How would this argument prove that we exist? It doesn't remove the problem of what caused God as there is no reason for the most complete being to not have any cause. At best, it is simply using God for "all that can exist." This would make the argument this:
Major Premise: All that can exist, by its concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: Therefore, all that can exist exists.
This is obviously utter nonsense.
You're side stepping the issue.
I ask you, once again, is there such a thing as "existence?" If not, how can something exist?
This thread is about the ontological argument. It does not matter if it is possible to prove there is existence. It matters if the ontological argument proves there is existence.
Moreover, I see no reason to care about whether or not I exist when for all intents and purposes, I exist.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
How would this argument prove that we exist? It doesn't remove the problem of what caused God as there is no reason for the most complete being to not have any cause. At best, it is simply using God for "all that can exist." This would make the argument this:
Major Premise: All that can exist, by its concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: Therefore, all that can exist exists.
This is obviously utter nonsense.
You're side stepping the issue.
I ask you, once again, is there such a thing as "existence?" If not, how can something exist?
This thread is about the ontological argument. It does not matter if it is possible to prove there is existence. It matters if the ontological argument proves there is existence.
Moreover, I see no reason to care about whether or not I exist when for all intents and purposes, I exist.
The ontological argument isn't concerned with primary ontology? That sounds like more side-stepping to me.
I didn't ask whether you exist. I ask whether there is "existence," or, if you prefer, "being."
I know I said I stopped, but there's so much nonsense flying around I feel like every time I post here I'm having a little adventure in Wonderland. I can't help myself.
The ontological argument isn't concerned with primary ontology? That sounds like more side-stepping to me.
"The Ontological Argument" is just short for "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," so yes, arguing about existence itself is kind of off topic. The argument posits that existence is already a thing that happens and is in the universe.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
"The Ontological Argument" is just short for "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," so yes, arguing about existence itself is kind of off topic. The argument posits that existence is already a thing that happens and is in the universe.
Not necessarily. For instance, the ontological argument posits that God is existence. You cannot really negate that, because that is a category error. Thus, Kant attacked the minor premise, by saying that being is not a predicate. If Being is not a predicate, then you are left with the need to account for what Being is.
Also, your notion that "existence" is "in" the universe seems unfounded to me. Wouldn't it be the otherway around, that the universe is, that the universe is part of existence?
The ontological argument isn't concerned with primary ontology? That sounds like more side-stepping to me.
I didn't ask whether you exist. I ask whether there is "existence," or, if you prefer, "being."
You are sidestepping my argument. You said:
If you do not believe in God, it is hard to account for believing in "existence" which covers most of the definitions of God. Someone like Ricouer will argue that this was the origins of religion.
You are coming at it from the wrong angle. I don't care about the theological elements of the ontological argument -- as I said in the OP, I think it is a terrible theological proof. Rather, I am interested in the ontological problems that the argument presents.
For instance, do you think that there is existence?
How does the ontological argument or even belief in God prove there is such a thing as existence? As I have stated, the ontological argument boils down to saying that all that can exist exists unless you make God something other than all that can exist. If you define God as something else, it still doesn't solve the problem of existence as God existing doesn't mean we exist.
For instance, the ontological argument posits that God is existence.
That makes no sense.
Major Premise: Existence, by his concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: Therefore, existence exists
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
The ontological argument isn't concerned with primary ontology? That sounds like more side-stepping to me.
I didn't ask whether you exist. I ask whether there is "existence," or, if you prefer, "being."
You are sidestepping my argument. You said:
If you do not believe in God, it is hard to account for believing in "existence" which covers most of the definitions of God. Someone like Ricouer will argue that this was the origins of religion.
You are coming at it from the wrong angle. I don't care about the theological elements of the ontological argument -- as I said in the OP, I think it is a terrible theological proof. Rather, I am interested in the ontological problems that the argument presents.
For instance, do you think that there is existence?
How does the ontological argument or even belief in God prove there is such a thing as existence? As I have stated, the ontological argument boils down to saying that all that can exist exists unless you make God something other than all that can exist. If you define God as something else, it still doesn't solve the problem of existence as God existing doesn't mean we exist.
Why are you so intent on not giving an answer to the question?
For instance, the ontological argument posits that God is existence.
That makes no sense.
Major Premise: Existence, by his concept, is the most perfect being.
Minor Premise: Existence belongs to the concept of the most perfect being.
Conclusion: Therefore, existence exists
essentia and entity are not synonymous
The essence of a thing is not the complete identity of something
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
So you are just saying that "things exist?" How do you know that?
If things don't exist, there's no point in this discussion. I think that means it's a good time for me to just stop.
Right. But what do you mean when you say "exist?"
