It is neither antiscientific nor dogmatic to say, for example, "I find it highly implausible that there are invisible vital energies that can be manipulated with copper needles in such a way to reliably heal the sick."
Rejecting a statement off-hand for being highly implausible given our current web of belief is not in and of itself dogmatism.
I don't even think it's dogmatic to say, in a colloquial sense, "there are not invisible vital energies that can be manipulated with copper needles." Similarly, it's not really dogmatic to say "the earth is round" or "my keyboard is not made of beef." Embracing reason means that any statement of truth you make implies "...it's technically possible that I'm wrong, but it's very unlikely." Nobody goes around ending every statement with "...but I might be wrong," though, because that would be unwieldy and, frankly, retarded.
A phrase like "dogmatic adherence to reason" is stupid because reason itself is a tool and not a belief. You may as well criticize a carpenter for his dogmatic adherence to building stuff - it's what he does. It is his job description. And a scientist's job description is "using reason to try to explain things." The alternative to reason is picking an explanation out of a hat. Even if you see a UFO and say "it must be aliens because I can't think of anything else that glows and flies," you're using reason. You just suck at it.
Yeah, pretty much.
hanskey: A web of belief is how I (and others) describe a worldview that is both coherent and nuanced. ("Idea X is compatible with previous idea Y, but previous idea Y might be wrong because it relies on assumption Z.") It does not in and of itself imply dogmatism.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
I mean, there is 0 evidence of mind-over- matter outside the body, so why is the placebo effect given a pass? So far the science explanations is: "well the mind appears to be able to do things that aren't intuitive given our understanding of consciousness and we have a bunch of evidence for this, though we're not really sure if it even exists because the evidence is not really all that good".
The mind is a part of the body. Why wouldn't you accept that the state of one part of your body alters the states of other parts? Do you think that having healthy lungs has no impact on the performance of your immune system? Or a healthy heart? The brain directs the body, so of course brain function is going to impact overall health. How exactly the belief that you're being fed caffeine pills equates to a similar neurochemical response as if you'd actually eaten caffeine pills is a great question and is something that plenty of people are trying to figure out, but I don't see why the lack of an answer to it throws any doubt on the final effect.
Also, to poke a hole in a theory I don't actually need to provide an alternative and the "scientific explanation" of the placebo effect is weak at best, since we basically have no idea how it actually works.
No, you don't have to replace the prevaling theory to disprove it, but you do have to provide some sort of counter-argument. Just saying "I don't think your argument is good enough" without saying which part of the argument is incorrect or providing an alterantive interpretation or result isn't enough.
There is no evidence to support the idea that consciousness can act to directly effect the material world except by moving the body. The placebo effect may be an exception to the general rule, or it might not exist, but it does seem contrary to what science says about conciousness.
How does consciousness move the body if not by affecting the material world?
Consciousness is not a mystical, ethereal, non-physical thing floating in the ether and driving your body via remote controls. It's an emergent phenomenon of the electrochemical engine inside your skull. Your thoughts impact the physical environment because they are, in fact, generated by electrochemical reaction patterns. As well to say that computer operating systems don't effect the physical world except by changing what's on the monitor, so how can someone claim that the OS changes the temperature of the RAM?
I mean, there is 0 evidence of mind-over- matter outside the body, so why is the placebo effect given a pass? So far the science explanations is: "well the mind appears to be able to do things that aren't intuitive given our understanding of consciousness and we have a bunch of evidence for this, though we're not really sure if it even exists because the evidence is not really all that good".
The mind is a part of the body. Why wouldn't you accept that the state of one part of your body alters the states of other parts? Do you think that having healthy lungs has no impact on the performance of your immune system? Or a healthy heart? The brain directs the body, so of course brain function is going to impact overall health. How exactly the belief that you're being fed caffeine pills equates to a similar neurochemical response as if you'd actually eaten caffeine pills is a great question and is something that plenty of people are trying to figure out, but I don't see why the lack of an answer to it throws any doubt on the final effect.
Also, to poke a hole in a theory I don't actually need to provide an alternative and the "scientific explanation" of the placebo effect is weak at best, since we basically have no idea how it actually works.
No, you don't have to replace the prevaling theory to disprove it, but you do have to provide some sort of counter-argument. Just saying "I don't think your argument is good enough" without saying which part of the argument is incorrect or providing an alterantive interpretation or result isn't enough.
