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Determinism: You are a machine. Get used to it.

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  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Phoenix-D wrote: »
    In short, its not a gaps argument. Its a "you don't have enough evidence, you just admitted you don't have enough evidence, so stop pretending you do" argument. Lack of any feasible alternative is not proof, and you're not just talking about behavior any more.
    Lacking any feasible alternative and lacking any contradictions that would suggest my model is inadequate ... okay, sure. Maybe spirits or some nebulous "free will" make brains do shit. Maybe Mesopotamian gods hand-crafted the first replicating strands of nucleotides 4 billion years ago. It's certainly possible—in the sense that anything is possible, at least.

    Of course, you seem to be talking about science, and science is based on the assumption that phenomena follow natural, physical laws.
    What you're proposing is this:
    The brain is a system that responds to inputs and produces outputs in an entirely predictable way. If we could completely control its environment and gave it stimuli A, it would produce neuron firing pattern B, which is thought/behavior C.

    Proof? Tests? Predictions?
    As far as we can tell, brains are made out of physical matter, which responds to inputs in a rigid and deterministic way.

    I'm not really sure what you're looking for here.
    I would not doubt that landslides follow physical laws. I'd doubt anyone who claimed they could predict the exact time and manner a landslide would occur, though, if they had as much proof as you do.
    This is relevant how?

    Did I ever once claim to be able to predict specific behavior?
    One more time. If you wanted to prove that the brain was deterministic, how would you go about doing so?
    I would show that brains are composed of atoms and energy.
    I'm not positing anything.
    So you don't believe in free will?

    Qingu on
  • LoserForHireXLoserForHireX Philosopher King The AcademyRegistered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    How can you know that though, how can you know that there is a biological cause for my liking of butterfingers? Are you just inferring that because there are biological causes for some of my behaviors that all my behaviors must have a biological cause (though not necessarily only a biological cause)?
    Before we get any further I think we should be careful to define our terms—what do you mean by "biological cause"?

    If you're talking about genetics, then I agree with you—there is more to behavior than the genetic construction of a person's brain (which includes instincts). An animal's brain also enacts behavior based on outside stimuli and (in many vertebrates), learned behavior.

    For example, chimpanzees bite down sticks and use them to "fish" for termites in trees. This behavior is not instinctual; it is not hardwired into their brains by genetic code. Instead, they learn how to do it from other chimps, and one chimp must have "discovered" how to do this at some point in the past and taught it to others. But there is nothing about this whole process that contradicts determinism—the brain is still made of physical matter, and the neurons arrange themselves based on physical stimuli (in this case, sights and sounds of other chimps biting down sticks and fishing).

    By biological cause I'm saying that the reason that I pick the Butterfinger rather than Snickers is because neuron x fires. Not that neuron x fires because I choose the butterfinger (a statement that i have no issue with whatsoever...neurons totally fire to execute physical motion in the body)

    I haven't been socialized to prefer butterfinger over snickers (not as far as i know, and I doubt that anyone here can prove that I was), but I like the taste of one over another...what about my Biology dictates that? What is the "Likes Butterfinger" biological configuration?

    LoserForHireX on
    "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
    "We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
  • Phoenix-DPhoenix-D Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    What I believe in or don't isn't relevant at the moment.

    What I'm looking for is quite simple. Take this slightly edited version of your definitions from earlier.
    1. The universe is deterministic. Every movement and action in the universe is the result of pre-determined physical forces.

    2. The universe is not deterministic. Certain things in the universe have "free will" and their actions cannot be directly predicted by physical laws.

    Show how you'd tell these apart, by experiment. Bonus points if your model for 1 manages to actually predict anything or has any way it could be falsified.

    Phoenix-D on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    By biological cause I'm saying that the reason that I pick the Butterfinger rather than Snickers is because neuron x fires. Not that neuron x fires because I choose the butterfinger (a statement that i have no issue with whatsoever...neurons totally fire to execute physical motion in the body)
    I disagree with seeing the two things as either causes or effects—with the idea that either the neuron-firing causes the choice, or the choice causes the neuron-firing.

    I would say that your neuron firing is your choice. Your brain internalizes the physical act of its neuron firing as a choice. They are not related by cause and effect, they are different abstractions of the same thing.
    I haven't been socialized to prefer butterfinger over snickers (not as far as i know, and I doubt that anyone here can prove that I was), but I like the taste of one over another...what about my Biology dictates that? What is the "Likes Butterfinger" biological configuration?
    I am sure your preference is the result of a long and complex configuration of neurons in your head, which were influenced by all of the various sweets you've eaten in life, combined with your mental state during eating them. I'm not trying to say you don't have preferences. I'm trying to say your preferences are rooted in physical reality, which is deterministic.

    Qingu on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Phoenix-D wrote: »
    What I believe in or don't isn't relevant at the moment.

    What I'm looking for is quite simple. Take this slightly edited version of your definitions from earlier.
    1. The universe is deterministic. Every movement and action in the universe is the result of pre-determined physical forces.

    2. The universe is not deterministic. Certain things in the universe have "free will" and their actions cannot be directly predicted by physical laws.

    Show how you'd tell these apart, by experiment. Bonus points if your model for 1 manages to actually predict anything or has any way it could be falsified.
    What are you talking about, dude.

