstrate, observe, or prove it. Kind of like faith in God I guess.
I'm still unclear how anyone can believe there is such a thing a choice on a physical level without outright rejecting our understanding of the universe so far. Even with randomness at a subatomic level built in, humans can't control that, it's random. Like everything else in the universe, human action is dictated by the interactions of the matter that we comprise of with itself and all external matter.
What exists on the "physical level" that could even be said to have or not have choice? We individual selves do not exist there.
Sorry by physical level I should have said physical basis. The only way you could have a choice is if there was essentially some "magical" way for consciousness to be outside the scope of the universe. A divine spark or whatever, with the ability to, say, prevent a molecule of neurotransmiter with a given velocity not to travel at that velocity, ultimately changing the activation of neurons to cause or prevent an action or thought.
If I'm reading you correctly, you're saying it's necessarily impossible to ever observe or prove that there is a causal chain of events that lead to an event. You are certain of determinism, though simulataneously certain that no one could ever demonstrate, observe, or prove it. Kind of like faith in God I guess.
And yes, this is it. As we understand the universe, matter interacts with other matter in a predictable way if you know all the information about all the matter involved. (Un)fortunately, it is not just practically impossible to know all that information but even theoretically impossible, as the act of measuring the information changes it. Thus while the universe is predetermined, its course is unknowable. But just because we can't measure all the information does not mean that all that matter does not have those properties.
Edit: And that's not really faith, that's our understanding of the universe as best as we've been able to test it so far.
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I'm still unclear how anyone can believe there is such a thing a choice on a physical level without outright rejecting our understanding of the universe so far. Even with randomness at a subatomic level built in, humans can't control that, it's random. Like everything else in the universe, human action is dictated by the interactions of the matter that we comprise of with itself and all external matter.
Yar implicitly dealt with this last post when he really takes a good squint at language like "could"
Really this is just some sort of argument against why we can't think ourselves up a square circle made of massless but completely immobile material and have it instantly materialize in front of us. Choice is as much a confine of the universe as much as 1+1=2 and only being able to move in 3 dimensions.
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Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
You introduced a new variable not accounted for by the simulation. And the simulation could not possibly be part of the simulation. Infinite recursion would kill it. At best, you could run the sim, go to the mall, then read the results after they could no longer affect the outcome.
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Thus while the universe is predetermined, its course is unknowable. But just because we can't measure all the information does not mean that all that matter does not have those properties.
Mmmmm, scientifically I think that is what it means. I'm not sure I've grasped yet how you can say that the universe is predetermined but the course is unknowable. That's one of them thar "non-falsifiables" that isn't allowed to be called truth.
You introduced a new variable not accounted for by the simulation. And the simulation could not possibly be part of the simulation. Infinite recursion would kill it. At best, you could run the sim, go to the mall, then read the results after they could no longer affect the outcome.
You're either saying that my choice defied determinism, or you're saying that determinism leads to paradox. Which?
Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
You will still end up going to get the mail at 3 pm. Otherwise, you're using a different definition of the words "deterministic causal events" and "determine" than we are.
Yar, your computer example is silly. If it didn't calculate the effects of the observer reading the prediction into the prediction, then it didn't take all the factors into account.
Unfortunately, a computer cannot deal in recursive problems like that. That addresses a limit on computation, but does not make a comment about reality.
Yar, your computer example is silly. If it didn't calculate the effects of the observer reading the prediction into the prediction, then it didn't take all the factors into account.
Unfortunately, a computer cannot deal in recursive problems like that. That addresses a limit on computation, but does not make a comment about reality.
Unfortunately, a computer cannot deal in recursive problems like that. That addresses a limit on computation, but does not make a comment about reality.
Well, the computer Yar describes is, for all intents and purposes, magical in the first place, so I don't think this is much of an issue :P
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You introduced a new variable not accounted for by the simulation. And the simulation could not possibly be part of the simulation. Infinite recursion would kill it. At best, you could run the sim, go to the mall, then read the results after they could no longer affect the outcome.
You're either saying that my choice defied determinism, or you're saying that determinism leads to paradox. Which?
Infinite recursion isn't a paradox, it would just paralyze a traditional computer. If you got some sort of magic insta-simulation, the outcome would settle on a time that you'd both read and go to the mall. Or if your decision is to be contrary, then it would print out that set of outcomes.
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Yar, your computer example is silly. If it didn't calculate the effects of the observer reading the prediction into the prediction, then it didn't take all the factors into account.
Come now, think about it. It did take into account all of the factors, including the one that said that I would do whatever the hell I had to to make sure the printout was wrong. If it had taken into account me reading the printout and therefore it knew I'd go out at 4pm, I'd have read that and gone out at 5pm. The factors become infinite and unresolvable.
You've probably considered this paradox before in the form of a guy who goes back in time and then murders his young self. Determinism, or at least the notion that anything could ever witness or demonstrate or prove or know determinism, is essentially the same paradox as travelling back in time. It negates cause and effect. Considering determinism is essentially cause and effect, it's rather interesting.
Infinite recursion isn't a paradox, it would just paralyze a traditional computer. If you got some sort of magic insta-simulation, the outcome would settle on a time that you'd both read and go to the mall. Or if your decision is to be contrary, then it would print out that set of outcomes.
So... then it would list the possible outcomes I'd be able to choose? Is that really your answer?
Unfortunately, a computer cannot deal in recursive problems like that. That addresses a limit on computation, but does not make a comment about reality.
Well, the computer Yar describes is, for all intents and purposes, magical in the first place, so I don't think this is much of an issue :P
No it's very much an issue since the magic in question defies the logical limit of simulation.
A simulation cannot simulate a system which contains the simulation, perfectly. It would need to simulate itself simulating itself simulating itself unto infinity. This is an infinite amount of information. Such a simulation is nonsensical; it's a square circle. A language game.
A simulation cannot simulate a system which contains the simulation, perfectly. It would need to simulate itself simulating itself simulating itself unto infinity. This is an infinite amount of information. Such a simulation is nonsensical; it's a square circle. A language game.
It's not a language game, and it is not whatsoever any reflection on my inability to accept premeses. It's proof that anyone who talks about determinism is talking about a concept which is, necessarily, something that could not possibly ever be demonstrated or proven or simulated or witnessed or known, it is non-falsifiable, not even in the smallest scale imaginable. That makes it a special kind of "truth," quite equivalent to the notion that God exists and created the universe.
I think this dumb "paradox" is only telling insofar as it illustrates the unwillingness of each side of this argument to accept the others premise.
Also, Yar, it seems like you're actually rejecting determinism. I thought you were a compatibilist...
C'mon. Imagine Waghmonger's example of scientists predicting which button a subject will press, 7 seconds before they do it. But instead of saving all the data at the end to pat themselves on the back, they relay the information back to the subjects in realtime. Recursive issues aren't even part of it.
Thus while the universe is predetermined, its course is unknowable. But just because we can't measure all the information does not mean that all that matter does not have those properties.
Mmmmm, scientifically I think that is what it means. I'm not sure I've grasped yet how you can say that the universe is predetermined but the course is unknowable. That's one of them thar "non-falsifiables" that isn't allowed to be called truth.
No it is not.
Our physical models rely on matter having sets of properties that change in predictable ways due to interactions with other matter. These models are testable (at least in theory) and constantly evolving. That's basically what science, and especially physics, is.
Simultaneously it is impossible to know all the properties of a piece of matter. The easiest citation of this is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that measuring perfect position and momentum of a given particle is outright impossible, even with the the best possible tools. The more you know about one, the less you know about the other.
