Well, edge cases are how you check whether your formalization of your intuitions around the fundamentals are [strike]correct[/strike] not problematic.
Least problematic. I haven't heard of a stance without some holes; the art is finding the one with the fewest and smallest.
jothki, you're right to point out the innate problem in discussing an idea through examples, but it's a decent way of shoring up issues at a reasonable pace and keeping the discussion moving. What might kick things off is if you offered your thoughts on what government is for, and what things it should and should not be allowed to do.
Unfortunately, the definition of legitimacy is subjective and malleable. Depending on your view, it may also be circular: for example, the belief that an organization making a legitimate claim to a monopoly on physical force is legitimate. So the best way to talk about and define it might be in relation to another theory.
The problem is that I'm not convinced that anything is 'legitimate'. Not in the sense that I hate government, but in the sense that government basically does anything that it wants that it can get away with, and legitimacy is assigned based solely on how much people happen to like those actions, not on any more fundamental basis. Legitimate is basically just a synonym for popular.
The problem is that I'm not convinced that anything is 'legitimate'. Not in the sense that I hate government, but in the sense that government basically does anything that it wants that it can get away with, and legitimacy is assigned based solely on how much people happen to like those actions, not on any more fundamental basis. Legitimate is basically just a synonym for popular.
But what would a "fundamental" basis be for you? "Legitimate" as in according to law?
And, really, "solely"? People hate, HATE, the Westboro Baptist Church. But I'd wager the vast majority of people supported the recent Supreme Court decision in favor of their freedom of speech, even though they really dislike the results (and probably wouldn't shed a tear, and maybe they'd even cheer, if Fred Phelps were murdered).
The problem is that I'm not convinced that anything is 'legitimate'. Not in the sense that I hate government, but in the sense that government basically does anything that it wants that it can get away with, and legitimacy is assigned based solely on how much people happen to like those actions, not on any more fundamental basis. Legitimate is basically just a synonym for popular.
But you're defining a normative concept based on a descriptive claim. In this topic, to say a set of actions is legitimate is to say that the state ought to be able to do those things, not that they do.
Edit: Think about the example of racial desegregation in the United States. The majority of whites were against it, but the government (can't remember if this was the supreme court or just congress) said that, in this case, the majority was simply wrong. Hence the famous case of the national guard being called in to escort black students around school. Was this a legitimate action?
Because they'd hate the government supressing speech even more.
But mainly because that'd be a direct violation of the 1st Amendment and, therefor, the Constitution, a thing that's quite independent of whatever government is in office. The legitimacy of the Supreme Court decision derived from respect to the law of the land, not to the "people" (whatever that means) approving the action.
I have an urge to say yes, but I think that's because I feel it was a good idea. I'm sure that many people thought that desegregation wasn't legitimate back when it happened.
It heavily resembles the problem of trying to find something false that I believe in. I can't figure out a way to seperate legitimacy from my beliefs about legitimacy.
One functional definition of legitimacy that is something along the lines that you speak is: any action that the State can take without causing itself to be replaced by inciting revolt may be considered legitimate. That's more of a Utilitarian approach informed by modern life, but at least it doesn't rely on divine right which used to be the legitimizing method for much of human history.
The definition of legitimate power has evolved quite a bit from place to place over time, but there are some common features that can be seen in most and here are some commonalities I can think of off the top of my head:
1. Legitimate power must be seen as fair in its application of reward and punishment.
2. Legitimate power must be seen to act in a moral fashion.
3. Legitimate power must be seen to be obtained through legitimate and ethical means, which may include the use of force and coercion, particularly if power is achieved through legitimate revolt.
4. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the common interest of the governed over the interests of the wielders of that power, when those interests conflict.
5. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the interests of the majority of the governed or a greater moral good when not acting in the interests of the majority of the governed.
Edit: An interesting side-question: why is legitimacy so important and how do various legitimacy tests alter the use of power (ie: how do divine right rulers differ from the people's choice rulers)?
But mainly because that'd be a direct violation of the 1st Amendment and, therefor, the Constitution, a thing that's quite independent of whatever government is in office. The legitimacy of the Supreme Court decision derived from respect to the law of the land, not to the "people" (whatever that means) approving the action.
The constitution is no less a construct of "the people" than current elected officials are. We could choose, via democratic process, to amend the constitution and repeal the first amendment. Would that be a "legitimate" action?
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Yes, it is legally legitimate to repeal parts of the constitution through the constitutionally proscribed amendment process, but it's pretty easy to argue that repealing the first amendment would not be ethically or morally legitimate, especially if a state religion was spawned on the heels of a repeal of the First Amendment.
