The problem is that, in the reduction, there does not seem to be an ability to discretely divide a choice in the same way that one can discretely divide a cat. I can quantify and divide a cat fairly easily; I cannot quantify and divide a "choice" as easily.
are you serious?
What have you been doing this whole time, except taking what we call choice and then breaking it up into a process of perception triggering memory and desire, prompting action, and so forth?
In your analogy, cat:particle::choice:all those things you keep telling me choice is actually made up of, various deterministic causes and events.
So, it's really not as if, in my arguments, i'm actually starting by granting "choice" and then reducing it. Really, I'm just flat-out denying choice but trying to be nice about it. So I'm trying to say "well, sure, we have the appearance of choices but REALLY it's just bla bla bla", except that very move of reduction fundamentally denies there ever being a choice in a way which is different from, say, physically reducing a cat.
No, you have not in any whatsoever shown it is different. You haven't even tried.
If you reduce a thought to a sequence of causal events you still have a thought.
Ditto cat.
If you reduce a choice to a sequence of causal events you no longer have a choice you have a sequence of caused events.
He's explaining it fine. (Well, really it'd be multiple parallel sequences of caused events but that's nitpicking)
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
"Choice" is the name of a process like a punch or a bike ride is a process. Unless you want to argue that reductionism denies the existence of bike rides, I'm not sure this argument gets us anywhere.
Well, good reductionism would deny the existence of bike rides. If only because there are no bikes, there are no riders, and there is no process of "riding"; there are only indivisible particles causally interracting with one another.
It would be cool if we could articulate a set of premises with which we all agree and then suss out whether choice is in there, but I think that the problem is going to be that, ultimately, determinists do not grant the "choice" premise and compatibilists need the "choice" premise. And, sadly, there is no way to build "choice" up out of any of the premises determinists would grant.
How about this: particles are deterministically knocking around in the brain, and they form the thoughts "chicken" and "steak" in turn. Downstream of further knocking, the brain causes the mouth to say "steak please."
Isn't this what determinists think happens? This is what compatibilists think happens. They call the process "choice" and consider it part of the self.
But it's not that the indivisible particles "form" the "thought" of "chicken" because, again, there is no "thought" and there is no "chicken", there are only the little particles bumping into one another.
To have the "thought" and "chicken" one has to be at the completely non-deterministic, non-reductionist point of view. One cannot get from "indivisible particles bouncing" to "chicken"; the process by which those particles could be amalgamated cannot occur from the point of view of there only being particles bouncing; there is nothing by which one would build when there is simply particles bouncing, there is no "buildingness", no amalgamating force to utilize. To get "thought" and "chicken" one has to have "I am a person looking at shit and thinking about shit", which is not part of the reductionist point of view.
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
Reduction does not "disprove everything", reduction reduces all things which can be reduced. Eventually there is something irreducible, because Western Philosophy.
Then stop following Western Philosophy. You're assuming things just because they agree with common sense, even if they have no intellectual backing beyond that.
jothki on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
"Choice" is the name of a process like a punch or a bike ride is a process. Unless you want to argue that reductionism denies the existence of bike rides, I'm not sure this argument gets us anywhere.
Well, good reductionism would deny the existence of bike rides. If only because there are no bikes, there are no riders, and there is no process of "riding"; there are only indivisible particles causally interracting with one another.
It would be cool if we could articulate a set of premises with which we all agree and then suss out whether choice is in there, but I think that the problem is going to be that, ultimately, determinists do not grant the "choice" premise and compatibilists need the "choice" premise. And, sadly, there is no way to build "choice" up out of any of the premises determinists would grant.
How about this: particles are deterministically knocking around in the brain, and they form the thoughts "chicken" and "steak" in turn. Downstream of further knocking, the brain causes the mouth to say "steak please."
Isn't this what determinists think happens? This is what compatibilists think happens. They call the process "choice" and consider it part of the self.
But it's not that the indivisible particles "form" the "thought" of "chicken" because, again, there is no "thought" and there is no "chicken", there are only the little particles bumping into one another.
To have the "thought" and "chicken" one has to be at the completely non-deterministic, non-reductionist point of view. One cannot get from "indivisible particles bouncing" to "chicken"; the process by which those particles could be amalgamated cannot occur from the point of view of there only being particles bouncing; there is nothing by which one would build when there is simply particles bouncing, there is no "buildingness", no amalgamating force to utilize. To get "thought" and "chicken" one has to have "I am a person looking at shit and thinking about shit", which is not part of the reductionist point of view.
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
Major problem
Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all. (Psychology doesn't measure "thoughts" as you are using the colloquial term "thought")
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
You do in fact outline the major problem with them but then skip over it as if it is meaningless. That we just assume they can be reduced and built back up. Except you know what both _J_ and I have been trying to point out is that this assumption is pretty stupid.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
What have you been doing this whole time, except taking what we call choice and then breaking it up into a process of perception triggering memory and desire, prompting action, and so forth?