The combination is a universe full of matter with properties constantly interacting with other matter (in fact, all other matter, albeit very weakly) in ways that *would* be predictable if we knew all the information, but that it is impossible to to know it. The information still exists, the outcome is set, but the outcome cannot be known precisely. "Choice" never enters into anything here, it simply is. The matter that makes up your brain (and ultimately, whatever you want to call consciousness) might become configured in such a way that you perceive a choice or into a thought wherein you imagine an outcome that did not come to pass, but it configuring itself in that way was put in motion from the start of the universe.
It is, of course, possible that our models are wrong but that is what I meant by rejecting our current understanding of the universe.
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A simulation cannot simulate a system which contains the simulation, perfectly. It would need to simulate itself simulating itself simulating itself unto infinity. This is an infinite amount of information. Such a simulation is nonsensical; it's a square circle. A language game.
It's not a language game, and it is not whatsoever any reflection on my inability to accept premeses. It's proof that anyone who talks about determinism is talking about a concept which is, necessarily, something that could not possibly ever be demonstrated or proven or simulated or witnessed or known, it is non-falsifiable, not even in the smallest scale imaginable. That makes it a special kind of "truth," quite equivalent to the notion that God exists and created the universe.
Wait, so...
You don't think the universe is causally determined?
If we take seriously the idea of absolute causal determinism in the way you're suggesting, one doesn't choose one's reaction, and one's understanding of the situation is as much linked to the causal nexus as anything else.
Sure. Though, presumably, a particular agent which has been causally determined to act in a manner such that it blames the person will have been causually determined to have different mental states than an agent who blames the causal nexus of the universe, rather than the person.
I do not know how to articulate that from the first person perspective, but if people are things whose actions are causally determined by the universe, and part of this process involves the universe bringing about mental states in the person, then a person who does X will have different mental states than the person who does ~X.
In the understanding of freedom here presented--a complete elimination of [at least efficient, maybe also final] causes--one stacks the deck such that arguing is one more exercise in futility. When the question is freedom of will, people normally mean whether they're able to make decisions and set ends for themselves, not whether gravity and father's insistent 'no' exert influence on their decision-making.
What I'm saying is that "set ends for themselves" only makes sense within the definition of freedom I have articulated. If I am causally determined to set end X, and am causally determined to pursue end X, then I, in every respect, had no agency, had no freedom, had no control. I am not the source of my ends; I am not the source of my action. Rather, I am this little billiard ball being knocked about by the other billiard balls of the universe.
"Set ends for themselves" usually means "is not a fucking billiard ball". However, when those ends come about as a result of external forces, and when "one" is simply that which engages with those ends...then "one" is simply a fucking billiard ball.
A simulation cannot simulate a system which contains the simulation, perfectly. It would need to simulate itself simulating itself simulating itself unto infinity. This is an infinite amount of information. Such a simulation is nonsensical; it's a square circle. A language game.
It's not a language game, and it is not whatsoever any reflection on my inability to accept premeses. It's proof that anyone who talks about determinism is talking about a concept which is, necessarily, something that could not possibly ever be demonstrated or proven or simulated or witnessed or known, it is non-falsifiable, not even in the smallest scale imaginable. That makes it a special kind of "truth," quite equivalent to the notion that God exists and created the universe.
All you have shown is that it is impossible for us to know what is determined in its completion. I wouldn't disagree.
Requiring that knowledge to support determinism as a theory is akin to requiring us to know every single genetic configuration that has ever occurred in order to support evolution.
Also, Yar, it seems like you're actually rejecting determinism. I thought you were a compatibilist...
I'm a compatabilist in that concepts of free will and determinism are compatible and arguments against their compatability are flawed. So to your point, I probably shouldn't be wasting time proving why determinism itself has some problems, because that is not directly topical.
Requiring that knowledge to support determinism as a theory is akin to requiring us to know every single genetic configuration that has ever occurred in order to support evolution.
Your analogy is fundamentally incorrect. There is no theory that disproves our ability to actually witness evolution, to predict and test and observe it and prove it happening. We've only scarcely done that, but it could happen more conclusively and there's no reason to say it couldn't. Furthermore, it's falsifiable. We could, hypothetically, demonstrate that species arise through some other method that isn't evolution. I'm saying that you could never do this with any example of a determined event, no matter how small or simplified you make the structure of the experiment. Science and philosophy say it's impossible to demonstrate it or prove/disprove it.
Our physical models rely on matter having sets of properties that change in predictable ways due to interactions with other matter. These models are testable (at least in theory) and constantly evolving. That's basically what science, and especially physics, is.
Simultaneously it is impossible to know all the properties of a piece of matter. The easiest citation of this is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that measuring perfect position and momentum of a given particle is outright impossible, even with the the best possible tools. The more you know about one, the less you know about the other.
The combination is a universe full of matter with properties constantly interacting with other matter (in fact, all other matter, albeit very weakly) in ways that *would* be predictable if we knew all the information, but that it is impossible to to know it. The information still exists, the outcome is set, but the outcome cannot be known precisely. "Choice" never enters into anything here, it simply is. The matter that makes up your brain (and ultimately, whatever you want to call consciousness) might become configured in such a way that you perceive a choice or into a thought wherein you imagine an outcome that did not come to pass, but it configuring itself in that way was put in motion from the start of the universe.
It is, of course, possible that our models are wrong but that is what I meant by rejecting our current understanding of the universe.
These models sound fine, and are not disagreeing with me in any way. Can you explain how they are? Well, other than when you contradict yourself by saying that it's impossible to predict what's going to happen, but if we could predict it, well then we could predict, and therefore we know that it is predictable. There is a fundamental quality of truth missing from this series of statements.
I mean, you aren't telling me anything I don't know here, my point is that you are describing exactly why so many of the statements made by the determinists are founded upon something which cannot be proven or disproven because it is by definition unknowable and paradoxical to consider.
Yar, I can demonstrate determinism by referring to any system that exists.
To believe that reality is deterministic is a simple inductive conclusion based on the lack of any evidence to the contrary and the observation of countless deterministic systems.
I for one am willing to entertain the notion that causality and determinism are incorrect or non absolute, incidentally. I think it is entirely possible that the universe is absurd or beyond our rational comprehension.
So far I think determinism is pretty convincing though.
I said X is a choice if one considered D and E, and that this consideration of D and E, and his preference for one over the other, were major causal forces leading to X.
But that presumes an agency which is impossible in a causally determined universe, given what I understand "consider" to mean.
If I consider D and I consider E, then this act of consideration is self-motivated, self-generated. "I" consider. That I has agency, has the power of self-motivation; there is an "I" which is considering by its own power of consideration.
But that cannot possibly be how it works if the "I" exists in a causally determined universe. The I will have come to "consider" as a result of causal forces, as a result of having been determined to "consider", in the sense of mentally processing D and mentally processing E to arrive at the causally determined "I will do D because (gigantic causal narrative)."
Within a causally determined universe, any activity of mental faculties is exactly the same kind of thing as a rock falling down a hill; the process itself will be dictated by the causal nexus of the universe, just as a rock's path is dictated by gravity, velocity, friction, etc. They are exactly the same thing; persons have no more agency or self-determination than rocks, and one's "internal preferences" are exactly the same as a rock's "internal inertia".
Part of the incoherence of your position is that you are defining the universe in such a way that words "could" and "otherwise" can't possibly have any meaning at all. The universe is a single, closed, predetermined set of events that might as well have already happened, we're just experiencing them in a time dimension. In the frame of reference from which your argument is launched, the words "could" and "otherwise" are therefore equivalent to "nonexistent;" or rather worse, these words are quite literally meaningless, impossible words that can't even have a conceptual definition. And yet then you are trying to use those words to define free will, which means you are defining free will with a divide-by-zero, DNE and DOA and N/A by your very (unaccepted) definition, and then trying to argue why it therefore doesn't exist.
