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[Morality] Subjectivity vs Objectivity

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  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    I believe that we can carve out an exception to the general rule that suffering is bad for voluntary suffering of the kind you describe Taber without too much trouble. Basically, we could say that a voluntary suffering is morally allowable as an exercise of Free Will as long as it does not impinge upon the Free Will of anyone else. However, I can't see how it could ever be morally required for anyone who did not ascribe to that belief system, because it would cease to be voluntary suffering. We could then say that any suffering not covered under the exception is morally disallowed.

    Also, I believe that "enlightenment" is typically understood to somehow be the end of suffering (end of the karmic cycle, etc.)?

    hanskey on
  • Apothe0sisApothe0sis Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    Suffering is bad is a great axiom, but you can't argue it is objective truth. Someone could believe that suffering leads to personal enlightenment, and personal enlightenment is the ultimate goal even if it never leads to less suffering, and design a morality system around that. Is there an objective way to say this other person is wrong? It seems like what we are optimizing for is subjective even if there are objective ways to measure how successfully we are optimizing for.

    Well, yes, obviously they can be objectively wrong. Some work needs to be done to clarify what you mean, but I'll try and address the possibilities as I see them.

    There are a few ways of looking at this - we can determine that preventing people from exercising free will in a way that causes personal pain or hardship causes greater personal suffering than allowing them to exercise their preferences. In which case it is trivially the case that specific kinds of behaviors that are apparently non-optimal should be allowed because preventing them causes greater personal suffering - because, people are miserable they can't seek enlightenment. The cost benefit analysis of "what leads to the least suffering" or "what maximises human flourishing" need not be confined only to the immediate.

    Alternatively, if you are arguing that there might be someone who prizes suffering as a mechanism for enlightenment then we can test this, in principle. What does enlightenment entail - presumably enlightenment entails some form of improved mental states - we can see whether people exposed to greater suffering do indeed exhibit improved mental states of some kind. If not, then we can say "WRONG!" (and if we can't make these judgements then what utility does "enlightenment" offfer?).

    Or if you're asking the meta-ethical question of what we say to someone who values "suffering with enlightenment" over "human flourishing" or "minimsation of suffering" then it's as simple as considering the following: What do you say to someone who values something other than reason and evidence for evaluating a proposition? What do you say to someone who values something other than health when undertaking the practice of medicine? By virtue of the fact that they have radically divergent concerns they've either already disqualified themselves from the conversation or are covertly smuggling exactly the same concern unwittingly. If the former then we can discount them they are undertaking and entirely different project to that of morality, if the latter then we can demonstrate that they are mistaken in their priorities.

    Apothe0sis on
  • TaberTaber Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    You are stepping around my point. Imagine a third person who believes that life is an abomination, and the most moral action is to let it all burn. Who's to say he's wrong? He certainly isn't limiting suffering, but his morality system doesn't have that as a goal. Morality systems with the same goal can certainly be compared objectively, but unless there's some God who does/doesn't want everything to burn, I don't think goals can be objectively compared.

    I certainly don't want everything to burn, and would stop this hypothetical third person, but it would be for solely subjective reasons.

    Edit: this was a response to Hanksy, I'll edit in a response to Apothe0sis as soon as I read his post.

    The third paragraph was closest to what I mean, but why are you taking for granted that the point of morality is reducing suffering. Abrahamic religions' morality explicitly isn't for reducing suffering, it is to please God. A side effect of pleasing God is reducing suffering, but that isn't why you are supposed to follow it.

    Taber on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    You are stepping around my point. Imagine a third person who believes that life is an abomination, and the most moral action is to let it all burn. Who's to say he's wrong? He certainly isn't limiting suffering, but his morality system doesn't have that as a goal. Morality systems with the same goal can certainly be compared objectively, but unless there's some God who does/doesn't want everything to burn, I don't think goals can be objectively compared.

    I certainly don't want everything to burn, and would stop this hypothetical third person, but it would be for solely subjective reasons.

    Edit: this was a response to Hanksy, I'll edit in a response to Apothe0sis as soon as I read his post.

    I wasn't side-stepping, but what you were saying was not clear and I got something completely different from you first post than this one. Sorry ... give me a minute ...

    Edit: Well actually this question is much simpler. Anyone can clearly see that making killing morally required is not a general rule that anyone could live with (wordplay = fun). That is a rule literally anathema to human life, and thus it is trivially wrong.