    #1 is the default assumption of all scientific endeavors—that the universe functions by knowable laws, which we can use to predict the phenomena they describe. It isn't testable because the whole methodology of science assumes it is true as its bedrock.

    Qingu on
  • Phoenix-DPhoenix-D Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    It isn't testable? What the fuck is physics, then?

    Phoenix-D on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Phoenix-D wrote: »
    It isn't testable? What the fuck is physics, then?
    You are confusing the specific theories of various scientific disciplines—which are testable—with the methodology of science itself. Science's methodology is naturalistic/materialist. You can't test "naturalism" because scientific testing itself presumes naturalism.

    Qingu on
  • LoserForHireXLoserForHireX Philosopher King The AcademyRegistered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Azio wrote: »
    How can you know that though, how can you know that there is a biological cause for my liking of butterfingers? Are you just inferring that because there are biological causes for some of my behaviors that all my behaviors must have a biological cause (though not necessarily only a biological cause)? It seems like you are treading dangerously close to unfalsifiability.

    The same to vrtra - how can you know that the reason you like math is biological?
    So one person's argument is too close to being unfalsifiable because we don't have the technological apparatus to directly verify it, but then you argue your point with vague, unsupported denials of all modern scientific understanding. If the reason for vrtra's mathematical inclination is not biological, what are you suggesting it is?

    I'm suggesting that vrta's personality is more than just an amalgamation of different biological structures.

    Oh, and I'm not denying all modern scientific understanding. I'm denying the premise that "In the case of every even that occurs, antecedent conditions (in this case being biological), known or unknown, ensure the event's occurrence."

    In essence if I get a butterfinger, i could not have not gotten a butterfinger, if all conditions remained the same (same time, same amount of money, same biological state, etc)

    working on reply to quingu...

    LoserForHireX on
    "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
    "We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
  • zakkielzakkiel Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    MrMister wrote: »
    zakkiel wrote: »
    Though ACSIS's system is in fact determined (being merely pseudo-random), it's worth pointing out that Apotheosis's statement is ridiculous. "Randomly determined" is as straight-forward an oxymoron as you get in philosophy.

    I think his point was that whether the world is actually deterministic in all its physical interactions is irrelevant to the free will debate, which is a point I agree with (as evidenced by the posts I wrote in support of compatibilism).

    It's a point I oppose, and I think it's enabled by exactly the logical slippage evidenced in Apotheosis' post, which is why I bring it up. Basically it amounts to "but if choices are random, it's really randomness that's doing the choosing, not you!" While I understand how the illusion arises, there's no reason to subscribe to it.

    There are two basic ways of looking at mental identity. One is to speak of a sort of particulate consciousness which possesses the properties of particular feelings, thoughts, qualia, etc. In other words, any given instance of a feeling has the property of belonging to someone. Any given choice likewise has the property of belonging to someone. The fact that the choice (on my account) is not entirely determined by the other properties of the consciousness has nothing to do with whether it belongs to the consciousness.

    The other way of looking at identity is to say a mind is just a constellation of mental events each of which bears a special relationship to each other event in the mind, what we might call "mutual transparency." On this view, a choice occurs when a set of possible volitions are resolved into a single possible volition without the intervention of an outside agency (again, on my account). In this case, again, the choice clearly belongs to the mind - it is the mind that resolves.

    On neither view is it sensible to speak of indeterminism as somehow denying the agency of the mind. You can try saying that the mind in such a case is not the cause of the choice, but that's like saying that the waveform of a particle is not the cause of its measured position - I just don't think it's an intelligible statement. "Cause" is actually a much more limited term than I think most people understand, meaningful only under particular assumptions, which is why I try to avoid using it in threads like this.

    zakkiel on
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  • Loren MichaelLoren Michael Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    I'm more talking about the choice of one butterfinger over another. all their characteristics apparently being equal. The only thing that I might posit is a mind, but I'm pretty shaky on philosophy of mind, so once again I'd be in some pretty untested waters for me.
    I think you're overcomplicating the situation.

    There are two options here.

    1. The universe is deterministic. Every movement and action in the universe is the result of pre-determined physical forces.

    2. The universe is not deterministic. Certain things in the universe have "free will" and their actions result not from physical laws but from some sort of soul or supernatural entity.

    Introducing the concept of a "mind" to this doesn't really change anything. If #1 is true (and I believe it is), the mind and all the choices that your mind appears (to you) to make are also the result of physical forces, chemical reactions in the brain. And the mind's choice of a butterfinger over a snickers is just as explainable as a leaf on a river drifting to the right rather than the left.

    We can't measure all the tiny eddies and currents in a river, and we can't measure all the neural pathways and functions of the brain. But if we could, we would be able to see why the leaf drifts that way, or why you choose butterfinger by apparent spontaneousness.

    On the other hand, we certainly can measure the broad flows of a river, as well as the broad proclivities of human brains. We know that, given enough time and water, a leaf on the Nile will end up flowing north. We also know that, given hunger and the smell of food, most human beings will tend to gravitate towards the smell of food. Human behavior is obviously much more complex than the behavior of a river, but that doesn't make it any less based in physical, deterministic laws.

    How can you know that though, how can you know that there is a biological cause for my liking of butterfingers? Are you just inferring that because there are biological causes for some of my behaviors that all my behaviors must have a biological cause (though not necessarily only a biological cause)? It seems like you are treading dangerously close to unfalsifiability.

