Most Egyptian journalists have had to watch their tongues and tone down their reporting over the past three years to keep their jobs under a military-dominated government. Now, the state is ordering some women working as television anchors to practice a similar restraint with their weight.
Earlier this week, Safaa Hegazy, the director of state-run Egyptian radio and television, barred eight anchorwomen from appearing on the air for a month, saying they were overweight, the state-owned Al-Ahram news website confirmed. Ms. Hegazy ordered the women to go on a diet during their suspensions, Al-Ahram said.
Khadija Khatab, one of the eight anchorwomen, said that she had not yet been formally notified of Ms. Hegazy’s order, but added that she was recently told that “measures will be taken against” those who fail to lose weight by mid-September, according to an interview she gave to a privately owned television station.
Ms. Khatab said she was offended that coverage of her ordeal included words like “fat” and similar terms she called “unfair” and “insulting.” She also said that the pictures of her that had been circulating and mocked on the internet and social media sites were old and that she had lost weight since they were taken.
“I believe I am an ordinary Egyptian woman who looks normal, and I don’t wear too much makeup,” Ms. Khatab said, challenging people to contradict her.
Many did.
Alaa el-Sadani, a commentator for Al-Ahram, said that she was “sickened by the disgusting and repulsive” appearance of the eight suspended anchors, and that she believed the rest of the country agreed with her.
Fatma al-Sharawi, another Al-Ahram writer, welcomed the move as a way to improve the abysmal ratings of the state channels. “Is a ban for eight enough?” she asked.
Viewership of state television, long dismissed by many Egyptians as a comically biased news source, fell significantly after the uprising that removed President Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011.
“They don’t understand that people don’t watch them because they have no credibility, skills or quality,” said Mostafa Shawky, a free-press advocate with the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. “It has nothing to do with looks. But it goes to show that actual skill is not something they care about.”
Mr. Shawky said the suspensions reinforced a widespread notion in Egypt that only women who meet a certain definition of beauty should work in television journalism. “The fact that it is a woman who is doing all of this just makes it all the worse,” he said.
Ms. Hegazy could not be reached for comment.
Really goes to show you how out of touch and delusional people running the state media are. I occasionally channel surf the Egyptian non-film stations, and they are in a sorry state. Half the ads are government PSAs extolling the virtues of saving electricity and water; apparently Egypt will become a great nation as soon as people turn off the lights. News propaganda segments haven't evolved past what we used to see in the 90s. It's Al Sisi touring a factory and getting a well rehearsed talk about Egypt's great industrial future. In the last one I saw, and I do not exaggerate, the person conducting the tour made to sure to include an honorific between every 5 to 6 words. He talked for maybe 10 minutes, and not once did he slip up. But no one seems to want to watch that. Solution: tell women to lose weight.
So your saying the Egyptian state is basically Shane from the Walking Dead?
Unfortunately, places called Nutella Bar have recently been spreading in Tehran," wrote the head of the Academy, Golamali Hadad Adel, in a letter to police last month.
"In these shops, chocolate is served with special bread and ice cream. The Academy proposes the use of 'Hot Bread, Hot Chocolate' for these shops."
edit - the article itself is pretty interesting though outside of the humor value
It's not really Iran-Contra though.
It was not illegal, they were not trying to hush it up and while I believe that there was a fair amount of tit-for-tat (because that's what international politics is) it's more of a Show of Good Faith.
I think it's more a case of Obama holding Iran hostage over the 1979 deal and saying "Hey. We're willing to pay indemnities for the failed arms affair...but do you really think we're going to do it while you hold US citizens prisoner?".
Because by international tradelaw Iran (as the recognized successor-government of Iran) do have a right to compensation for the US failure to complete the 1979 arms deal.
Ehhh I think the legality is questionable. They didn't use US dollars because it isn't legal to send those to Iran under sanctions (not all sanctions were lifted after the nuclear deal remember, there are other sanctions about ballistic missiles and terrorism). Converting to a different currency in secret to get around sanctions is... if not illegal, then verging on it.
Because Iran won a case at the Hague based on weapon purchases under the Shah that were never delivered on and considering the US actually follows international law we are complying with the repayment of all that money that the Hague granted Iran and we negotiated it down to.
It was post Hillary.
It is international law and tied to our backing of the bloody and despotic previous regime.
It has nothing to do with the nuke deal or the hostages who were released.
Thought this little story was over...
