Internal states are part of an individual - and insofar as an individual acts in accordance with them they are self-determined.
No, the individual would not be "self"-determined; the individual would be determined by the individual states, which are PART of the individual, and not the entirety of the individual. It's not "Self"-determined, it is "part-of-self"-determined.
Except that part did not come to be purely via the individual self, but rather came to be as a result of a wealth of external factors; the little self had wishes, desires, hopes, dreams posited onto it.
So it is not the self acting, it is those wishes, desires, hopes, and dreams coming to realize themselves by way of the individual.
But these wishes, desires, and dreams *ARE* the self!
]The "self", in effect, is slave to the passions festering within the self, and "slavery" is not "freedom".
The passions are part of the self. So the self is slave to the self... except the idea of slavery implies service forced to something outside oneself - the notion of "self-slavery" is incoherent.
So as the self cannot be a slave of oneself due to semantics of the term 'slavery' let us just say "the self serves the self." Considering that freedom is usually regarded as being free from external influence and "one can be free from oneself" is also a logically incoherent statement, it seems that to serve oneself is to be free.
So basically, it's wrong for you to use the word slavery there. You should be using the word freedom.
'folk understanding' means the answer you would get if you went up to people on the street and asked them to explain the concept.
Otherwise known as the "incorrect" understanding, usually ending in "huyuck".
Edit: Alternatively ending in "We don't take kindly to readers round here."
But I'm arguing for compatibilism on the basis it more closely aligns with folk understanding of the words meaning...
If the entirety of your argument for free will is founded upon definitions utilized by silly geese, then, by definition, your argument would be the argument for free will as understood by silly geese. While that is fine, I am more interested in discerning the way things are starting with true and correct understandings, so that we can get to a true and correct understanding of free will.
Premises:
the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation.
the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to folk understanding
We're both trying to come to an understanding of free will - but we're also arguing over the definition of the phrase. If you grant me the previous premises it follows that the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to the meaning of the phrase 'free will'
So I have a question about a random theory I have heard. I have no clue to its validity. Well thats not true I assume it to me borderline complete bs. Anyways I am sure some of you have heard about it. I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
Premises:
the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation.
the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to folk understanding
We're both trying to come to an understanding of free will - but we're also arguing over the definition of the phrase. If you grant me the previous premises it follows that the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to the meaning of the phrase 'free will'
No to "the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation."
Would it be more helpful to stop using the terms "free will" and "determinism" and, rather, simply come to an understanding of what is going on?
Any action results from its having been caused.
We seem to all agree on that. The contention is that some people want to call that "freedom" and other people know what "free" means...I mean...do not want to call that "freedom".
I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
That is something people sometimes say, sure.
It would not prove free will. Mostly because there would still be causal necessity in such a universe, especially if it was impossible for there to be multiple universes which were exact mirrors / duplicates of one another. So if we already have sequence (a-b-c-d-e-f-g) it would be impossible for another universe to be that exact same sequence and would, necessarily, have to be a different sequence.
Basically, if we can answer the question "Why did Player A do X rather than Y?" then there is no free will because, again, free will is a very absurd and improbable thing which is most likely impossible; there cannot possibly be free will.
But instead of simply tossing the phrase aside people try to change the definition.
Really? I'm not so sure. My contention is that regardless of determinism free will holds.
We disagree on the meaning of freedom in the phrase "free will." It is a question of freedom from what?
Freedom from necessity? Then an acausal universe allows it, a deterministic one does not.
Freedom from necessity and randomness? Logically impossible
Freedom from external influence? Then we have the compatibilist interpretation, insofar as we are dealing with an individual with an unset internal state.
They are properties of the individual. So, both. And this is an entirely trivial point.
It is not trivial; if Player A IS passion (A B C) and nothing else, then a loss of passion C would mean a loss of Player A.
Do we really want to get into ship of theseus and heap of sand bullshit?
If we agree that
A) an entity is composed of its properties some of an individual's properties, including its internal state may change, and it remains the same "individual." E.G. Bob is the same person if he is happy or sad.
this is a non-issue.
If not, we should stop, because we can't agree on the definition of the fucking word "is"
"what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence".
I don't know if _J_ will agree. He disagreed with me the last time I referenced Wittgenstein (on the meanings of words). He must have no soul.
Damn. I... really? I don't really watch these threads like a hawk, but... I thought those kinds of philosophy of language problems were pretty much universally agreed on by now.
Freedom from external influence? Then we have the compatibilist interpretation, insofar as we are dealing with an individual with an unset internal state.
That's one of the things I do not understand about the position you seem to be articulating: "Freedom from external influence".
Ok. So, we pack all the desires and intentions "inside" the person. But did not those desires and intentions come from outside the person, such that they would be external influences? And would not those desires and intentions have a necessary causal story to their coming to be?
. So, we pack all the desires and intentions "inside" the person. But did not those desires and intentions come from outside the person, such that they would be external influences? And would not those desires and intentions have a necessary causal story to their coming to be?
Yes. But when we ask the question "will individual A do X or Y?" we're asking a question of the general individual A, not a question of a hyper-specified version with a causally necessitated internal state.
I believe you said A has free will if A can do X or Y in situation Z.
Let us hope you agree that Bob is the same individual regardless of whether he is happy or sad.
I'm saying there exists a set of different entities (I use entities here in a logical sense) with different internal states states all of which would validly be called the 'individual A.' Some of these entities would pick X some would pick Y. Thus A, depending which one of these entities he is at the time, could choose X or Y.
It's true that only one of these entities will exist, and which one is causally necessitated, but if you agree that happy Bob is the same individual as sad Bob you must agree that when we discuss 'individual A' we are discussing the class of entities, and not a specific one. And thus the external/internal to the individual distinction is coherent.
. So, we pack all the desires and intentions "inside" the person. But did not those desires and intentions come from outside the person, such that they would be external influences? And would not those desires and intentions have a necessary causal story to their coming to be?
Yes. But when we ask the question "will individual A do X or Y?" we're asking a question of the general individual A, not a question of a hyper-specified version with a causally necessitated internal state.
I believe you said A has free will if A can do X or Y in situation Z.
Let us hope you agree that Bob is the same individual regardless of whether he is happy or sad.