The definition of legitimate power has evolved quite a bit from place to place over time, but there are some common features that can be seen in most and here are some commonalities I can think of off the top of my head:
1. Legitimate power must be seen as fair in its application of reward and punishment.
2. Legitimate power must be seen to act in a moral fashion.
3. Legitimate power must be obtained through legitimate and ethical means, which may include the use of force and coercion, particularly if power is achieved through legitimate revolt.
4. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the common interest of the governed over the interests of the wielders of that power, when those interests conflict.
5. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the interests of the majority of the governed or a greater moral good when not acting in the interests of the majority of the governed.
Why did you choose to put "seen" in all of them besides 3? Is there something relative about the others but absolute about the 3?
I can see why you would hesitate to add it to 3, but does it actually belong in the others?
I just missed it. It's a very off-the-cuff list so I'll toss it in there on 3 as well.
The main thing that I was driving home with the "seen" qualifier is that legitimacy is closely coupled with perception. Usually if you can appear legitimate that is enough for a period of time, of course, for truly stable government appearances aren't really enough, but sometimes that's all you have. Also, as with many things, perception is reality, and there are plenty of fun examples of a seemingly legitimate ruler or governing body acting in a way that is illegitimate.
Besides, legitimacy has no real meaning outside of the context of human affairs, and both the governed and rulers participate in ongoing meaning creation around the concept of legitimate uses of the power of the state. Therefore, I chose to emphasize the participatory nature of meaning creation around this concept by explicitly stating that legitimate power is "seen" to be this or that, instead of saying that legitimate power "is" this or that.
Edit: Not sure if I managed to clarify anything there, but hopefully I did...
You wouldn't get any argument from a libertarian on how stupid the Patriot Act is, or the TSA, or Gitmo. We just see smoking-bans in bars as similar to TSA pat-downs. Most of the arguments are the same "it's for your own good", "government knows best" etc..
Wow. I think you owe other Libertarians an apology for making them look like silly geese. Really, if you can't tell the difference between a smoking ban in a public establishment and the Patriot Act such that you a) think all the arguments for them are identical and b) don't even understand those arguments, are you surprised, honestly, that people are not falling all over themselves agreeing with you? Or are you one of those Libertarians who secretly doesn't want to persuade people you're right because you enjoy being superior to the sheeple?
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
edited May 2011
So, super-necro-post time. Finals are over, so, back to this thread I come.
On unfair constructions: for reference, Indonesia was here (note the context). Malaysia and South Korea was here. I used Google. The estimated death toll of the Indonesian communist purges is nearly a million, actually.
I don't actually see how a liberal construction - your liberal construction, that is - prohibits these; I could take the tack that liberalism "couldn't work" (compare actually-turned-communist neighbors) and thus illiberal measures were justified, or I could take the tack that they chose to pursue a very different set of individual liberties, or both. State stability and economic wealth permit some obvious material freedoms that would not exist otherwise, often substantial, due to the accumulative nature of growth; if people can be under duress from disease, why not grinding poverty? That is easily fatal, too. This is why I did not reply to your earlier objection about past actual atrocities: namely, that your framework is weak at actually prohibiting as such, or in requiring that the state act in protection of some violated right.
(to nitpick, I don't actually approve of the Indonesian or Korean purges, but my objection would be that we don't plausibly know the impact of doing so a priori, certainly not enough to justify murdering a lot of people - note that, for nearly two decades after the Korean War, American expert predictions were for the North to grow faster than the South, and so intervention was actively harmful to the South given known circumstances at the time, before "export-led growth" was a thing - but observing, after the fact, that it turned out to be arguably an improvement for the people who exist five decades later is entirely possible, and allowing for this is necessary if you want to avoid easy objections to naïve theorizing about the powers of developing would-be liberal democracies.
You are probably right to press me here, but I don't think that you've demonstrated what you need to yet. Yes, one could argue that liberalism in Indonesia was impossible because the communists were fundamentally committed to illiberal outcomes, and that this both justified and generated the purges. However, I don't think such an argument would work. The communists co-existed as part of the government for decades without making a violent play for power, and even if they had attained greater prominence, it's not clear that they would have turned Indonesia into another USSR. As such, painting them as a clear and present danger warranting extreme extra-legal persecution appears to be a rationalization more than a rationale.
Furthermore, even though you are right that increased wealth allows new freedoms, you are forgetting the egalitarian bent in liberalism: it is not the most freedom possible, but the most freedom possible that is consistent with similar freedom for others. So, for instance, even if killing a million people increases the liberties for those left standing, it is clearly not consistent with similar freedom for the rest. The rest are dead; they are not getting any freedoms once they're six feet under.