    Edit x2:
    Here are a few applicable bits to mull from a random google find.
    If something is right or wrong according to reason, anyone who reasons about the issue should also be able to work out what is right or wrong. Therefore, actions are good or bad universally.
    or
    Look at any rule. Is it logical? What would be the consequences if this rule was followed universally? Would it be logical to ‘will’ (want) the situation that would result from this rule?
    and
    Kant suggests that the only action that is truly good is the one that is in accordance with the Good Will. Meaning that the action is done because it is good to do in itself, not because of any consequence of doing the action.
    This last bit doesn't address your question directly, but it does encapsulate my understanding of the basis of duties in Deontology (Kantian Ethics).

    hanskey on
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    I think the various examples of cases where suffering is 'allowable' or whatever are dancing around the larger issue. The reason that we can describe cases where some suffering is okay, morally, is because we consider there to be some larger goal than elimination of suffering which the allowance of suffering serves. In the first example the responses said that we could allow moral suffering in pursuit of the exercise of Free Will, presumably meaning that the existence and exercise of Free Will is more important than the elimination of suffering. Meaning that you've defined the exercise of Free Will as axiomatically good. Another post or two mentioned 'human flourishing' in similar manner.

    So what determines what goals should be desirable? Why should I believe that free will is objectively good? Or 'human flourishing', whatever that means? Or enlightenment?

    Society, as it exists, requires suffering. We cannot progress towards society's goals, such as they can be said to exist, without people suffering. Not everyone can enjoy their lives to the fullest at every moment while still doing whatever it is that our grand human endeavor is meant to be doing (spreading the species, gaining knowledge, increasing our net worth, whatever). Which means that we, as humans, are either objectively immoral as a global culture or else the axiom is not "suffering is bad", but "suffering is bad except when necessary in pursuit of goals X, Y, and Z". I don't see any way to select X, Y, and Z that are truly objective.

    CptHamilton on
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  • Grid SystemGrid System Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Nobody says that the universe has to be a kind and inviting place. We aren't yet at a point (if such a point exists) where the elimination of suffering is possible.

    And, simply put, humans as a global culture are pretty shitty. We do a lot of horrendous stuff for no good reason at all. I'm quite comfortable saying that.

    Grid System on
  • TaberTaber Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »

    Edit: Well actually this question is much simpler. Anyone can clearly see that making killing morally required is not a general rule that anyone could live with (wordplay = fun). That is a rule literally anathema to human life, and thus it is trivially wrong.

    Morality is about what actions are good or bad, not about what actions propagate human life. Why is human life continuing objectively good?
    kant wrote:
    Look at any rule. Is it logical? What would be the consequences if this rule was followed universally? Would it be logical to ‘will’ (want) the situation that would result from this rule?

    All life forms on Earth die. Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing is wholly subjective.

    Taber on
  • Apothe0sisApothe0sis Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    That's a clear confusion of what I'm saying.

    A) In the context of my example the exercise of free will is evaluated in relationship to suffering/human flourishing. Allowing the exercise of free will prevents suffering (because people are miserable, having their agency removed) or supports human flourishing, etc.

    B) There is no reason to believe there's only one principle at play in determining the morality of an action. Human flourishing, minimisation of suffering, freedom of the will and conscience can all be (possibly competing) principles which we are to hold and balance in. It might be the case that there are multiple criteria or, ultimately, only one - either possibility is perfectly compatible with non-relativist positions.

    C) As I said, asking "what determines what goals should be desirable" is just as problematic for questions of medicine. Or to put it more basically the question "What determines what kind of food is desirable" has a lot of different answers many of which are valid, but this does nothing to erase the distinction between food and poison. There might be multiple good systems of morality, but that doesn't mean that there aren't clearly bad ones.

    D) The stuff about society requiring suffering is a fairly bizarre non sequitur.

    NB. 'Human flourishing' is an alternative to the usual "minimisation of suffering" - usefully it's a positive principle as opposed to a negative one. It refers to a range of things - usually around the promotion of health, happiness and so forth. We can start to try and give it some broad strokes of definition, but like trying to define what "health" is it quickly becomes quite unwieldly. I'd be happier if it was "Sentient flourishing" or something like this so that when our silicon-based brethren arise they're already accounted for.

    Apothe0sis on
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Nobody says that the universe has to be a kind and inviting place. We aren't yet at a point (if such a point exists) where the elimination of suffering is possible.

    And, simply put, humans as a global culture are pretty shitty. We do a lot of horrendous stuff for no good reason at all. I'm quite comfortable saying that.