    Either biological, environmental, or most likely, both.

    How can I "know"?
    If something isn't answerable to biology or environment, well, what is it answerable to?

    Qingu has spotted this problem, that there is this assertion of "something else", something not biology or environment. How could something fit that requirement? Conceptually, I just can't wrap my mind around even a hypothetical version of that without resorting to come very uncomfortable contortions, and even then... If you've found a simpler way, by all means, let us know.

    Again, I don't "know" that it's just biology or environment, In theory, of course, pretty much anything is possible, but my ignorance of the factors involved is not an indictment of nature/nurture. I think you and Phoenix-D are making arguments from ignorance on this point.

    Loren Michael on
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  • PodlyPodly you unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu, you're pushing LfHX into a corner to try and win the argument. You know very well that dualism / materialism are not a binary opposition.

    Let us stick with the butterfinger example for a moment. You argument follows like this, correct? My body sense my environment, sends the data to my brain. The knowledge of food then links with "I am hungry" or "I desire sweets" that then is impacted by a predetermined preference for butterfingers and you then reach for the butterfinger. The frontal cortex then, in consciousness, is witness to this then and thinks that it has controlled the operation - the virtual simulation of selfhood.

    The other option is not dualism. There does not need to be a little man inside the brain which watches all of this as it happens and then shouts BUTTERFINGER! MACHINE, GO! Rather, I assert that free will deals stems from our ontological ability to understand structures. Let us even postulate that this may come from your "strange loop theory." The brain, complex as it is, has somehow gained the ability to recognize the formal existence of material reality. Our free will does not stem from our ability to control the deterministic machine that is our body, but from our ability to recognize that we have control over our "being-there," that we exist IN the choice. We are present to the signal "I AM HUNGRY" and we intend our relationship with the butterfinger. In the butterfinger's relationship to us, we see "food" "tastiness" and perhaps even fond memories of butterfingers. We have in our existence a relationship to butterfingers that we may not have with Sweedish Fish. Perhaps we want to expand our existential discourse, so we grab the Sweedish Fish. Perhaps we want to return to the satisfaction of the Butterfinger or be conservative and go for the sure pleasure of the butterfinger.

    Let us talk about more human, abstract situations. I was afforded an opportunity to go to Fordham University and Kenyon College. One was a better school, but one was in New York City and gave me slightly more aid. I really don't know why I chose Fordham. Was I predeterminately, in all scenarios, going to go to Fordham because that is the choice that I would always necessarily have to make? I made lists in my head for the pros and cons, and I simply couldn't decide which was better. In the end, I just chose Fordham for no reason. Was this my false subjectivity acquiescing to the deterministic fate, or was it literally that the choice was the absurdity of choice -- that humans are so free in certain areas that we are overwhelmed, so used to dealing with little choices that the mostly determined universe offers us?

    Also, what do you think of biological determinism? Is everything materially determined? If so, is language a materialistic area of discourse with which to measure its determination on society? What about things like love?

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  • itylusitylus Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    One way to consider the location of the "something else" is that it is emergent from biology and environment. There's a wikipedia entry on emergence - not an entirely uncontroversial idea - but the way I would basically explain it is this. Consider a universe with only one fundamental particle in it. In such a universe, could information exist? My answer would be, no, because information depends on at least some interaction between particles, including some kind of "intelligence" to interpret that interaction. So from this one particle, the quality of "conveying information" or "containing information" is not merely somewhat weak but totally and entirely absent. And yet, in our own universe, made of the same kind of fundamental particles (assuming there is such a thing, of course...) then groups of these particles contain varying amounts of information when taken collectively, although again one can "re-atomise" these collectivities and in so doing lose that information (not in the strict technical sense, since apparently information can't be "destroyed" any more than matter can, but still, for practical purposes, it's a lot harder to read a pile of ash than an unburned book) and so one can say that certain assembleges of things which individually have none of property X whatsoever, produce some of property X. Intelligence would be another example - single particles cannot be said to contain even the smallest fraction of intelligence, and yet, &c &c. I'm not personally a fan of the term "free will" and in most formulations of what it means, I intuitively tend to suspect that such a thing is not possible - nonetheless, I think it is conceivable that under some definition of "free will" it could be conceived of as something which is an emergent property.

    itylus on
  • agoajagoaj Top Tier One FearRegistered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Podly wrote: »
    Qingu, you're pushing LfHX into a corner to try and win the argument. You know very well that dualism / materialism are not a binary opposition.

    Let us stick with the butterfinger example for a moment. You argument follows like this, correct? My body sense my environment, sends the data to my brain. The knowledge of food then links with "I am hungry" or "I desire sweets" that then is impacted by a predetermined preference for butterfingers and you then reach for the butterfinger. The frontal cortex then, in consciousness, is witness to this then and thinks that it has controlled the operation - the virtual simulation of selfhood.