I also think that when you condemn the purges you are getting the right result for the wrong reason. You make their error out to be one of prudence, not one of principle--your response implies that had people at the time known that export-lead growth was a real economic phenomenon, then that would have justified murdering the leftists and moving on with an aggressive economic policy along those lines. This strikes me as the absolute wrong conclusion, for reasons both of principle and practicality. In principle, political murder is itself a terrible thing. And practically, a system where one can justify political murder via some points on or off GDP is incredibly unstable. If coups are permitted, then so are counter-coups. I don't think you've really said much yet in response to what I think is one of liberalism's stronger points: that it prevents situations like the wars of religion.
Family and local community bonds have, historically, occupied much of one's individual identity and religious outlook. Such ties have also functioned, materially speaking, as informal safety nets and risk-sharing. These reinforce each other: individual rebellion against social norms comes at a risk of being denied material assistance during a personal crisis, and refusing the obligation to provide assistance to those in need is punished through the risk of social shame and ostracism.
This isn't actually objectionable in a liberal society. We may regard it as regrettable if families and communities ostracize someone for being, say, gay, but regulating how one treats family members is generally outside state purview (and I don't see this being plausibly different). In a culturally tolerant society, it's even desirable: families and communities provide additional support without using it as a means to enforce culturally conservative values.
With all that in mind. The provision of individualist welfare is generally taken for granted in the West (but doesn't have to be so; welfare in East Asia can be family-centric, by focusing welfare on people in families or by relying on family ties to redirect welfare). Such welfare systems can substitute for informal communal safety nets and thus undermine the ability of families and local communities to police against cultural rebellion.
So: I don't suppose anyone here actually disputes the legitimacy of individual welfare provision, so let's take that for granted. Suppose a government proposes an expansion of some individualist welfare scheme. Is it, as a hypothetical, legitimate to do so if the ruling government happens to also notice that family-enforced cultural attitudes may also decline?
What if the government proposes the welfare expansion in order to pursue such a decline?
Or consider the reverse: a government seeks a culture-neutral objective, of, say, easing the burden on the state safety net by reinforcing communal support networks ("thousand points of light"). Ignore, for now, the inherent inequality of increasing reliance on where you were lucky enough to be born. Presumably it would be kosher to do so through culture-neutral methods, like altering the relevant tax codes to ease family asset accumulation. What about doing so via encouraging the prevailing (probably conservative) cultural attitudes among small towns?
Suppose we find that last objectionable. As noted, culturally tolerant families and communities can provide such support without using them as culture war battlegrounds. Is setting out to engineer multiculturalist tolerance a legitimate goal of the state? If it is in order to achieve a neutral objective?
I'm not sure how far I grasp your sketch, but I will say that I think you are overstating the compatibility of liberalism with social support networks controlled at the family level. For instance, I think Martha Nussbaum has written persuasively against the very thing you claim to be obviously okay: the giving of social support to heads-of-household rather than individuals. This sort of support system systematically disenfranchises women, and one who takes the liberal value on autonomy to be truly important will not go along with aid programs which treat individuals as parts of a more important organic whole (a family) rather than individuals with their own independent needs.
So I think that you are presenting something as a fatal dilemma to me (can the state intervene to economically promote or punish family support networks?) where in fact I take it to have a clear answer: the state should minimize the economic control that family support networks can exercise over their members. We are all individually autonomous, not autonomous insofar as we are a cog in a government-recognized social institution. Of course, there are balancing acts to do here between the individual liberty to do as you wish with your estates versus the coercive power that establishes over your heirs, but in general, we at the least get clear answers in the extreme cases--for instance, I am willing to categorically come out against aid for Indian families which is disbursed exclusively to male heads of household, as opposed to women, who, under these aid schemes, are often left without skills or ability to survive when widowed, or who are never allowed to become literate when money is too tight for school as daughters.
For the record, I am not okay with giving social support to the heads-of-households; it should be provided to individuals, and it should be provided even if we are aware that it would undermine existing social institutions, and even if the members of said institutions nominally desire to maintain the existing social order; indeed we should characterize its destruction as a benefit. I mentioned GHWB's thousand points of light to emphasize that the developed West does have non-negligible political movement in this policy space; this is not just a developing-country issue; I too oppose it for the reasons you mention.