There is no evidence to support the idea that consciousness can act to directly effect the material world except by moving the body. The placebo effect may be an exception to the general rule, or it might not exist, but it does seem contrary to what science says about conciousness.
What, no. That's a complete misinterpretation of the current science surrounding the brain and mind.
You're inventing constraints.
I mean we specifically track the way conscious states change physical conditions all the flipping time. What do you think neurotransmitters are?
This thread has somehow turned into the same thing as that one guy who believes in aliens. One or two people debating with everyone else over skepticism and rationality.
What happened to that thread? It was honestly kind of more interesting.
This thread has somehow turned into the same thing as that one guy who believes in aliens. One or two people debating with everyone else over skepticism and rationality.
What happened to that thread? It was honestly kind of more interesting.
I think it died because ACSIS quit responding. I'm kind of surprised he hasn't shown up in here to give us some random youtube links and mention Puma Punku or whatever the place with the diorite ruins is.
I mean, there is 0 evidence of mind-over- matter outside the body, so why is the placebo effect given a pass? So far the science explanations is: "well the mind appears to be able to do things that aren't intuitive given our understanding of consciousness and we have a bunch of evidence for this, though we're not really sure if it even exists because the evidence is not really all that good".
The mind is a part of the body. Why wouldn't you accept that the state of one part of your body alters the states of other parts? Do you think that having healthy lungs has no impact on the performance of your immune system? Or a healthy heart? The brain directs the body, so of course brain function is going to impact overall health. How exactly the belief that you're being fed caffeine pills equates to a similar neurochemical response as if you'd actually eaten caffeine pills is a great question and is something that plenty of people are trying to figure out, but I don't see why the lack of an answer to it throws any doubt on the final effect.
Also, to poke a hole in a theory I don't actually need to provide an alternative and the "scientific explanation" of the placebo effect is weak at best, since we basically have no idea how it actually works.
No, you don't have to replace the prevaling theory to disprove it, but you do have to provide some sort of counter-argument. Just saying "I don't think your argument is good enough" without saying which part of the argument is incorrect or providing an alterantive interpretation or result isn't enough.
There is no evidence to support the idea that consciousness can act to directly effect the material world except by moving the body. The placebo effect may be an exception to the general rule, or it might not exist, but it does seem contrary to what science says about conciousness.
How does consciousness move the body if not by affecting the material world?
Consciousness is not a mystical, ethereal, non-physical thing floating in the ether and driving your body via remote controls. It's an emergent phenomenon of the electrochemical engine inside your skull. Your thoughts impact the physical environment because they are, in fact, generated by electrochemical reaction patterns. As well to say that computer operating systems don't effect the physical world except by changing what's on the monitor, so how can someone claim that the OS changes the temperature of the RAM?
The difference is that we have a great empirical body of knowledge often called electrical engineering, that tells you everything about how a computer effects the outside world, and besides, as a programmer I am intimately involved with making computers do things beyond the screen all the time, so that was a waste of an analogy. Try again!. Seriously, did you forget about thermodynamics or are you just struggling to make a point?
Plus, the brain may or not be equivalent to a computer - that's just a matter of philosophy at this point.
This thread has somehow turned into the same thing as that one guy who believes in aliens. One or two people debating with everyone else over skepticism and rationality.
What happened to that thread? It was honestly kind of more interesting.
Isn't that ironic that YOU should make this criticism considering you have not contributed to this thread with a single one of your posts?
You have done nothing more than pop-up every once in a while to thread shit and agree with the rest of the "science is my religion" crowd.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
The difference is that we have a great empirical body of knowledge often called electrical engineering, that tells you everything about how a computer effects the outside world, and besides, as a programmer I am intimately involved with making computers do things beyond the screen all the time, so that was a waste of an analogy. Try again!. Seriously, did you forget about thermodynamics or are you just struggling to make a point?
Plus, the brain may or not be equivalent to a computer - that's just a matter of philosophy at this point.
We have a great empirical body of knowledge often called neurochemistry, that tells you a lot about how consciousness affects the state of the brain, and besides, as a person who knows anything about modern notions of neurochemistry, I am aware that many things our consciousness does impact the chemical state of our brains and, conversely, many things involving the chemical state of our brains impact our consciousness.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
Eh, I'm actually not a big fan of the mind as a computer analogy, I feel like too many psychologists tack it on without putting in the necessary thought. I've read more than a few papers by people who just patently do not understand what a computer does while insisting that a brain is just like one.