In an attempt to help your noble thread along, I would point out that Sartre tackled notions of existence in a way that will hopefully further this discussion.
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
The only way in which a person can conceive of the ideas that are being thrown around is to presuppose existence in the first place, which I know you've already made a point of saying, but I feel it bears repeating.
Anyway, I just came up with a bunch of ways to refute everything I just said, but I wanted to post since I think this is an interesting intellectual exercise.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
By asking whether or not something exists you are doing the same thing. You can't ask of someone the question "is there such a thing as existence" without yourself assuming that there is such a thing as existence that something can do.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
So you aren't going to answer my question?
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
By asking whether or not something exists you are doing the same thing. You can't ask of someone the question "is there such a thing as existence" without yourself assuming that there is such a thing as existence that something can do.
That's basically the point. We necessarily have to posit existence. It is a foundational proposition which philosophy and all thought rests upon. Thus, if existence "is," there are many problems that we encounter.
• How do atheists account for Being?
• How is Being different from beings?
• Do all things exist in the same way? If so, are the existential "is" (I am) and the copula (I am human) the same?
• Why is existence "truth?" I.e., why do we say that "two and two is four" true?
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
I'm pretty sure that's from one of the essays in Ecriture et Differance (not to be a smartass). If I weren't tired I would run downstairs and grab my copy to check.
Since we're on the topic of Derrida, the idea of existence becomes even more fleeting, particularly if we follow his linguistic arguments. The only existence that words can actually contain are those that are ascribed and interpreted at very specific, fleeting moments. If we accept the rupture in language that he details in Structure, Sign, and Play, we're left with another problem defining existence: it's impossible to define anythinig accurate as language serves to obfuscate meaning.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
So you aren't going to answer my question?
See my last post. We necessarily believe that Being exists. The existence of God doesn't matter for this thread. I've said that time and time again. I don't think that the ontological argument is a useful theological proof. Rather, I think that it creates ontological problems for all philosophical positions, based upon the essential ontological questions it raises about existence.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
By asking whether or not something exists you are doing the same thing. You can't ask of someone the question "is there such a thing as existence" without yourself assuming that there is such a thing as existence that something can do.
That's basically the point. We necessarily have to posit existence. It is a foundational proposition which philosophy and all thought rests upon. Thus, if existence "is," there are many problems that we encounter.
• How do atheists account for Being?
• How is Being different from beings?
• Do all things exist in the same way? If so, are the existential "is" (I am) and the copula (I am human) the same?
• Why is existence "truth?" I.e., why do we say that "two and two is four" true?
and a boatload of other questions
This strays heavily from the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which does not, without extensive re-imagining, conclude that God and existence are the same thing.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
I forget where, but somewhere Derrida talks about the difference between Being and beings -- the ontological difference, which I have brought up a few times in this thread. Heidegger was one of the main people to talk abot the ontological difference, but Derrida laboriously shows how even within Being there is a difference between itself -- the ontological différance. Pretty crazy stuff!
I'm pretty sure that's from one of the essays in Ecriture et Differance (not to be a smartass). If I weren't tired I would run downstairs and grab my copy to check.
Since we're on the topic of Derrida, the idea of existence becomes even more fleeting, particularly if we follow his linguistic arguments. The only existence that words can actually contain are those that are ascribed and interpreted at very specific, fleeting moments. If we accept the rupture in language that he details in Structure, Sign, and Play, we're left with another problem defining existence: it's impossible to define anythinig accurate as language serves to obfuscate meaning.
Not even meaning. To think of anything, we turn in into a meaning. Which is why it's so hard to talk about Existence, and other [strike]beings[/strike] like time and space.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
So you aren't going to answer my question?
See my last post. We necessarily believe that Being exists.
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
I'm pretty sure that's from one of the essays in Ecriture et Differance (not to be a smartass). If I weren't tired I would run downstairs and grab my copy to check.
Since we're on the topic of Derrida, the idea of existence becomes even more fleeting, particularly if we follow his linguistic arguments. The only existence that words can actually contain are those that are ascribed and interpreted at very specific, fleeting moments. If we accept the rupture in language that he details in Structure, Sign, and Play, we're left with another problem defining existence: it's impossible to define anythinig accurate as language serves to obfuscate meaning.
Not even meaning. To think of anything, we turn in into a meaning. Which is why it's so hard to talk about Existence, and other [strike]beings[/strike] like time and space.
My answer is that I don't give a shit if there is such a thing as existence. Now answer my fucking question.
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
By asking whether or not something exists you are doing the same thing. You can't ask of someone the question "is there such a thing as existence" without yourself assuming that there is such a thing as existence that something can do.