    So is cultural quality a moral imperative? Would it be ethical for a subset of humanity to cause the suffering of the rest in pursuit of a new global culture which is 'better'?

    If you say that suffering is axiomatically bad then either you're saying that the universe can be a kind and inviting place or you're saying that the universe is inherently bad. The universe doesn't appear to give a shit about human suffering, and indeed every potential timeline leads to a state that would undeniably entail greater human suffering. So the universe is evil?

    CptHamilton on
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  • Apothe0sisApothe0sis Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    The universe isn't a moral agent.

    Apothe0sis on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    ... why are you taking for granted that the point of morality is reducing suffering. Abrahamic religions' morality explicitly isn't for reducing suffering, it is to please God. A side effect of pleasing God is reducing suffering, but that isn't why you are supposed to follow it.

    That's why ethics can judge religion and law. Ethics is the application of reason to determine good and bad actions and religion obviously requires the abandonment of reason where God demands it. This also why religion makes for terribly unjust legal systems. Also, let's please not devolve into a religion thread here and come up with other examples. Please.

    hanskey on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »

    Edit: Well actually this question is much simpler. Anyone can clearly see that making killing morally required is not a general rule that anyone could live with (wordplay = fun). That is a rule literally anathema to human life, and thus it is trivially wrong.

    Morality is about what actions are good or bad, not about what actions propagate human life. Why is human life continuing objectively good?
    kant wrote:
    Look at any rule. Is it logical? What would be the consequences if this rule was followed universally? Would it be logical to ‘will’ (want) the situation that would result from this rule?

    All life forms on Earth die. Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing is wholly subjective.

    Frankly, I'd be surprised to find that you actually believe that and aren't simply pursuing the abandonment of reason to play devil's advocate.

    hanskey on
  • TaberTaber Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    Taber on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Nobody says that the universe has to be a kind and inviting place. We aren't yet at a point (if such a point exists) where the elimination of suffering is possible.

    And, simply put, humans as a global culture are pretty shitty. We do a lot of horrendous stuff for no good reason at all. I'm quite comfortable saying that.

    So is cultural quality a moral imperative? Would it be ethical for a subset of humanity to cause the suffering of the rest in pursuit of a new global culture which is 'better'?

    If you say that suffering is axiomatically bad then either you're saying that the universe can be a kind and inviting place or you're saying that the universe is inherently bad. The universe doesn't appear to give a shit about human suffering, and indeed every potential timeline leads to a state that would undeniably entail greater human suffering. So the universe is evil?

    You are making it too complicated: apply reason. Also your hypotheticals really need to be fleshed out much more if you expect them to be a serious item of discourse.

    hanskey on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    Frankly, you aren't providing nearly enough info to even pretend that is a serious question.

    hanskey on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    We're talking full-on predicate logic here yo!!!

    hanskey on
  • Grid SystemGrid System Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Nobody says that the universe has to be a kind and inviting place. We aren't yet at a point (if such a point exists) where the elimination of suffering is possible.

    And, simply put, humans as a global culture are pretty shitty. We do a lot of horrendous stuff for no good reason at all. I'm quite comfortable saying that.

    So is cultural quality a moral imperative? Would it be ethical for a subset of humanity to cause the suffering of the rest in pursuit of a new global culture which is 'better'?
    Probably not, because you can never be sure of an outcome. You might impose all of that suffering and have no benefit at all to show for it. Not to mention that you'd have to have a pretty spectacular new global culture to offset all the ticks on the "harm" column, if that is even something you can do.
    If you say that suffering is axiomatically bad then either you're saying that the universe can be a kind and inviting place or you're saying that the universe is inherently bad. The universe doesn't appear to give a shit about human suffering, and indeed every potential timeline leads to a state that would undeniably entail greater human suffering. So the universe is evil?
    Apothe0sis wrote: »
    The universe isn't a moral agent.

    Grid System on
  • Apothe0sisApothe0sis Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    We have two systems of health. One reduces sickness and pain to essentially nothing, while maximising quality of life. The other results in short, pain-filled lives. Why is the first system objectively better?

    Re: edit

    That would be rather assuming what you hope to prove.

    Apothe0sis on
  • voodoosporkvoodoospork Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Let's say that I built a fabulous device that would instantly kill every person on the planet. Let's say that this device also downloads them into a Matrix-style virtual world, creating a continuity of experience.