It's not the incoherence of my position; it's the beauty of my position. In order for there to be free will there must be "could" and "otherwise". Could and otherwise are fundamental impossibilities of the universe. Therefore, etc.
On the other hand, the very fact that you are using words "could" and "otherwise" in your definition requires a frame of reference in which such things do have meaning, else you wouldn't be using them.
Sure, but the frame of references is within an imagined hypothetical world which has no relation to the real, actual world. I can imagine what "could" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "could" actually does exist. I can imagine what "free" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "free" actually does exist.
I can use the words "dog with 8 legs" without there being dogs with 8 legs. I can use the word "unicorn" without there being unicorns. Freedom, choice, could, and otherwise are like unicorns; they have definitions, but are not actualized. There is no "free" just as there is no "unicorn".
Unless you want to say that by using "could" I imply that "could" exists, just as when using the word "god" that means that god necessarily exists.
I'm offering a definition of free will which is entirely useful and coherent and fits into your universe and into both frames of reference we want to speak from; and it means what people think it means and doesn't require misleading incoherent concepts that we already know can't exist in your universe and particular frame of reference.
But your definition of free will does not fit into "my" universe given that your definition of free will relies upon a personal agency which is fundamentally impossible in the causally determined universe.
The only way in which I would agree with your compatibilist definition of free will is if you expand it to be such that EVERYTHING has free will. So, my having consideration for D or E denotes my free will just as a rocks having interia denotes its free will, as there is no magical difference between "mental faculties" and "physical faculties", given that one's mental faculties, in the causally deterministic universe, are just as caused and influenced and controlled as the physical faculties.
Perhaps you are unaware that compatabilism, one of the three in the trilemma and the correct answer per the OP, is the position that determinism and choosing something need not be contradictory under a coherent understanding of each. It is you who are not being helpful by attempting to force everyone to accept them as mutually exclusive as a precondition to the discussion.
It's not that I am being stubborn, it is that the definition of determinism contains X, and the definition of choice contains ~X; so they are not compatible.
Determinism means that everything ever has always already been causally determined; that I will type "penis" has been causally determined to happen since ever.
Choice means that my typing "penis" is the result of my consideration, my mental faculties, my willing, my desiring. The entirety of history existed prior to me, but at the point prior to my typing "penis" I considered both typing it and not typing it in such a way as to make possible my not typing it; I typed "penis" as a result of myself, I was the source of my typing "penis".
Which is complete nonsense given that the source of my typing "penis" is the first falling of the first cosmic domino which happened millions of years ago.
One cannot save free will in a deterministic universe by moving the focus. That I typed "penis" is not the result of ME, it is the result of GOD, who first pushed the first cosmic domino eons ago; "I" did not do it, "God" did it by way of the causally determinate sequence of events in the finte, closed universe.
Unless you're John Calvin, i cannot be thought to be the reason for my having typed "penis". God did it.
How is something a slave to itself? What is the self there that is enslaved?
It's not that the self is the slave to itself. Rather, the self is slave to those states which came to be in the self by way of something other than the self. The universe, God, whatever put "desires steak" in me, my self, by way of the causally determined universe. So "desires steak" is not me but rather is something posited into me; I never had the option of not wanting steak, I have always already been determined to want steak.
Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
Your example makes no sense. It is akin to "Suppose we have a universe in which all entities were always necessarily held down via gravity...but then something shot up despite gravity!! I guess we weren't in a universe within which all things are necessarily held down by gravity! Hey, wha happened?"
If the premise is that the world is deterministic, and there is a manner by which the pre-determined events can be known, then they are going to happen as they are pre-determined.
I think this dumb "paradox" is only telling insofar as it illustrates the unwillingness of each side of this argument to accept the others premise.
I don't grant your premise that both "sides" of the argument are utilizing functional premises insofar as the compatibilist camp uses premises which are fundamentally self-contradictory.
"Suppose that we are in a causally determined universe wherein all actions have been pre-determined since the beginning of time...but then you, like, choose to do something. See, we have free will!"
"could" has a perfectly acceptable meaning in a deterministic framework. It is simply a knowledge claim, much like "random." it is a supposition about future events based on incomplete information.
Even in a situation where the answer is plainly determined - say, a math question - we use the word "could." the answer could be x=6. We say this because we don't have enough information.
All potentiality in a deterministic world is an epistemological concern.
These models sound fine, and are not disagreeing with me in any way. Can you explain how they are? Well, other than when you contradict yourself by saying that it's impossible to predict what's going to happen, but if we could predict it, well then we could predict, and therefore we know that it is predictable. There is a fundamental quality of truth missing from this series of statements.
I mean, you aren't telling me anything I don't know here, my point is that you are describing exactly why so many of the statements made by the determinists are founded upon something which cannot be proven or disproven because it is by definition unknowable and paradoxical to consider.
You can't prove it directly if that's what your asking. It's a hypothesis based off of our understanding of two core elements of physics -- that identical interactions will lead to identical results, and that it is impossible to fully know everything about a particle.
To disprove the hypothesis, you would have to find evidence of two things:
A) A case where matter can arbitrarily change its properties for no reason. A case where matter can be forced to do A by something that doesn't interact with the matter in any way (which would be quite a challenge since it would have be something that doesn't exist within our universe :P)*
Showing A would mean the universe has elements of randomness in it. It would mean it was not predictable. However, it would still not mean there was any choice, just that in a certain percentage of cases, even with perfect knowledge, matter would not act as expected. Nothing controls those random occurrences, so in practice the distinction between it and a predetermined but unknowable universe would be minute and irrelevant to this discussion.
However, having found A, one could look for B. This would require consciousness to be outside the universe, or at least immune to interactions with matter in the universe. Then by consciously altering the states of matter, it could create a real choice. However, even if this were the case, this extrauniversal consciousness might be predeterminely governed on its own.
A is possible, B is so very very unlikely, but our current understanding assumes both to be untrue afaik.
Basically I think you are tripping over the word predetermined, it doesn't mean any intelligence determined it. If you chuck a handful of dust into the air no one needs to know how it will move before hand, but each spec will interact with the other specs and the air and everything else according to pretty well tested rules to give the final cloud. They all have their mass, their velocity, and their position even if no one is bothering to measure them.
The universe is currently thought to work like that, as in at the dawn of the universe "stuff" interacted with other "stuff" according to precise rules. This leads to a single possible series of events, hence, predetermined, whether we know this path or not. If A is true, then there could be any number of paths based on the occurrence of things not working with the rules 100% of the time. It will change how things were "supposed" to go but there is no consciousness behind it -- no one "chooses" a path -- its just random. Only with B is there ever anything that could possibly be considered a choice, as we understand the universe.
But TL;DR:
It doesn't really matter if there is one path or infinite paths, unless the consciousness is immune to the universe it follows the same laws and rules as ordinary matter, and subject to any whims of randomness in the same way. Everything simply is and any consciousness perceiving choice is only doing so because the matter of their brain happens to become configured a certain way. It may be one way governed from the dawn of the universe (if there is no randomness), it may be any other number of ways governed by a general framework of rules with random "glitches" now and then, but it doesn't really mater. There's no intent governing anything, as far as we know for now.
*B is essentially a soul / divine spark, although not necessarily. It would mean consciousness goes beyond matter. And it's why it, for our current understanding of the universe, is pretty unlikely and exceedingly difficult to find any evidence for.
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Tag, do you think a particular individual can know anything about the universe? Or does all knowledge only pertain to a supposed understanding, an abstraction of, any sort of "universe" which may or may not exist?