That's basically the point. We necessarily have to posit existence. It is a foundational proposition which philosophy and all thought rests upon. Thus, if existence "is," there are many problems that we encounter.
• How do atheists account for Being?
• How is Being different from beings?
• Do all things exist in the same way? If so, are the existential "is" (I am) and the copula (I am human) the same?
• Why is existence "truth?" I.e., why do we say that "two and two is four" true?
and a boatload of other questions
This strays heavily from the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which does not, without extensive re-imagining, conclude that God and existence are the same thing.
This thread, at least as I originally intended, is not for the ontology of God, but general problems about ontology. The ontological argument for the existence of God is particularly problematic not in the propositions, but the arguments against the propositions. This is why I have centered my posts not upon either the major or minor premises, nor the conclusion, but rather upon Kant's argument that "Being is not a predicate." The ontological argument reveals the problems about ontology in general.
I don't see any problem with accepting Kant's conclusion.
I don't see any problem with existence being transcendent, whatever your definition of "transcendent" is.
"If we experience anything, we are experiencing 'existence.' " ...yeah? That sounds perfectly fine to me.
But "therefore existence is God" has no relationship with the previous conclusions, unless your definition of God is a completely useless one.
I had a post a few posts ago where I argue that to accept that Kant's argument means that Being is very similar to the fundamental attributes of God. Being is absolutely present, infinite, and all powerful, in that Being sustains beings and beings can only exist if there is Being. That sounds a lot like a description of God.
I don't see any problem with accepting Kant's conclusion.
I don't see any problem with existence being transcendent, whatever your definition of "transcendent" is.
"If we experience anything, we are experiencing 'existence.' " ...yeah? That sounds perfectly fine to me.
But "therefore existence is God" has no relationship with the previous conclusions, unless your definition of God is a completely useless one.
I had a post a few posts ago where I argue that to accept that Kant's argument means that Being is very similar to the fundamental attributes of God. Being is absolutely present, infinite, and all powerful, in that Being sustains beings and beings can only exist if there is Being. That sounds a lot like a description of God.
"Absolutely present" - I have no problem with this. Where could being not be present?
"infinite" - Being can be finite, if there are only finite beings spatiotemporally or otherwise (which seems likely given our current understanding); it is also finite if potentiality/possibility are finite in any way. I would argue that, if you are looking at existential concepts as "beings" in their own right, non-physically, then "infinite" or "finite "are nonsensical terms to apply to the notion of Being.
"all powerful" - Being has no power as such; to describe power as something being can "have" is nonsensical. It cannot "have" anything. But for lack of better words, Being's "power" is limited to the existence of all things that were, are, or can be - things that exist in any sense. I suppose this is "all powerful" by definition, in some sense of the term, but it is not acting or working. To say that Being is all-powerful is to say "the property of existence has the capacity to make anything exist that exists" or similar, and it is a tautology of little worth.
Most importantly, though, to name some kind of fundamental property as "God" is to attribute some kind of mind/intent/consciousness to whatever force that is. It doesn't matter how you define God; the connotation of the word is such that it will bring that kind of entity into play. There is no reason to believe that, if Being exists in the ways you describe, it is mindful. A semantic argument, but an important one in this context, because calling anything "God" without referring to a specific deity is a provocative language game; the word God is used instead of some more neutral word precisely because it carries various connotations.
All I see here is the simple argument of "why do things exist?" or "what is existence?" being resolved with
-they just do/it just is
-we don't know
-God
...all of which are exactly equivalent answers.
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Powerpuppiesdrinking coffee in themountain cabinRegistered Userregular
edited April 2009
Seeking a recap of the problems with Kant's argument.
Talking about whether something exists is discussing existence rather than discussing a thing. Existence is not a quality or property something can possess, it is a thing that possesses qualities and properties. Whether I exist or God exists is a quality or property of existence and not of me or God.
So what's the problem? Seems straightforward.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
"all powerful" - Being has no power as such; to describe power as something being can "have" is nonsensical. It cannot "have" anything. But for lack of better words, Being's "power" is limited to the existence of all things that were, are, or can be - things that exist in any sense. I suppose this is "all powerful" by definition, in some sense of the term, but it is not acting or working. To say that Being is all-powerful is to say "the property of existence has the capacity to make anything exist that exists" or similar, and it is a tautology of little worth.
Yes, "all powerful" was a bit of loose analogy on my part. By power, I was speaking of the "power" that Being has to present beings, that beings are thought of by the "presencing" / "presenting" beings by Being. Whence comes the question: "Could you have Being without beings?"