I was trying to be nice. But unfortunately my being nice, my trying to have this conversation within that accomodating language game, was fallacious.
For example, in your summary of my summary of choice as "perception triggers memory and desire, prompting action" this posits volition and discreteness onto fabricated entities which don't really make any sense within a deterministic framework. It really makes no senes to say "Let's figure out what choice is by reducing it to its constitutive parts", but then only reduce it one step and leave, say, "desire for chicken" as a discrete entity, because that "desire for chicken" bundle contains with it a wealth of premises and assumptions which are incompatible with determinism.
Mostly because "desire" would be a self-motivating force, a causal spark to action in and of itself. "Desire for chicken" would be a causally compelling force. But it does not make sense, in determinism, to have an entity "desire for chicken" which itself starts a causal chain reaction. Because the whole point of determinism is that this is all causally determined since the first cosmic domino fell. Yet here we have a "desire for chicken" which is itself causally motivational, which itself creates and maintains a causal energy.
Determinism is billiard balls and dominos. There's no way to make sense of "desire" in terms of billiard balls and dominos. There is an internal dunamis to desire which dominos and billiard balls lack. And since the whole point of causal determinism is external dumanis, positing entities with internal dunamis within a causally deterministic framework is just plain silly.
So, it's really not as if, in my arguments, i'm actually starting by granting "choice" and then reducing it. Really, I'm just flat-out denying choice but trying to be nice about it. So I'm trying to say "well, sure, we have the appearance of choices but REALLY it's just bla bla bla", except that very move of reduction fundamentally denies there ever being a choice in a way which is different from, say, physically reducing a cat.
No, you have not in any whatsoever shown it is different. You haven't even tried.
Determinism:
Billiard Ball A hits Billiard Ball B, causing Billiard Ball B to move.
Choice:
Billiard Ball A hits Billiard Ball B, Billiard Ball B sort of thinks about it for a while, then Billiard Ball B either moves or does not move depending upon how it feels about it.
All that shit in the choice example of "thinks" and "either" and "feel" is just pretty much nonsense.
Major problem
Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
Wait, what now?
You're saying that thoughts and choices can't be reduced to causal mechanisms?
This whole discussion is making me think you guys have no fucking clue what you're even arguing about.
And _J_, I understand your position. It is called solipsism. Nothing exists to you. Why is free will or choice any different from a billiard ball in that regard? None of it exists. Nothing exists. Why would you keep talking about free will or choice if your point all along was that nothing at all exists? And why would you ignore the fact that since page one we've already been clear that we know this is where your position leads, that nothing exists, not even ourselves, those very selves who you claim don't have free will. How do they have or not have anything if you don't believe they exist?
Also, don't think for one second that I don't see right through your dishonest attempt to claim that you were "being nice" - you are just trying to spiral this conversation into oblivion because you're realizing again that your position doesn't hold.
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
Major problem Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
You do in fact outline the major problem with them but then skip over it as if it is meaningless. That we don't know the mechanics of "thoughts" and just assume they can be reduced and built back up. Except you know what both _J_ and I have been trying to point out is that this assumption is pretty stupid.
Yeah
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
Major problem
Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
Wait, what now?
You're saying that thoughts and choices can't be reduced to causal mechanisms?
This whole discussion is making me think you guys have no fucking clue what you're even arguing about.
Seriously, in saying that, I'm granting you your own premise: that everything that happens in the brain is predetermined. If you don't believe that, I'm really confused about your argument.
GenlyAi on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
Major problem
Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
Wait, what now?
You're saying that thoughts and choices can't be reduced to causal mechanisms?
This whole discussion is making me think you guys have no fucking clue what you're even arguing about.
If you don't hold back your temper I'm going to ignore any further input you might have.
It would be incredibly easy for me to take the easy way out and claim it is you have no idea what you are talking about. It's certainly what I am feeling. But I don't do this, I try to understand what you are saying and I keep finding problems with your arguments. Do me the same courtesy, or stop talking to me.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
Major problem Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
You do in fact outline the major problem with them but then skip over it as if it is meaningless. That we don't know the mechanics of "thoughts" and just assume they can be reduced and built back up. Except you know what both _J_ and I have been trying to point out is that this assumption is pretty stupid.
Yeah
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
It does so in a way that harms the determinist argument. I thought we had already reached a common ground that thought processes were mechanical and predetermined. If we haven't then who's the determinist here?
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
Major problem Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all.
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
You do in fact outline the major problem with them but then skip over it as if it is meaningless. That we don't know the mechanics of "thoughts" and just assume they can be reduced and built back up. Except you know what both _J_ and I have been trying to point out is that this assumption is pretty stupid.