I am somewhat puzzled by your characterization of the state seeking to undermine a non-state, nominally voluntary culturally-sustained hierachy as something springing out of a (classically) liberal outlook, however, for state actions of that nature is more or less what I was seeking to defend. Recognize that it isn't actually unreasonable for individuals in such hierarchies to leave; people who permanently migrate from rural poor to rich urban regions do this all the time, often across national and cultural borders. Furthermore, the destruction of such institutions doesn't actually further the economic autonomy of the individuals involved - where families have historically acted as a savings vehicle, its destruction as such harms the last generation involved, having neither a family fallback nor a reliable banking system. The West's last such transition took place during the postwar boom, but otherwise there is a generation of relative privation: see also, Asian tiger states and the alarmingly tiny retirement funds of the postwar generation. It is the next generation that begins to benefit.
Atop this there is the more fundamental problem that policies have to popularly validate themselves - there must be a big tent, there must be sustainable coalition support, if it undermines one existing interest group then it must enable another to have an interest in its defense, if it is at possible to bind the hands of future governments by making your program extraordinarily unpopular to dismantle, do so, future generations must not recognize it as a past political bargain but as something which is their right - if this is not cultural engineering, what is?
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It feels like we're picking over edge cases rather than dealing with it at a more fundamental level, though.
Least problematic. I haven't heard of a stance without some holes; the art is finding the one with the fewest and smallest.
jothki, you're right to point out the innate problem in discussing an idea through examples, but it's a decent way of shoring up issues at a reasonable pace and keeping the discussion moving. What might kick things off is if you offered your thoughts on what government is for, and what things it should and should not be allowed to do.
Unfortunately, the definition of legitimacy is subjective and malleable. Depending on your view, it may also be circular: for example, the belief that an organization making a legitimate claim to a monopoly on physical force is legitimate. So the best way to talk about and define it might be in relation to another theory.
But what would a "fundamental" basis be for you? "Legitimate" as in according to law?
And, really, "solely"? People hate, HATE, the Westboro Baptist Church. But I'd wager the vast majority of people supported the recent Supreme Court decision in favor of their freedom of speech, even though they really dislike the results (and probably wouldn't shed a tear, and maybe they'd even cheer, if Fred Phelps were murdered).
But you're defining a normative concept based on a descriptive claim. In this topic, to say a set of actions is legitimate is to say that the state ought to be able to do those things, not that they do.
Edit: Think about the example of racial desegregation in the United States. The majority of whites were against it, but the government (can't remember if this was the supreme court or just congress) said that, in this case, the majority was simply wrong. Hence the famous case of the national guard being called in to escort black students around school. Was this a legitimate action?
But mainly because that'd be a direct violation of the 1st Amendment and, therefor, the Constitution, a thing that's quite independent of whatever government is in office. The legitimacy of the Supreme Court decision derived from respect to the law of the land, not to the "people" (whatever that means) approving the action.
It heavily resembles the problem of trying to find something false that I believe in. I can't figure out a way to seperate legitimacy from my beliefs about legitimacy.
The definition of legitimate power has evolved quite a bit from place to place over time, but there are some common features that can be seen in most and here are some commonalities I can think of off the top of my head:
1. Legitimate power must be seen as fair in its application of reward and punishment.
2. Legitimate power must be seen to act in a moral fashion.
3. Legitimate power must be seen to be obtained through legitimate and ethical means, which may include the use of force and coercion, particularly if power is achieved through legitimate revolt.
4. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the common interest of the governed over the interests of the wielders of that power, when those interests conflict.
5. Legitimate power must be seen to act in the interests of the majority of the governed or a greater moral good when not acting in the interests of the majority of the governed.
Edit: An interesting side-question: why is legitimacy so important and how do various legitimacy tests alter the use of power (ie: how do divine right rulers differ from the people's choice rulers)?
The constitution is no less a construct of "the people" than current elected officials are. We could choose, via democratic process, to amend the constitution and repeal the first amendment. Would that be a "legitimate" action?
Pluto was a planet and I'll never forget
Why did you choose to put "seen" in all of them besides 3? Is there something relative about the others but absolute about the 3?
I can see why you would hesitate to add it to 3, but does it actually belong in the others?
The main thing that I was driving home with the "seen" qualifier is that legitimacy is closely coupled with perception. Usually if you can appear legitimate that is enough for a period of time, of course, for truly stable government appearances aren't really enough, but sometimes that's all you have. Also, as with many things, perception is reality, and there are plenty of fun examples of a seemingly legitimate ruler or governing body acting in a way that is illegitimate.
Besides, legitimacy has no real meaning outside of the context of human affairs, and both the governed and rulers participate in ongoing meaning creation around the concept of legitimate uses of the power of the state. Therefore, I chose to emphasize the participatory nature of meaning creation around this concept by explicitly stating that legitimate power is "seen" to be this or that, instead of saying that legitimate power "is" this or that.