Tag, do you think a particular individual can know anything about the universe? Or does all knowledge only pertain to a supposed understanding, an abstraction of, any sort of "universe" which may or may not exist?
That's tricky, in part because I am wary of dragging concepts of individual or person in because people frame them as special. So to preface, by my arguments above, I believe consciousness is simply a current configuration of a brain, and thus subject to all physics rules.
So to answer, I think a brain may become configured in such a way that the consciousness "thinks" it "knows" something, the accuracy of which is irrelevant. That something is almost certainly an abstraction as you've stated, but the process of learning it, while an extremely complex set of interactions, is fundamentally no different than a rock sitting on the ground.
The only thing I think a consciousness could know in your first sense is the configuration of the parts of the brain that make up the consciousness, because that is it's definition. That doesn't mean it knows the positions of the atoms or anything, but rather it knows that some part of the universe (presumably the brain, but hey, maybe not), at that moment, is configured to form it, because it is there. Sort of a spin on "I think therefore I am." However, since we don't have a good definition of consciousness really is yet, I am not entirely comfortable even with this.
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Donkey KongPutting Nintendo out of business with AI nipsRegistered Userregular
Infinite recursion isn't a paradox, it would just paralyze a traditional computer. If you got some sort of magic insta-simulation, the outcome would settle on a time that you'd both read and go to the mall. Or if your decision is to be contrary, then it would print out that set of outcomes.
So... then it would list the possible outcomes I'd be able to choose? Is that really your answer?
No. Each option will be predicated upon a piece of information that it did not have at the time of the simulation. You're being unfair to the simulation. Unless you let it update its predictions as you make your choice, it's not going to have all the information. And by the way, your contrarian policy and its perfect prediction are going to form an oscillator. The departure time will change so fast it'll be a blur. The only way you will be able to make a choice is to shut your eyes and make it based on what you last saw. And the instant you shut them, your choice will show up as the prediction.
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That, or it will reach something stable, telling you exactly what you need to prompt you to do exactly what it says.
You probably wouldn't end up checking the mail, either. Given the ability to look into the future, the simulation will almost certainly find something much more compelling for you to do.
Yar, I can demonstrate determinism by referring to any system that exists.
To believe that reality is deterministic is a simple inductive conclusion based on the lack of any evidence to the contrary and the observation of countless deterministic systems.
Well, no, you haven't observed any deterministic systems. You observed a system but it is impossible for you to have observed that it was deterministic. And your inductive reasoning, or lack of evidence to the contrary, is no different than the inductive reasoning behind Intelligent Design and its lack of evidence to the contrary. I know it's inductive reasoning, that's part of my point.
If I consider D and I consider E, then this act of consideration is self-motivated, self-generated. "I" consider. That I has agency, has the power of self-motivation; there is an "I" which is considering by its own power of consideration.
But that cannot possibly be how it works if the "I" exists in a causally determined universe. The I will have come to "consider" as a result of causal forces, as a result of having been determined to "consider", in the sense of mentally processing D and mentally processing E to arrive at the causally determined "I will do D because (gigantic causal narrative)."
Look, I've defined choice. It is compatible with determinsim. You can't say "but it's caused!" because my definition incorporates and accepts and even relies on this. My definition is all about causation and fits directly into a determined set of causes. So stop explaining over and over why a choice is caused. I know. That doesn't address the argument.
Within a causally determined universe, any activity of mental faculties is exactly the same kind of thing as a rock falling down a hill
One is a rock falling down the hill and the other is an activity of mental faculties. I don't grasp how you can claim they are exactly the same thing. That's absurd on its face. You yourself called them by two different names, obviously they are different things.
the process itself will be dictated by the causal nexus of the universe, just as a rock's path is dictated by gravity, velocity, friction, etc. They are exactly the same thing; persons have no more agency or self-determination than rocks, and one's "internal preferences" are exactly the same as a rock's "internal inertia".
Unless you can explain how they are different.
Because one involves thoughts and desires, involves a consideration of possible outcomes, and a decision to act caused by these thoughts and desires and a consideration of possible outcomes. The other doesn't. I've explained this multiple times. That's one way in which they are different; the way that we call "choice." And it doesn't break causation. There are many other ways they are different, too, and we have words for those differences as well. You are making no sense. You have explained how they are the same in one way: that they are both caused. One similarity does not mean identical. I accept your similarity, it need not be explained anymore. They are both caused. It does not mean what you think it does. Dogs and cats are both caused, too, that does not prove that cats don't exist or that they are identical to dogs.
It's not the incoherence of my position; it's the beauty of my position. In order for there to be free will there must be "could" and "otherwise". Could and otherwise are fundamental impossibilities of the universe. Therefore, etc.
They aren't fundamental impossibilities of the mind, which is where choice occurs, and the only reference point from which a discussion about choice has any meaning. There is nothing beautiful about using words to define something when, according to you, those words have no meaning. That makes your definition meaningless. It doesn't mean free will doesn't exist, it means you've provided a meaningless, incoherent definition of free will. I've got a coherent, useful one, and it doesn't conflict with anyone's universe here. Let's use mine, eh?
Sure, but the frame of references is within an imagined hypothetical world which has no relation to the real, actual world. I can imagine what "could" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "could" actually does exist. I can imagine what "free" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "free" actually does exist.
So you acknlowedge the significance of our minds' ability to conceive of possibilities. That ability is a big part of what makes up choice and free will. A falling rock doesn't do that. Not many things at all can do that. Certainly not everything. We can, though.
But your definition of free will does not fit into "my" universe given that your definition of free will relies upon a personal agency which is fundamentally impossible in the causally determined universe.
You've never even attempted to demonstrate or argue the claim you just made. Again: my definition of choice is when reasoned consideration of possible outcomes, weighed into desires and preferences, is a dominant causal factor leading to an action. Please explain how this definition is fundamentally impossible in a causally determined universe. It isn't.
It's not that I am being stubborn, it is that the definition of determinism contains X, and the definition of choice contains ~X; so they are not compatible.
You've not shown a meaningful definition of choice that contains ~X.
Determinism means that everything ever has always already been causally determined; that I will type "penis" has been causally determined to happen since ever.
Choice means that my typing "penis" is the result of my consideration, my mental faculties, my willing, my desiring. The entirety of history existed prior to me, but at the point prior to my typing "penis" I considered both typing it and not typing it in such a way as to make possible my not typing it; I typed "penis" as a result of myself, I was the source of my typing "penis".
Everything here is correct and compatible and explains why it was a choice and does not demonstrate a contradiction, except for the red part. The red part is the one that I've shown in many different ways is a nonsense notion that you've forced into the definition in a way that doesn't fit with the rest and isn't even referencing the same context.
The "make possible not typing it" was at least conceiveable to your mind, whereas the full set of determinstic factors that already set the outcome into place are not conceiveable to your mind. All you need to do is change the red part to "in such a way as to consider not typing it as a possibility." Or heck, remove the red part altogether, and thereby remove unnecessary sci-fi nonsense, the necessity for someone to be omniscient and omnipotent and have root-level control over all of causation (which we know is impossible). We've also removed the conflict with determinism. And, we've done nothing that any sane person would deem as having ruined or weakened a very sensible definition of choice. You are forcing a useless and impossible paradox into an otherwise perfectly usable and meaningful concept, for no reason other than to dive-bomb it. It might also help the definition to change the last clause after the comma to "my considerations and desires were the most direct sources of my typing..."
But yeah, I could insert "and also must make the impossible possible" into any definition in an attempt to prove that thing doesn't exist. Cats are feline animals who require that 1 + 1 = 3. Boom, I just disproved the existence of cats. Nevermind that the part I inserted doesn't make sense and isn't helpful or necessary. Nevermind that I could take that out and still have a useful and correct definition of what a cat is. Cats don't exist, I proved it.