    On the one hand, I have killed/imprisoned the population of Earth. On the other hand, these people are now free to go on entirely unaware of this fact in a simulated environment that can be rolled back or adjusted as necessary to maximize virtual human flourishing and minimize virtual human suffering in ways that could not be accomplished otherwise.

    There could be a more complicated and realistic form, but I think the bones of the ethical dilemma are present. From the subjective point of view of almost all human beings, it would be a substantial boon. Dropped babies manage to land just right a little more often, the virus that decimates the human population causes a roll back and a tweak of the virus before anyone is even aware of it, the universe itself loves and protects the human race. How could this act be judged objectively?

    voodoospork on
  • Grid SystemGrid System Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    A device that complex would have too high a chance and price of failure to ever be reasonable to employ.

    Grid System on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Let's say that I built a fabulous device that would instantly kill every person on the planet. Let's say that this device also downloads them into a Matrix-style virtual world, creating a continuity of experience.

    On the one hand, I have killed/imprisoned the population of Earth. On the other hand, these people are now free to go on entirely unaware of this fact in a simulated environment that can be rolled back or adjusted as necessary to maximize virtual human flourishing and minimize virtual human suffering in ways that could not be accomplished otherwise.

    There could be a more complicated and realistic form, but I think the bones of the ethical dilemma are present. From the subjective point of view of almost all human beings, it would be a substantial boon. Dropped babies manage to land just right a little more often, the virus that decimates the human population causes a roll back and a tweak of the virus before anyone is even aware of it, the universe itself loves and protects the human race. How could this act be judged objectively?
    Nah, this still is just a toy problem and in no way realistic about actual consequences.

    hanskey on
  • JepheryJephery Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    We're talking full-on predicate logic here yo!!!

    Right, within a single moral framework morality can be objective because we can work off our established axioms. Once we start debating what those axioms should be morality becomes subjective.

    Jephery on
    }
    "Orkses never lose a battle. If we win we win, if we die we die fightin so it don't count. If we runs for it we don't die neither, cos we can come back for annuver go, see!".
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    If it's axiomatic then either it must be self-evidently true - which it is not - or it is simply assumed to be axiomatic in your system, making your system irrelevant to anyone who judges your founding axiom to be false.

    CptHamilton on
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  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    If it's axiomatic then either it must be self-evidently true - which it is not - or it is simply assumed to be axiomatic in your system, making your system irrelevant to anyone who judges your founding axiom to be false.
    We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad
    Do I need to remind you what "self-evidently" actually means or have you gotten caught up in devil's advocate fever despite your reason?

    hanskey on
  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Jephery wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    We're talking full-on predicate logic here yo!!!

    Right, within a single moral framework morality can be objective because we can work off our established axioms. Once we start debating what those axioms should be morality becomes subjective.

    All the way up until you run aground of something other than a toy problem and actually have to consider realistic consequences and scenarios.

    hanskey on
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    If it's axiomatic then either it must be self-evidently true - which it is not - or it is simply assumed to be axiomatic in your system, making your system irrelevant to anyone who judges your founding axiom to be false.
    We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad
    Do I need to remind you what "self-evidently" actually means?

    I don't agree. I'd prefer to go on existing, but if I died I'd no longer be around to care. Nobody would, if we all died. It may or may not be bad for us all to die, depending on what you think the value of our continued existence is, but it's hardly self-evident. I also don't see why it would be bad for any other sentient species or bad for the universe in general.

    CptHamilton on
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  • JepheryJephery Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    All the way up until you run aground of something other than a toy problem and actually have to consider realistic consequences and scenarios.

    A system of axioms doesn't have to be complete or consistent though. Objectively we may realize that we don't have an answer to whether something is moral or not within our agreed upon system or that we have more than one right answer.

    Jephery on
    }
    "Orkses never lose a battle. If we win we win, if we die we die fightin so it don't count. If we runs for it we don't die neither, cos we can come back for annuver go, see!".
  • TaberTaber Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    If it's axiomatic then either it must be self-evidently true - which it is not - or it is simply assumed to be axiomatic in your system, making your system irrelevant to anyone who judges your founding axiom to be false.
    We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad
    Do I need to remind you what "self-evidently" actually means?

    It is possible to come up with a goal for morality that doesn't involve reducing suffering that we don't all agree is bad though. Pleasing God, punishing 'wicked' humanity, heck there might be some out there that don't agree that obliterating life is a bad thing.

    Taber on
  • LoserForHireXLoserForHireX Philosopher King The AcademyRegistered User regular
    edited June 2011
    jothki wrote: »
    jothki wrote: »
    The problem there is more that moral objectivists have difficulty comprehending moral relativism.