Yeah
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
It does so in a way that harms the determinist argument. I thought we had already reached a common ground that thought processes were mechanical and predetermined. If we haven't then who's the determinist here?
There is a distinct difference between claiming something has a causal mechanism and you "just don't know it" and actually outlining what that causal mechanism might be.
There's a lot of scientific theories that could describe a bike. I know of zero that could describe a choice.
Also none that could describe a thought as you are using thought. Read that carefully. As you, Genlyai, are using the word "thought", no science exists to describe it. This should be a little indicator that the problem is the assumptions behind your terms.
It's not enough to be all "haha it's deterministic" if you can't actually show that.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
It does so in a way that harms the determinist argument. I thought we had already reached a common ground that thought processes were mechanical and predetermined. If we haven't then who's the determinist here?
Here is a very simple explanation of a very complicated thing: There is a distinction to be made between the physical, material brain and "thought". Unless you want to claim that "thought" is material, that I can cut open a head and find "thought" in the same way that I could find, say, a particular lump of brain matter, then we have a difference of kind between the material brain and the non-material (epiphenomenal) thought.
When we have this difference of kind, then we have to explain how the material and the non-material causally interract.
And the amount of time and effort required to articulate that argument simply isn't worth it given that it is not the position I maintain. Because, remember, causal determinism and physical reductionism is just discrete, indivisible physical entities causally interracting.
Trying to fit non-physical entities into that framework is pretty much absurd.
So the whole notion of there being "thought" or "choices" or "desires" really makes no sense unless you want to say that "thought" and "choice" and "Desire" are physical...and you really don't want to do that unless you want to be Hobbes.
We know enough about the mechanisms of neurons to know that they're causal. We know enough about neurochemistry to know that it is causal. We know enough about cellular growth and structure to know that it is causal. Are there any components left that you'd like to claim might not be causal?
We know enough about the mechanisms of neurons to know that they're causal. We know enough about neurochemistry to know that it is causal. We know enough about cellular growth and structure to know that it is causal. Are there any components left that you'd like to claim might not be causal?
Yeah: "A thought".
I'm ok with neurons and neurochemistry and cells being causal; because they are material, physical things.
"A thought" is not a physical thing.
Unless you are Hobbes. But you are most certainly not Hobbes.
_J_ on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
We know enough about the mechanisms of neurons to know that they're causal. We know enough about neurochemistry to know that it is causal. We know enough about cellular growth and structure to know that it is causal. Are there any components left that you'd like to claim might not be causal?
Who are you talking to?
"Thought" dates back to Galilleo, Descartes and Locke. Gallileo was the first person to claim mind and brain is separate. Descartes took this to the extreme. Lock expounded on this with his thesis on "idea".
When you guys talk about "thought" you are talking about a dualist concept.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought". You only need to know a bit about how neurochemistry works to realise the dualist thought doesn't exist as a concept.
Much of the problem is people using "thought" without (hah) thought as to what it really means. They assume that because psychology studies people they are going to naturally reduce everything in our culture to neurochemistry. Except what neurochemistry has to say is that quite a lot of what is in our culture that is considered to be the building blocks of a human being isn't the building blocks and we work differently. So differently that many of these cultural entities have no correlate and need to be thrown out.
So assuming "oh my god are you saying this thing that actually exists is not reducible are you crazy" is my claim is the wrong way around.
I'm saying "This thing doesn't really exist, which is why you can't reduce it"
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
We know enough about the mechanisms of neurons to know that they're causal. We know enough about neurochemistry to know that it is causal. We know enough about cellular growth and structure to know that it is causal. Are there any components left that you'd like to claim might not be causal?
Who are you talking to?
I always just assume that everyone in the thread is talking to me unless they specifically say otherwise.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought".
Or "choice" or "qualia" or "consciousness" or "desire" or "intention".
_J_ on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
edited June 2010
"Thought" dates back to Galilleo, Descartes and Locke. Gallileo was the first person to claim mind and brain is separate. (I know it surprised me too) Descartes took this to the extreme. Lock expounded on this with his thesis on "idea".
When you guys talk about "thought" you are talking about a dualist concept.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought". You only need to know a bit about how neurochemistry works to realise the dualist thought doesn't exist as a concept.
Much of the problem is people using "thought" without (hah) thought as to what it really means. They assume that because psychology studies people they are going to naturally reduce everything in our culture to neurochemistry. Except what neurochemistry has to say is that quite a lot of what is in our culture that is considered to be the building blocks of a human being isn't the building blocks and we work differently. So differently that many of these cultural entities have no correlate and need to be thrown out.
So assuming "oh my god are you saying this thing that actually exists is not reducible are you crazy" is my claim is the wrong way around.