The State Department has said a $400m (£300.8m) cash payment to Iran was used as "leverage" in the release of five US prisoners.
Spokesman John Kirby maintained the payment was negotiated separately from the release, but said it was withheld until the Americans had left Iran.
So it wasn't a ransom, you see, it was just money that would only be paid when prisoners were released!
If you borrow my table saw and I owe you $100, not giving you the $100 until you return it doesn't mean you are holding my saw for ransom.
There's a reason they used the word leverage. It covers a lot of less than 100% squeaky clean activity.
And I've got zero problem with any of that. We owed Iran money, Iran had some of our people, we can either pay what we owe them in a timely manner, or we can put it on our 'to-do in 2020' list.
With "less than 100% clean" and "leverage" are pretty much the definition of 95% of EU foreign policy. The last 5% being aerial bombing.
That's just how people play ball in international politics, when they want to play nice that is.
"The western world sips from a poisonous cocktail: Polarisation, populism, protectionism and post-truth"
-Antje Jackelén, Archbishop of the Church of Sweden
Unfortunately, places called Nutella Bar have recently been spreading in Tehran," wrote the head of the Academy, Golamali Hadad Adel, in a letter to police last month.
"In these shops, chocolate is served with special bread and ice cream. The Academy proposes the use of 'Hot Bread, Hot Chocolate' for these shops."
edit - the article itself is pretty interesting though outside of the humor value
Is the propsal that they rebrand as "[HC,HB] Bars" or simply [HC,HB]; as in:
"[Let's go to the HotChocolateHotBread and get some] Nutella crepes!" ?
The Pentagon warned the Syrian government Friday not to strike U.S. and coalition personnel in Syria, a day after the regime carried out airstrikes in an area near American special operations forces, prompting the U.S. to scramble jets to protect them.
The U.S. jets arrived just as the two Syrian government Su-24 bombers were departing, according to Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, who said none of the U.S. forces on the ground were harmed.
The Syrian government bombers had been striking Kurdish positions near the city of Hasakah, where the U.S. has been backing Kurdish forces in the fight against Islamic State.
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
Here i thought it might've been because the Syrian government didn't know where those forces were deployed, being secret operations and all. This implies that their location is being shared with Assad and his allies.
Although with Assad going hard after the Kurds up near Manbij now, who knows.
The Pentagon warned the Syrian government Friday not to strike U.S. and coalition personnel in Syria, a day after the regime carried out airstrikes in an area near American special operations forces, prompting the U.S. to scramble jets to protect them.
The U.S. jets arrived just as the two Syrian government Su-24 bombers were departing, according to Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, who said none of the U.S. forces on the ground were harmed.
The Syrian government bombers had been striking Kurdish positions near the city of Hasakah, where the U.S. has been backing Kurdish forces in the fight against Islamic State.
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
Yeah. As I said before I've been wondering if SDF territory essentially constitutes a no-fly zone at this point, given the presence of US troops on the ground and the presence of the USAF in the skies. This incident seems like it could be taken either way - on the one hand, the Syrian air force bombed the YPG and weren't shot down. On the other hand, the US threatened retaliation if its soldiers were bombed and, from the sounds of it, flew sorties to challenge the Syrian planes. That's starting to sound pretty close to a no-fly zone.
I just posted a couple days ago about how I thought the Syrian government would be hesitant to bomb the SDF; Syria loves to prove me wrong whenever I tentatively try to make a prediction or judgment. Although I am skeptical that the escalation of the fighting in Hasakah was primarily due to the SAA/NDF (National Defense Force; basically loyalist militia) - they are completely surrounded by the SDF, and far from the government's main territories. Tactically, picking a fight with the YPG in the northeast makes no sense. Strategically I can't think of why they'd do so unless they're just trying to send a message to the US/test the US's commitment to protecting the SDF. But even that sounds risky. In my opinion it's more likely that the YPG was the primary instigator, as they want to consolidate control of their territory and remaining government positions in Hasakah and Qamishli are a thorn in their side. Fighting in these cities has happened on numerous past occasions, but usually it's a minor skirmish or two followed by a ceasefire/return to status quo. I don't think things have ever reached the point of airstrikes before, although I could be wrong about that.