BUT A.) that wasn't even the point of the analogy there and B.) yeah it's a perfectly serviceable analogy that's better than throwaway mysticism.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
Eh, I'm actually not a big fan of the mind as a computer analogy, I feel like too many psychologists tack it on without putting in the necessary thought. I've read more than a few papers by people who just patently do not understand what a computer does while insisting that a brain is just like one.
BUT A.) that wasn't even the point of the analogy there and B.) yeah it's a perfectly serviceable analogy that's better than throwaway mysticism.
I'm not either, but it was the first example that came to mind of something vaguely metaphysical that is, with even the slightest contemplation, obviously a mechanical process with secondary effects.
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
Eh, I'm actually not a big fan of the mind as a computer analogy, I feel like too many psychologists tack it on without putting in the necessary thought. I've read more than a few papers by people who just patently do not understand what a computer does while insisting that a brain is just like one.
BUT A.) that wasn't even the point of the analogy there and B.) yeah it's a perfectly serviceable analogy that's better than throwaway mysticism.
My point is that any analogy is a weak basis for a belief. If that's all you got (which is what it sounds like) then I will continue to reserve judgement.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
No magic is required, but there is a clear dearth of plausible explanations.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
No magic is required, but there is a clear dearth of plausible explanations.
What's one implausible explanation?
Or perhaps even: Why is computationalism implausible?
This thread has somehow turned into the same thing as that one guy who believes in aliens. One or two people debating with everyone else over skepticism and rationality.
What happened to that thread? It was honestly kind of more interesting.
Isn't that ironic that YOU should make this criticism considering you have not contributed to this thread with a single one of your posts?
You have done nothing more than pop-up every once in a while to thread shit and agree with the rest of the "science is my religion" crowd.
Boooooooooooring!!
Actually, I think the reason other's stopped bringing up weird shit is that they had no desire to be roasted over hot coals by the purveyors of a belief system who refuse to acknowledge that it is merely a belief system.
Seriously - you can't dogpile the opposition and even hope to coax them into returning to the field of battle.
How is the human brain not equivalent to a computer?
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
No magic is required, but there is a clear dearth of plausible explanations.
What's one implausible explanation?
Or perhaps even: Why is computationalism implausible?
Explain why humans do more than compute using the computational model.
First, a personal note - that makes me very sad for you.
I would counter and say "how are emotions explained as computations".
wikipedia is your friend, so here's some much more scholarly criticism of that model:
There are arguments against the Computational Theory of Mind. Some of the most compelling encompass the physical realm of a computational process. Gallistel writes in Learning and Representation about some of the implications of a truly computational system of the mind. Essentially Gallistel is concerned with the limits of thermodynamics within the circuits of the brain. With the high volume of information, and the low level of lost material necessary, we have to ask where the energy comes from and how the heat would be dissipated.[citation needed]
John Searle has offered a thought experiment known as the Chinese Room that demonstrates this problem. Imagine that there is a man in a room with no way of communicating to anyone or anything outside of the room except for a piece of paper that is passed under the door. With the paper, he is to use a series of provided books to “answer” what is on the paper. The symbols are all in Chinese, and all the man knows is where to look in the books, which then tell him what to write in response. It just so happens that this generates a conversation that the Chinese man outside of the room can actually understand, but can our man in the room really be said to understand it? This is essentially what the computational theory of mind presents us with; a model in which the mind simply decodes symbols and outputs more symbols. It is argued that perhaps this is not real learning or thinking at all. However, it can be argued in response to this that it is the man and the paper together that understand Chinese, albeit in a rudimentary way due to the rudimentary nature of the system; as opposed to if the man learned Chinese, which would create a sophisticated system of communicating Chinese.
Searle has further raised questions about what exactly constitutes a computation:
the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Wordstar, if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain.[3]
Putnam has similarly claimed that "every ordinary open system realizes every abstract finite automaton."[4] Computationalists have responded by aiming to develop criteria describing what exactly counts as an implementation.[5] [6] Additionally, Roger Penrose has proposed the idea that the human mind does not use a knowably sound calculation procedure to understand and discover mathematical intricacies. This would mean that a normal Turing complete computer would not be able to ascertain certain mathematical truths that human minds can.[7]
This is from a wiki article on Cognitivism, a competing model:
The idea that mental functions can be described as information processing models has been criticised by philosopher John Searle and mathematician Roger Penrose who both argue that computation has some inherent shortcomings which cannot capture the fundamentals of mental processes.