I'm saying "This thing doesn't really exist, which is why you can't reduce it"
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
We know enough about the mechanisms of neurons to know that they're causal. We know enough about neurochemistry to know that it is causal. We know enough about cellular growth and structure to know that it is causal. Are there any components left that you'd like to claim might not be causal?
Who are you talking to?
I always just assume that everyone in the thread is talking to me unless they specifically say otherwise.
this provides some insight into the quality of your metaphysical claims :P
Evil Multifarious on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
It does so in a way that harms the determinist argument. I thought we had already reached a common ground that thought processes were mechanical and predetermined. If we haven't then who's the determinist here?
Here is a very simple explanation of a very complicated thing: There is a distinction to be made between the physical, material brain and "thought". Unless you want to claim that "thought" is material, that I can cut open a head and find "thought" in the same way that I could find, say, a particular lump of brain matter, then we have a difference of kind between the material brain and the non-material (epiphenomenal) thought.
When we have this difference of kind, then we have to explain how the material and the non-material causally interract.
And the amount of time and effort required to articulate that argument simply isn't worth it given that it is not the position I maintain. Because, remember, causal determinism and physical reductionism is just discrete, indivisible physical entities causally interracting.
Trying to fit non-physical entities into that framework is pretty much absurd.
So the whole notion of there being "thought" or "choices" or "desires" really makes no sense unless you want to say that "thought" and "choice" and "Desire" are physical...and you really don't want to do that unless you want to be Hobbes.
And you don't fucking want to be Hobbes.
And that's where your philosophy fails you. You don't have a good grasp of the abstract, you can't look at a object and understand that it's only an object because we describe it as such, that it only exists within our minds. And even our minds only exist within our minds.
If you dissect a boat, you won't eventually break it down to the point where there is no wood left, only the mast. Likewise, if you dissect a brain, you won't eventually break it down to the point where you only have a thought. That doesn't mean that ships don't have masts, or that brains don't have thoughts. Or maybe it does. It all depends on your perspective. In fact, perspective is all that matters.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain, in the same way that masts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a ship. We merely pretend to ourselves that the objects that we percieve actually have physical meaning. Doing so has served us well, but that doesn't mean that objects have any sort of real physical existance.
jothki on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
It does so in a way that harms the determinist argument. I thought we had already reached a common ground that thought processes were mechanical and predetermined. If we haven't then who's the determinist here?
Here is a very simple explanation of a very complicated thing: There is a distinction to be made between the physical, material brain and "thought". Unless you want to claim that "thought" is material, that I can cut open a head and find "thought" in the same way that I could find, say, a particular lump of brain matter, then we have a difference of kind between the material brain and the non-material (epiphenomenal) thought.
When we have this difference of kind, then we have to explain how the material and the non-material causally interract.
And the amount of time and effort required to articulate that argument simply isn't worth it given that it is not the position I maintain. Because, remember, causal determinism and physical reductionism is just discrete, indivisible physical entities causally interracting.
Trying to fit non-physical entities into that framework is pretty much absurd.
So the whole notion of there being "thought" or "choices" or "desires" really makes no sense unless you want to say that "thought" and "choice" and "Desire" are physical...and you really don't want to do that unless you want to be Hobbes.
And you don't fucking want to be Hobbes.
And that's where your philosophy fails you. You don't have a good grasp of the abstract, you can't look at a object and understand that it's only an object because we describe it as such, that it only exists within our minds. And even our minds only exist within our minds.
If you dissect a boat, you won't eventually break it down to the point where there is no wood left, only the mast. Likewise, if you dissect a brain, you won't eventually break it down to the point where you only have a thought. That doesn't mean that ships don't have masts, or that brains don't have thoughts. Or maybe it does. It all depends on your perspective. In fact, perspective is all that matters.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain, in the same way that masts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a ship. We merely pretend to ourselves that the objects that we percieve actually have physical meaning. Doing so has served us well, but that doesn't mean that objects have any sort of real physical existance.
Woah dualist to the max.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Wait, then what are those things supposed to be if not physical? Magic?
cultural inventions.
imagination
fantasy
Ah, ok.
Why wouldn't what is called a thought just be considered another physical thing, though? Wouldn't, say, the thought "Oh shit I left the stove on" be a firing up of memory and language and some other things in the brain, and thus physical?
Wait, then what are those things supposed to be if not physical? Magic?
cultural inventions.
imagination
fantasy
Ah, ok.
Why wouldn't what is called a thought just be considered another physical thing, though? Wouldn't, say, the thought "Oh shit I left the stove on" be a firing up of memory and language and some other things in the brain, and thus physical?
Because "Oh shit I left the stove on" does not have the properties of a physical thing. For starters, i can't cut it out of you and look at it under a microscope.
_J_ on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
"Thought" dates back to Galilleo, Descartes and Locke. Gallileo was the first person to claim mind and brain is separate. (I know it surprised me too) Descartes took this to the extreme. Lock expounded on this with his thesis on "idea".