I'm saying there exists a set of different entities (I use entities here in a logical sense) with different internal states states all of which would validly be called the 'individual A.' Some of these entities would pick X some would pick Y. Thus A, depending which one of these entities he is at the time, could choose X or Y.
It's true that only one of these entities will exist, and which one is causally necessitated, but if you agree that happy Bob is the same individual as sad Bob you must agree that when we discuss 'individual A' we are discussing the class of entities, and not a specific one. And thus the external/internal to the individual distinction is coherent.
Your answer focuses on the issue of what constitutes an individual. That isn't the issue with which I am interested in the quote.
So, we pack all the desires and intentions "inside" the person. But did not those desires and intentions come from outside the person, such that they would be external influences? And would not those desires and intentions have a necessary causal story to their coming to be?
How can a person's actions be independent of external forces if any internal desires by which a person acts came to be from external forces?
You claim that if I choose steak instead of chicken as a result of my internal desire to have steak then I am free, as I acted in accord with my desires and was not influenced by external forces.
But those internal forces only exist as a result of external forces.
So the action is not independent of external forces, as the internal forces came to be as a result of external forces; the internal forces are causally linked to the external forces.
I have the desire for steak because of (Causal story). So, my desiring steak cannot be free, as I desire steak as a result of a causal story which determined that I would like steak.
If someone pushes you out a window then you were not free. If you jump out a window as a result of your own desire, then you are free. BUT the desire to jump itself came to be as a result of external forces. So, even if I jump as a result of my desire to jump, that desire to jump was an external influence on me, given that its origins are external to myself.
Do you understand what I am saying? I don't care if you agree with it, I just want to know if you understand the problem.
I understand the problem - that internal states in a deterministic universe are the necessary results of external forces.
My discussion of what constitutes the individual was my solution to the problem - mainly, even though you have the desire for steak because of (causal story), you would still be you if you didn't like steak because of (alternate causal story). Thus when asked do you want steak? You could answer yes, or no.
(Because the 'you' denoted by the question could be either the one that experienced (causal story) or (alternate causal story))
I understand the problem - that internal states in a deterministic universe are the necessary results of external forces.
My discussion of what constitutes the individual was my solution to the problem
But once you grant that internal states in a deterministic universe are the necessary result of external forces you can't solve the problem; you just have determinism.
I was determined to have internal states X, and I am determined by internal states X to do action Y at time point Z. So, I am a determined being; I cannot do anything other than that which I am determined to do.
So, with regard to moral responsibility, I could not have not thrown that kitten at the wall for unplugging my Xbox, that kitten could not have not unplugged my Xbox, etc. It's all pre-determined and has been determined since ever. Which is why there cannot be free will; I can NEVER do that which is other than which I was determined to do.
Edit: So, even if we want to try to be Kantians, we cannot say that one is a "free will" when it acts in accord with those internal states, but rather one is a "determined will" which simply follows those pre-determined sets of instructions. If I am presented with chicken or steak I cannot possibly have not chosen steak because I am simply mechanically bound to that internal state of desires which dictates that which I will do.
Compatibilism strikes me as some sort of...last ditch attempt to reconcile the observation that free will can't rationally exist with a worldview in which free will is a requisite for meaning in life. All the flavors seem the exist only by blurring definitions; there is no actual stance here, just smoke and mirrors.
The fact that the gaps in our understanding of the human mind and nature of the universe are the only places that the concept of Free Will can exist safely seems rather telling, much like attempts to reconcile religion with science.
If we discard the idea of Free Will, then, do we also have to discard morality and such? I'd argue that the most moral - rendering the greatest good - actions can only occur with an understanding that actions are (effectively) predetermined.
Really, the idea that Free Will is a prerequisite for meaning in life feels like people wanting to be more than they are; to believe they themselves alter the very path of the universe with every decision over what to eat or what shoes to wear. This might be a result of the fact that the alternative is that life is meaningless beyond the enjoyment you take from it; hedonism has long been seen in a negative light.
Accepting no free will means it becomes easier to forgive people, easier to make the decision to reform rather than punish criminals, and engenders empathy; if the cosmic math had been a little different, it could have been YOU sucking dick in an alley for cocaine.
If we discard the idea of Free Will, then, do we also have to discard morality and such?
Well, two things.
1) "do we also have to discard morality" is a phrase which is only sensible within a universe of free will, within which there are options and logical requirements which motivate an agent to do X when an agent would have otherwise done ~X. If every agent is causally determined then there is no magical point at which the agent would decide to change its stance on morality, its understanding of morality. Rather, the agent simply does what it is causally determined to do.
2) Ignoring all of the problems in 1, we can still have morality in a deterministic universe; we just change what morality means....in the same way that compatibilists change what "free will" means.
Accepting no free will means it becomes easier to forgive people, easier to make the decision to reform rather than punish criminals, and engenders empathy; if the cosmic math had been a little different, it could have been YOU sucking dick in an alley for cocaine.
Not really, no. It actually renders forgiveness, decisions, reform, empathy to be nonsense. If you push a button and an air conditioner starts running you don't forgive it, empathize with it. The air conditioner does not make decisions or reform. It simply acts as it has been programmed to act.
Which is what people do in a deterministic universe, in our universe. They're just weird little machines that do what the weird little machines are causally determined to do.
So, we lose any sort of magical value of freedom and simply become very interesting rocks which do that which the very interesting rocks were causally determined to do.
I think were you and I differ is that I don't think any of that matters. The fact that everything is just part of a really big math problem in no way effects the fact that when I eat a hamburger or read a good book I enjoy it, and when I hear about kids starving I feel bad about it.
The reasons behind those feelings only hold meaning in that they allow me to better act to min/max my feelings like a good little machine.
edit: I forgot to mention this, but I think you fell again into the 'assigning too much meaning' trap. Empathy and the rest don't need to have objective meaning, they just need to do their part in helping the machines work effectively.
I think were you and I differ is that I don't think any of that matters. The fact that everything is just part of a really big math problem in no way effects the fact that when I eat a hamburger or read a good book I enjoy it, and when I hear about kids starving I feel bad about it.
Sure, but if we understand that, really, it is all part of a gigantic math problem, a gigantic pre-determined causal nexus, then presumably that understanding would causally impact the experience of the hamburger or the book.