Penrose uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem (which states that there are mathematical truths which can never be proven in a sufficiently strong mathematical system; any sufficiently strong system of axioms will also be incomplete) and Turing's halting problem (which states that there are some things which are inherently non-computable) as evidence for his position.
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
First, a personal note - that makes me very sad for you.
1 word - emotion
Your response made me laugh.
Why does us having emotions mean computationalism is wrong?
Somewhat related: Are you a dualist? What do you think about qualia?
Edit: I too can read wikipedia, and I happen to think those are very weak counterarguments. I want to know what you think.
To answer directly, emotions are the emergent manifestations of certain neurotransmitters. I don't really think that explanation is implausible.
1. That is not an accurate representation of the computational model.
2. Emotions are not the solution to a computation, but they may often appear as a side-effect of a computation.
3. I see no separation between my body and myself, except for the one OoBE that I had, in which I was definitely looking down on my inert body for several minutes. However, I don't see any definitive evidence one way or the other, so mostly I reserve judgment.
4. Qualia - semantics and hair-splitting, but seem to cut to the heart of the controversy.
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
No, they are not inherently malleable except in theory, because that entirely depends on the person holding the views to change or not change them given new evidence.
I'm not sure how you can avoid computationalism without subscribing to substance dualism. Ignoring consciousness for the moment, the brain is an electro-chemical engine. There is nothing mysterious or unknown about that fact. As such a thing it necessarily follows the rules of electrical and chemical interactions. The particles composing the chemicals follow the rules of particulate interaction in the universe, and so forth. Even if you hold that quantum interactions are inherently non-deterministic, that makes the volume of particles in the brain a probabilistic Turing machine whose tape is the state of each particle at a given moment in time and whose ruleset are the laws of the physical universe (including any non-determinism). (Note that I'm well aware that more than just the brain has an impact on your consciousness, so whenever I say "brain" here pretend that I mean enough of your body that it forms a relatively closed system with a finite number of inputs and outputs.)
Scaling back up, the brain must be a (possibly-probabilistic) Turing machine. If you subscribe to property dualism/emergent physicalism or strict reductionist physicalism then consciousness is necessarily just a more abstract way of looking at the states on the Turing machine's tape. The only way to escape that which I can see is substance dualism.
Which is really what my point was in regards to the computer analogy. Not that I think our brains are computers, but that our brains are purely physical machines which have consciousness as an emergent phenomenon in the same what that a computer has whatever meaning you can attribute to its outputs as an emergent phenomenon of its physical actions.
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
No, they are not inherently malleable except in theory, because that entirely depends on the person holding the views to change or not change them given the new evidence.
"In theory" is the best you can do when not discussing a particular individual. I assume we're not since you're not saying, for instance, "CptHamilton believes X" or "Feral believes Y" with any evidence to support that such persons' beliefs are immutable. You're throwing out generalizations about people who subscribe to science as the most worthwhile method for learning about the universe around us. So yes, "in theory".
Moridrin - I think you are conflating the computational analogy, with a mechanistic explanation of the mind. There are not actually the same thing, since the computational analogy explains what the brain does, and the reductionist mechanistic explanation explains how that happens (in a very loose and unconvincing way I might add).
But hey, I don't believe in reductionist explanations of consciousness, because they aren't even close to complete explanations. For me, this gives weight to the idea that consciousness is not explicable via reductionist methods at all, but I'd love to be proven wrong.
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
No, they are not inherently malleable except in theory, because that entirely depends on the person holding the views to change or not change them given the new evidence.
"In theory" is the best you can do when not discussing a particular individual. I assume we're not since you're not saying, for instance, "CptHamilton believes X" or "Feral believes Y" with any evidence to support that such persons' beliefs are immutable. You're throwing out generalizations about people who subscribe to science as the most worthwhile method for learning about the universe around us. So yes, "in theory".
Moridrin - I think you are conflating the computational analogy, with a mechanistic explanation of the mind. There are not actually the same thing, since the computational analogy explains what the brain does, and the reductionist mechanistic explanation explains how that happens (in a very loose and unconvincing way I might add).