When you guys talk about "thought" you are talking about a dualist concept.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought". You only need to know a bit about how neurochemistry works to realise the dualist thought doesn't exist as a concept.
Much of the problem is people using "thought" without (hah) thought as to what it really means. They assume that because psychology studies people they are going to naturally reduce everything in our culture to neurochemistry. Except what neurochemistry has to say is that quite a lot of what is in our culture that is considered to be the building blocks of a human being isn't the building blocks and we work differently. So differently that many of these cultural entities have no correlate and need to be thrown out.
So assuming "oh my god are you saying this thing that actually exists is not reducible are you crazy" is my claim is the wrong way around.
I'm saying "This thing doesn't really exist, which is why you can't reduce it"
So based on this above.
I would say I think that people exist. And dogs exist.
I don't believe in the existence of self. And I definitely don't believe in the separate of mind and body. So I don't believe in the existence of thought or idea or mind as something separate from the brain. I don't think of them as existing in that way.
Emotion is an interesting case, because I know the physiology behind emotion.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
How does the physical brain interract with the non-physical objects within the non-physical system of the brain?
_J_ on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
edited June 2010
I got no idea what you are talking about jothki.
Not meant to be an insult, I'm being honest. You are all ???
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Wait, then what are those things supposed to be if not physical? Magic?
cultural inventions.
imagination
fantasy
Ah, ok.
Why wouldn't what is called a thought just be considered another physical thing, though? Wouldn't, say, the thought "Oh shit I left the stove on" be a firing up of memory and language and some other things in the brain, and thus physical?
Because "Oh shit I left the stove on" does not have the properties of a physical thing. For starters, i can't cut it out of you and look at it under a microscope.
You aren't going to find it printed out on the inside of my skull, sure, but I don't see why you couldn't identify and observe the interplay of neurons that is that thought with advanced science.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
How does the physical brain interract with the non-physical objects within the non-physical system of the brain?
The same way the hardware systems of a computer interact with the software systems of a computer, which I guess could be descirbed as "non-physical" if you stretch that definition to the same extent that it's being stretched by everyone else here.
Seriously, folks, Turing machines. I can't be the only person in this thread that's heard of them.
Daedalus on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
edited June 2010
That's nice.
It'd be relevant if people were computers.
They're not though so...
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
How does the physical brain interract with the non-physical objects within the non-physical system of the brain?
There is no physical brain. There's a collection of particles that we call a brain, but that just means that there's a collection of particles that we call a brain, nothing more.
A brain can have thoughts, but it's a fallacy to assume that therefore, a collection of particles that we call a brain can contain collections of particles that we call thoughts. They are entirely different things.
The fact that we can deconstruct most named collections into named component collections has been quite useful to humanity. It's not a universal rule, though, as examining ontological paradoxes can demonstrate.
Prove it. Should be easy, just show a problem that isn't Turing-recognizable that the human brain can solve. I've been looking for a couple years now, and it's become increasingly obvious that a brain is just a Turing machine made out of meat.
The only real argument against that I've even seen was Searle's "Chinese Room" argument, which only proved that Searle didn't know what a Universal Turing Machine is. (hint: it's the guy in the room).
Daedalus on
0
Options
MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
Wait, then what are those things supposed to be if not physical? Magic?
cultural inventions.
imagination
fantasy
Ah, ok.
Why wouldn't what is called a thought just be considered another physical thing, though? Wouldn't, say, the thought "Oh shit I left the stove on" be a firing up of memory and language and some other things in the brain, and thus physical?
Because "Oh shit I left the stove on" does not have the properties of a physical thing. For starters, i can't cut it out of you and look at it under a microscope.
You aren't going to find it printed out on the inside of my skull, sure, but I don't see why you couldn't identify and observe the interplay of neurons that is that thought with advanced science.
Well for one you have a statement in english there, not whatever is actually happening when remembering about the stove, imagining potential disaster and feeling fear.
So if you tried to analyse that statement you'd be analysing those parts of the brain which deal with language and not the parts of the brain which handle emotion, memory and so on.
Which of those parts is the thought? All of them? All of them combined? But they can work separately. A person can have their memory system destroyed and still be obviously thinking. Ditto for emotional problems or language deficiency.
So which of those parts defines thought? The representation of all of them? That's your statement in english, generated for the benefit of someone else.
So "thought" as you are talking about it seems to be something generated in discussion with others.
Morninglord on
(PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
How does the physical brain interract with the non-physical objects within the non-physical system of the brain?
There is no physical brain. There's a collection of particles that we call a brain, but that just means that there's a collection of particles that we call a brain, nothing more.
A brain can have thoughts, but it's a fallacy to assume that therefore, a collection of particles that we call a brain can contain collections of particles that we call thoughts. They are entirely different things.