Most importantly, though, to name some kind of fundamental property as "God" is to attribute some kind of mind/intent/consciousness to whatever force that is. It doesn't matter how you define God; the connotation of the word is such that it will bring that kind of entity into play. There is no reason to believe that, if Being exists in the ways you describe, it is mindful. A semantic argument, but an important one in this context, because calling anything "God" without referring to a specific deity is a provocative language game; the word God is used instead of some more neutral word precisely because it carries various connotations.
Good point. However, if one has an experience, phenomenologically or otherwise, where they are "beholden to existence," is that then synonymous with someone being "beholden to God?" And, likewise, is an authentic existential experience something analogous to a religious experience?
MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
edited April 2009
I'm not sure if accept your conclusions on Kant. However, I'm no Kant scholar, nor have I studied the ontological argument extensively--I'm not particularly big on history of philosophy. However, I thought I'd throw in a couple thoughts on the ontological argument nonetheless.
The first is that although you can define something to exist, you cannot define it into existence. I can define Kabyristan as the Turkish state of which I am president and which exists. And from that I can infer that Kabyristan is defined to exist, but not that it actually exists. Arguments that proceed from definition are not successful for this reason. This objection, and variations, were kicking around even in Descartes day.
As an alternate tack, it is also sometimes argued that we are not arbitrarily defining god as existing, but rather, that we have a concept of god already in our heads, and that by examining that concept we can tell that it does in fact correctly refer to something existent. Hence, because we know our concept of god must correctly refer to something existent, we know that god exists (as god is just what is referred to by our concept of god). This is closer to what Descartes was arguing. The problem with this alternate tack is that there are no valid non-question-begging arguments for why our concept of god must successfully refer to something real. So it doesn't work.
Besides which, the problem of evil makes any omnipotent and omnibenevolent god extremely implausible, and make Descartes attempts to prove one look pretty silly. This also goes for the Christian theologians who committed themselves to omnipotence and omnibenevolence and then tried to prove that such a being must exist.
Seeking a recap of the problems with Kant's argument.
Talking about whether something exists is discussing existence rather than discussing a thing. Existence is not a quality or property something can possess, it is a thing that possesses qualities and properties. Whether I exist or God exists is a quality or property of existence and not of me or God.
So what's the problem? Seems straightforward.
The problem, or the issue which Podly sees as problematic, is that such a position puts existence as transcendent - beyond or prior to any other fact or truth in reality; something that pervades reality and is omnipresent because it must be omnipresent in order for things to exist. This results in a definition of existence that is similar to the definition of God.
My response is that they are both identical to "we don't understand," regardless of how you phrase it.
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Powerpuppiesdrinking coffee in themountain cabinRegistered Userregular
The problem, or the issue which Podly sees as problematic, is that such a position puts existence as transcendent - beyond or prior to any other fact or truth in reality; something that pervades reality and is omnipresent because it must be omnipresent in order for things to exist. This results in a definition of existence that is similar to the definition of God.
Okay, fine. As a theist, this doesn't bother me. Pretending to be atheistic for a moment, if I limit God to the blind, dumb, volitionless, and omnipresent existence of everything that exists, that would seem to satisfy traditional atheism.
The problem, or the issue which Podly sees as problematic, is that such a position puts existence as transcendent - beyond or prior to any other fact or truth in reality; something that pervades reality and is omnipresent because it must be omnipresent in order for things to exist. This results in a definition of existence that is similar to the definition of God.
It might not be true and there isn't evidence for it, but I don't see how that is a problem.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
The first is that although you can define something to exist, you cannot define it into existence. I can define Kabyristan as the Turkish state of which I am president and which exists. And from that I can infer that Kabyristan is defined to exist, but not that it actually exists. Arguments that proceed from definition are not successful for this reason. This objection, and variations, were kicking around even in Descartes day.
It's a good argument. I hold that existence and actuality are difficult categories to speak of, because they interact with each other but function differently. For instance, everything that is actual exists, but something that exist are not actual. I argue that Unicorns, Socrates, and Sherlock Holmes exist because we can think of their possibility, but that they do not constitute actuality. However, something like ungravity or an object outside of time and space do not exist, because they are impossible. Anything which can be defined exists because it is capable of being thought of, and existence is known though Kant alone. (Hence, Kant says that the existence of something is known only through conscious experience of the phenomena.)
As an alternate tack, it is also sometimes argued that we are not arbitrarily defining god as existing, but rather, that we have a concept of god already in our heads, and that by examining that concept we can tell that it does in fact correctly refer to something existent. Hence, because we know our concept of god must correctly refer to something existent, we know that god exists (as god is just what is referred to by our concept of god). This is closer to what Descartes was arguing. The problem with this alternate tack is that there are no valid non-question-begging arguments for why our concept of god must successfully refer to something real. So it doesn't work.