    The other option is not dualism. There does not need to be a little man inside the brain which watches all of this as it happens and then shouts BUTTERFINGER! MACHINE, GO! Rather, I assert that free will deals stems from our ontological ability to understand structures. Let us even postulate that this may come from your "strange loop theory." The brain, complex as it is, has somehow gained the ability to recognize the formal existence of material reality. Our free will does not stem from our ability to control the deterministic machine that is our body, but from our ability to recognize that we have control over our "being-there," that we exist IN the choice. We are present to the signal "I AM HUNGRY" and we intend our relationship with the butterfinger. In the butterfinger's relationship to us, we see "food" "tastiness" and perhaps even fond memories of butterfingers. We have in our existence a relationship to butterfingers that we may not have with Sweedish Fish. Perhaps we want to expand our existential discourse, so we grab the Sweedish Fish. Perhaps we want to return to the satisfaction of the Butterfinger or be conservative and go for the sure pleasure of the butterfinger.

    Let us talk about more human, abstract situations. I was afforded an opportunity to go to Fordham University and Kenyon College. One was a better school, but one was in New York City and gave me slightly more aid. I really don't know why I chose Fordham. Was I predeterminately, in all scenarios, going to go to Fordham because that is the choice that I would always necessarily have to make? I made lists in my head for the pros and cons, and I simply couldn't decide which was better. In the end, I just chose Fordham for no reason. Was this my false subjectivity acquiescing to the deterministic fate, or was it literally that the choice was the absurdity of choice -- that humans are so free in certain areas that we are overwhelmed, so used to dealing with little choices that the mostly determined universe offers us?

    Also, what do you think of biological determinism? Is everything materially determined? If so, is language a materialistic area of discourse with which to measure its determination on society? What about things like love?

    You did not just seriously ask What is love?

    agoaj on
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  • blue tapeblue tape Brooklyn, NYRegistered User regular
    edited May 2008
    zakkiel wrote: »
    There are two basic ways of looking at mental identity. One is to speak of a sort of particulate consciousness which possesses the properties of particular feelings, thoughts, qualia, etc. In other words, any given instance of a feeling has the property of belonging to someone. Any given choice likewise has the property of belonging to someone. The fact that the choice (on my account) is not entirely determined by the other properties of the consciousness has nothing to do with whether it belongs to the consciousness.

    The other way of looking at identity is to say a mind is just a constellation of mental events each of which bears a special relationship to each other event in the mind, what we might call "mutual transparency." On this view, a choice occurs when a set of possible volitions are resolved into a single possible volition without the intervention of an outside agency (again, on my account). In this case, again, the choice clearly belongs to the mind - it is the mind that resolves.

    On neither view is it sensible to speak of indeterminism as somehow denying the agency of the mind. You can try saying that the mind in such a case is not the cause of the choice, but that's like saying that the waveform of a particle is not the cause of its measured position - I just don't think it's an intelligible statement. "Cause" is actually a much more limited term than I think most people understand, meaningful only under particular assumptions, which is why I try to avoid using it in threads like this.

    Neither of these are an affront to determinism. You're just laying out typical identity theory and Parfitian identity theory and attempting to juxtapose them to a determinist system. You've also left out how these two differ most which is in the case of change over time, which belies how far from having to do with determinism this is.

    The internal operations of consciousness don't matter as long as they are governed by laws. Whether the "mind" operates as a senate or a despot, it's still physical (unless you're talking about some sort of metaphysical mind which... well there's nothing I can do for you.
    Podly wrote: »
    Let us talk about more human, abstract situations. I was afforded an opportunity to go to Fordham University and Kenyon College. One was a better school, but one was in New York City and gave me slightly more aid. I really don't know why I chose Fordham. Was I predeterminately, in all scenarios, going to go to Fordham because that is the choice that I would always necessarily have to make? I made lists in my head for the pros and cons, and I simply couldn't decide which was better. In the end, I just chose Fordham for no reason. Was this my false subjectivity acquiescing to the deterministic fate, or was it literally that the choice was the absurdity of choice -- that humans are so free in certain areas that we are overwhelmed, so used to dealing with little choices that the mostly determined universe offers us?

    There is no "in all scenarios." You've just involved mystic fatalism in which Oidipous can "choose" different actions but be forced into the same ends somehow. That's not determinism. There is one scenario that does not have to be hand-crafted from the beginning, but which falls into place via necessity.

    It's not the choice you necessarily have to make. It's the choice you necessarily make, based on the state of things.

    Determinism isn't deep or foreboding. It just is.

    Edit: Also, baby don't hurt me... don't hurt me... no more.

    blue tape on
  • grendel824_grendel824_ Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Hmm... if Everett's or something like it is true, can't both be true? Deterministic in that all possible arrangements of matter exist throughout spacetime, including every possible position that your body could be in - one universe has it reaching for the 7th candy bar, another for the 4th, etc. Not deterministic in that the "consciousness" or "soul" (which is the only undefined cheat, which sounds fishy until you realize that this model replaces a whole bunch of fishy unknowns/workarounds about motion and time with just one unknown - still not declarably true, but not much worse than the alternatives, at least) gets to decide which bodies it "moves" through to experience existence in 4D.

    Err... that might sound crazy or incomprehensible, but that's more me not explaining it right or referencing copious amounts of science and theory to keep it short. I'm not saying I think this is how it is, just that it's an interesting if convenient take on things.

    grendel824_ on
  • blue tapeblue tape Brooklyn, NYRegistered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Hmm... if Everett's or something like it is true, can't both be true? Deterministic in that all possible arrangements of matter exist throughout spacetime, including every possible position that your body could be in - one universe has it reaching for the 7th candy bar, another for the 4th, etc. Not deterministic in that the "consciousness" or "soul" (which is the only undefined cheat, which sounds fishy until you realize that this model replaces a whole bunch of fishy unknowns/workarounds about motion and time with just one unknown - still not declarably true, but not much worse than the alternatives, at least) gets to decide which bodies it "moves" through to experience existence in 4D.