I'm sorta concerned that the US/SDF alliance, ostensibly based on a shared enemy in IS, might reposition itself as another US-backed anti-Assad alliance if the IS threat is reduced. On the other hand, in the recent battles for Aleppo city, the YPG in Sheik Maqsud fought the rebels at a critical moment and helped enable the government's short-lived imposition of a siege. It's hard to tell how much either incident reflects overall SDF policy or individual tactical decisions based on localized conflicts, but right now I'd still lean more toward the latter in each case.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
This is what the Russian government has been aiming for since the Rojava office opened in Moscow months ago--and it is important that the Syrian government likewise acknowledge the deal openly. Of course, that's no guarantee against the truce falling apart in the immediate future.
I think we're seeing a high-level political game between the different Kurdish leadership factions and both the Damascus and Russian governments. Despite the office closure (that I'd missed), the PYD has publicly stated that it believes Turkish and Russian political goals are irreconcilable, particularly over Syria, no matter what summits are held between leadership. And their argument, while old, is very sound on its surface: the USSR and post-Soviet Russia provided decades of support to the PKK, and their are deep connections (that have historically infuriated Turkey) between Kurdish military leaders and clandestine Soviet backers. Soviet-Turkish (and Russian-Turkish) relations have been flimsy by comparison, despite being on a state-to-state level.
The rumor from the Turkish media is, when Pres. Erdogan brought up the matter with Pres. Putin, his Russian counterpart denied knowledge of the PYD and YPG having offices in Moscow. Or so the rumor goes.
Of course, these alliances don't last forever. Pres. al-Assad's father actually offered material support (and even sanctuary) to both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish guerrilla movements in the 1970s and onwards--but by the time his son came to power, said groups associates were labeled terrorists organizations (as they were by the United States and a lot of other governments). Even if the Kurdish leadership publicly is still optimistic it doesn't mean everything is set in stone.
The Pentagon warned the Syrian government Friday not to strike U.S. and coalition personnel in Syria, a day after the regime carried out airstrikes in an area near American special operations forces, prompting the U.S. to scramble jets to protect them.
The U.S. jets arrived just as the two Syrian government Su-24 bombers were departing, according to Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, who said none of the U.S. forces on the ground were harmed.
The Syrian government bombers had been striking Kurdish positions near the city of Hasakah, where the U.S. has been backing Kurdish forces in the fight against Islamic State.
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
It doesn't seem fair that the US expects to operate Special Forces inside Syria to undermine Assad but expects them to not be targets of state forces.
The Pentagon warned the Syrian government Friday not to strike U.S. and coalition personnel in Syria, a day after the regime carried out airstrikes in an area near American special operations forces, prompting the U.S. to scramble jets to protect them.
The U.S. jets arrived just as the two Syrian government Su-24 bombers were departing, according to Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, who said none of the U.S. forces on the ground were harmed.
The Syrian government bombers had been striking Kurdish positions near the city of Hasakah, where the U.S. has been backing Kurdish forces in the fight against Islamic State.
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
It doesn't seem fair that the US expects to operate Special Forces inside Syria to undermine Assad but expects them to not be targets of state forces.
And that would indeed not be fair, if that was why they were there.
It looks more like the Kurds and the government started fighting about the fate of the city. The American Special forces are there to back the Kurds against IS. No news report I have seen says the special forces are engaged against Assad.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
This is what the Russian government has been aiming for since the Rojava office opened in Moscow months ago--and it is important that the Syrian government likewise acknowledge the deal openly. Of course, that's no guarantee against the truce falling apart in the immediate future.
I think we're seeing a high-level political game between the different Kurdish leadership factions and both the Damascus and Russian governments. Despite the office closure (that I'd missed), the PYD has publicly stated that it believes Turkish and Russian political goals are irreconcilable, particularly over Syria, no matter what summits are held between leadership. And their argument, while old, is very sound on its surface: the USSR and post-Soviet Russia provided decades of support to the PKK, and their are deep connections (that have historically infuriated Turkey) between Kurdish military leaders and clandestine Soviet backers. Soviet-Turkish (and Russian-Turkish) relations have been flimsy by comparison, despite being on a state-to-state level.
The rumor from the Turkish media is, when Pres. Erdogan brought up the matter with Pres. Putin, his Russian counterpart denied knowledge of the PYD and YPG having offices in Moscow. Or so the rumor goes.