One cannot save free will in a deterministic universe by moving the focus. That I typed "penis" is not the result of ME, it is the result of GOD, who first pushed the first cosmic domino eons ago; "I" did not do it, "God" did it by way of the causally determinate sequence of events in the finte, closed universe.
Then you don't do anything. You don't exist. Only God and his set of events. Not helpful.
It's not that the self is the slave to itself. Rather, the self is slave to those states which came to be in the self by way of something other than the self.
I'll repeat the question using the language of your pointless obfuscation: what is the self if it is not the states that came to be within the self?
The universe, God, whatever put "desires steak" in me, my self, by way of the causally determined universe. So "desires steak" is not me but rather is something posited into me; I never had the option of not wanting steak, I have always already been determined to want steak.
Do you desire steaks then, or does the fact this was caused mean that you don't desire steaks? And again, if you aren't the things the universe put into you, if you are something separate from them, what are you?
Your example makes no sense. It is akin to "Suppose we have a universe in which all entities were always necessarily held down via gravity...but then something shot up despite gravity!! I guess we weren't in a universe within which all things are necessarily held down by gravity! Hey, wha happened?"
If the premise is that the world is deterministic, and there is a manner by which the pre-determined events can be known, then they are going to happen as they are pre-determined.
Try to be more specific. Computer tells me I'll go check the mail at 4pm. Based on this I decide to wait until 5pm. What happened? Explain in more detail what is wrong with this.
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Try to be more specific. Computer tells me I'll go check the mail at 4pm. Based on this I decide to wait until 5pm. What happened? Explain in more detail what is wrong with this.
I don't think _J_ needs to explain. There are enough explanations of what's wrong with this already. The simulation wasn't targeting for you to have read the results of the simulation because it would need to results to calculate the results. And if it could do this infinite calculation and show you the result it would either settle on some stable time or, if your decision-making process was ultimately unstable (contrarian, for example) the feedback would cause the result to change constantly until you looked away.
When would you choose to look away? Well, you'd need another larger sim to figure that out. And you'd have to look away from that before you could make a contrarian choice of when to look away.
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I don't think _J_ needs to explain. There are enough explanations of what's wrong with this already. The simulation wasn't targeting for you to have read the results of the simulation because it would need to results to calculate the results. And if it could do this infinite calculation and show you the result it would either settle on some stable time or, if your decision-making process was ultimately unstable (contrarian, for example) the feedback would cause the result to change constantly until you looked away.
You're saying that the answer would be in flux and there would be no single predetermined outcome. This denies determinism.
When I finally made up my mind to go outside and check the mail, it would suddenly report the current time. Again, looks like it was always based on my choice and there was no determined event. Even a machine with hypothetical access to all causal factors could not determine when I would go check the mail until the point at which I had definitely decided to do it.
I'm having trouble understanding how you think you're making a case against me, it seems you are making my points for me and agree with me.
I think a brain may become configured in such a way that the consciousness "thinks" it "knows" something, the accuracy of which is irrelevant. That something is almost certainly an abstraction as you've stated, but the process of learning it, while an extremely complex set of interactions, is fundamentally no different than a rock sitting on the ground.
Alright, that works so long as we are preserving the lack of any special character to the brain such that, as you said, what the brain does is the same as a rock sitting on the ground.
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MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
edited June 2010
I just wanted to mention something.
Thoughts: cognitions, beliefs.
these can't be motivational. Putting aside for a second the question of agency or determinism, cognitions/beliefs can't be motivational because they are policy neutral.
A believing that doing B will lead to X does not necessarily mean A will do B. A might do C. This is a given, people do this all the time.
By the same token, A believing that doing B will lead to X does not necessarily mean X will occur. The goal may not occur.
Cognitions and beliefs are policy neutral.
So you need a motivational concept. The problem is that all agency based motivational concepts: intentions, purpose, needs, desires, goalseeking etc are all teleological explanations.
Teleological explanations take the form: A did B in order that X will occur. This is not compatible with causal determinism. X cannot do double duty as both cause and effect. You cannot identify the consequence as the cause.
Any compatabilist account cannot use an inherently teleological explanation as a motivational concept, nor can you use beliefs/cognitions (because as said, they're policy neutral).
A true compatablist explanation will put forth a causal mechanism that identifies the antecedent conditions that lead A to do B and that's where the story ends. You don't need to talk about X at all. (Then a compatabilist account needs to handwave away why this isn't just a deterministic account. Normally they do this with agency, but as I just explained, you can't do this: agency based motivations are incompatible with determinism. Fundamentally, in a way that cannot be reconciled. So you'd need a new way to reconcile them.)
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In another universe you understand this.
Read the bold and the last paragraph for a tl;dr.
You've changed what I said and vastly oversimplified it. I did not say X is a choice if one thinks about it. I said X is a choice if one considered D and E, and that this consideration of D and E, and his preference for one over the other, were major causal forces leading to X.
But I'm already aware that, even without you trying to change what I said and oversimplifying it, this discussion can certainly raise questions about computers. You seem to have no problem saying that a computer "thinks," you treat it as if it were obvious, but then you also seem to assume we (or I) couldn't possibly say it has "free will" in the way a human might. The common sense that you are employing seems to contradict itself. In other words, it would seem that your blanket assumption that a computer couldn't possibly be said to have free will might also easily apply to saying that a computer thinks. I don't believe you've got a solid point here yet. More on this below.
Actually we were specifically talking about "choice," but whatever. I don't understand what you trying to say. When you say "you're calling it free will for some reason," you are not making an argument of any value. I'm calling things exactly what they are.
Only weird in that you have tried too hard to oversimplify and change what I said. Anyway, you are invoking an incoherent and unacceptable notion of what "could" and "otherwise" actually mean, and I don't know I'll able to respond in a way that accepts your understanding of them. What if I said that, "if the causal chain of events hadn't been such that it included me choosing X, then otherwise it could have included me choosing Y." Does that work for your "could" and "otherwise?"
Part of the incoherence of your position is that you are defining the universe in such a way that words "could" and "otherwise" can't possibly have any meaning at all. The universe is a single, closed, predetermined set of events that might as well have already happened, we're just experiencing them in a time dimension. In the frame of reference from which your argument is launched, the words "could" and "otherwise" are therefore equivalent to "nonexistent;" or rather worse, these words are quite literally meaningless, impossible words that can't even have a conceptual definition. And yet then you are trying to use those words to define free will, which means you are defining free will with a divide-by-zero, DNE and DOA and N/A by your very (unaccepted) definition, and then trying to argue why it therefore doesn't exist. On the other hand, the very fact that you are using words "could" and "otherwise" in your definition requires a frame of reference in which such things do have meaning, else you wouldn't be using them. And in that frame of reference, the one you are speaking from and defining free will from, one in which we imagine possible futures or past mistakes in our mind, where we conceive of that which could have otherwise happened, there is choice and free will.
And the real kicker is that, for the purposes of this discussion, I'm fine with your censure of the universe. I'm offering a definition of free will which is entirely useful and coherent and fits into your universe and into both frames of reference we want to speak from; and it means what people think it means and doesn't require misleading incoherent concepts that we already know can't exist in your universe and particular frame of reference.
Again, this is not justifiable. How can you claim that addressing the many causes of a crime beyond that individual is more "deterministic" than is considering the many effects of retribution beyond that individual? If you think someone has poor information, fine. But it is poor information, not determinism, that is their problem. Determinism supports anything anyone wants it to.
As you must know, I can claim that anything that you say exists is actually only your feeling that it exists. That is not an argument at all, it is meaningless solipsist confusion and a flawed and unusable way of looking at ontology.