    Err... that might sound crazy or incomprehensible, but that's more me not explaining it right or referencing copious amounts of science and theory to keep it short. I'm not saying I think this is how it is, just that it's an interesting if convenient take on things.
    I will allow for a second that we could possibly, maybe, somehow develop this ability of transference between possible worlds, but, as long as the processes of transference are goverened by laws, doesn't the ability itself still fall under the determinist umbrella?

    blue tape on
  • Darius BlackDarius Black Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    I think I'm joining a little too late to be able to contribute, but I would like to offer something. I've never taken a philosophy class or anything of the like, so I never even knew about the existence of this theory, but for the longest time I've held a very similar belief solely based on my own... musings. A theory that suggests a sort of predetermined fate for everyone and everything, and that that fate can only be known once it's been fulfilled. That story quoted earlier of the judge and the murderer pretty much hits the nail on the head in terms of an easy explanation.

    Ask yourself this: if by some means you could discover your own fate, and then take measures to change it, then it would have been your fate in the end to do just that. It's like if you dropped a marble down a rocky hill once, and recorded its path, throw it one more time within the exact same conditions, with the exact same trajectory and it'll follow that same path. Eh, hope I'm making sense here. I'm gonna read through this thread and look further into this theory, as it's hitting a familiar note with me.

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  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Ask yourself this: if by some means you could discover your own fate, and then take measures to change it, then it would have been your fate in the end to do just that. It's like if you dropped a marble down a rocky hill once, and recorded its path, throw it one more time within the exact same conditions, with the exact same trajectory and it'll follow that same path. Eh, hope I'm making sense here. I'm gonna read through this thread and look further into this theory, as it's hitting a familiar note with me.
    Human beings and most animals do this every day. When a mongoose looks at a snake and successfully anticipates the snake's lunge so he can counterattack, the mongoose is predicting the future and changing his behavior around it. The ability to predict the future to a reasonable degree is a huge evolutionary advantage.

    I don't know how rigorous this is, but I wonder if you could even define "intelligence" as an evolutionary adaption that allows an organism to predict the future. The reason science is so awesome is because it is much better at predicting the future than any other ideological system or method.

    Of course, if you predict the future and change your behavior, this doesn't mean you rewrite destiny or cheat determinism. Your brain is simply responding to stimuli and outputting behavior in response to that stimuli to best take advantage of it. It's still billiard balls.

    Qingu on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    itylus wrote: »
    One way to consider the location of the "something else" is that it is emergent from biology and environment. There's a wikipedia entry on emergence - not an entirely uncontroversial idea - but the way I would basically explain it is this. Consider a universe with only one fundamental particle in it. In such a universe, could information exist? My answer would be, no, because information depends on at least some interaction between particles, including some kind of "intelligence" to interpret that interaction. So from this one particle, the quality of "conveying information" or "containing information" is not merely somewhat weak but totally and entirely absent. And yet, in our own universe, made of the same kind of fundamental particles (assuming there is such a thing, of course...) then groups of these particles contain varying amounts of information when taken collectively, although again one can "re-atomise" these collectivities and in so doing lose that information (not in the strict technical sense, since apparently information can't be "destroyed" any more than matter can, but still, for practical purposes, it's a lot harder to read a pile of ash than an unburned book) and so one can say that certain assembleges of things which individually have none of property X whatsoever, produce some of property X. Intelligence would be another example - single particles cannot be said to contain even the smallest fraction of intelligence, and yet, &c &c. I'm not personally a fan of the term "free will" and in most formulations of what it means, I intuitively tend to suspect that such a thing is not possible - nonetheless, I think it is conceivable that under some definition of "free will" it could be conceived of as something which is an emergent property.
    This is actually what I was getting at when I was talking about patterns, like the mind and genes.

    A gene is an emergent entity—it is nothing more than a pattern of nucleotides, mundane molecules, and yet it is so much more than that. Because of a lucky set of physical properties, genes can function in ways that are completely unlike any other chunks of matter in the known universe. I think that animal minds/consciousnesses/souls are the same way.

    However, these emergent entities are not "something else" in the sense that what's-his-face was talking about. They are rooted in material matter and obey deterministic laws.

    There is an excellent book called I Am A Strange Loop that is all about how the human soul is an emergent property.

    Qingu on
  • MrMisterMrMister Jesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    There is an excellent book called I Am A Strange Loop that is all about how the human soul is an emergent property.

    I don't know if you mean the full baggage of the term 'emergent' here. It's usually used to signify a property that results from combining two things which is impossible to predict from the properties of the two things combined. They used to think that gases and such had emergent properties, but then they understood physics better, and now the mind is pretty much the only thing people ever claim to be emergent.

    MrMister on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    MrMister wrote: »
    Qingu wrote: »
    There is an excellent book called I Am A Strange Loop that is all about how the human soul is an emergent property.

    I don't know if you mean the full baggage of the term 'emergent' here. It's usually used to signify a property that results from combining two things which is impossible to predict from the properties of the two things combined. They used to think that gases and such had emergent properties, but then they understood physics better, and now the mind is pretty much the only thing people ever claim to be emergent.
    Wait—Isn't the stock market widely considered to be emergent? Not to mention a whole host of cultural things? (Law, language, etc).