Edit: Not sure if I managed to clarify anything there, but hopefully I did...
Wow. I think you owe other Libertarians an apology for making them look like silly geese. Really, if you can't tell the difference between a smoking ban in a public establishment and the Patriot Act such that you a) think all the arguments for them are identical and b) don't even understand those arguments, are you surprised, honestly, that people are not falling all over themselves agreeing with you? Or are you one of those Libertarians who secretly doesn't want to persuade people you're right because you enjoy being superior to the sheeple?
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You are probably right to press me here, but I don't think that you've demonstrated what you need to yet. Yes, one could argue that liberalism in Indonesia was impossible because the communists were fundamentally committed to illiberal outcomes, and that this both justified and generated the purges. However, I don't think such an argument would work. The communists co-existed as part of the government for decades without making a violent play for power, and even if they had attained greater prominence, it's not clear that they would have turned Indonesia into another USSR. As such, painting them as a clear and present danger warranting extreme extra-legal persecution appears to be a rationalization more than a rationale.
Furthermore, even though you are right that increased wealth allows new freedoms, you are forgetting the egalitarian bent in liberalism: it is not the most freedom possible, but the most freedom possible that is consistent with similar freedom for others. So, for instance, even if killing a million people increases the liberties for those left standing, it is clearly not consistent with similar freedom for the rest. The rest are dead; they are not getting any freedoms once they're six feet under.
I also think that when you condemn the purges you are getting the right result for the wrong reason. You make their error out to be one of prudence, not one of principle--your response implies that had people at the time known that export-lead growth was a real economic phenomenon, then that would have justified murdering the leftists and moving on with an aggressive economic policy along those lines. This strikes me as the absolute wrong conclusion, for reasons both of principle and practicality. In principle, political murder is itself a terrible thing. And practically, a system where one can justify political murder via some points on or off GDP is incredibly unstable. If coups are permitted, then so are counter-coups. I don't think you've really said much yet in response to what I think is one of liberalism's stronger points: that it prevents situations like the wars of religion.
I'm not sure how far I grasp your sketch, but I will say that I think you are overstating the compatibility of liberalism with social support networks controlled at the family level. For instance, I think Martha Nussbaum has written persuasively against the very thing you claim to be obviously okay: the giving of social support to heads-of-household rather than individuals. This sort of support system systematically disenfranchises women, and one who takes the liberal value on autonomy to be truly important will not go along with aid programs which treat individuals as parts of a more important organic whole (a family) rather than individuals with their own independent needs.
So I think that you are presenting something as a fatal dilemma to me (can the state intervene to economically promote or punish family support networks?) where in fact I take it to have a clear answer: the state should minimize the economic control that family support networks can exercise over their members. We are all individually autonomous, not autonomous insofar as we are a cog in a government-recognized social institution. Of course, there are balancing acts to do here between the individual liberty to do as you wish with your estates versus the coercive power that establishes over your heirs, but in general, we at the least get clear answers in the extreme cases--for instance, I am willing to categorically come out against aid for Indian families which is disbursed exclusively to male heads of household, as opposed to women, who, under these aid schemes, are often left without skills or ability to survive when widowed, or who are never allowed to become literate when money is too tight for school as daughters.
So fuck a thousand points of light :P
I am somewhat puzzled by your characterization of the state seeking to undermine a non-state, nominally voluntary culturally-sustained hierachy as something springing out of a (classically) liberal outlook, however, for state actions of that nature is more or less what I was seeking to defend. Recognize that it isn't actually unreasonable for individuals in such hierarchies to leave; people who permanently migrate from rural poor to rich urban regions do this all the time, often across national and cultural borders. Furthermore, the destruction of such institutions doesn't actually further the economic autonomy of the individuals involved - where families have historically acted as a savings vehicle, its destruction as such harms the last generation involved, having neither a family fallback nor a reliable banking system. The West's last such transition took place during the postwar boom, but otherwise there is a generation of relative privation: see also, Asian tiger states and the alarmingly tiny retirement funds of the postwar generation. It is the next generation that begins to benefit.
Atop this there is the more fundamental problem that policies have to popularly validate themselves - there must be a big tent, there must be sustainable coalition support, if it undermines one existing interest group then it must enable another to have an interest in its defense, if it is at possible to bind the hands of future governments by making your program extraordinarily unpopular to dismantle, do so, future generations must not recognize it as a past political bargain but as something which is their right - if this is not cultural engineering, what is?