Yes, it does. That's exactly what choice is.
Right, that's a simple example of making a choice, though leaves out a lot of why it's a choice. But it's a choice. That's what we call it.
Well, yeah, does it not make a choice? If that bothers you, it's likely only because of the extremely limited situations and inputs and outputs in which Deep Blue is capable of making a choice, compared to you and I. And also the numerous debates we could have over desires, preferences, etc., and whether or not Deep Blue used those in making it's choice. But the simple answer is that it did make a choice, and that's exactly the word we'd use to describe it.
Perhaps you are unaware that compatabilism, one of the three in the trilemma and the correct answer per the OP, is the position that determinism and choosing something need not be contradictory under a coherent understanding of each. It is you who are not being helpful by attempting to force everyone to accept them as mutually exclusive as a precondition to the discussion.
I proved that I chose X because X was caused predominantly by that process which is meaningfully called a choice. Like I said, this is really not complicated. Choice is a thing, I said what it is, there's nothing wrong or incoherent or unusable or contraditory about my definition. It describes what goes on when we make a choice. Your definition relies on sci-fi theories about parallel timelines and such in order for choice to even be on the table for consideration. That is needlessly complex, it isn't a sound representation of how reality works, and it doesn't reflect what we actually do when we make a choice.
How is something a slave to itself? What is the self there that is enslaved?
If you recall, when we did this years ago, it was on this point where you eventually lost and acknowledged that your understanding of the universe was dualist and both did and didn't include free will.
I would like to add a third statement, that the deterministic definition of free will can be shown to be self-contradicting and relies on incoherence.
And many actions are freely-made choices, a truth completely unrelated to the fact that they were caused by something.
Let me try another tactic here:
Say I have a computer that can calculate all of the deterministic causal events at play and determine for certain that I will go get the mail at 3pm. I read this on the printout and based on that I decide to wait until 4pm to go get the mail. What happened?
That shouldn't be possible based on our understanding of science as long as those causal events are the interactions of matter from a subatomic scale and up. Of course measuring those is impossible, preventing the paradox.
I'm still unclear how anyone can believe there is such a thing a choice on a physical level without outright rejecting our understanding of the universe so far. Even with randomness at a subatomic level built in, humans can't control that, it's random. Like everything else in the universe, human action is dictated by the interactions of the matter that we comprise of with itself and all external matter.
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What exists on the "physical level" that could even be said to have or not have choice? We individual selves do not exist there.
And yes, this is it. As we understand the universe, matter interacts with other matter in a predictable way if you know all the information about all the matter involved. (Un)fortunately, it is not just practically impossible to know all that information but even theoretically impossible, as the act of measuring the information changes it. Thus while the universe is predetermined, its course is unknowable. But just because we can't measure all the information does not mean that all that matter does not have those properties.
Edit: And that's not really faith, that's our understanding of the universe as best as we've been able to test it so far.
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Yar implicitly dealt with this last post when he really takes a good squint at language like "could"
Really this is just some sort of argument against why we can't think ourselves up a square circle made of massless but completely immobile material and have it instantly materialize in front of us. Choice is as much a confine of the universe as much as 1+1=2 and only being able to move in 3 dimensions.
You introduced a new variable not accounted for by the simulation. And the simulation could not possibly be part of the simulation. Infinite recursion would kill it. At best, you could run the sim, go to the mall, then read the results after they could no longer affect the outcome.
You're either saying that my choice defied determinism, or you're saying that determinism leads to paradox. Which?
You will still end up going to get the mail at 3 pm. Otherwise, you're using a different definition of the words "deterministic causal events" and "determine" than we are.
Unfortunately, a computer cannot deal in recursive problems like that. That addresses a limit on computation, but does not make a comment about reality.
You must know what's coming next...
Well, the computer Yar describes is, for all intents and purposes, magical in the first place, so I don't think this is much of an issue :P
Infinite recursion isn't a paradox, it would just paralyze a traditional computer. If you got some sort of magic insta-simulation, the outcome would settle on a time that you'd both read and go to the mall. Or if your decision is to be contrary, then it would print out that set of outcomes.
You've probably considered this paradox before in the form of a guy who goes back in time and then murders his young self. Determinism, or at least the notion that anything could ever witness or demonstrate or prove or know determinism, is essentially the same paradox as travelling back in time. It negates cause and effect. Considering determinism is essentially cause and effect, it's rather interesting.
Which is to say that determinism, or any evidence of such, is magical.
So... then it would list the possible outcomes I'd be able to choose? Is that really your answer?
No it's very much an issue since the magic in question defies the logical limit of simulation.
A simulation cannot simulate a system which contains the simulation, perfectly. It would need to simulate itself simulating itself simulating itself unto infinity. This is an infinite amount of information. Such a simulation is nonsensical; it's a square circle. A language game.
Also, Yar, it seems like you're actually rejecting determinism. I thought you were a compatibilist...
C'mon. Imagine Waghmonger's example of scientists predicting which button a subject will press, 7 seconds before they do it. But instead of saving all the data at the end to pat themselves on the back, they relay the information back to the subjects in realtime. Recursive issues aren't even part of it.
No it is not.
Our physical models rely on matter having sets of properties that change in predictable ways due to interactions with other matter. These models are testable (at least in theory) and constantly evolving. That's basically what science, and especially physics, is.
Simultaneously it is impossible to know all the properties of a piece of matter. The easiest citation of this is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that measuring perfect position and momentum of a given particle is outright impossible, even with the the best possible tools. The more you know about one, the less you know about the other.
The combination is a universe full of matter with properties constantly interacting with other matter (in fact, all other matter, albeit very weakly) in ways that *would* be predictable if we knew all the information, but that it is impossible to to know it. The information still exists, the outcome is set, but the outcome cannot be known precisely. "Choice" never enters into anything here, it simply is. The matter that makes up your brain (and ultimately, whatever you want to call consciousness) might become configured in such a way that you perceive a choice or into a thought wherein you imagine an outcome that did not come to pass, but it configuring itself in that way was put in motion from the start of the universe.
It is, of course, possible that our models are wrong but that is what I meant by rejecting our current understanding of the universe.
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Wait, so...
You don't think the universe is causally determined?
Sure. Though, presumably, a particular agent which has been causally determined to act in a manner such that it blames the person will have been causually determined to have different mental states than an agent who blames the causal nexus of the universe, rather than the person.
I do not know how to articulate that from the first person perspective, but if people are things whose actions are causally determined by the universe, and part of this process involves the universe bringing about mental states in the person, then a person who does X will have different mental states than the person who does ~X.
What I'm saying is that "set ends for themselves" only makes sense within the definition of freedom I have articulated. If I am causally determined to set end X, and am causally determined to pursue end X, then I, in every respect, had no agency, had no freedom, had no control. I am not the source of my ends; I am not the source of my action. Rather, I am this little billiard ball being knocked about by the other billiard balls of the universe.
"Set ends for themselves" usually means "is not a fucking billiard ball". However, when those ends come about as a result of external forces, and when "one" is simply that which engages with those ends...then "one" is simply a fucking billiard ball.
All you have shown is that it is impossible for us to know what is determined in its completion. I wouldn't disagree.
Requiring that knowledge to support determinism as a theory is akin to requiring us to know every single genetic configuration that has ever occurred in order to support evolution.
Your analogy is fundamentally incorrect. There is no theory that disproves our ability to actually witness evolution, to predict and test and observe it and prove it happening. We've only scarcely done that, but it could happen more conclusively and there's no reason to say it couldn't. Furthermore, it's falsifiable. We could, hypothetically, demonstrate that species arise through some other method that isn't evolution. I'm saying that you could never do this with any example of a determined event, no matter how small or simplified you make the structure of the experiment. Science and philosophy say it's impossible to demonstrate it or prove/disprove it.