If your ex-girlfriend freely chose to sleep around with a bunch of guys that is significantly different from your ex girlfriend being causally determined to sleep around with a bunch of guys. Both situations suck, but the understanding of why the events happened can, I think, contribute to an understanding of the situation and so one's reaction to it.
So I have a question about a random theory I have heard. I have no clue to its validity. Well thats not true I assume it to me borderline complete bs. Anyways I am sure some of you have heard about it. I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
String theorists argue this I believe, but there is no real way of testing this hypothesis. That and it's always sounded arrogant to me: every action we individually perform results in a Universe entirely devoted to our action? Seems a bit far fetched and "centre of the Universe" silly.
If your ex-girlfriend freely chose to sleep around with a bunch of guys that is significantly different from your ex girlfriend being causally determined to sleep around with a bunch of guys. Both situations suck, but the understanding of why the events happened can, I think, contribute to an understanding of the situation and so one's reaction to it.
Strikes me you're trying to have it both ways. If we take seriously the idea of absolute causal determinism in the way you're suggesting, one doesn't choose one's reaction, and one's understanding of the situation is as much linked to the causal nexus as anything else. While I appreciate the sentiment behind thinking others aren't freely choosing to hurt, that move requires you to give up your own free choosing too. So however you react is just how you react.
Incidentally, one can't live as if she were absolutely determined, so I don't much see the point in dismissing the experience of choosing as evidence in favor of something like free will; as just seen, even our arch-determinist slips into that kind of talk.
in the same way that compatibilists change what "free will" means.
I know "definition-switching" upsets you, so I was surprised to see you making such a move regarding morality. Anyway, do you have evidence of any major thinker who argues for the kind of freedom you do? How about anyone who defines freedom as you do? In the understanding of freedom here presented--a complete elimination of [at least efficient, maybe also final] causes--one stacks the deck such that arguing is one more exercise in futility. When the question is freedom of will, people normally mean whether they're able to make decisions and set ends for themselves, not whether gravity and father's insistent 'no' exert influence on their decision-making.
When one goes to the grocery store and sees "buy one, get one free" offers, one doesn't storm the manager's office demanding compensation for the gasoline spent, the clothes worn, and the shoe rubber expended in arriving at the store. One understands, rather, that this 'free' is relative to the question at hand, the question of purchasing. By setting the free-will argument in terms that disregard the question's context, importing a reified concept of freedom, the game is over before it has begun, and we're much poorer for fruitlessly spinning our wheels.
So I have a question about a random theory I have heard. I have no clue to its validity. Well thats not true I assume it to me borderline complete bs. Anyways I am sure some of you have heard about it. I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
String theorists argue this I believe, but there is no real way of testing this hypothesis. That and it's always sounded arrogant to me: every action we individually perform results in a Universe entirely devoted to our action? Seems a bit far fetched and "centre of the Universe" silly.
It has nothing to do with string theory. It's a philosophical interpretation of basic, undergraduate quantum mechanics. And the 'theory' stated above is the usual silly-goosed-up layman's misunderstanding of the actual theory. The universe does not split whenever you (or some other thinking individual) makes a choice. The universe exists as a superposition of discrete energy states. For every state which it is possible for any particle in the universe to occupy there is a finite probability that it will do so. This can be viewed as the particle existing in every possible state simultaneously with a 'probability density' related to the likelihood it will be observed there. When an observer observes a particle the quantum system of the observer becomes coupled to the quantum system of the thing being observed, causing the superpositions of possible states of both systems to become intertwined in such a way that for every possible state of the observed system there is a state of the observer which sees that state. Under the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics this doesn't happen and, instead, one state is selected by unknown means and the observer sees that one state. The universal wave-function hypothesis (or 'many worlds theory' as it is popularly known) says that there is no selection mechanism because the observed system continues to exist in every possible state; our consciousness is just only aware of one. Presumably our consciousness 'splits' when systems become coupled such that there are 'copies' of us that are aware of every possible state.
tl;dr: There is only one universe. We are just incapable of accurately observing its probabilistic structure.
I understand the problem - that internal states in a deterministic universe are the necessary results of external forces.
My discussion of what constitutes the individual was my solution to the problem - mainly, even though you have the desire for steak because of (causal story), you would still be you if you didn't like steak because of (alternate causal story). Thus when asked do you want steak? You could answer yes, or no.
(Because the 'you' denoted by the question could be either the one that experienced (causal story) or (alternate causal story))
I don't see how this can be the case. 'You', as in a specific individual, are, in large part, the result of your causal story. If you had experienced a different personal history such that you did/did not like steak then the steak-liking and steak-disliking versions of you would be two different people. Any internal thing or collection of things that you choose to define as the self are, eventually, the product of external factors. Genetics, physical environment, interactions with other people, exposure to information and cultural factors, etc. Your thoughts, hopes, dreams, desires, and passions all come from something and any change in them necessitates a different set of external stimuli to have caused the divergence.
Also, I wonder whether this argument becomes more interesting if we stop talking in terms of efficient causes and instead incorporate teleology. I don't doubt that one's ends-making happens in response to efficient causes, but it's unclear whether final causes are reducible to efficient ones.
Also, I wonder whether this argument becomes more interesting if we stop talking in terms of efficient causes and instead incorporate teleology. I don't doubt that one's ends-making happens in response to efficient causes, but it's unclear whether final causes are reducible to efficient ones.
Er, why would they be? Goals and the actions undertaken to achieve them are frequently completely dissimilar. There are constant military research solicitations requesting people come up with behavioral/statistical models such that they can plan mission tasks in such a way as to achieve course of action goals (there is an example involving a Marine company handing out free milk to non-extremist Afghani villagers to effect a reduction in overall IED attacks).
So I have a question about a random theory I have heard. I have no clue to its validity. Well thats not true I assume it to me borderline complete bs. Anyways I am sure some of you have heard about it. I don't know exactly what its called but the basic premise is that for every choice we make the universe splits into a parallel universe. Each universe splitting into different choices. Its like an infinite universe theory, since we all have an infinite number of choices. I mean assuming we do have choices.