The fact that we can deconstruct most named collections into named component collections has been quite useful to humanity. It's not a universal rule, though, as examining ontological paradoxes can demonstrate.
Thoughts are not collections of particles, they are information encoded in the state of the particles of the brain. Information is quantifiable.
You aren't going to find it printed out on the inside of my skull, sure, but I don't see why you couldn't identify and observe the interplay of neurons that is that thought with advanced science.
There's this philosophical term, "qualia" which, simply stated, is "what it's like to be". An example is the qualia of the taste of a strawberry, which is to say "What it is like to taste a strawberry". Usually, there is a distinction made between, say, a bio-chemical understanding of what the constitutive parts of a strawberry are, the way in which the physical composition of a strawberry interracts with the taste buds of the tongue, the electrical signals generated and sent to the brain, and the "what it is like to taste a strawberry".
If we want to say that "Oh shit, the stove is on" can be said to relate to a particular arrangement of neurons in the brain, "When one thinks 'oh shit' this area of the brain lights up." then we will, usually, still maintain that there is a difference between these particular neurons lighting up, and the "what it is like to think 'oh shit, the stove is on'."
You can deny the "what it is like to think" qualia of thought...but you really don't want to do that.
Posts
If you reduce a thought to a sequence of causal events you still have a thought.
Ditto cat.
If you reduce a choice to a sequence of causal events you no longer have a choice you have a sequence of caused events.
He's explaining it fine. (Well, really it'd be multiple parallel sequences of caused events but that's nitpicking)
Honestly, this is some really extreme reductionism and strikes me as pretty useless. We all agree that the bike is made of particles, but we define a particular configuration of particles as a bike. We define particular processes involving those particles as bike rides. We get a lot of value out of this. We can do the same thing with thoughts and choices (though of course we don't really know the mechanics of thoughts on the systems level, we just assume they can be reduced and built back up).
If you really view the universe as an undifferentiated churn of particles where there is no utility in simplifying them into more understandable units, you lose all power to reason, understand, and act on almost everything. That's how I know you don't really think that way.
edit: also, what yar said
Then stop following Western Philosophy. You're assuming things just because they agree with common sense, even if they have no intellectual backing beyond that.
Major problem
Everything except the bolded can be meaningfully reduced and causal mechanisms for them outlined. I could sit down and explain to you the physics behind a bike. It would take a very long time but I could.
This doesn't happen for choices or thoughts at all. (Psychology doesn't measure "thoughts" as you are using the colloquial term "thought")
Please stop talking like this stuff is common knowledge when you don't have any knowledge at all.
You do in fact outline the major problem with them but then skip over it as if it is meaningless. That we just assume they can be reduced and built back up. Except you know what both _J_ and I have been trying to point out is that this assumption is pretty stupid.
I was trying to be nice. But unfortunately my being nice, my trying to have this conversation within that accomodating language game, was fallacious.
For example, in your summary of my summary of choice as "perception triggers memory and desire, prompting action" this posits volition and discreteness onto fabricated entities which don't really make any sense within a deterministic framework. It really makes no senes to say "Let's figure out what choice is by reducing it to its constitutive parts", but then only reduce it one step and leave, say, "desire for chicken" as a discrete entity, because that "desire for chicken" bundle contains with it a wealth of premises and assumptions which are incompatible with determinism.
Mostly because "desire" would be a self-motivating force, a causal spark to action in and of itself. "Desire for chicken" would be a causally compelling force. But it does not make sense, in determinism, to have an entity "desire for chicken" which itself starts a causal chain reaction. Because the whole point of determinism is that this is all causally determined since the first cosmic domino fell. Yet here we have a "desire for chicken" which is itself causally motivational, which itself creates and maintains a causal energy.
Determinism is billiard balls and dominos. There's no way to make sense of "desire" in terms of billiard balls and dominos. There is an internal dunamis to desire which dominos and billiard balls lack. And since the whole point of causal determinism is external dumanis, positing entities with internal dunamis within a causally deterministic framework is just plain silly.
Determinism:
Billiard Ball A hits Billiard Ball B, causing Billiard Ball B to move.
Choice:
Billiard Ball A hits Billiard Ball B, Billiard Ball B sort of thinks about it for a while, then Billiard Ball B either moves or does not move depending upon how it feels about it.
All that shit in the choice example of "thinks" and "either" and "feel" is just pretty much nonsense.
You're saying that thoughts and choices can't be reduced to causal mechanisms?
This whole discussion is making me think you guys have no fucking clue what you're even arguing about.
And _J_, I understand your position. It is called solipsism. Nothing exists to you. Why is free will or choice any different from a billiard ball in that regard? None of it exists. Nothing exists. Why would you keep talking about free will or choice if your point all along was that nothing at all exists? And why would you ignore the fact that since page one we've already been clear that we know this is where your position leads, that nothing exists, not even ourselves, those very selves who you claim don't have free will. How do they have or not have anything if you don't believe they exist?