Of course, these alliances don't last forever. Pres. al-Assad's father actually offered material support (and even sanctuary) to both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish guerrilla movements in the 1970s and onwards--but by the time his son came to power, said groups associates were labeled terrorists organizations (as they were by the United States and a lot of other governments). Even if the Kurdish leadership publicly is still optimistic it doesn't mean everything is set in stone.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
This is what the Russian government has been aiming for since the Rojava office opened in Moscow months ago--and it is important that the Syrian government likewise acknowledge the deal openly. Of course, that's no guarantee against the truce falling apart in the immediate future.
I think we're seeing a high-level political game between the different Kurdish leadership factions and both the Damascus and Russian governments. Despite the office closure (that I'd missed), the PYD has publicly stated that it believes Turkish and Russian political goals are irreconcilable, particularly over Syria, no matter what summits are held between leadership. And their argument, while old, is very sound on its surface: the USSR and post-Soviet Russia provided decades of support to the PKK, and their are deep connections (that have historically infuriated Turkey) between Kurdish military leaders and clandestine Soviet backers. Soviet-Turkish (and Russian-Turkish) relations have been flimsy by comparison, despite being on a state-to-state level.
The rumor from the Turkish media is, when Pres. Erdogan brought up the matter with Pres. Putin, his Russian counterpart denied knowledge of the PYD and YPG having offices in Moscow. Or so the rumor goes.
Of course, these alliances don't last forever. Pres. al-Assad's father actually offered material support (and even sanctuary) to both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish guerrilla movements in the 1970s and onwards--but by the time his son came to power, said groups associates were labeled terrorists organizations (as they were by the United States and a lot of other governments). Even if the Kurdish leadership publicly is still optimistic it doesn't mean everything is set in stone.
The Pentagon warned the Syrian government Friday not to strike U.S. and coalition personnel in Syria, a day after the regime carried out airstrikes in an area near American special operations forces, prompting the U.S. to scramble jets to protect them.
The U.S. jets arrived just as the two Syrian government Su-24 bombers were departing, according to Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis, who said none of the U.S. forces on the ground were harmed.
The Syrian government bombers had been striking Kurdish positions near the city of Hasakah, where the U.S. has been backing Kurdish forces in the fight against Islamic State.
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
It doesn't seem fair that the US expects to operate Special Forces inside Syria to undermine Assad but expects them to not be targets of state forces.
And that would indeed not be fair, if that was why they were there.
It looks more like the Kurds and the government started fighting about the fate of the city. The American Special forces are there to back the Kurds against IS. No news report I have seen says the special forces are engaged against Assad.
Have you seen differently?
Well we're arming the FSA and other anti-Assad groups, and providing training to them. The Kurd's are not Anti-Assad for now, but I feel their long term goal in independence from Syria.
I guess I'm trying to say given our Anti-Assad positions it's hard to draw a line between our "Anti-ISIS" actions and our "Anti-Assad" actions. The weapons and training we provide can and will be used against regime forces at some point, and this is a feature not a bug.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
This is what the Russian government has been aiming for since the Rojava office opened in Moscow months ago--and it is important that the Syrian government likewise acknowledge the deal openly. Of course, that's no guarantee against the truce falling apart in the immediate future.
I think we're seeing a high-level political game between the different Kurdish leadership factions and both the Damascus and Russian governments. Despite the office closure (that I'd missed), the PYD has publicly stated that it believes Turkish and Russian political goals are irreconcilable, particularly over Syria, no matter what summits are held between leadership. And their argument, while old, is very sound on its surface: the USSR and post-Soviet Russia provided decades of support to the PKK, and their are deep connections (that have historically infuriated Turkey) between Kurdish military leaders and clandestine Soviet backers. Soviet-Turkish (and Russian-Turkish) relations have been flimsy by comparison, despite being on a state-to-state level.
The rumor from the Turkish media is, when Pres. Erdogan brought up the matter with Pres. Putin, his Russian counterpart denied knowledge of the PYD and YPG having offices in Moscow. Or so the rumor goes.
Of course, these alliances don't last forever. Pres. al-Assad's father actually offered material support (and even sanctuary) to both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish guerrilla movements in the 1970s and onwards--but by the time his son came to power, said groups associates were labeled terrorists organizations (as they were by the United States and a lot of other governments). Even if the Kurdish leadership publicly is still optimistic it doesn't mean everything is set in stone.
I wonder if the relationship between the EU and Turkey will further deteriorate when the arms Germany is supplying the iraqi Kurds with show up in fights against Syrian and Turkish Forces. Germany had stopped the supply earlier this year because some weapons showed up on markets etc. but now the Kurds got another shipment of rifles, anti-tank missiles and armoured vehicles according to Süddeutsche.de.