    Okay, then break it down for me.

    I want you to tell me what Moral Relativism is.

    The idea behind relativism isn't that there is no truth, but that there are multiple truths, and that the judgement of one sort of truth doesn't affect the nature of others. Someone who believes that murder is wrong may consider someone who believes that murder is right to be evil, and be correct. The person who supports murder may consider someone who opposes it to be evil, and also be correct. This is not necessarily a contradiction, though it is also probably necessarily a contradiction to the people who believe that they are objectively correct. This is itself both a contradiction and not a contradiction, which is a contradiction and not a contradiction, and so on. It's possible to be bothered by this infinite regress, but it's also possible to not be bothered. A relativist is not bothered by it.

    One consequence of this is that moral relativism concludes that moral objectivism is correct, even though moral objectivism concludes that moral relativism is wrong. By debating, I'm just trying to get moral objectivists to better understand why they're right.

    If anyone disagrees with my evaluation of relativism, don't worry, you're correct too. :P

    Okay, now I understand what the problem is.

    It is now unproductive for us to discuss this further.

    I didn't want you to think that I was ignoring your post, and I'm honestly not trying to be a dick about it.

    LoserForHireX on
    "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
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  • MrMisterMrMister Jesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    If the problem is that ethics rests on basic propositions about which one could conceivably disagree, but which cannot be further defended or explained, then why does that problem not infect all knowledge quite generally? For instance, why do we not face the exact same problem when it comes to empirical knowledge of induction, of the past, of other minds, of a real external world, and so on? And yet, as far as I can tell, no one is advocating that knowledge of the position of the sun is subjective.

    MrMister on
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Taber wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »
    hanskey wrote: »
    Taber wrote: »
    Ok. We have two morality systems. One reduces suffering to essentially nothing. The other causes extreme amounts of suffering. Why is the first system objectively better?

    edit: value judgements are inherently subjective. We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad, but it is still a value judgement and therefore subjective.

    No. It is an axiom and therefore universal in our system of logic applied to morality.

    If it's axiomatic then either it must be self-evidently true - which it is not - or it is simply assumed to be axiomatic in your system, making your system irrelevant to anyone who judges your founding axiom to be false.
    We all agree that the obliteration of life on Earth would be bad
    Do I need to remind you what "self-evidently" actually means?

    It is possible to come up with a goal for morality that doesn't involve reducing suffering that we don't all agree is bad though. Pleasing God, punishing 'wicked' humanity, heck there might be some out there that don't agree that obliterating life is a bad thing.

    We can certainly pick some axioms and build a logic out of them, but if we are cherry-picking our axioms the framework is hardly objective. It can be objective to the situation at hand, which is what I thought was the goal of objectivism until people started calling value judgements self-evident.

    I'm not all convinced that it is possible in practice to actually construct a mon-trivial ethical logic, even accepting the selection of undefined moral axioms.

    CptHamilton on
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  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    MrMister wrote: »
    If the problem is that ethics rests on basic propositions about which one could conceivably disagree, but which cannot be further defended or explained, then why does that problem not infect all knowledge quite generally? For instance, why do we not face the exact same problem when it comes to empirical knowledge of induction, of the past, of other minds, of a real external world, and so on? And yet, as far as I can tell, no one is advocating that knowledge of the position of the sun is subjective.

    Because no one has any particular reason to claim that their knowledge of solar positioning is based on objective measurements and therefore superior. I'm fine with a conceptual ethical framework founded on selected axioms which are acknowledged to be subjective. I don't think that such a framework could be composed as even the simplest ethical decision would require a prohibitively complex calculus. I just find it ridiculous to say that such and such is an objective moral standard for the same reason I'd be confounded by someone saying "obviously my measurents are perfectly accurate... Just look at them!"

    CptHamilton on
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  • Apothe0sisApothe0sis Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    MrMister wrote: »
    If the problem is that ethics rests on basic propositions about which one could conceivably disagree, but which cannot be further defended or explained, then why does that problem not infect all knowledge quite generally? For instance, why do we not face the exact same problem when it comes to empirical knowledge of induction, of the past, of other minds, of a real external world, and so on? And yet, as far as I can tell, no one is advocating that knowledge of the position of the sun is subjective.

    This.

    This is what I have been Socratically attempting to argue.

    Apothe0sis on
  • MrMisterMrMister Jesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Because no one has any particular reason to claim that their knowledge of solar positioning is based on objective measurements and therefore superior.