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
String theorists argue this I believe, but there is no real way of testing this hypothesis. That and it's always sounded arrogant to me: every action we individually perform results in a Universe entirely devoted to our action? Seems a bit far fetched and "centre of the Universe" silly.
It has nothing to do with string theory. It's a philosophical interpretation of basic, undergraduate quantum mechanics. And the 'theory' stated above is the usual silly-goosed-up layman's misunderstanding of the actual theory. The universe does not split whenever you (or some other thinking individual) makes a choice. The universe exists as a superposition of discrete energy states. For every state which it is possible for any particle in the universe to occupy there is a finite probability that it will do so. This can be viewed as the particle existing in every possible state simultaneously with a 'probability density' related to the likelihood it will be observed there. When an observer observes a particle the quantum system of the observer becomes coupled to the quantum system of the thing being observed, causing the superpositions of possible states of both systems to become intertwined in such a way that for every possible state of the observed system there is a state of the observer which sees that state. Under the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics this doesn't happen and, instead, one state is selected by unknown means and the observer sees that one state. The universal wave-function hypothesis (or 'many worlds theory' as it is popularly known) says that there is no selection mechanism because the observed system continues to exist in every possible state; our consciousness is just only aware of one. Presumably our consciousness 'splits' when systems become coupled such that there are 'copies' of us that are aware of every possible state.
tl;dr: There is only one universe. We are just incapable of accurately observing its probabilistic structure.
Also, I wonder whether this argument becomes more interesting if we stop talking in terms of efficient causes and instead incorporate teleology. I don't doubt that one's ends-making happens in response to efficient causes, but it's unclear whether final causes are reducible to efficient ones.
Er, why would they be?
Contemporary causal discourse--especially that surrounding the question of "free will"--is normally carried out in terms of only efficient, and perhaps material, causes. It's probably not worth blaming anything for this, but I expect the impoverished notion of causality often presented is due to the cultural grip of scientization.
What Melkster calls the "fourth position" is actually just a flavor of compatibilism.
Eh. My interpretation of compatibilism was that you had to believe free will still existed even though you believed determinism was true. But that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying the notion of free will is irrelevant and silly. It's a misnomer. The concept itself is absurd. It's a construction of words that makes no sense; a signpost that points to a city that doesn't exist and could have never existed.
Me saying free will doesn't exist is sort of like uttering the words "slopoah doeing aol doesn't exist." It's just a nonsense idea.
Discussions like these really just continue to make me believe that philosophy is stupid and ultimately says nothing. It's like it never really sheds light on anything, it just makes people write lots of stuff. I never get ah-ha! moments from philosophy. My understanding of things never grows.
Now, science on the other hand - you know, that field that relies on the idea that things cause other things - gives me those ah-ha! moments all the time. Science talks about things that are verifiable (and falsifiable). And since it seems science stays out of this whole free will thing, I suppose I will too. That's sort of why I think my position is different from the compatibilist position - I just think free will a silly, irrelevant notion to begin with. It's fun to ponder occasionally, but only for fun and with nothing accomplished. I suppose that's it's basically intellectual masturbation, then.
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HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
What Melkster calls the "fourth position" is actually just a flavor of compatibilism.
Eh. My interpretation of compatibilism was that you had to believe free will still existed even though you believed determinism was true. But that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying the notion of free will is irrelevant and silly. It's a misnomer. The concept itself is absurd. It's a construction of words that makes no sense; a signpost that points to a city that doesn't exist and could have never existed.
Or maybe it merely means free of violent coercion or extortion.
Oh and that whole science vs. philosophy rant? That is all philosophy. Philosophical questions are unavoidable! Even when you are doing science you are implicitly accepting a particular philosophical position (empiricism, and probably some variant of materialism).
Edit: And of course saying that "nothing is accomplished" from philosophy is demonstrably false. I mean, Karl Marx was a philosopher. He had a pretty big impact on events don't you think?
What Melkster calls the "fourth position" is actually just a flavor of compatibilism.
Eh. My interpretation of compatibilism was that you had to believe free will still existed even though you believed determinism was true. But that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying the notion of free will is irrelevant and silly. It's a misnomer. The concept itself is absurd. It's a construction of words that makes no sense; a signpost that points to a city that doesn't exist and could have never existed.
Or maybe it merely means free of violent coercion or extortion.
Oh and that whole science vs. philosophy rant? That is all philosophy. Philosophical questions are unavoidable! Even when you are doing science you are implicitly accepting a particular philosophical position (empiricism, and probably some variant of materialism).
Edit: And of course saying that "nothing is accomplished" from philosophy is demonstrably false. I mean, Karl Marx was a philosopher. He had a pretty big impact on events don't you think?
Yeah, that's true. He came up with a type of government/economy that was based on a particular philosophy, and that shaped world events up through today.
And on the other side, the democratic republic of the United States was built on philosophical ideas too, so you have that point as well.
Well maybe you're right - up to a point. It still bothers me, though. We seem to get nowhere with these philosophical arguments. We just argue semantics over and over again for days. We haven't even come to a definition of free will to begin with that's accepted by all parties.
I contrast our debates on philosophy with debates on science stuff, where you have a system of falsifying hypotheses; and where you're talking about actual stuff that's directly observable in the real world. In science debates, it's all about pointing out evidence. Does the theory of gravity fit? Well, let's try this experiment. Does the theory of evolution fit? Well, let's exhaustively examine different species and look at fossil records and run experiments on fruit flies. But what about the theory of free will? There's no evidence to examine, no experiments to run. And that leaves me feeling annoyed, like I've done all this thinking and have nothing to show for it.
Lots of philosophical debates leave me feeling that way. Maybe I'm just missing something.
I contrast our debates on philosophy with debates on science stuff, where you have a system of falsifying hypotheses; and where you're talking about actual stuff that's directly observable in the real world. In science debates, it's all about pointing out evidence. Does the theory of gravity fit? Well, let's try this experiment. Does the theory of evolution fit? Well, let's exhaustively examine different species and look at fossil records and run experiments on fruit flies. But what about the theory of free will? There's no evidence to examine, no experiments to run. And that leaves me feeling annoyed, like I've done all this thinking and have nothing to show for it.
Lots of philosophical debates leave me feeling that way. Maybe I'm just missing something.
