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[Philosophy on]: Define your Fucking Terms

_J__J_ PedantRegistered User, __BANNED USERS regular
edited November 2009 in Debate and/or Discourse
Let's say that you have a notion of there being this thing called "truth" in some capacity, in some way. Since there is no universally agreed upon definition of truth, at least philosophically, there shall be no universally posited definition of truth here in the OP. However, I take it to be a sensible assumption that all readers have some notion of there being a thing called "truth".

Given this setup, here is the conversation for the thread. You have two options; pick:

1) Truth is a thing already existing in reality which is discovered.
2) Truth is a thing created by beings who create truths.


Which would you say is the case?


If 1:
If truth is a thing discovered then it is impossible to discover truth absent epistemology and ontological metaphysics. To discover truth in that which exists one must determine both what exists and how one knows anything about that which exists. It makes no sense to maintain that truths are discovered in reality yet maintain that one need not discern what is reality and how one knows anything about said reality. Moreover, one might ask how one can engage in either epistemology or ontological metaphysics without always already having some concept of truth which, if truth is found, would create an odd circularity.


If 2:
If truth is a thing created then, presumably, one could simply just fucking create a truth. If truth is not beholden to anything except one's intentions and capacity for creation then just fucking make something up. Would this kind of truth necessarily have to be inter-subjective? If two truths are offerred which contradict one another (A and ~A) how would one discern that which is true since both cannot be true? Can contradictory truths both be true?

If 1 & 2:
If it is the case that truth is both 1 and 2, that truth is both discovered and created, then I think both sets of criteria apply. One needs to understand both the process of discovery and the process of creation. However, there is an obvious conflict here. If truth is discovered then any created truth must be beholden to those things discovered and so creation is limited. If truth is created then there seems to be some flexibility with regard to that which is discovered insofar as it can be manipulated and interpreted.


My guess is that a contemporary kneejerk post-darwinian answer would be to say that truths are created based upon what is found. Except there is an obvious heirarchy or sequence here. First one finds what there is. Second, one makes something out of that which is. This would put "what there is" primary and, so, primordially true whereas the second step would not be truth qua truth but rather would be a creation which, to some degree, involved truth as an ingredient. It would be very odd to claim that there are two steps to truth (find what there is, make something with that) and claim that both are truth given that one may discuss both the finding what there is and the making as two seperate things and, so, two seperate truths.


Where do you think truth is and why? Is truth "out there" and so found or is truth fabricated? How do you deal with the issues which arise in either of these positions? Is truth a mixture of discovery and creation? How do you deal with the issues which arise in this position?

_J_ on
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    ronyaronya Arrrrrf. the ivory tower's basementRegistered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?

    It might help if you explained your conception of truth, where there are primordially true things and other true things which only involve truth as an ingredient (what are the other ingredients?). This doesn't seem intuitively obvious.

    ronya on
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    ronya wrote: »
    Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?

    All men are mortal
    Socrates is a man
    (Therefore,) Socrates is mortal

    In this deductive argument the truth of the conclusion follows from the truth of the two premises. The truths which are known are the truths of the premises and the truth which is deduced is the conclusion. Yet the truth "Socrates is mortal" is not known in itself. Rather, its truth is contingent on the truth of the two premises.

    In a deductive argument the conclusion is of the form "This is true if the premises are true"; the conclusion cannot be known to be true in itself independent of those premises. If the conclusion could be known to be true independent of the premises then its truth would not be contingent. However, one would have to ask why it was involved in a deductive argument in the first place.

    ronya wrote: »
    It might help if you explained your conception of truth, where there are primordially true things and other true things which only involve truth as an ingredient (what are the other ingredients?). This doesn't seem intuitively obvious.

    I do not want to define my concept of truth insofar as the purpose of the thread is to argue concepts of truth. However, I think I can address the question of the idea of primordially true things and truths which utilize those as ingredients.

    The pragmatic conception of truth deals with practice wherein notions of truth are tested and utilized in "everyday" scenarios in order to establish their practical consequences. In that sort of situation a truth (say, some empirical truth about desks) would be mixed with some intentionality, purpose, perception of a human activity which utilized desks. So one gets to a truth about desks (desks can support cups up to X weight) by manipulating the thing in itself, the desk. In that case the truth "desks can support cups up to X weight" contains both empirical truth about a desk AND the intentionality of utilizing a desk to support cups.