These models sound fine, and are not disagreeing with me in any way. Can you explain how they are? Well, other than when you contradict yourself by saying that it's impossible to predict what's going to happen, but if we could predict it, well then we could predict, and therefore we know that it is predictable. There is a fundamental quality of truth missing from this series of statements.
I mean, you aren't telling me anything I don't know here, my point is that you are describing exactly why so many of the statements made by the determinists are founded upon something which cannot be proven or disproven because it is by definition unknowable and paradoxical to consider.
To believe that reality is deterministic is a simple inductive conclusion based on the lack of any evidence to the contrary and the observation of countless deterministic systems.
So far I think determinism is pretty convincing though.
But that presumes an agency which is impossible in a causally determined universe, given what I understand "consider" to mean.
If I consider D and I consider E, then this act of consideration is self-motivated, self-generated. "I" consider. That I has agency, has the power of self-motivation; there is an "I" which is considering by its own power of consideration.
But that cannot possibly be how it works if the "I" exists in a causally determined universe. The I will have come to "consider" as a result of causal forces, as a result of having been determined to "consider", in the sense of mentally processing D and mentally processing E to arrive at the causally determined "I will do D because (gigantic causal narrative)."
Within a causally determined universe, any activity of mental faculties is exactly the same kind of thing as a rock falling down a hill; the process itself will be dictated by the causal nexus of the universe, just as a rock's path is dictated by gravity, velocity, friction, etc. They are exactly the same thing; persons have no more agency or self-determination than rocks, and one's "internal preferences" are exactly the same as a rock's "internal inertia".
Unless you can explain how they are different.
It's not the incoherence of my position; it's the beauty of my position. In order for there to be free will there must be "could" and "otherwise". Could and otherwise are fundamental impossibilities of the universe. Therefore, etc.
Sure, but the frame of references is within an imagined hypothetical world which has no relation to the real, actual world. I can imagine what "could" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "could" actually does exist. I can imagine what "free" would be were it to exist, but that does not mean that "free" actually does exist.
I can use the words "dog with 8 legs" without there being dogs with 8 legs. I can use the word "unicorn" without there being unicorns. Freedom, choice, could, and otherwise are like unicorns; they have definitions, but are not actualized. There is no "free" just as there is no "unicorn".
Unless you want to say that by using "could" I imply that "could" exists, just as when using the word "god" that means that god necessarily exists.
But I do not think you want to argue that.
But your definition of free will does not fit into "my" universe given that your definition of free will relies upon a personal agency which is fundamentally impossible in the causally determined universe.
The only way in which I would agree with your compatibilist definition of free will is if you expand it to be such that EVERYTHING has free will. So, my having consideration for D or E denotes my free will just as a rocks having interia denotes its free will, as there is no magical difference between "mental faculties" and "physical faculties", given that one's mental faculties, in the causally deterministic universe, are just as caused and influenced and controlled as the physical faculties.
It's not that I am being stubborn, it is that the definition of determinism contains X, and the definition of choice contains ~X; so they are not compatible.
Determinism means that everything ever has always already been causally determined; that I will type "penis" has been causally determined to happen since ever.
Choice means that my typing "penis" is the result of my consideration, my mental faculties, my willing, my desiring. The entirety of history existed prior to me, but at the point prior to my typing "penis" I considered both typing it and not typing it in such a way as to make possible my not typing it; I typed "penis" as a result of myself, I was the source of my typing "penis".
Which is complete nonsense given that the source of my typing "penis" is the first falling of the first cosmic domino which happened millions of years ago.
One cannot save free will in a deterministic universe by moving the focus. That I typed "penis" is not the result of ME, it is the result of GOD, who first pushed the first cosmic domino eons ago; "I" did not do it, "God" did it by way of the causally determinate sequence of events in the finte, closed universe.
Unless you're John Calvin, i cannot be thought to be the reason for my having typed "penis". God did it.
It's not that the self is the slave to itself. Rather, the self is slave to those states which came to be in the self by way of something other than the self. The universe, God, whatever put "desires steak" in me, my self, by way of the causally determined universe. So "desires steak" is not me but rather is something posited into me; I never had the option of not wanting steak, I have always already been determined to want steak.
Your example makes no sense. It is akin to "Suppose we have a universe in which all entities were always necessarily held down via gravity...but then something shot up despite gravity!! I guess we weren't in a universe within which all things are necessarily held down by gravity! Hey, wha happened?"
If the premise is that the world is deterministic, and there is a manner by which the pre-determined events can be known, then they are going to happen as they are pre-determined.
I don't grant your premise that both "sides" of the argument are utilizing functional premises insofar as the compatibilist camp uses premises which are fundamentally self-contradictory.
"Suppose that we are in a causally determined universe wherein all actions have been pre-determined since the beginning of time...but then you, like, choose to do something. See, we have free will!"
causally determined = X
choice = ~X
Compatiblism: Suppose both X and ~X.
Oh fucks!
Even in a situation where the answer is plainly determined - say, a math question - we use the word "could." the answer could be x=6. We say this because we don't have enough information.
All potentiality in a deterministic world is an epistemological concern.
That sentence gave me an erection.
Edit: I do not know if I agree with it. I just like the sentence.
You can't prove it directly if that's what your asking. It's a hypothesis based off of our understanding of two core elements of physics -- that identical interactions will lead to identical results, and that it is impossible to fully know everything about a particle.
To disprove the hypothesis, you would have to find evidence of two things:
A) A case where matter can arbitrarily change its properties for no reason.
Showing A would mean the universe has elements of randomness in it. It would mean it was not predictable. However, it would still not mean there was any choice, just that in a certain percentage of cases, even with perfect knowledge, matter would not act as expected. Nothing controls those random occurrences, so in practice the distinction between it and a predetermined but unknowable universe would be minute and irrelevant to this discussion.
However, having found A, one could look for B. This would require consciousness to be outside the universe, or at least immune to interactions with matter in the universe. Then by consciously altering the states of matter, it could create a real choice. However, even if this were the case, this extrauniversal consciousness might be predeterminely governed on its own.
A is possible, B is so very very unlikely, but our current understanding assumes both to be untrue afaik.
Basically I think you are tripping over the word predetermined, it doesn't mean any intelligence determined it. If you chuck a handful of dust into the air no one needs to know how it will move before hand, but each spec will interact with the other specs and the air and everything else according to pretty well tested rules to give the final cloud. They all have their mass, their velocity, and their position even if no one is bothering to measure them.
The universe is currently thought to work like that, as in at the dawn of the universe "stuff" interacted with other "stuff" according to precise rules. This leads to a single possible series of events, hence, predetermined, whether we know this path or not. If A is true, then there could be any number of paths based on the occurrence of things not working with the rules 100% of the time. It will change how things were "supposed" to go but there is no consciousness behind it -- no one "chooses" a path -- its just random. Only with B is there ever anything that could possibly be considered a choice, as we understand the universe.
But TL;DR:
It doesn't really matter if there is one path or infinite paths, unless the consciousness is immune to the universe it follows the same laws and rules as ordinary matter, and subject to any whims of randomness in the same way. Everything simply is and any consciousness perceiving choice is only doing so because the matter of their brain happens to become configured a certain way. It may be one way governed from the dawn of the universe (if there is no randomness), it may be any other number of ways governed by a general framework of rules with random "glitches" now and then, but it doesn't really mater. There's no intent governing anything, as far as we know for now.
*B is essentially a soul / divine spark, although not necessarily. It would mean consciousness goes beyond matter. And it's why it, for our current understanding of the universe, is pretty unlikely and exceedingly difficult to find any evidence for.