Hi. I'm new. Anyway:
We DO do studies exploring free will. Not so much in my home field of physics, but some psychology and neuroscience people have done really interesting things surrounding thought and thinking. I suppose it's not surprising. I really should be getting work done, so I'm not going to hunt down the studies. Here are the short versions:
A doctor has been working with a patient for years now. He's written books about this poor sailor who drank away his short-term memory by accident when he was 19. Yeah. Sort of like Memento. He'll stay in the game for about 2 minutes before forgetting whatever just went on, and going back to being the same 19 year old he was, plus two minutes. I don't think it's like a cache dump. More like a queue (I've been told the brain parcels up info into a couple milli...or micro...can't remember...milliseconds, I'll say, but I've got nothing to verify this). So his short-term is gone, which is necessary to form long-term memories. The point is, he's the same guy personality-wise that he was when he was 19. It's interesting because he apparently can get better at doing things, like solving those twisty iron puzzles, or playing checkers, but will not remember who you are if you leave the room.
SECOND STUDY: (I think this one's cooler)
Experimentalists take subjects and monitor their brain patterns in some sort of apparatus, I'm guessing MRI, but I don't remember. The subjects are instructed to push a button whenever they feel like it, and remember when they decided to push it. There is a scrolling disk with numbers around the edge that they are intended to use to indicate when they made the decision. After enough data is collected, the experimentalists could predict 3 seconds in advance of when the subject would push the button. There were cries that the experiment was not conducted well enough. There's just one button, they can see the disc rotating, etc.
So they did it again. This time, subjects had two buttons, and the images did not scroll, they just changed, and they were not numbers anymore. This time the scientists could predict, not only when they would push the button, but which button they would push, 7 seconds in advance.
So the first experiment might suggest that we are a sum of our experiences, nothing more. The second one might suggest that it is just a chemical reaction that makes a decision, and a predictable one at that. Maybe this doesn't say anything one way or the other on "free will," but we're working on it. And you CAN work on it, which is cool.
A doctor has been working with a patient for years now. He's written books about this poor sailor who drank away his short-term memory by accident when he was 19. Yeah. Sort of like Memento. He'll stay in the game for about 2 minutes before forgetting whatever just went on, and going back to being the same 19 year old he was, plus two minutes. I don't think it's like a cache dump. More like a queue (I've been told the brain parcels up info into a couple milli...or micro...can't remember...milliseconds, I'll say, but I've got nothing to verify this). So his short-term is gone, which is necessary to form long-term memories. The point is, he's the same guy personality-wise that he was when he was 19. It's interesting because he apparently can get better at doing things, like solving those twisty iron puzzles, or playing checkers, but will not remember who you are if you leave the room.
This one's pretty cool on it's own, though.
I could think of a billion different tests to perform on the guy. Seeing if I could add or remove all kinds of nervous tics like knuckle popping or beard stroking. Seeing if I could give him affective prejudices. Not much of it would be ethical, though.
I contrast our debates on philosophy with debates on science stuff, where you have a system of falsifying hypotheses; and where you're talking about actual stuff that's directly observable in the real world. In science debates, it's all about pointing out evidence. Does the theory of gravity fit? Well, let's try this experiment. Does the theory of evolution fit? Well, let's exhaustively examine different species and look at fossil records and run experiments on fruit flies. But what about the theory of free will? There's no evidence to examine, no experiments to run. And that leaves me feeling annoyed, like I've done all this thinking and have nothing to show for it.
Lots of philosophical debates leave me feeling that way. Maybe I'm just missing something.
Hi. I'm new. Anyway:
We DO do studies exploring free will. Not so much in my home field of physics, but some psychology and neuroscience people have done really interesting things surrounding thought and thinking. I suppose it's not surprising. I really should be getting work done, so I'm not going to hunt down the studies. Here are the short versions:
A doctor has been working with a patient for years now. He's written books about this poor sailor who drank away his short-term memory by accident when he was 19. Yeah. Sort of like Memento. He'll stay in the game for about 2 minutes before forgetting whatever just went on, and going back to being the same 19 year old he was, plus two minutes. I don't think it's like a cache dump. More like a queue (I've been told the brain parcels up info into a couple milli...or micro...can't remember...milliseconds, I'll say, but I've got nothing to verify this). So his short-term is gone, which is necessary to form long-term memories. The point is, he's the same guy personality-wise that he was when he was 19. It's interesting because he apparently can get better at doing things, like solving those twisty iron puzzles, or playing checkers, but will not remember who you are if you leave the room.
SECOND STUDY: (I think this one's cooler)
Experimentalists take subjects and monitor their brain patterns in some sort of apparatus, I'm guessing MRI, but I don't remember. The subjects are instructed to push a button whenever they feel like it, and remember when they decided to push it. There is a scrolling disk with numbers around the edge that they are intended to use to indicate when they made the decision. After enough data is collected, the experimentalists could predict 3 seconds in advance of when the subject would push the button. There were cries that the experiment was not conducted well enough. There's just one button, they can see the disc rotating, etc.
So they did it again. This time, subjects had two buttons, and the images did not scroll, they just changed, and they were not numbers anymore. This time the scientists could predict, not only when they would push the button, but which button they would push, 7 seconds in advance.
So the first experiment might suggest that we are a sum of our experiences, nothing more. The second one might suggest that it is just a chemical reaction that makes a decision, and a predictable one at that. Maybe this doesn't say anything one way or the other on "free will," but we're working on it. And you CAN work on it, which is cool.
This stuff is super cool but I don't think it's pertinent to the debate that's been going on for the last few pages. They don't care about what's actually going on in someone's brain. They care about the definition of freedom, like what this guy said:
Premises:
the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation.
the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to folk understanding
We're both trying to come to an understanding of free will - but we're also arguing over the definition of the phrase. If you grant me the previous premises it follows that the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to the meaning of the phrase 'free will'
No to "the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation."
Would it be more helpful to stop using the terms "free will" and "determinism" and, rather, simply come to an understanding of what is going on?
Any action results from its having been caused.
We seem to all agree on that. The contention is that some people want to call that "freedom" and other people know what "free" means...I mean...do not want to call that "freedom".
^ All that kind of stuff just seems silly to me. That's what I was really going for.
