The whole of the Afghanistan war is basically a text book case of "how not to do a war."
Like, The US and it's NATO allies could have won IMHO if Bush had fully committed in 2002, with the extra hundred thousand troops that were used for iraq being able to seize more territory more quickly and Long range missiles from carrier groups reducing anything that looked like it could be a cave into a gravel pit. The Speed and overwhelming power of the assault would have grievously harmed the morale of the taliban/AQ and likely swung the support of local tribes who likely wouldn't want to tangle with that kind of a juggernaught.
Further, If Bush hadn't talked shit about Iran, they could have helped with the post assault clean up as well as being a much closer source for supplies.\
At this stage though there really isn't a good option; the Taliban is too hardened to crack, they've learned the limitations of american doctrine and they are still recruiting foreign support. Further, if the US pulls out then they are willfully accepting the existance of a terrorist stronghold and giving them one hell of a boast.
The US victory in 2001/2 was decisive, for the time. The problem was not that US troops were insufficient to bring down the Taliban flags across Afghanistan; they did so with their Afghan allies pretty quickly. Taliban morale was indeed grievously harmed; they largely died, fled to Pakistan, dropped their guns to become normal citizens, or accepted reconciliation if it was offered. It took a few years for the insurgency to pick up speed and the Taliban to regain significance. A lack of US soldiers weren't the reason that this gradually happened; domestic Afghan politics and regional geopolitics (Pakistan) are the issues. A force of 100,000 deployed from the start for years might have kept the Taliban underground (as opposed to taking swathes of territory as they had by 2008), but I don't think it would have averted further conflict. Afghan rebels know that the occupiers eventually leave, and the conditions that foster rebellion would still be there despite (or sometimes because of) the US soldiers.
The longer they were kept underground the longer you have to stabilize the situation and set up a structure that might last while you give it time to grow.
By the time the US was paying attention again to Afghanistan the situation had turned already and all the goodwill and momentum and spirit of cooperation across the board (inside the country, from international allies, etc, etc) had evaporated.
Iraq absolutely fucked any chance of a better outcome. That chance wasn't 100% without Iraq, sure, but it was a hell of a lot higher then it is now.
The whole of the Afghanistan war is basically a text book case of "how not to do a war."
Like, The US and it's NATO allies could have won IMHO if Bush had fully committed in 2002, with the extra hundred thousand troops that were used for iraq being able to seize more territory more quickly and Long range missiles from carrier groups reducing anything that looked like it could be a cave into a gravel pit. The Speed and overwhelming power of the assault would have grievously harmed the morale of the taliban/AQ and likely swung the support of local tribes who likely wouldn't want to tangle with that kind of a juggernaught.
Further, If Bush hadn't talked shit about Iran, they could have helped with the post assault clean up as well as being a much closer source for supplies.\
At this stage though there really isn't a good option; the Taliban is too hardened to crack, they've learned the limitations of american doctrine and they are still recruiting foreign support. Further, if the US pulls out then they are willfully accepting the existance of a terrorist stronghold and giving them one hell of a boast.
The US victory in 2001/2 was decisive, for the time. The problem was not that US troops were insufficient to bring down the Taliban flags across Afghanistan; they did so with their Afghan allies pretty quickly. Taliban morale was indeed grievously harmed; they largely died, fled to Pakistan, dropped their guns to become normal citizens, or accepted reconciliation if it was offered. It took a few years for the insurgency to pick up speed and the Taliban to regain significance. A lack of US soldiers weren't the reason that this gradually happened; domestic Afghan politics and regional geopolitics (Pakistan) are the issues. A force of 100,000 deployed from the start for years might have kept the Taliban underground (as opposed to taking swathes of territory as they had by 2008), but I don't think it would have averted further conflict. Afghan rebels know that the occupiers eventually leave, and the conditions that foster rebellion would still be there despite (or sometimes because of) the US soldiers.
The longer they were kept underground the longer you have to stabilize the situation and set up a structure that might last while you give it time to grow.
By the time the US was paying attention again to Afghanistan the situation had turned already and all the goodwill and momentum and spirit of cooperation across the board (inside the country, from international allies, etc, etc) had evaporated.
Iraq absolutely fucked any chance of a better outcome. That chance wasn't 100% without Iraq, sure, but it was a hell of a lot higher then it is now.
I'd wager the broader political effects of our time in Iraq probably exacerbated the situation more than our lack of focus.
We pissed off our allies and the UN, further validated extremist propaganda about us, and showed them that world that we could be beaten, or at least thoroughly vexxed, by a guerilla insugency.
Absent our flippant military adventurism, we might have had more of a chance to convince a broader international coalition to take part in a peace keeping operation after the resurgence. Maybe the sort of intenational pressure we can no longer bring to bear could have persuaded on Pakistan to be more proactive.
And had Iraq not been such teachable moment for anyone looking to resist a US occupation, the Taliban may have felt less emboldened, and maybe the international community would have been less concerned that throwing in with us for the long haul would be a losing proposition.
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The longer they were kept underground the longer you have to stabilize the situation and set up a structure that might last while you give it time to grow.
By the time the US was paying attention again to Afghanistan the situation had turned already and all the goodwill and momentum and spirit of cooperation across the board (inside the country, from international allies, etc, etc) had evaporated.
Iraq absolutely fucked any chance of a better outcome. That chance wasn't 100% without Iraq, sure, but it was a hell of a lot higher then it is now.
I'd wager the broader political effects of our time in Iraq probably exacerbated the situation more than our lack of focus.
We pissed off our allies and the UN, further validated extremist propaganda about us, and showed them that world that we could be beaten, or at least thoroughly vexxed, by a guerilla insugency.
Absent our flippant military adventurism, we might have had more of a chance to convince a broader international coalition to take part in a peace keeping operation after the resurgence. Maybe the sort of intenational pressure we can no longer bring to bear could have persuaded on Pakistan to be more proactive.
And had Iraq not been such teachable moment for anyone looking to resist a US occupation, the Taliban may have felt less emboldened, and maybe the international community would have been less concerned that throwing in with us for the long haul would be a losing proposition.