"To all the elements of the regime and its militias who are besieged in the city you are targeted by our units," leaflets distributed by the YPG said.
"This battle is decided and we will not retreat ... We call on you to give up your weapons or count yourselves dead."
So I guess that ceasefire didn't really happen/work out
edit - meanwhile, to the west, Turkey's favored rebel factions gather on their side of the border with Syria in preparation for an assault on IS-held Jarabulus, their remaining border stronghold. Given the YPG's victory in Manbij, this move may be partly motivated by Turkey's desire to ensure that the YPG does not control the Turkish border in Aleppo Governorate.
I wonder if the relationship between the EU and Turkey will further deteriorate when the arms Germany is supplying the iraqi Kurds with show up in fights against Syrian and Turkish Forces. Germany had stopped the supply earlier this year because some weapons showed up on markets etc. but now the Kurds got another shipment of rifles, anti-tank missiles and armoured vehicles according to Süddeutsche.de.
While there's probably some black market trade, the KRG in Iraq does not have good relations with the PYD in Syria and is unlikely to arm them on a significant scale, IMO.
Iran's sudden reversal Monday showed that allies with a common cause, fighting against Assad's enemies, maintain diverse goals in the region. While Russian politicians indicated a long-term deployment, saying that warplanes stationed in Iran would conserve fuel instead of flying a longer route from the Russian Caucasus, Iranian officials made clear that they were unhappy about the publicity and being seen as a Russian client in the region.
Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan on Monday attacked publications of the Russian military press that reported the use of Iran's air base. “There has been a kind of showing-off and inconsiderate attitude behind the announcement of this news,” he told an Iranian television channel.
I was surprised to see that alliance be so public, so this makes sense to me.
It was a very controversial move at home for the Iranians, being debatably constitutional as we've seen but also because the Iranian on the street is understandably wary of foreign interference.
The Sirte offensive continues to squeeze ISIS out of their major Libyan holding, the attackers took over a mosque and a "morality jail" on Sunday. Of course the ISIS militants are fleeing into the southern desert, but the question is if they'll have power to really effect anything back there aside from being a perpetual thorn in Tripoli's side.
It's aggravating that Ankara is using this terrorist attack as a rhetorical point to try and draw parallels between ISIS, the Kurds, and Gulen.
The Pentagon warned the Syrian regime Monday it is prepared to shoot down planes threatening US-led coalition forces in northern Syria, but stopped short of declaring a no-fly zone.
So we've gone from "no boots on the ground" to "no no-fly zone" to "a no-fly zone in order to protect our boots on the ground." Sigh.
It was a very controversial move at home for the Iranians, being debatably constitutional as we've seen but also because the Iranian on the street is understandably wary of foreign interference.
With more focus on American troops in the terrain, I imagine plenty of Iranian officials are worried about going from support a regional partner to being dragged into something beyond their control.
Plus, terminating the agreement doesn't really hurt relations with Moscow either--the Russian military knew it was a temporary thing (or at least stated as much), because they had a shared stake in Syria. So this would be treated as business as usual--at least, that's what I'd guess.
After all, it's Syria that had a 1980 strategic alliance with the USSR. In 1980, the USSR was one of Iran's rhetorical "Great Satans," courtesy of its support for Iraq.
The Turkey/Syrian rebel offensive on Jarabulus has begun. Coalition air strikes and Turkish shelling are supporting the offensive. I'm seeing reports that Turkish ground troops (special forces) have entered the country as well, according to a Turkish news station.
One US soldier dead and another injured (along with six Afghan soldiers) by an IED outside the capital of Helmand yesterday.
CNN Turk is saying that Turkey plans to push IS from the entire border area between Mare and Jarabulus. This would essentially create a buffer zone between them and the SDF, if successful, as well as completely cutting off IS from the border.
CNN Turk is saying that Turkey plans to push IS from the entire border area between Mare and Jarabulus. This would essentially create a buffer zone between them and the SDF, if successful, as well as completely cutting off IS from the border.
It would also prevent the SDF from linking their territory in the east and west. Which I dare say is a more important goal to Turkey and fighting IS.
CNN Turk is saying that Turkey plans to push IS from the entire border area between Mare and Jarabulus. This would essentially create a buffer zone between them and the SDF, if successful, as well as completely cutting off IS from the border.