(Those studies are awesome by the way.)
Edit: Oh and stuff like what this guy said is what I have a problem with:
Also, I wonder whether this argument becomes more interesting if we stop talking in terms of efficient causes and instead incorporate teleology. I don't doubt that one's ends-making happens in response to efficient causes, but it's unclear whether final causes are reducible to efficient ones.
Er, why would they be?
Contemporary causal discourse--especially that surrounding the question of "free will"--is normally carried out in terms of only efficient, and perhaps material, causes. It's probably not worth blaming anything for this, but I expect the impoverished notion of causality often presented is due to the cultural grip of scientization.
I don't even know what this person is trying to say, but I don't like it.
Posts
Define 'correct'.
You're going to need some sort of outside system to evaluate your premises. And another system to evaluate that system.
First to get to the archimedian point wins.
The passions are part of the self. So the self is slave to the self... except the idea of slavery implies service forced to something outside oneself - the notion of "self-slavery" is incoherent.
So as the self cannot be a slave of oneself due to semantics of the term 'slavery' let us just say "the self serves the self." Considering that freedom is usually regarded as being free from external influence and "one can be free from oneself" is also a logically incoherent statement, it seems that to serve oneself is to be free.
So basically, it's wrong for you to use the word slavery there. You should be using the word freedom.
Are they "the self" or "part of the self"?
Premises:
the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation.
the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to folk understanding
We're both trying to come to an understanding of free will - but we're also arguing over the definition of the phrase. If you grant me the previous premises it follows that the compatibilist definition of free will is closer to the meaning of the phrase 'free will'
But if this theory were ever to be proven would it not almost certainly prove that free will exists?
They are properties of the individual. So, both. And this is an entirely trivial point.
No to "the meaning of a word is it's uses in everyday conversation."
Would it be more helpful to stop using the terms "free will" and "determinism" and, rather, simply come to an understanding of what is going on?
Any action results from its having been caused.
We seem to all agree on that. The contention is that some people want to call that "freedom" and other people know what "free" means...I mean...do not want to call that "freedom".
That is something people sometimes say, sure.
It would not prove free will. Mostly because there would still be causal necessity in such a universe, especially if it was impossible for there to be multiple universes which were exact mirrors / duplicates of one another. So if we already have sequence (a-b-c-d-e-f-g) it would be impossible for another universe to be that exact same sequence and would, necessarily, have to be a different sequence.
Basically, if we can answer the question "Why did Player A do X rather than Y?" then there is no free will because, again, free will is a very absurd and improbable thing which is most likely impossible; there cannot possibly be free will.
But instead of simply tossing the phrase aside people try to change the definition.
It is not trivial; if Player A IS passion (A B C) and nothing else, then a loss of passion C would mean a loss of Player A.
Fuck that!
Besides, "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence".
Really? I'm not so sure. My contention is that regardless of determinism free will holds.
We disagree on the meaning of freedom in the phrase "free will." It is a question of freedom from what?
Freedom from necessity? Then an acausal universe allows it, a deterministic one does not.
Freedom from necessity and randomness? Logically impossible
Freedom from external influence? Then we have the compatibilist interpretation, insofar as we are dealing with an individual with an unset internal state.
Do we really want to get into ship of theseus and heap of sand bullshit?
If we agree that
A) an entity is composed of its properties
this is a non-issue.
If not, we should stop, because we can't agree on the definition of the fucking word "is"
I don't know if _J_ will agree. He disagreed with me the last time I referenced Wittgenstein (on the meanings of words). He must have no soul.
Damn. I... really? I don't really watch these threads like a hawk, but... I thought those kinds of philosophy of language problems were pretty much universally agreed on by now.
Oh god no.
That's one of the things I do not understand about the position you seem to be articulating: "Freedom from external influence".
Ok. So, we pack all the desires and intentions "inside" the person. But did not those desires and intentions come from outside the person, such that they would be external influences? And would not those desires and intentions have a necessary causal story to their coming to be?
Yes. But when we ask the question "will individual A do X or Y?" we're asking a question of the general individual A, not a question of a hyper-specified version with a causally necessitated internal state.
I believe you said A has free will if A can do X or Y in situation Z.
Let us hope you agree that Bob is the same individual regardless of whether he is happy or sad.
I'm saying there exists a set of different entities (I use entities here in a logical sense) with different internal states states all of which would validly be called the 'individual A.' Some of these entities would pick X some would pick Y. Thus A, depending which one of these entities he is at the time, could choose X or Y.
It's true that only one of these entities will exist, and which one is causally necessitated, but if you agree that happy Bob is the same individual as sad Bob you must agree that when we discuss 'individual A' we are discussing the class of entities, and not a specific one. And thus the external/internal to the individual distinction is coherent.
Your answer focuses on the issue of what constitutes an individual. That isn't the issue with which I am interested in the quote.
How can a person's actions be independent of external forces if any internal desires by which a person acts came to be from external forces?
You claim that if I choose steak instead of chicken as a result of my internal desire to have steak then I am free, as I acted in accord with my desires and was not influenced by external forces.
But those internal forces only exist as a result of external forces.
So the action is not independent of external forces, as the internal forces came to be as a result of external forces; the internal forces are causally linked to the external forces.
I have the desire for steak because of (Causal story). So, my desiring steak cannot be free, as I desire steak as a result of a causal story which determined that I would like steak.
If someone pushes you out a window then you were not free. If you jump out a window as a result of your own desire, then you are free. BUT the desire to jump itself came to be as a result of external forces. So, even if I jump as a result of my desire to jump, that desire to jump was an external influence on me, given that its origins are external to myself.
Do you understand what I am saying? I don't care if you agree with it, I just want to know if you understand the problem.
My discussion of what constitutes the individual was my solution to the problem - mainly, even though you have the desire for steak because of (causal story), you would still be you if you didn't like steak because of (alternate causal story). Thus when asked do you want steak? You could answer yes, or no.
(Because the 'you' denoted by the question could be either the one that experienced (causal story) or (alternate causal story))
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
But once you grant that internal states in a deterministic universe are the necessary result of external forces you can't solve the problem; you just have determinism.