    But for the record, I Am A Strange Loop isn't explicitly about emergence theory.

    Qingu on
  • MrMisterMrMister Jesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    Wait—Isn't the stock market widely considered to be emergent? Not to mention a whole host of cultural things? (Law, language, etc).

    The philosophy of mind definition I was using may not be general, then.
    Emergentism. There is another interesting response to the question "Why are mental phenomena correlated with neural phenomena in the way they are?" It is this: the question is unanswerable--the correlations are "brute facts" that we must simply accept; they are not subject to further explanation. This is the position of emergentism. It holds that when biological processes attain a certain level of organizational complexity, a wholly new type of phenomenon, namely, consciousness, "emerges," and these "emergent" phenomena are not explainable in terms of the lower-level physical-biological phenomena. There is no explanation of why, say, pains rather than itches emerge from C-fiber activations or why pains emerge from C-fiber activations rather than another kind of neural state. Indeed, there is no explanation of why state conscious should emerge from neuro-biological processes. That there are just these emergence relationships and not others must be accepted, in the words of Samuel Alexander, a leading theoretician of the emergence school, "with natural piety." Thus, emergentism presents another possible response to the mind-body problem: Mental phenomena are brute emergent phenomena, and we should expect no further explanation of why they emerge. That they do must be recognized as a fundamental fact about the natural world."

    MrMister on
  • zakkielzakkiel Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Neither of these are an affront to determinism. You're just laying out typical identity theory and Parfitian identity theory and attempting to juxtapose them to a determinist system. You've also left out how these two differ most which is in the case of change over time, which belies how far from having to do with determinism this is.

    The internal operations of consciousness don't matter as long as they are governed by laws. Whether the "mind" operates as a senate or a despot, it's still physical (unless you're talking about some sort of metaphysical mind which... well there's nothing I can do for you.
    No, I'm not. I guess I was unclear. I'm talking specifically about an indeterministic system, and why such a system is compatible with free will, specifically why indeterminism does not alienate the outcome of a decision from the decider.

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  • MahnmutMahnmut Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    zakkiel wrote: »
    Neither of these are an affront to determinism. You're just laying out typical identity theory and Parfitian identity theory and attempting to juxtapose them to a determinist system. You've also left out how these two differ most which is in the case of change over time, which belies how far from having to do with determinism this is.

    The internal operations of consciousness don't matter as long as they are governed by laws. Whether the "mind" operates as a senate or a despot, it's still physical (unless you're talking about some sort of metaphysical mind which... well there's nothing I can do for you.
    No, I'm not. I guess I was unclear. I'm talking specifically about an indeterministic system, and why such a system is compatible with free will, specifically why indeterminism does not alienate the outcome of a decision from the decider.

    I think the point is that indeterminism via randomness only enables free will if determinism also enables free will.

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  • KetherialKetherial Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    first let me apologize and say that i have not yet read the entire thread. but i will.

    reading the first few pages though, i can see that we are already getting into semantic ruts.

    the best way i think to illustrate what i am talking about is by making some comparisons.

    1) i like ice cream. i go into an ice cream store and buy some. my act of buying ice cream (because my proclivities induce me to) is an act of "free will".

    2) i hate pain. someone cuts me. i hurt. my act of bleeding is not an act of my "free will". it is imposed on me; i bleed when i am cut. i am walking and suddenly crushed by an asteroid. my dying is not an act of my "free will". alternatively, for a negative example: i want to fly. i cannot fly. if i had the ability to fly, i would. my act of non-flying is not an act of my "free will".

    now, please dont tell me that 1) and 2) are identical, because they are clearly different. buying ice cream and bleeding are not the same thing. there is no "conscious" choice involved and this is a big deal. either determinism must address the moral implications (i.e., should / should not) that result from the differences between 1) and 2) or it is inadequate.

    if it does address the differences between 1) and 2), what does it say? murdering someone is not the same as getting crushed by an asteroid. yes, i think murderers should get punished and should suffer. no, i dont think someone who is thrown out of a building and lands on someone else, killing them, should get punished or suffer (should that person miraculously survive).

    so if you agree with me that there is a huge conceptual difference between 1) and 2), then what is the relevance of determinism? what does it require that our society does not already do? i acknowledge that this may already be addressed in the thread and i will read the whole thing so please feel free to ignore this question if it is already answered.

    i just dont see how determinism is relevant or useful for anything.

    Ketherial on
  • electricitylikesmeelectricitylikesme Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    MrMister wrote: »
    Qingu wrote: »
    Wait—Isn't the stock market widely considered to be emergent? Not to mention a whole host of cultural things? (Law, language, etc).