Why do we not have a cultural meme of ungravity or atemporality? I would argue because these "things" do not exist. God "exists" because we talk about him, but what does that have to do with the reality of God? Is he merely existing like a unicorn, or does he have a metaphysical or ontological reality about him?
"all powerful" - Being has no power as such; to describe power as something being can "have" is nonsensical. It cannot "have" anything. But for lack of better words, Being's "power" is limited to the existence of all things that were, are, or can be - things that exist in any sense. I suppose this is "all powerful" by definition, in some sense of the term, but it is not acting or working. To say that Being is all-powerful is to say "the property of existence has the capacity to make anything exist that exists" or similar, and it is a tautology of little worth.
Yes, "all powerful" was a bit of loose analogy on my part. By power, I was speaking of the "power" that Being has to present beings, that beings are thought of by the "presencing" / "presenting" beings by Being. Whence comes the question: "Could you have Being without beings?"
Most importantly, though, to name some kind of fundamental property as "God" is to attribute some kind of mind/intent/consciousness to whatever force that is. It doesn't matter how you define God; the connotation of the word is such that it will bring that kind of entity into play. There is no reason to believe that, if Being exists in the ways you describe, it is mindful. A semantic argument, but an important one in this context, because calling anything "God" without referring to a specific deity is a provocative language game; the word God is used instead of some more neutral word precisely because it carries various connotations.
Good point. However, if one has an experience, phenomenologically or otherwise, where they are "beholden to existence," is that then synonymous with someone being "beholden to God?" And, likewise, is an authentic existential experience something analogous to a religious experience?
I don't know what you mean by "beholden to existence/God." Do you mean forced (or made) to acknowledge or confront it?
I am suggesting that there is a fundamental ignorance or lack of understanding at the root of this discussion. We know that things exist; it is the only thing we can know. But we don't know what existence means, or is, or however you want to phrase it; we don't know why or how things exist. Fundamentally this is a problem of ignorance.
To me, the question is as yet unanswerable, and an atheist must face that unanswerability and get on with their life. To marvel that we exist is, perhaps, the same emotional experience as marveling at God, in some way, depending on how a religious person marvels at God (and how they define God). But a religious experience means attributing that existence to some force or being, most importantly to a force or being with intent or agency or action, and those conceptions seem to be both essentially misguided in terms of understanding what Being "is," and powerfully inauthentic, because they consist of claims made about the nature of Being despite the unanswerability of the question.
At the root of the conception of any kind of God, that claim is simply that Being is an entity, or the exercise of an entity's power; I take issue with that claim. But inevitably any God is also attached to any number of other claims and positive assertions, and I take even more issue with those, of course.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
Seeking a recap of the problems with Kant's argument.
Talking about whether something exists is discussing existence rather than discussing a thing. Existence is not a quality or property something can possess, it is a thing that possesses qualities and properties. Whether I exist or God exists is a quality or property of existence and not of me or God.
So what's the problem? Seems straightforward.
When you make "existence," or, more appropriately, Being, separate, then Being becomes something like God.
Seeking a recap of the problems with Kant's argument.
Talking about whether something exists is discussing existence rather than discussing a thing. Existence is not a quality or property something can possess, it is a thing that possesses qualities and properties. Whether I exist or God exists is a quality or property of existence and not of me or God.
So what's the problem? Seems straightforward.
When you make "existence," or, more appropriately, Being, separate, then Being becomes something like God.
But being something like God is different from being God. I don't see how it crosses the threshold and becomes God.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
I don't know what you mean by "beholden to existence/God." Do you mean forced (or made) to acknowledge or confront it?
Something along the lines of "experiencing Being without beings" or something more typically descriptive of a religious experience.
I am suggesting that there is a fundamental ignorance or lack of understanding at the root of this discussion. We know that things exist; it is the only thing we can know. But we don't know what existence means, or is, or however you want to phrase it; we don't know why or how things exist. Fundamentally this is a problem of ignorance.
The Onto-Theo-Logico Constitution of Metaphysics -- we will never be able to comprehend Being, because we can only comprehend beings differed from Being.
To me, the question is as yet unanswerable, and an atheist must face that unanswerability and get on with their life.
But will we one day be able to? I think we will not. Or at least we would have been able to, had the Nazi's won and set up Heideggerian re-education centers.
At the root of the conception of any kind of God, that claim is simply that Being is an entity, or the exercise of an entity's power; I take issue with that claim. But inevitably any God is also attached to any number of other claims and positive assertions, and I take even more issue with those, of course.
But Being is not a being, so how can it be an entity?