I was determined to have internal states X, and I am determined by internal states X to do action Y at time point Z. So, I am a determined being; I cannot do anything other than that which I am determined to do.
So, with regard to moral responsibility, I could not have not thrown that kitten at the wall for unplugging my Xbox, that kitten could not have not unplugged my Xbox, etc. It's all pre-determined and has been determined since ever. Which is why there cannot be free will; I can NEVER do that which is other than which I was determined to do.
Edit: So, even if we want to try to be Kantians, we cannot say that one is a "free will" when it acts in accord with those internal states, but rather one is a "determined will" which simply follows those pre-determined sets of instructions. If I am presented with chicken or steak I cannot possibly have not chosen steak because I am simply mechanically bound to that internal state of desires which dictates that which I will do.
The fact that the gaps in our understanding of the human mind and nature of the universe are the only places that the concept of Free Will can exist safely seems rather telling, much like attempts to reconcile religion with science.
If we discard the idea of Free Will, then, do we also have to discard morality and such? I'd argue that the most moral - rendering the greatest good - actions can only occur with an understanding that actions are (effectively) predetermined.
Really, the idea that Free Will is a prerequisite for meaning in life feels like people wanting to be more than they are; to believe they themselves alter the very path of the universe with every decision over what to eat or what shoes to wear. This might be a result of the fact that the alternative is that life is meaningless beyond the enjoyment you take from it; hedonism has long been seen in a negative light.
Accepting no free will means it becomes easier to forgive people, easier to make the decision to reform rather than punish criminals, and engenders empathy; if the cosmic math had been a little different, it could have been YOU sucking dick in an alley for cocaine.
Well, two things.
1) "do we also have to discard morality" is a phrase which is only sensible within a universe of free will, within which there are options and logical requirements which motivate an agent to do X when an agent would have otherwise done ~X. If every agent is causally determined then there is no magical point at which the agent would decide to change its stance on morality, its understanding of morality. Rather, the agent simply does what it is causally determined to do.
2) Ignoring all of the problems in 1, we can still have morality in a deterministic universe; we just change what morality means....in the same way that compatibilists change what "free will" means.
Not really, no. It actually renders forgiveness, decisions, reform, empathy to be nonsense. If you push a button and an air conditioner starts running you don't forgive it, empathize with it. The air conditioner does not make decisions or reform. It simply acts as it has been programmed to act.
Which is what people do in a deterministic universe, in our universe. They're just weird little machines that do what the weird little machines are causally determined to do.
So, we lose any sort of magical value of freedom and simply become very interesting rocks which do that which the very interesting rocks were causally determined to do.
The reasons behind those feelings only hold meaning in that they allow me to better act to min/max my feelings like a good little machine.
edit: I forgot to mention this, but I think you fell again into the 'assigning too much meaning' trap. Empathy and the rest don't need to have objective meaning, they just need to do their part in helping the machines work effectively.
Sure, but if we understand that, really, it is all part of a gigantic math problem, a gigantic pre-determined causal nexus, then presumably that understanding would causally impact the experience of the hamburger or the book.
If your ex-girlfriend freely chose to sleep around with a bunch of guys that is significantly different from your ex girlfriend being causally determined to sleep around with a bunch of guys. Both situations suck, but the understanding of why the events happened can, I think, contribute to an understanding of the situation and so one's reaction to it.
String theorists argue this I believe, but there is no real way of testing this hypothesis. That and it's always sounded arrogant to me: every action we individually perform results in a Universe entirely devoted to our action? Seems a bit far fetched and "centre of the Universe" silly.
Strikes me you're trying to have it both ways. If we take seriously the idea of absolute causal determinism in the way you're suggesting, one doesn't choose one's reaction, and one's understanding of the situation is as much linked to the causal nexus as anything else. While I appreciate the sentiment behind thinking others aren't freely choosing to hurt, that move requires you to give up your own free choosing too. So however you react is just how you react.
Incidentally, one can't live as if she were absolutely determined, so I don't much see the point in dismissing the experience of choosing as evidence in favor of something like free will; as just seen, even our arch-determinist slips into that kind of talk.
I know "definition-switching" upsets you, so I was surprised to see you making such a move regarding morality. Anyway, do you have evidence of any major thinker who argues for the kind of freedom you do? How about anyone who defines freedom as you do? In the understanding of freedom here presented--a complete elimination of [at least efficient, maybe also final] causes--one stacks the deck such that arguing is one more exercise in futility. When the question is freedom of will, people normally mean whether they're able to make decisions and set ends for themselves, not whether gravity and father's insistent 'no' exert influence on their decision-making.
When one goes to the grocery store and sees "buy one, get one free" offers, one doesn't storm the manager's office demanding compensation for the gasoline spent, the clothes worn, and the shoe rubber expended in arriving at the store. One understands, rather, that this 'free' is relative to the question at hand, the question of purchasing. By setting the free-will argument in terms that disregard the question's context, importing a reified concept of freedom, the game is over before it has begun, and we're much poorer for fruitlessly spinning our wheels.
It has nothing to do with string theory. It's a philosophical interpretation of basic, undergraduate quantum mechanics. And the 'theory' stated above is the usual silly-goosed-up layman's misunderstanding of the actual theory. The universe does not split whenever you (or some other thinking individual) makes a choice. The universe exists as a superposition of discrete energy states. For every state which it is possible for any particle in the universe to occupy there is a finite probability that it will do so. This can be viewed as the particle existing in every possible state simultaneously with a 'probability density' related to the likelihood it will be observed there. When an observer observes a particle the quantum system of the observer becomes coupled to the quantum system of the thing being observed, causing the superpositions of possible states of both systems to become intertwined in such a way that for every possible state of the observed system there is a state of the observer which sees that state. Under the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics this doesn't happen and, instead, one state is selected by unknown means and the observer sees that one state. The universal wave-function hypothesis (or 'many worlds theory' as it is popularly known) says that there is no selection mechanism because the observed system continues to exist in every possible state; our consciousness is just only aware of one. Presumably our consciousness 'splits' when systems become coupled such that there are 'copies' of us that are aware of every possible state.
tl;dr: There is only one universe. We are just incapable of accurately observing its probabilistic structure.