It would also prevent the SDF from linking their territory in the east and west. Which I dare say is a more important goal to Turkey and fighting IS.
Yeah, good call, the Jarabulus-Mare line doesn't allow for the buffer zone idea. This seems likely to result in direct conflict with the SDF, unless the SDF backs down.
Syria has been going pretty haywire lately, even by Syria standards.
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CorehealerThe ApothecaryThe softer edge of the universe.Registered Userregular
A lot of Turkish Syria policy can be summed up as "How best can we fuck over the Kurds without pissing off the Americans by using combating IS as a cover."
Yemen's situation is tragic because that Central Bank is the only thing holding the country together by guaranteeing payments for food imports. If the Central Bank gets cut off as Hadi wants, lots of people *will* starve.
The CB is also paying the wages of soldiers on both sides of the conflict, too. I wonder where Hadi thinks "his" men are going to get their pay? Unless Saudia wants to start footing the bill for the whole thing.
Posts
So your saying the Egyptian state is basically Shane from the Walking Dead?
edit - the article itself is pretty interesting though outside of the humor value
With "less than 100% clean" and "leverage" are pretty much the definition of 95% of EU foreign policy. The last 5% being aerial bombing.
That's just how people play ball in international politics, when they want to play nice that is.
-Antje Jackelén, Archbishop of the Church of Sweden
Is the propsal that they rebrand as "[HC,HB] Bars" or simply [HC,HB]; as in:
"[Let's go to the HotChocolateHotBread and get some] Nutella crepes!" ?
Jesus. This exactly the thing that could lead to an escalation of war, if the outcome was different; close call.
Although with Assad going hard after the Kurds up near Manbij now, who knows.
50.
And the suicide bomber was a kid...
So should one assume Erdogan's quiet endorsement of ISIS is still paying off?
I just posted a couple days ago about how I thought the Syrian government would be hesitant to bomb the SDF; Syria loves to prove me wrong whenever I tentatively try to make a prediction or judgment. Although I am skeptical that the escalation of the fighting in Hasakah was primarily due to the SAA/NDF (National Defense Force; basically loyalist militia) - they are completely surrounded by the SDF, and far from the government's main territories. Tactically, picking a fight with the YPG in the northeast makes no sense. Strategically I can't think of why they'd do so unless they're just trying to send a message to the US/test the US's commitment to protecting the SDF. But even that sounds risky. In my opinion it's more likely that the YPG was the primary instigator, as they want to consolidate control of their territory and remaining government positions in Hasakah and Qamishli are a thorn in their side. Fighting in these cities has happened on numerous past occasions, but usually it's a minor skirmish or two followed by a ceasefire/return to status quo. I don't think things have ever reached the point of airstrikes before, although I could be wrong about that.
I'm sorta concerned that the US/SDF alliance, ostensibly based on a shared enemy in IS, might reposition itself as another US-backed anti-Assad alliance if the IS threat is reduced. On the other hand, in the recent battles for Aleppo city, the YPG in Sheik Maqsud fought the rebels at a critical moment and helped enable the government's short-lived imposition of a siege. It's hard to tell how much either incident reflects overall SDF policy or individual tactical decisions based on localized conflicts, but right now I'd still lean more toward the latter in each case.
From al-Monitor today: Syria regime, Kurds agree Hasakeh truce after Russia mediation.
edit- also, the PYD recently closed its office in Moscow, and Erdogan is going on about how the conflict in Hasakah shows that Damascus is finally recognizing that the Kurds are a threat.
This is what the Russian government has been aiming for since the Rojava office opened in Moscow months ago--and it is important that the Syrian government likewise acknowledge the deal openly. Of course, that's no guarantee against the truce falling apart in the immediate future.
I think we're seeing a high-level political game between the different Kurdish leadership factions and both the Damascus and Russian governments. Despite the office closure (that I'd missed), the PYD has publicly stated that it believes Turkish and Russian political goals are irreconcilable, particularly over Syria, no matter what summits are held between leadership. And their argument, while old, is very sound on its surface: the USSR and post-Soviet Russia provided decades of support to the PKK, and their are deep connections (that have historically infuriated Turkey) between Kurdish military leaders and clandestine Soviet backers. Soviet-Turkish (and Russian-Turkish) relations have been flimsy by comparison, despite being on a state-to-state level.