Also, don't think for one second that I don't see right through your dishonest attempt to claim that you were "being nice" - you are just trying to spiral this conversation into oblivion because you're realizing again that your position doesn't hold.
Yeah
We can explain material entities as amalgamations of material particles. Big material thing is made up of smaller material things.
We can't explain epiphenomenal "thoughts" and "choices" as amalgamations of material particles, because epiphenomenal things are not material.
It's a difference in kind that just breaks the comparison.
Seriously, in saying that, I'm granting you your own premise: that everything that happens in the brain is predetermined. If you don't believe that, I'm really confused about your argument.
If you don't hold back your temper I'm going to ignore any further input you might have.
It would be incredibly easy for me to take the easy way out and claim it is you have no idea what you are talking about. It's certainly what I am feeling. But I don't do this, I try to understand what you are saying and I keep finding problems with your arguments. Do me the same courtesy, or stop talking to me.
Well, no. I'm not arguing for solipsism in this thread. I'm arguing for causal determinism qua physical reductionism.
There is a distinct difference between claiming something has a causal mechanism and you "just don't know it" and actually outlining what that causal mechanism might be.
There's a lot of scientific theories that could describe a bike. I know of zero that could describe a choice.
Also none that could describe a thought as you are using thought. Read that carefully. As you, Genlyai, are using the word "thought", no science exists to describe it. This should be a little indicator that the problem is the assumptions behind your terms.
It's not enough to be all "haha it's deterministic" if you can't actually show that.
Here is a very simple explanation of a very complicated thing: There is a distinction to be made between the physical, material brain and "thought". Unless you want to claim that "thought" is material, that I can cut open a head and find "thought" in the same way that I could find, say, a particular lump of brain matter, then we have a difference of kind between the material brain and the non-material (epiphenomenal) thought.
When we have this difference of kind, then we have to explain how the material and the non-material causally interract.
And the amount of time and effort required to articulate that argument simply isn't worth it given that it is not the position I maintain. Because, remember, causal determinism and physical reductionism is just discrete, indivisible physical entities causally interracting.
Trying to fit non-physical entities into that framework is pretty much absurd.
So the whole notion of there being "thought" or "choices" or "desires" really makes no sense unless you want to say that "thought" and "choice" and "Desire" are physical...and you really don't want to do that unless you want to be Hobbes.
And you don't fucking want to be Hobbes.
Yeah: "A thought".
I'm ok with neurons and neurochemistry and cells being causal; because they are material, physical things.
"A thought" is not a physical thing.
Unless you are Hobbes. But you are most certainly not Hobbes.
Who are you talking to?
"Thought" dates back to Galilleo, Descartes and Locke. Gallileo was the first person to claim mind and brain is separate. Descartes took this to the extreme. Lock expounded on this with his thesis on "idea".
When you guys talk about "thought" you are talking about a dualist concept.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought". You only need to know a bit about how neurochemistry works to realise the dualist thought doesn't exist as a concept.
Much of the problem is people using "thought" without (hah) thought as to what it really means. They assume that because psychology studies people they are going to naturally reduce everything in our culture to neurochemistry. Except what neurochemistry has to say is that quite a lot of what is in our culture that is considered to be the building blocks of a human being isn't the building blocks and we work differently. So differently that many of these cultural entities have no correlate and need to be thrown out.
So assuming "oh my god are you saying this thing that actually exists is not reducible are you crazy" is my claim is the wrong way around.
I'm saying "This thing doesn't really exist, which is why you can't reduce it"
I always just assume that everyone in the thread is talking to me unless they specifically say otherwise.
Or "choice" or "qualia" or "consciousness" or "desire" or "intention".
When you guys talk about "thought" you are talking about a dualist concept.
Because there aint no neurochemistry that'll find you a "thought". You only need to know a bit about how neurochemistry works to realise the dualist thought doesn't exist as a concept.
Much of the problem is people using "thought" without (hah) thought as to what it really means. They assume that because psychology studies people they are going to naturally reduce everything in our culture to neurochemistry. Except what neurochemistry has to say is that quite a lot of what is in our culture that is considered to be the building blocks of a human being isn't the building blocks and we work differently. So differently that many of these cultural entities have no correlate and need to be thrown out.
So assuming "oh my god are you saying this thing that actually exists is not reducible are you crazy" is my claim is the wrong way around.
I'm saying "This thing doesn't really exist, which is why you can't reduce it"
this provides some insight into the quality of your metaphysical claims :P
cultural inventions.
imagination
fantasy
they don't exist.
you have been lied to all your life.
And that's where your philosophy fails you. You don't have a good grasp of the abstract, you can't look at a object and understand that it's only an object because we describe it as such, that it only exists within our minds. And even our minds only exist within our minds.