But hey, I don't believe in reductionist explanations of consciousness, because they aren't even close to complete explanations. For me, this gives weight to the idea that consciousness is not explicable via reductionist methods at all, but I'd love to be proven wrong.
So are you a substance dualist or a property dualist?
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
No, they are not inherently malleable except in theory, because that entirely depends on the person holding the views to change or not change them given the new evidence.
"In theory" is the best you can do when not discussing a particular individual. I assume we're not since you're not saying, for instance, "CptHamilton believes X" or "Feral believes Y" with any evidence to support that such persons' beliefs are immutable. You're throwing out generalizations about people who subscribe to science as the most worthwhile method for learning about the universe around us. So yes, "in theory".
1. That is not an accurate representation of the computational model.
2. Emotions are not the solution to a computation, but they may often appear as a side-effect of a computation.
What isn't an accurate representation? Do you know what computationalism is?
Computationalism doesn't even really address qualia, so I'm not sure why you've brought them up.
That said, this is all kind of just getting really tangential.
The point I was trying to get at was more what CptHamilton just posted about the brain being strictly describable by science.
So I guess the most direct question I could ask is, do you think we could build a brain?
edit: Just saw your other post. I think we were talking past each other. I actually was talking about computationalism. Not the "computational model". But I'm actually more interested in why you think reductionism is wrong, so we can drop the computationalism thing for now =D
...Not that I think our brains are computers, but that our brains are purely physical machines which have consciousness as an emergent phenomenon in the same what that a computer has whatever meaning you can attribute to its outputs as an emergent phenomenon of its physical actions.
This is not computational-ism, but rather this is simple materialism which needs to do more than simple assert that it is a good model.
The point I was trying to get at was more what CptHamilton just posted about the brain being strictly describable by science.
So I guess the most direct question I could ask is, do you think we could build a brain?
I'm pretty sure he's a substance dualist, but I'm pretty sure he won't admit it since there are so many arguments against it. Or possibly he'll dismiss all of them as irrelevant sciencedogma.
...Not that I think our brains are computers, but that our brains are purely physical machines which have consciousness as an emergent phenomenon in the same what that a computer has whatever meaning you can attribute to its outputs as an emergent phenomenon of its physical actions.
This is not computational-ism, but rather this is simple materialism which needs to do more than simple assert that it is a good model.
It's emergent reductionist materialism, actually.
What more does it need to do? All evidence indicates that it is both a good and an accurate model. If you'd like to claim substance dualism then I invite you to show me how that is a better or more accurate model.
Edit: I also never claimed to be a computationalist. You told me it was wrong after I made an analogy to the only other available information-processing machines around.
1. That is not an accurate representation of the computational model.
2. Emotions are not the solution to a computation, but they may often appear as a side-effect of a computation.
What isn't an accurate representation? Do you know what computationalism is?
Computationalism doesn't even really address qualia, so I'm not sure why you're them up.
That said, this is all kind of just getting really tangential.
The point I was trying to get at was more what CptHamilton just posted about the brain being strictly describable by science.
So I guess the most direct question I could ask is, do you think we could build a brain?
edit: Just saw your other post. I think we were talking past each other. I actually was talking about computationalism. Not the "computational model". But I'm actually more interested in why you think reductionism is wrong, so we can drop the computationalism thing for now =D
1. You brought up qualia in the quote tree that you lopped off there, which is the only reason I discussed it.
2. I think reductionst analysis is good for many things, but I think there are many things cannot be understood by breaking them down or removing them from their context. The mind is one of those things. If you want me to be cliche - I don't accept that the mind is merely the sum of its parts. That approach has failed to provide a complete theory that explains all facets of consciousness, and there is no evidence to suggest it ever will.
I really hate Searle and I really hate the Chinese goosing Room. Never is there a more blatant carbon-facist argument than that.