The rumor from the Turkish media is, when Pres. Erdogan brought up the matter with Pres. Putin, his Russian counterpart denied knowledge of the PYD and YPG having offices in Moscow. Or so the rumor goes.
Of course, these alliances don't last forever. Pres. al-Assad's father actually offered material support (and even sanctuary) to both Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish guerrilla movements in the 1970s and onwards--but by the time his son came to power, said groups associates were labeled terrorists organizations (as they were by the United States and a lot of other governments). Even if the Kurdish leadership publicly is still optimistic it doesn't mean everything is set in stone.
It doesn't seem fair that the US expects to operate Special Forces inside Syria to undermine Assad but expects them to not be targets of state forces.
And that would indeed not be fair, if that was why they were there.
It looks more like the Kurds and the government started fighting about the fate of the city. The American Special forces are there to back the Kurds against IS. No news report I have seen says the special forces are engaged against Assad.
Have you seen differently?
The source isn't named, which kind of sucks, but isn't out of the ordinary when dealing with the Kurdish military leadership.
So it's entirely possible it's already fallen through (or just...didn't happen, which is a little more unusual).
Well we're arming the FSA and other anti-Assad groups, and providing training to them. The Kurd's are not Anti-Assad for now, but I feel their long term goal in independence from Syria.
I guess I'm trying to say given our Anti-Assad positions it's hard to draw a line between our "Anti-ISIS" actions and our "Anti-Assad" actions. The weapons and training we provide can and will be used against regime forces at some point, and this is a feature not a bug.
Its also possible its more a statement of "Everything's tentative and nothing has been finalized"
So I guess that ceasefire didn't really happen/work out
edit - meanwhile, to the west, Turkey's favored rebel factions gather on their side of the border with Syria in preparation for an assault on IS-held Jarabulus, their remaining border stronghold. Given the YPG's victory in Manbij, this move may be partly motivated by Turkey's desire to ensure that the YPG does not control the Turkish border in Aleppo Governorate.
"Just hear me out here! If there are no kurds, there can't be any be any vicious ISIS attacks against them! Win-win!"
Please put his photos in spoiler tags Panda, please. Here I am exposed to him and his bullshit 24/7, I can do without seeing him on here
I was surprised to see that alliance be so public, so this makes sense to me.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-ends-russian-use-of-air-base-because-of-unwanted-publicity/2016/08/22/87364e5e-2dbe-4544-889b-2cb7f233fc62_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_iran-810a:homepage/story
The Sirte offensive continues to squeeze ISIS out of their major Libyan holding, the attackers took over a mosque and a "morality jail" on Sunday. Of course the ISIS militants are fleeing into the southern desert, but the question is if they'll have power to really effect anything back there aside from being a perpetual thorn in Tripoli's side.
It's aggravating that Ankara is using this terrorist attack as a rhetorical point to try and draw parallels between ISIS, the Kurds, and Gulen.
So we've gone from "no boots on the ground" to "no no-fly zone" to "a no-fly zone in order to protect our boots on the ground." Sigh.
and here's a nice map:
With more focus on American troops in the terrain, I imagine plenty of Iranian officials are worried about going from support a regional partner to being dragged into something beyond their control.
Plus, terminating the agreement doesn't really hurt relations with Moscow either--the Russian military knew it was a temporary thing (or at least stated as much), because they had a shared stake in Syria. So this would be treated as business as usual--at least, that's what I'd guess.
After all, it's Syria that had a 1980 strategic alliance with the USSR. In 1980, the USSR was one of Iran's rhetorical "Great Satans," courtesy of its support for Iraq.
EDIT: As usual, outstanding graphic Tycho.
One US soldier dead and another injured (along with six Afghan soldiers) by an IED outside the capital of Helmand yesterday.
The SDF's (US-backed Kurdish-led alliance) front line is nearby to the south, though, and Turkey has been shelling them as well.
It would also prevent the SDF from linking their territory in the east and west. Which I dare say is a more important goal to Turkey and fighting IS.
Syria has been going pretty haywire lately, even by Syria standards.
The CB is also paying the wages of soldiers on both sides of the conflict, too. I wonder where Hadi thinks "his" men are going to get their pay? Unless Saudia wants to start footing the bill for the whole thing.
Turkey and others are now reporting that the Turks (well their pet rebels) hold Jarabulus.
And Uncle Joe is there to try to repair relations.