I don't think experiencing Being without beings is possible, especially since experience is itself a being, and a person is a being that is at least partially composed of experience-beings. Besides that, the simple fact that you are your body means that you are constantly experiencing beings; even if it is possible to somehow "experience Being" - which sounds like some suspiciously hempen-garbed garble, to me - it is impossible to not experience beings.
I don't know if we will ever answer that question; essentially, being a physicalist, the question for me is "will science ever be able to resolve metaphysical questions?" or "are metaphysics really just more ethereal forms of physics?" I have no idea. I am certainly suspicious of our capacity to answer questions like "what is existence" or "why do things exist," or our ability to formulate a question like that in any meaningful way, or grasp whatever answer may exist.
As for Being being an entity - I am not claiming it is; I am suggesting that religious experience or religous metaphysics means characterizing God as the origin or synonym of being. I guess I am suggesting that someone such as yourself is implicitly suggesting that Being is, in fact, a being. Unless you don't think God is a being, or that he is something that cannot be expressed as "being," or some other contorted notion.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
I guess I am suggesting that someone such as yourself is implicitly suggesting that Being is, in fact, a being. Unless you don't think God is a being, or that he is something that cannot be expressed as "being," or some other contorted notion.
Again, that is the onto-theo-logico problem. Being itself cannot be a being, but we cannot think of it otherwise. Being is a presencing / veiling: it presences beings and veils over itself, leaving only the (Derridean) trace and difference.
I also think that God is not a Being. (Maybe God is actually nothingness, and God is actually all possibility! Who knows?!)
you, then, are Catholic and religious not because the very-much-a-being God of Catholicism and Christianity resonates with your philosophy, but because the experience in ritual of that religious tradition makes you "experience Being" in a way that you find most effective and authentic, which is in accordance with your philosophy?
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This thread is about the ontological argument. It does not matter if it is possible to prove there is existence. It matters if the ontological argument proves there is existence.
Moreover, I see no reason to care about whether or not I exist when for all intents and purposes, I exist.
The ontological argument isn't concerned with primary ontology? That sounds like more side-stepping to me.
I didn't ask whether you exist. I ask whether there is "existence," or, if you prefer, "being."
"The Ontological Argument" is just short for "The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God," so yes, arguing about existence itself is kind of off topic. The argument posits that existence is already a thing that happens and is in the universe.
Not necessarily. For instance, the ontological argument posits that God is existence. You cannot really negate that, because that is a category error. Thus, Kant attacked the minor premise, by saying that being is not a predicate. If Being is not a predicate, then you are left with the need to account for what Being is.
Also, your notion that "existence" is "in" the universe seems unfounded to me. Wouldn't it be the otherway around, that the universe is, that the universe is part of existence?
Why are you so intent on not giving an answer to the question?
I ask
yet again
Is there such a thing as "existence?"
essentia and entity are not synonymous
The essence of a thing is not the complete identity of something
Now now, don't get pissy.
But how can you not care about existence if you "don't give a shit" about something, if in doing that you are using an existential qualifier and are thus posting the existence of the thing that you verily "don't give a shit" about.
That doesn't seem like a good belief to hold.
In an attempt to help your noble thread along, I would point out that Sartre tackled notions of existence in a way that will hopefully further this discussion.
For instance, that really famous quote "existence precedes essence" creates two categories that seems to go against the notion of universal existence that's already been posited here. Sartre would argue that proving a person exists is dramatically different from proving an object exists, which would mean that perfection, at least as it's being used here, would necessarily encompass contradictory and dichotomous paths.
The only way in which a person can conceive of the ideas that are being thrown around is to presuppose existence in the first place, which I know you've already made a point of saying, but I feel it bears repeating.
Anyway, I just came up with a bunch of ways to refute everything I just said, but I wanted to post since I think this is an interesting intellectual exercise.
By asking whether or not something exists you are doing the same thing. You can't ask of someone the question "is there such a thing as existence" without yourself assuming that there is such a thing as existence that something can do.
I forget where, but somewhere Derrida talks about the difference between Being and beings -- the ontological difference, which I have brought up a few times in this thread. Heidegger was one of the main people to talk abot the ontological difference, but Derrida laboriously shows how even within Being there is a difference between itself -- the ontological différance. Pretty crazy stuff!
So you aren't going to answer my question?
That's basically the point. We necessarily have to posit existence. It is a foundational proposition which philosophy and all thought rests upon. Thus, if existence "is," there are many problems that we encounter.
• How do atheists account for Being?
• How is Being different from beings?
• Do all things exist in the same way? If so, are the existential "is" (I am) and the copula (I am human) the same?
• Why is existence "truth?" I.e., why do we say that "two and two is four" true?
and a boatload of other questions
I'm pretty sure that's from one of the essays in Ecriture et Differance (not to be a smartass). If I weren't tired I would run downstairs and grab my copy to check.