    The philosophy of mind definition I was using may not be general, then.
    Emergentism. There is another interesting response to the question "Why are mental phenomena correlated with neural phenomena in the way they are?" It is this: the question is unanswerable--the correlations are "brute facts" that we must simply accept; they are not subject to further explanation. This is the position of emergentism. It holds that when biological processes attain a certain level of organizational complexity, a wholly new type of phenomenon, namely, consciousness, "emerges," and these "emergent" phenomena are not explainable in terms of the lower-level physical-biological phenomena. There is no explanation of why, say, pains rather than itches emerge from C-fiber activations or why pains emerge from C-fiber activations rather than another kind of neural state. Indeed, there is no explanation of why state conscious should emerge from neuro-biological processes. That there are just these emergence relationships and not others must be accepted, in the words of Samuel Alexander, a leading theoretician of the emergence school, "with natural piety." Thus, emergentism presents another possible response to the mind-body problem: Mental phenomena are brute emergent phenomena, and we should expect no further explanation of why they emerge. That they do must be recognized as a fundamental fact about the natural world."
    I thought that idea of the mind wasn't exactly widely accepted - it very much implies that consciousness is an on/off type of system, rather then a spectrum of behavioral complexity.

    In fact don't most of the studies of infants and the like debunk the notion, since we can pretty well observe the ability of a human brain to implement different concepts as it matures through childhood.

    electricitylikesme on
  • ViolentChemistryViolentChemistry __BANNED USERS regular
    edited May 2008
    Ketherial wrote: »
    i just dont see how determinism is relevant or useful for anything.

    Recognizing that environment influences behavior is very relevant or useful on its own, but determinism has so far been unable to explain behavior universally enough and in enough detail to be at all meaningful. It's often more about stickin' it to the churchies than actually seeking truth. And in a lot of cases just a convenient excuse.

    ViolentChemistry on
  • electricitylikesmeelectricitylikesme Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Ketherial wrote: »
    i just dont see how determinism is relevant or useful for anything.

    Recognizing that environment influences behavior is very relevant or useful on its own, but determinism has so far been unable to explain behavior universally enough and in enough detail to be at all meaningful. It's often more about stickin' it to the churchies than actually seeking truth. And in a lot of cases just a convenient excuse.
    What are you talking about? Free will - worthless. Determinism - also worthless. They're both abstract philosophical questions. Neither purport to explain anything in the context of this thread.

    electricitylikesme on
  • ViolentChemistryViolentChemistry __BANNED USERS regular
    edited May 2008
    Ketherial wrote: »
    i just dont see how determinism is relevant or useful for anything.

    Recognizing that environment influences behavior is very relevant or useful on its own, but determinism has so far been unable to explain behavior universally enough and in enough detail to be at all meaningful. It's often more about stickin' it to the churchies than actually seeking truth. And in a lot of cases just a convenient excuse.
    What are you talking about? Free will - worthless. Determinism - also worthless. They're both abstract philosophical questions. Neither purport to explain anything in the context of this thread.

    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.

    ViolentChemistry on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    Qingu on
  • ViolentChemistryViolentChemistry __BANNED USERS regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    That doesn't really make them not rational actors either, though. There's a significant difference between acknowledging that people are influenced by their environment and claiming that they're unilaterally controlled by it in all things.

    ViolentChemistry on
  • Vrtra TheoryVrtra Theory Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    I personally think this is the most important implication of determinism: a different intent for the justice system. If you understand that a criminal is not "evil" or "morally bankrupt", simply "broken", then the obvious focus of the justice system becomes (a) how to fix criminals so that they behave correctly, (b) how to protect other citizens in the meantime, and (c) how to prevent future criminals.

    Now, it might turn out that the best way to accomplish those three goals is to throw criminals in prison. But we'll be doing it to accomplish those specific goals, not because of some abstract belief in the virtue of Justice or Punishment.

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  • ViolentChemistryViolentChemistry __BANNED USERS regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    I personally think this is the most important implication of determinism: a different intent for the justice system. If you understand that a criminal is not "evil" or "morally bankrupt", simply "broken", then the obvious focus of the justice system becomes (a) how to fix criminals so that they behave correctly, (b) how to protect other citizens in the meantime, and (c) how to prevent future criminals.

    Now, it might turn out that the best way to accomplish those three goals is to throw criminals in prison. But we'll be doing it to accomplish those specific goals, not because of some abstract belief in the virtue of Justice or Punishment.

    Most criminals are not evil, or morally bankrupt, or simply psychotic.

    Edit: And I'd venture that most people who are evil or morally bankrupt or psychotic likely aren't technically criminals.

    ViolentChemistry on
  • Loren MichaelLoren Michael Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.
    Qingu wrote: »
    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    I personally think this is the most important implication of determinism: a different intent for the justice system. If you understand that a criminal is not "evil" or "morally bankrupt", simply "broken", then the obvious focus of the justice system becomes (a) how to fix criminals so that they behave correctly, (b) how to protect other citizens in the meantime, and (c) how to prevent future criminals.

    Now, it might turn out that the best way to accomplish those three goals is to throw criminals in prison. But we'll be doing it to accomplish those specific goals, not because of some abstract belief in the virtue of Justice or Punishment.

    You two said my thoughts perfectly.

    I was initially going to make a thread on the ethical implications of determinism, but...

    Loren Michael on
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  • Chake99Chake99 Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    That doesn't really make them not rational actors either, though. There's a significant difference between acknowledging that people are influenced by their environment and claiming that they're unilaterally controlled by it in all things.

    From my high school level understanding, classical economics assumes people are perfectly rational and are perfectly informed-- and they always make decisions that benefit them the most.

    Of course that's clearly not the case: people don't always choose the best option; a lot of the time people don't know for sure what the best option is. Behavioural Economics is about an economics where the actions actors make are predicted on a deterministic model, but the model doesn't assume people will always act in their best interest.