I don't see how this can be the case. 'You', as in a specific individual, are, in large part, the result of your causal story. If you had experienced a different personal history such that you did/did not like steak then the steak-liking and steak-disliking versions of you would be two different people. Any internal thing or collection of things that you choose to define as the self are, eventually, the product of external factors. Genetics, physical environment, interactions with other people, exposure to information and cultural factors, etc. Your thoughts, hopes, dreams, desires, and passions all come from something and any change in them necessitates a different set of external stimuli to have caused the divergence.
Er, why would they be? Goals and the actions undertaken to achieve them are frequently completely dissimilar. There are constant military research solicitations requesting people come up with behavioral/statistical models such that they can plan mission tasks in such a way as to achieve course of action goals (there is an example involving a Marine company handing out free milk to non-extremist Afghani villagers to effect a reduction in overall IED attacks).
BOOM!
MIND BLOWN.
DEAD.
Contemporary causal discourse--especially that surrounding the question of "free will"--is normally carried out in terms of only efficient, and perhaps material, causes. It's probably not worth blaming anything for this, but I expect the impoverished notion of causality often presented is due to the cultural grip of scientization.
Eh. My interpretation of compatibilism was that you had to believe free will still existed even though you believed determinism was true. But that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying the notion of free will is irrelevant and silly. It's a misnomer. The concept itself is absurd. It's a construction of words that makes no sense; a signpost that points to a city that doesn't exist and could have never existed.
Me saying free will doesn't exist is sort of like uttering the words "slopoah doeing aol doesn't exist." It's just a nonsense idea.
Discussions like these really just continue to make me believe that philosophy is stupid and ultimately says nothing. It's like it never really sheds light on anything, it just makes people write lots of stuff. I never get ah-ha! moments from philosophy. My understanding of things never grows.
Now, science on the other hand - you know, that field that relies on the idea that things cause other things - gives me those ah-ha! moments all the time. Science talks about things that are verifiable (and falsifiable). And since it seems science stays out of this whole free will thing, I suppose I will too. That's sort of why I think my position is different from the compatibilist position - I just think free will a silly, irrelevant notion to begin with. It's fun to ponder occasionally, but only for fun and with nothing accomplished. I suppose that's it's basically intellectual masturbation, then.
Or maybe it merely means free of violent coercion or extortion.
Oh and that whole science vs. philosophy rant? That is all philosophy. Philosophical questions are unavoidable! Even when you are doing science you are implicitly accepting a particular philosophical position (empiricism, and probably some variant of materialism).
Edit: And of course saying that "nothing is accomplished" from philosophy is demonstrably false. I mean, Karl Marx was a philosopher. He had a pretty big impact on events don't you think?
Yeah, that's true. He came up with a type of government/economy that was based on a particular philosophy, and that shaped world events up through today.
And on the other side, the democratic republic of the United States was built on philosophical ideas too, so you have that point as well.
Well maybe you're right - up to a point. It still bothers me, though. We seem to get nowhere with these philosophical arguments. We just argue semantics over and over again for days. We haven't even come to a definition of free will to begin with that's accepted by all parties.
I contrast our debates on philosophy with debates on science stuff, where you have a system of falsifying hypotheses; and where you're talking about actual stuff that's directly observable in the real world. In science debates, it's all about pointing out evidence. Does the theory of gravity fit? Well, let's try this experiment. Does the theory of evolution fit? Well, let's exhaustively examine different species and look at fossil records and run experiments on fruit flies. But what about the theory of free will? There's no evidence to examine, no experiments to run. And that leaves me feeling annoyed, like I've done all this thinking and have nothing to show for it.
Lots of philosophical debates leave me feeling that way. Maybe I'm just missing something.
Hi. I'm new. Anyway:
We DO do studies exploring free will. Not so much in my home field of physics, but some psychology and neuroscience people have done really interesting things surrounding thought and thinking. I suppose it's not surprising. I really should be getting work done, so I'm not going to hunt down the studies. Here are the short versions:
A doctor has been working with a patient for years now. He's written books about this poor sailor who drank away his short-term memory by accident when he was 19. Yeah. Sort of like Memento. He'll stay in the game for about 2 minutes before forgetting whatever just went on, and going back to being the same 19 year old he was, plus two minutes. I don't think it's like a cache dump. More like a queue (I've been told the brain parcels up info into a couple milli...or micro...can't remember...milliseconds, I'll say, but I've got nothing to verify this). So his short-term is gone, which is necessary to form long-term memories. The point is, he's the same guy personality-wise that he was when he was 19. It's interesting because he apparently can get better at doing things, like solving those twisty iron puzzles, or playing checkers, but will not remember who you are if you leave the room.
SECOND STUDY: (I think this one's cooler)
Experimentalists take subjects and monitor their brain patterns in some sort of apparatus, I'm guessing MRI, but I don't remember. The subjects are instructed to push a button whenever they feel like it, and remember when they decided to push it. There is a scrolling disk with numbers around the edge that they are intended to use to indicate when they made the decision. After enough data is collected, the experimentalists could predict 3 seconds in advance of when the subject would push the button. There were cries that the experiment was not conducted well enough. There's just one button, they can see the disc rotating, etc.
So they did it again. This time, subjects had two buttons, and the images did not scroll, they just changed, and they were not numbers anymore. This time the scientists could predict, not only when they would push the button, but which button they would push, 7 seconds in advance.
So the first experiment might suggest that we are a sum of our experiences, nothing more. The second one might suggest that it is just a chemical reaction that makes a decision, and a predictable one at that. Maybe this doesn't say anything one way or the other on "free will," but we're working on it. And you CAN work on it, which is cool.
This one's pretty cool on it's own, though.
I could think of a billion different tests to perform on the guy. Seeing if I could add or remove all kinds of nervous tics like knuckle popping or beard stroking. Seeing if I could give him affective prejudices. Not much of it would be ethical, though.
This stuff is super cool but I don't think it's pertinent to the debate that's been going on for the last few pages. They don't care about what's actually going on in someone's brain. They care about the definition of freedom, like what this guy said:
^ All that kind of stuff just seems silly to me. That's what I was really going for.
(Those studies are awesome by the way.)
Edit: Oh and stuff like what this guy said is what I have a problem with:
I don't even know what this person is trying to say, but I don't like it.