    Wait, what? People do that all the time. What did classical astronomy consist in except competing claims about questions like which were the best measurements of the position of the sun?

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  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    MrMister wrote: »
    Because no one has any particular reason to claim that their knowledge of solar positioning is based on objective measurements and therefore superior.

    Wait, what? People do that all the time. What did classical astronomy consist in except competing claims about which were the best measurements of the position of the sun?

    They claim their measurements to be more accurate on the basis of X methodology or Y equipment. The equivalent here would be saying that measurement of solar distance using Lunar parallax is less accurate not because of the sensitivity to experimental error, but because the parallax of Venus is self-evidently the appropriate method.

    Edit: that's not really a good analogy... There is no good analogy because no one who simply claimed that the distance was obvious and didn't require explaining would be taken seriously.

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  • Grid SystemGrid System Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    I don't think that such a framework could be composed as even the simplest ethical decision would require a prohibitively complex calculus.
    On a day to day basis, you wouldn't have to do that anyway. Most of the decisions we make are pretty easy to hash out as we go. They're also not terribly important, so if we make a mistake we can apologize and move on. And as the stakes get higher, I don't think there's anything wrong with trying really hard to figure out how to arrive at the most likely best outcome.

    Grid System on
  • MrMisterMrMister Jesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    MrMister wrote: »
    Wait, what? People do that all the time. What did classical astronomy consist in except competing claims about which were the best measurements of the position of the sun?

    They claim their measurements to be more accurate on the basis of X methodology or Y equipment. The equivalent here would be saying that measurement of solar distance using Lunar parallax is less accurate not because of the sensitivity to experimental error, but because the parallax of Venus is self-evidently the appropriate method.

    You're not going deep enough. What about the person who disagrees because they think divine revelation is the only real source of knowledge, and their divine revelation conflicts with your empirical finding? Or because they think that there is actually no planet of Venus, because the heavens are a perceptual illusion? Or because they think that the past does not accurately predict the future, and thus that Venus has likely ceased to exist? And so on. How do these people not put you in the exact same situation we were just so despairing of in ethics?

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  • hanskeyhanskey Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    Actually, killing is wrong is a good axiom precisely because it has an excellent empirical foundation, that it extends by logic. It is trivial to demonstrate that all disease free living beings desire life despite suffering, by instinct. If the only good is reducing suffering then you cannot explain this because death is the only sure end to suffering. This is why the prohibition against killing is more fundamental as an ethical basis. This same calculus can easily be applied to any alternative primary axiom you can formulate.

    It is also trivial to demonstrate a universal preference for satisfaction over suffering in all disease free beings, and this may be a secondary axiom conditioned by the killing rule.

    hanskey on
  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    MrMister wrote: »
    MrMister wrote: »
    Wait, what? People do that all the time. What did classical astronomy consist in except competing claims about which were the best measurements of the position of the sun?

    They claim their measurements to be more accurate on the basis of X methodology or Y equipment. The equivalent here would be saying that measurement of solar distance using Lunar parallax is less accurate not because of the sensitivity to experimental error, but because the parallax of Venus is self-evidently the appropriate method.

    You're not going deep enough. What about the person who disagrees because they think divine revelation is the only real source of knowledge, and their divine revelation conflicts with your empirical finding? Or because they think that there is actually no planet of Venus, because the heavens are a perceptual illusion? Or because they think that the past does not accurately predict the future, and thus that Venus has likely ceased to exist? And so on. How do these people not put you in the exact same situation we were just so despairing of in ethics?

    All of those people exist, or at least plausibly could exist. And their claims are dismissed as irrelevant because the admittedly subjective empiricism allows for more subjective empiricism. The majority agree that maybe we are wrong, but at least we are consistent. Which seems like a fine basis for a system of ethics. Why do objective moral truths cone into it if they aren't relevant anywhere else?

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  • CptHamiltonCptHamilton Registered User regular
    edited June 2011
    hanskey wrote: »
    Actually, killing is wrong is a good axiom precisely because it has an excellent empirical foundation. It is trivial to demonstrate that all disease free living beings desire life despite suffering, by instinct. If the only good is reducing suffering then you cannot explain this because death is the only sure end to suffering. This is why the prohibition against killing is more fundamental as an ethical basis.

    It is also trivial to demonstrate a universal preference for satisfaction over suffering in all disease free beings, and this may be a secondary axiom conditioned by the killing rule.

    Then why does suicide exist?

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