Since we're on the topic of Derrida, the idea of existence becomes even more fleeting, particularly if we follow his linguistic arguments. The only existence that words can actually contain are those that are ascribed and interpreted at very specific, fleeting moments. If we accept the rupture in language that he details in Structure, Sign, and Play, we're left with another problem defining existence: it's impossible to define anythinig accurate as language serves to obfuscate meaning.
See my last post. We necessarily believe that Being exists. The existence of God doesn't matter for this thread. I've said that time and time again. I don't think that the ontological argument is a useful theological proof. Rather, I think that it creates ontological problems for all philosophical positions, based upon the essential ontological questions it raises about existence.
This strays heavily from the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, which does not, without extensive re-imagining, conclude that God and existence are the same thing.
Not even meaning. To think of anything, we turn in into a meaning. Which is why it's so hard to talk about Existence, and other [strike]beings[/strike] like time and space.
Ironically, I couldn't think of a better word.
I don't see any problem with existence being transcendent, whatever your definition of "transcendent" is.
"If we experience anything, we are experiencing 'existence.' " ...yeah? That sounds perfectly fine to me.
But "therefore existence is God" has no relationship with the previous conclusions, unless your definition of God is a completely useless one.
Also, God doesn't account for existence - it's just a hand wave that side-steps the issue.
This thread, at least as I originally intended, is not for the ontology of God, but general problems about ontology. The ontological argument for the existence of God is particularly problematic not in the propositions, but the arguments against the propositions. This is why I have centered my posts not upon either the major or minor premises, nor the conclusion, but rather upon Kant's argument that "Being is not a predicate." The ontological argument reveals the problems about ontology in general.
I had a post a few posts ago where I argue that to accept that Kant's argument means that Being is very similar to the fundamental attributes of God. Being is absolutely present, infinite, and all powerful, in that Being sustains beings and beings can only exist if there is Being. That sounds a lot like a description of God.
"Absolutely present" - I have no problem with this. Where could being not be present?
"infinite" - Being can be finite, if there are only finite beings spatiotemporally or otherwise (which seems likely given our current understanding); it is also finite if potentiality/possibility are finite in any way. I would argue that, if you are looking at existential concepts as "beings" in their own right, non-physically, then "infinite" or "finite "are nonsensical terms to apply to the notion of Being.
"all powerful" - Being has no power as such; to describe power as something being can "have" is nonsensical. It cannot "have" anything. But for lack of better words, Being's "power" is limited to the existence of all things that were, are, or can be - things that exist in any sense. I suppose this is "all powerful" by definition, in some sense of the term, but it is not acting or working. To say that Being is all-powerful is to say "the property of existence has the capacity to make anything exist that exists" or similar, and it is a tautology of little worth.
Most importantly, though, to name some kind of fundamental property as "God" is to attribute some kind of mind/intent/consciousness to whatever force that is. It doesn't matter how you define God; the connotation of the word is such that it will bring that kind of entity into play. There is no reason to believe that, if Being exists in the ways you describe, it is mindful. A semantic argument, but an important one in this context, because calling anything "God" without referring to a specific deity is a provocative language game; the word God is used instead of some more neutral word precisely because it carries various connotations.
All I see here is the simple argument of "why do things exist?" or "what is existence?" being resolved with
-they just do/it just is
-we don't know
-God
...all of which are exactly equivalent answers.
Talking about whether something exists is discussing existence rather than discussing a thing. Existence is not a quality or property something can possess, it is a thing that possesses qualities and properties. Whether I exist or God exists is a quality or property of existence and not of me or God.
So what's the problem? Seems straightforward.
Yes, "all powerful" was a bit of loose analogy on my part. By power, I was speaking of the "power" that Being has to present beings, that beings are thought of by the "presencing" / "presenting" beings by Being. Whence comes the question: "Could you have Being without beings?"
Good point. However, if one has an experience, phenomenologically or otherwise, where they are "beholden to existence," is that then synonymous with someone being "beholden to God?" And, likewise, is an authentic existential experience something analogous to a religious experience?
The first is that although you can define something to exist, you cannot define it into existence. I can define Kabyristan as the Turkish state of which I am president and which exists. And from that I can infer that Kabyristan is defined to exist, but not that it actually exists. Arguments that proceed from definition are not successful for this reason. This objection, and variations, were kicking around even in Descartes day.
As an alternate tack, it is also sometimes argued that we are not arbitrarily defining god as existing, but rather, that we have a concept of god already in our heads, and that by examining that concept we can tell that it does in fact correctly refer to something existent. Hence, because we know our concept of god must correctly refer to something existent, we know that god exists (as god is just what is referred to by our concept of god). This is closer to what Descartes was arguing. The problem with this alternate tack is that there are no valid non-question-begging arguments for why our concept of god must successfully refer to something real. So it doesn't work.