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That's tricky, in part because I am wary of dragging concepts of individual or person in because people frame them as special. So to preface, by my arguments above, I believe consciousness is simply a current configuration of a brain, and thus subject to all physics rules.
So to answer, I think a brain may become configured in such a way that the consciousness "thinks" it "knows" something, the accuracy of which is irrelevant. That something is almost certainly an abstraction as you've stated, but the process of learning it, while an extremely complex set of interactions, is fundamentally no different than a rock sitting on the ground.
The only thing I think a consciousness could know in your first sense is the configuration of the parts of the brain that make up the consciousness, because that is it's definition. That doesn't mean it knows the positions of the atoms or anything, but rather it knows that some part of the universe (presumably the brain, but hey, maybe not), at that moment, is configured to form it, because it is there. Sort of a spin on "I think therefore I am." However, since we don't have a good definition of consciousness really is yet, I am not entirely comfortable even with this.
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No. Each option will be predicated upon a piece of information that it did not have at the time of the simulation. You're being unfair to the simulation. Unless you let it update its predictions as you make your choice, it's not going to have all the information. And by the way, your contrarian policy and its perfect prediction are going to form an oscillator. The departure time will change so fast it'll be a blur. The only way you will be able to make a choice is to shut your eyes and make it based on what you last saw. And the instant you shut them, your choice will show up as the prediction.
an oscillator
amazing
You probably wouldn't end up checking the mail, either. Given the ability to look into the future, the simulation will almost certainly find something much more compelling for you to do.
Look, I've defined choice. It is compatible with determinsim. You can't say "but it's caused!" because my definition incorporates and accepts and even relies on this. My definition is all about causation and fits directly into a determined set of causes. So stop explaining over and over why a choice is caused. I know. That doesn't address the argument.
One is a rock falling down the hill and the other is an activity of mental faculties. I don't grasp how you can claim they are exactly the same thing. That's absurd on its face. You yourself called them by two different names, obviously they are different things.
Because one involves thoughts and desires, involves a consideration of possible outcomes, and a decision to act caused by these thoughts and desires and a consideration of possible outcomes. The other doesn't. I've explained this multiple times. That's one way in which they are different; the way that we call "choice." And it doesn't break causation. There are many other ways they are different, too, and we have words for those differences as well. You are making no sense. You have explained how they are the same in one way: that they are both caused. One similarity does not mean identical. I accept your similarity, it need not be explained anymore. They are both caused. It does not mean what you think it does. Dogs and cats are both caused, too, that does not prove that cats don't exist or that they are identical to dogs.
They aren't fundamental impossibilities of the mind, which is where choice occurs, and the only reference point from which a discussion about choice has any meaning. There is nothing beautiful about using words to define something when, according to you, those words have no meaning. That makes your definition meaningless. It doesn't mean free will doesn't exist, it means you've provided a meaningless, incoherent definition of free will. I've got a coherent, useful one, and it doesn't conflict with anyone's universe here. Let's use mine, eh?
So you acknlowedge the significance of our minds' ability to conceive of possibilities. That ability is a big part of what makes up choice and free will. A falling rock doesn't do that. Not many things at all can do that. Certainly not everything. We can, though.
You've never even attempted to demonstrate or argue the claim you just made. Again: my definition of choice is when reasoned consideration of possible outcomes, weighed into desires and preferences, is a dominant causal factor leading to an action. Please explain how this definition is fundamentally impossible in a causally determined universe. It isn't.
You've not shown a meaningful definition of choice that contains ~X.
Everything here is correct and compatible and explains why it was a choice and does not demonstrate a contradiction, except for the red part. The red part is the one that I've shown in many different ways is a nonsense notion that you've forced into the definition in a way that doesn't fit with the rest and isn't even referencing the same context.
The "make possible not typing it" was at least conceiveable to your mind, whereas the full set of determinstic factors that already set the outcome into place are not conceiveable to your mind. All you need to do is change the red part to "in such a way as to consider not typing it as a possibility." Or heck, remove the red part altogether, and thereby remove unnecessary sci-fi nonsense, the necessity for someone to be omniscient and omnipotent and have root-level control over all of causation (which we know is impossible). We've also removed the conflict with determinism. And, we've done nothing that any sane person would deem as having ruined or weakened a very sensible definition of choice. You are forcing a useless and impossible paradox into an otherwise perfectly usable and meaningful concept, for no reason other than to dive-bomb it. It might also help the definition to change the last clause after the comma to "my considerations and desires were the most direct sources of my typing..."
But yeah, I could insert "and also must make the impossible possible" into any definition in an attempt to prove that thing doesn't exist. Cats are feline animals who require that 1 + 1 = 3. Boom, I just disproved the existence of cats. Nevermind that the part I inserted doesn't make sense and isn't helpful or necessary. Nevermind that I could take that out and still have a useful and correct definition of what a cat is. Cats don't exist, I proved it.
Then you don't do anything. You don't exist. Only God and his set of events. Not helpful.
I'll repeat the question using the language of your pointless obfuscation: what is the self if it is not the states that came to be within the self?
Do you desire steaks then, or does the fact this was caused mean that you don't desire steaks? And again, if you aren't the things the universe put into you, if you are something separate from them, what are you?
Try to be more specific. Computer tells me I'll go check the mail at 4pm. Based on this I decide to wait until 5pm. What happened? Explain in more detail what is wrong with this.
I don't think _J_ needs to explain. There are enough explanations of what's wrong with this already. The simulation wasn't targeting for you to have read the results of the simulation because it would need to results to calculate the results. And if it could do this infinite calculation and show you the result it would either settle on some stable time or, if your decision-making process was ultimately unstable (contrarian, for example) the feedback would cause the result to change constantly until you looked away.
When would you choose to look away? Well, you'd need another larger sim to figure that out. And you'd have to look away from that before you could make a contrarian choice of when to look away.
Turtles turtles turtles
When I finally made up my mind to go outside and check the mail, it would suddenly report the current time. Again, looks like it was always based on my choice and there was no determined event. Even a machine with hypothetical access to all causal factors could not determine when I would go check the mail until the point at which I had definitely decided to do it.
I'm having trouble understanding how you think you're making a case against me, it seems you are making my points for me and agree with me.
Alright, that works so long as we are preserving the lack of any special character to the brain such that, as you said, what the brain does is the same as a rock sitting on the ground.
Thoughts: cognitions, beliefs.
these can't be motivational. Putting aside for a second the question of agency or determinism, cognitions/beliefs can't be motivational because they are policy neutral.
A believing that doing B will lead to X does not necessarily mean A will do B. A might do C. This is a given, people do this all the time.
By the same token, A believing that doing B will lead to X does not necessarily mean X will occur. The goal may not occur.
Cognitions and beliefs are policy neutral.
So you need a motivational concept. The problem is that all agency based motivational concepts: intentions, purpose, needs, desires, goalseeking etc are all teleological explanations.
Teleological explanations take the form: A did B in order that X will occur. This is not compatible with causal determinism. X cannot do double duty as both cause and effect. You cannot identify the consequence as the cause.
Any compatabilist account cannot use an inherently teleological explanation as a motivational concept, nor can you use beliefs/cognitions (because as said, they're policy neutral).
A true compatablist explanation will put forth a causal mechanism that identifies the antecedent conditions that lead A to do B and that's where the story ends. You don't need to talk about X at all. (Then a compatabilist account needs to handwave away why this isn't just a deterministic account. Normally they do this with agency, but as I just explained, you can't do this: agency based motivations are incompatible with determinism. Fundamentally, in a way that cannot be reconciled. So you'd need a new way to reconcile them.)