    So economics pretty much always assumes people act deterministically, its necessary in a science where you have to build in prediction.

    Chake99 on
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  • ViolentChemistryViolentChemistry __BANNED USERS regular
    edited May 2008
    Chake99 wrote: »
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    That doesn't really make them not rational actors either, though. There's a significant difference between acknowledging that people are influenced by their environment and claiming that they're unilaterally controlled by it in all things.

    From my high school level understanding, classical economics assumes people are perfectly rational and are perfectly informed-- and they always make decisions that benefit them the most.

    Of course that's clearly not the case: people don't always choose the best option; a lot of the time people don't know for sure what the best option is. Behavioural Economics is about an economics where the actions actors make are predicted on a deterministic model, but the model doesn't assume people will always act in their best interest.

    So economics pretty much always assumes people act deterministically, its necessary in a science where you have to build in prediction.

    Could this have any causal role in the fact that economists have successfully predicted 9 of the last 3 recessions?

    ViolentChemistry on
  • QinguQingu Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Chake99 wrote: »
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    That doesn't really make them not rational actors either, though. There's a significant difference between acknowledging that people are influenced by their environment and claiming that they're unilaterally controlled by it in all things.

    From my high school level understanding, classical economics assumes people are perfectly rational and are perfectly informed-- and they always make decisions that benefit them the most.

    Of course that's clearly not the case: people don't always choose the best option; a lot of the time people don't know for sure what the best option is. Behavioural Economics is about an economics where the actions actors make are predicted on a deterministic model, but the model doesn't assume people will always act in their best interest.

    So economics pretty much always assumes people act deterministically, its necessary in a science where you have to build in prediction.
    Touche, good point. I guess they're both deterministic, now that I think about it. The difference is that behavioral economics uses a more complex array of factors to predict deterministic behavior.

    Qingu on
  • Darius BlackDarius Black Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    I got to thinking... determinism cannot be used as an excuse for anything both for reasons for and against determinism itself.

    Here's a nice little paradox. A criminal in court appeals to the jury and uses this theory as an excuse. For some reason, the jury sees the light and agrees: this guy really had no other fate in store than being a criminal. They realize that their destinies are just as set as the criminal's, their choices just as meaningless, and therefore lose the will (*ahem*) to exercise free will. Are they choosing to drop "free will"? If they decide to go out and do something crazy now, is that because they were destined to all along? If recognizing and understanding this theory has affected them... oh shit, my brain.

    I need to take a moment.

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  • Vrtra TheoryVrtra Theory Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Here's a nice little paradox. A criminal in court appeals to the jury and uses this theory as an excuse. For some reason, the jury sees the light and agrees: this guy really had no other fate in store than being a criminal. They realize that their destinies are just as set as the criminal's, their choices just as meaningless, and therefore lose the will (*ahem*) to exercise free will. Are they choosing to drop "free will"? If they decide to go out and do something crazy now, is that because they were destined to all along? If recognizing and understanding this theory has affected them... oh shit, my brain.

    I think your "paradox" is incorrect because you are assuming certain consequences of determinism that don't actually follow.

    Let's say an entire jury was made up of determinists, and had decided that this criminal was guilty of murdering his daughter's abusive boyfriend. Accepting determinism simply means that they understand the criminal's behavior is the result of his past: perhaps a combination of seeing his mother hit by an abusive father, a less-than-stellar school record, a troubled marriage, and then seeing the boyfriend strike his daughter caused him to explode and attack the boyfriend, accidentally killing him.

    None of that changes the fact he committed the crime. Mitigating circumstances might bring the charges down to aggravated assault and accidental manslaughter or something like that, but ideally the sentence will be harsh enough to discourage similar crimes of passion, while also rehabilitating the criminal (anger management, therapy, etc.)

    As for the jury, there's no conflict between making choices and accepting determinism. I believe strongly in determinism, while still accepting that the act of belief is simply neural patterns firing in my brain. If I had inherited different genes, or my upbringing had been slightly different, or if my life experience were different, I might reject determinism and embrace Christianity (or, to take it full circle, I might be on trial for murdering my daughter's boyfriend.)

    Side note, but if you accept determinism, you're basically accepting a secular version of the old "There but for the grace of God, goes I." Visiting retributive justice upon someone else becomes much harder to swallow when you realize that you're just luckier than them.

    Vrtra Theory on
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  • Phoenix-DPhoenix-D Registered User regular
    edited May 2008
    Qingu wrote: »
    That's kind of the point. They're both essentially without value except as a convenient excuse.
    I disagree. In economics, for example, human beings were classically treated as "rational actors" or whatever, with total free will. But now (as I understand it) there is a new way of thinking called behavioral economics that treats human beings more as deterministic billiard balls. (I read an article a while ago about how Barack Obama's economic advisors are all behavioral economics, and that this model is what drives innovations like the iPod).

    It also matters from a legal/moral perspective. If people are in complete control of their destiny then they should be held completely accountable for their crimes. If people are billiard balls then we should take full account of their environment, upbringing, genetics, and other material factors separate from their actions when dealing judgment.

    If people are billard balls then we WILL do whatever we will do. There is no "should" involved.

    Determism is sort of useless as a moral compass that way. You can't say "Oh, the criminal is just a ball acting according to pre-determined events" without recognizing that so are the judge and jury

    Phoenix-D on
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