And Penrose is simply flat out transprenty wrong in trying to use Goedel and the Halting Problem to show that computers cannot have conciousness. Just. Wrong.
if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
Right. When I use the phrase "web of belief," that's not a phrase I coined myself - I borrowed it from a pretty famous 20th century philosopher - and when the term "belief" is used in philosophy of science (and arguably in philosophy in general), it simply means "an idea considered to be true" without intrinsically implying a level of dogmatism.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
I know what the fuck it is called I just don't fucking care, because it is not equivalent to the computational model of the mind, which is what the fuck was under discussion at the time of your interjection. Emergent reductionist materialism is also not a belief we share, because I think it sounds dumb as shit and has next to 0 empirical evidence to support it over any other model, despite your unsupported assertions to the otherwise. In addition, I take exception to the idea that any reductionist approach has a snowball's chance in hell of completely explaining all of consciousness and its many features.
Edit: I also never claimed to be a computationalist. You told me it was wrong after I made an analogy to the only other available information-processing machines around.
Sure, since information processing is all we do, that really makes sense.
Posts
Yeah, pretty much.
hanskey: A web of belief is how I (and others) describe a worldview that is both coherent and nuanced. ("Idea X is compatible with previous idea Y, but previous idea Y might be wrong because it relies on assumption Z.") It does not in and of itself imply dogmatism.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
How does consciousness move the body if not by affecting the material world?
Consciousness is not a mystical, ethereal, non-physical thing floating in the ether and driving your body via remote controls. It's an emergent phenomenon of the electrochemical engine inside your skull. Your thoughts impact the physical environment because they are, in fact, generated by electrochemical reaction patterns. As well to say that computer operating systems don't effect the physical world except by changing what's on the monitor, so how can someone claim that the OS changes the temperature of the RAM?
What, no. That's a complete misinterpretation of the current science surrounding the brain and mind.
You're inventing constraints.
I mean we specifically track the way conscious states change physical conditions all the flipping time. What do you think neurotransmitters are?
What happened to that thread? It was honestly kind of more interesting.
I think it died because ACSIS quit responding. I'm kind of surprised he hasn't shown up in here to give us some random youtube links and mention Puma Punku or whatever the place with the diorite ruins is.
The difference is that we have a great empirical body of knowledge often called electrical engineering, that tells you everything about how a computer effects the outside world, and besides, as a programmer I am intimately involved with making computers do things beyond the screen all the time, so that was a waste of an analogy. Try again!. Seriously, did you forget about thermodynamics or are you just struggling to make a point?
Plus, the brain may or not be equivalent to a computer - that's just a matter of philosophy at this point.
Isn't that ironic that YOU should make this criticism considering you have not contributed to this thread with a single one of your posts?
You have done nothing more than pop-up every once in a while to thread shit and agree with the rest of the "science is my religion" crowd.
Boooooooooooring!!
I mean, calling it a computer is kind of blowing over some (a lot) of details, but which body of knowledge is missing to describe how the brain works?
We have an understanding of most of the neurotransmitters. We understand neural networks. We just don't have the technology to build one yet.
Are you suggesting that there's something, daresay, magical about how the brain works? And if so, what is it and how can it not be described by current science?
Does that include this belief?
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
We have a great empirical body of knowledge often called neurochemistry, that tells you a lot about how consciousness affects the state of the brain, and besides, as a person who knows anything about modern notions of neurochemistry, I am aware that many things our consciousness does impact the chemical state of our brains and, conversely, many things involving the chemical state of our brains impact our consciousness.
BUT A.) that wasn't even the point of the analogy there and B.) yeah it's a perfectly serviceable analogy that's better than throwaway mysticism.
I'm not either, but it was the first example that came to mind of something vaguely metaphysical that is, with even the slightest contemplation, obviously a mechanical process with secondary effects.
Jumping headlong into paradox - YES!!!!
However, I must acknowledge at least one exception to save us from paradox - if a belief is malleable, or subject to change, then it is not dogmatic by the definition of dogma, but you might then argue that it was never a belief by the definition of belief, either.
My point is that any analogy is a weak basis for a belief. If that's all you got (which is what it sounds like) then I will continue to reserve judgement.
No magic is required, but there is a clear dearth of plausible explanations.
What's one implausible explanation?
Or perhaps even: Why is computationalism implausible?
Actually, I think the reason other's stopped bringing up weird shit is that they had no desire to be roasted over hot coals by the purveyors of a belief system who refuse to acknowledge that it is merely a belief system.
Seriously - you can't dogpile the opposition and even hope to coax them into returning to the field of battle.
Explain why humans do more than compute using the computational model.
Because I don't think we do.