If you dissect a boat, you won't eventually break it down to the point where there is no wood left, only the mast. Likewise, if you dissect a brain, you won't eventually break it down to the point where you only have a thought. That doesn't mean that ships don't have masts, or that brains don't have thoughts. Or maybe it does. It all depends on your perspective. In fact, perspective is all that matters.
Thoughts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a brain, in the same way that masts are non-physical objects within the non-physical system of a ship. We merely pretend to ourselves that the objects that we percieve actually have physical meaning. Doing so has served us well, but that doesn't mean that objects have any sort of real physical existance.
Woah dualist to the max.
is it also your position that emotions don't exist? ideas? chairs? dogs? people? selves? etc
also, guys, J is a dualist, so just...don't even. don't even go there.
Ah, ok.
Why wouldn't what is called a thought just be considered another physical thing, though? Wouldn't, say, the thought "Oh shit I left the stove on" be a firing up of memory and language and some other things in the brain, and thus physical?
Where is the non-physical system of the brain?
Because "Oh shit I left the stove on" does not have the properties of a physical thing. For starters, i can't cut it out of you and look at it under a microscope.
So based on this above.
I would say I think that people exist. And dogs exist.
I don't believe in the existence of self. And I definitely don't believe in the separate of mind and body. So I don't believe in the existence of thought or idea or mind as something separate from the brain. I don't think of them as existing in that way.
Emotion is an interesting case, because I know the physiology behind emotion.
Systems aren't really anywhere.
I suppose you could have a system that claims to be somewhere. Maybe brains do that, claim to be located inside the 'skull' of an 'animal'. That doesn't mean that they actually are in that place, though.
Then again, I have no way to demonstrate that they don't have locations, since that would just be relying on an entirely different system. I've already compromised the unbiasedness of my claim merely by expressing it in a system of language, though, so I'm not sure where I can or can't go from there.
How does the physical brain interract with the non-physical objects within the non-physical system of the brain?
Not meant to be an insult, I'm being honest. You are all ???
You aren't going to find it printed out on the inside of my skull, sure, but I don't see why you couldn't identify and observe the interplay of neurons that is that thought with advanced science.
The same way the hardware systems of a computer interact with the software systems of a computer, which I guess could be descirbed as "non-physical" if you stretch that definition to the same extent that it's being stretched by everyone else here.
Seriously, folks, Turing machines. I can't be the only person in this thread that's heard of them.
It'd be relevant if people were computers.
They're not though so...
There is no physical brain. There's a collection of particles that we call a brain, but that just means that there's a collection of particles that we call a brain, nothing more.
A brain can have thoughts, but it's a fallacy to assume that therefore, a collection of particles that we call a brain can contain collections of particles that we call thoughts. They are entirely different things.
The fact that we can deconstruct most named collections into named component collections has been quite useful to humanity. It's not a universal rule, though, as examining ontological paradoxes can demonstrate.
Prove it. Should be easy, just show a problem that isn't Turing-recognizable that the human brain can solve. I've been looking for a couple years now, and it's become increasingly obvious that a brain is just a Turing machine made out of meat.
The only real argument against that I've even seen was Searle's "Chinese Room" argument, which only proved that Searle didn't know what a Universal Turing Machine is. (hint: it's the guy in the room).
Well for one you have a statement in english there, not whatever is actually happening when remembering about the stove, imagining potential disaster and feeling fear.
So if you tried to analyse that statement you'd be analysing those parts of the brain which deal with language and not the parts of the brain which handle emotion, memory and so on.
Which of those parts is the thought? All of them? All of them combined? But they can work separately. A person can have their memory system destroyed and still be obviously thinking. Ditto for emotional problems or language deficiency.
So which of those parts defines thought? The representation of all of them? That's your statement in english, generated for the benefit of someone else.
So "thought" as you are talking about it seems to be something generated in discussion with others.
Thoughts are not collections of particles, they are information encoded in the state of the particles of the brain. Information is quantifiable.
There's this philosophical term, "qualia" which, simply stated, is "what it's like to be". An example is the qualia of the taste of a strawberry, which is to say "What it is like to taste a strawberry". Usually, there is a distinction made between, say, a bio-chemical understanding of what the constitutive parts of a strawberry are, the way in which the physical composition of a strawberry interracts with the taste buds of the tongue, the electrical signals generated and sent to the brain, and the "what it is like to taste a strawberry".
If we want to say that "Oh shit, the stove is on" can be said to relate to a particular arrangement of neurons in the brain, "When one thinks 'oh shit' this area of the brain lights up." then we will, usually, still maintain that there is a difference between these particular neurons lighting up, and the "what it is like to think 'oh shit, the stove is on'."
You can deny the "what it is like to think" qualia of thought...but you really don't want to do that.