Besides which, the problem of evil makes any omnipotent and omnibenevolent god extremely implausible, and make Descartes attempts to prove one look pretty silly. This also goes for the Christian theologians who committed themselves to omnipotence and omnibenevolence and then tried to prove that such a being must exist.
The problem, or the issue which Podly sees as problematic, is that such a position puts existence as transcendent - beyond or prior to any other fact or truth in reality; something that pervades reality and is omnipresent because it must be omnipresent in order for things to exist. This results in a definition of existence that is similar to the definition of God.
My response is that they are both identical to "we don't understand," regardless of how you phrase it.
Okay, fine. As a theist, this doesn't bother me. Pretending to be atheistic for a moment, if I limit God to the blind, dumb, volitionless, and omnipresent existence of everything that exists, that would seem to satisfy traditional atheism.
It's a good argument. I hold that existence and actuality are difficult categories to speak of, because they interact with each other but function differently. For instance, everything that is actual exists, but something that exist are not actual. I argue that Unicorns, Socrates, and Sherlock Holmes exist because we can think of their possibility, but that they do not constitute actuality. However, something like ungravity or an object outside of time and space do not exist, because they are impossible. Anything which can be defined exists because it is capable of being thought of, and existence is known though Kant alone. (Hence, Kant says that the existence of something is known only through conscious experience of the phenomena.)
Why do we not have a cultural meme of ungravity or atemporality? I would argue because these "things" do not exist. God "exists" because we talk about him, but what does that have to do with the reality of God? Is he merely existing like a unicorn, or does he have a metaphysical or ontological reality about him?
I don't know what you mean by "beholden to existence/God." Do you mean forced (or made) to acknowledge or confront it?
I am suggesting that there is a fundamental ignorance or lack of understanding at the root of this discussion. We know that things exist; it is the only thing we can know. But we don't know what existence means, or is, or however you want to phrase it; we don't know why or how things exist. Fundamentally this is a problem of ignorance.
To me, the question is as yet unanswerable, and an atheist must face that unanswerability and get on with their life. To marvel that we exist is, perhaps, the same emotional experience as marveling at God, in some way, depending on how a religious person marvels at God (and how they define God). But a religious experience means attributing that existence to some force or being, most importantly to a force or being with intent or agency or action, and those conceptions seem to be both essentially misguided in terms of understanding what Being "is," and powerfully inauthentic, because they consist of claims made about the nature of Being despite the unanswerability of the question.
At the root of the conception of any kind of God, that claim is simply that Being is an entity, or the exercise of an entity's power; I take issue with that claim. But inevitably any God is also attached to any number of other claims and positive assertions, and I take even more issue with those, of course.
When you make "existence," or, more appropriately, Being, separate, then Being becomes something like God.
But being something like God is different from being God. I don't see how it crosses the threshold and becomes God.
Something along the lines of "experiencing Being without beings" or something more typically descriptive of a religious experience.
The Onto-Theo-Logico Constitution of Metaphysics -- we will never be able to comprehend Being, because we can only comprehend beings differed from Being.
But will we one day be able to? I think we will not. Or at least we would have been able to, had the Nazi's won and set up Heideggerian re-education centers.
But Being is not a being, so how can it be an entity?
I don't know if we will ever answer that question; essentially, being a physicalist, the question for me is "will science ever be able to resolve metaphysical questions?" or "are metaphysics really just more ethereal forms of physics?" I have no idea. I am certainly suspicious of our capacity to answer questions like "what is existence" or "why do things exist," or our ability to formulate a question like that in any meaningful way, or grasp whatever answer may exist.
As for Being being an entity - I am not claiming it is; I am suggesting that religious experience or religous metaphysics means characterizing God as the origin or synonym of being. I guess I am suggesting that someone such as yourself is implicitly suggesting that Being is, in fact, a being. Unless you don't think God is a being, or that he is something that cannot be expressed as "being," or some other contorted notion.
Again, that is the onto-theo-logico problem. Being itself cannot be a being, but we cannot think of it otherwise. Being is a presencing / veiling: it presences beings and veils over itself, leaving only the (Derridean) trace and difference.
I also think that God is not a Being. (Maybe God is actually nothingness, and God is actually all possibility! Who knows?!)
a whatchacallit
epiphany
you, then, are Catholic and religious not because the very-much-a-being God of Catholicism and Christianity resonates with your philosophy, but because the experience in ritual of that religious tradition makes you "experience Being" in a way that you find most effective and authentic, which is in accordance with your philosophy?