I would counter and say "how are emotions explained as computations".
wikipedia is your friend, so here's some much more scholarly criticism of that model: This is from a wiki article on Cognitivism, a competing model:
Your response made me laugh.
Why does us having emotions mean computationalism is wrong?
Somewhat related: Are you a dualist? What do you think about qualia?
Edit: I too can read wikipedia, and I happen to think those are very weak counterarguments. I want to know what you think.
To answer directly, emotions are the emergent manifestations of certain neurotransmitters. I don't really think that explanation is implausible.
But the beliefs of someone who subscribes to the scientific belief structure are inherently malleable. As new evidence comes to light existing theories have to be revised.
2. Emotions are not the solution to a computation, but they may often appear as a side-effect of a computation.
3. I see no separation between my body and myself, except for the one OoBE that I had, in which I was definitely looking down on my inert body for several minutes. However, I don't see any definitive evidence one way or the other, so mostly I reserve judgment.
4. Qualia - semantics and hair-splitting, but seem to cut to the heart of the controversy.
No, they are not inherently malleable except in theory, because that entirely depends on the person holding the views to change or not change them given new evidence.
Scaling back up, the brain must be a (possibly-probabilistic) Turing machine. If you subscribe to property dualism/emergent physicalism or strict reductionist physicalism then consciousness is necessarily just a more abstract way of looking at the states on the Turing machine's tape. The only way to escape that which I can see is substance dualism.
Which is really what my point was in regards to the computer analogy. Not that I think our brains are computers, but that our brains are purely physical machines which have consciousness as an emergent phenomenon in the same what that a computer has whatever meaning you can attribute to its outputs as an emergent phenomenon of its physical actions.
"In theory" is the best you can do when not discussing a particular individual. I assume we're not since you're not saying, for instance, "CptHamilton believes X" or "Feral believes Y" with any evidence to support that such persons' beliefs are immutable. You're throwing out generalizations about people who subscribe to science as the most worthwhile method for learning about the universe around us. So yes, "in theory".
But hey, I don't believe in reductionist explanations of consciousness, because they aren't even close to complete explanations. For me, this gives weight to the idea that consciousness is not explicable via reductionist methods at all, but I'd love to be proven wrong.
DUH
So are you a substance dualist or a property dualist?
So... science is not a dogmatic belief structure?
What isn't an accurate representation? Do you know what computationalism is?
Computationalism doesn't even really address qualia, so I'm not sure why you've brought them up.
That said, this is all kind of just getting really tangential.
The point I was trying to get at was more what CptHamilton just posted about the brain being strictly describable by science.
So I guess the most direct question I could ask is, do you think we could build a brain?
edit: Just saw your other post. I think we were talking past each other. I actually was talking about computationalism. Not the "computational model". But I'm actually more interested in why you think reductionism is wrong, so we can drop the computationalism thing for now =D
I'm pretty sure he's a substance dualist, but I'm pretty sure he won't admit it since there are so many arguments against it. Or possibly he'll dismiss all of them as irrelevant sciencedogma.
It's emergent reductionist materialism, actually.
What more does it need to do? All evidence indicates that it is both a good and an accurate model. If you'd like to claim substance dualism then I invite you to show me how that is a better or more accurate model.
Edit: I also never claimed to be a computationalist. You told me it was wrong after I made an analogy to the only other available information-processing machines around.
1. You brought up qualia in the quote tree that you lopped off there, which is the only reason I discussed it.
2. I think reductionst analysis is good for many things, but I think there are many things cannot be understood by breaking them down or removing them from their context. The mind is one of those things. If you want me to be cliche - I don't accept that the mind is merely the sum of its parts. That approach has failed to provide a complete theory that explains all facets of consciousness, and there is no evidence to suggest it ever will.
And Penrose is simply flat out transprenty wrong in trying to use Goedel and the Halting Problem to show that computers cannot have conciousness. Just. Wrong.
I made a game, it has penguins in it. It's pay what you like on Gumroad.
Currently Ebaying Nothing at all but I might do in the future.
Right. When I use the phrase "web of belief," that's not a phrase I coined myself - I borrowed it from a pretty famous 20th century philosopher - and when the term "belief" is used in philosophy of science (and arguably in philosophy in general), it simply means "an idea considered to be true" without intrinsically implying a level of dogmatism.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
Sure, since information processing is all we do, that really makes sense.