    Some might argue that "desks can support cups up to X weight" is also a primordial truth about desks. However, I would say that a desk in and of itself is not inherently a thing which supports cups; utilizing a desk to support a cup is secondary to the desk-in-itself.

    So, truths related to the desk-in-itself are primordial truths.
    Truths related to human intentions of uses for desks would be a secondary, created truth. It would be a truth created based upon a particular intention for the use of desks.

    That make sense?

    _J_ on
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    Marty81Marty81 Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    In a deductive argument the conclusion is of the form "This is true iff the premises are true"

    Quick correction: that should be "This is true if the premises are true", not iff. The truth of the conclusion need not imply the truth of the premises, even if the argument deriving the conclusion is valid.

    Marty81 on
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Marty81 wrote: »
    _J_ wrote: »
    In a deductive argument the conclusion is of the form "This is true iff the premises are true"

    Quick correction: that should be "This is true if the premises are true", not iff. The truth of the conclusion need not imply the truth of the premises, even if the argument deriving the conclusion is valid.

    Correct. I hit 'f' too many times.

    _J_ on
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    NuckerNucker Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    I could be wrong, but isn't the original premise for truth being a thing in reality which is discovered assuming that a single person must know all things in order for the truth to exist? In other words, isn't that premise assuming that someone has to be in the forest to hear the tree make a sound when it falls?

    Nucker on
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    DasUberEdwardDasUberEdward Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Truth = proximity to ascribed value

    DasUberEdward on
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    PodlyPodly you unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    1) Truth is a thing already existing in reality which is discovered.
    2) Truth is a thing created by beings who create truths.

    I formally reject both of these propositions. Truth, first of all, is not a thing. Truth is an ontological proposition, truth is a declaration of identity. When something is true, it stands with it self, it is itself the same as itself. False deals with a difference between (x1) and (x2), that they are not found standing together, that X does not stand in itself as proposed. Truth is presence, and falsetity is absence or, more appropriately, presence as difference. I have no idea how you could prose that truth is discovered.

    2) Truth is not created. Truth is ontological. Truth is where you find yourself. Does my car get into a car crash because of the truths of Newton or of Heisenberg? What is the truth that an insurance company looks for when they go through their claims reports? What truths would a car crash specialist use? What truth would a quantum physicist look for? They all have their truths, because all are looking to make statements about the [strike]Being[/strike] in question, are looking to identity the truth of what happened.

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    HamHamJHamHamJ Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    Where do you think truth is and why? Is truth "out there" and so found or is truth fabricated? How do you deal with the issues which arise in either of these positions? Is truth a mixture of discovery and creation? How do you deal with the issues which arise in this position?

    Knowledge is justified belief, and it is belief about how things are. Truth is how things actually are.

    HamHamJ on
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    PodlyPodly you unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    HamHamJ wrote: »
    Truth is how things actually are.

    So Truth is Being?

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Nucker wrote: »
    I could be wrong, but isn't the original premise for truth being a thing in reality which is discovered assuming that a single person must know all things in order for the truth to exist? In other words, isn't that premise assuming that someone has to be in the forest to hear the tree make a sound when it falls?

    If truth is a thing in reality which is discovered then truth exists independent of its being perceived or understood.

    So, with the tree example, if we go with truth as a thing discovered then a truth is true independent of its being perceived or understood just as the tree would make a noise independent of the noise being heard.

    _J_ on
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Podly wrote: »
    _J_ wrote: »
    1) Truth is a thing already existing in reality which is discovered.
    2) Truth is a thing created by beings who create truths.

    I formally reject both of these propositions. Truth, first of all, is not a thing. Truth is an ontological proposition, truth is a declaration of identity. When something is true, it stands with it self, it is itself the same as itself. False deals with a difference between (x1) and (x2), that they are not found standing together, that X does not stand in itself as proposed. Truth is presence, and falsetity is absence or, more appropriately, presence as difference. I have no idea how you could prose that truth is discovered.

    2) Truth is not created. Truth is ontological. Truth is where you find yourself. Does my car get into a car crash because of the truths of Newton or of Heisenberg? What is the truth that an insurance company looks for when they go through their claims reports? What truths would a car crash specialist use? What truth would a quantum physicist look for? They all have their truths, because all are looking to make statements about the [strike]Being[/strike] in question, are looking to identity the truth of what happened.

    If truth is a declaration then it only exists in its being declared. That would be 2.
    "when something is true it stands with it self, it is itself the same as itself." That would be 1.

    With your example of the car crash specialist and the quantum physicist that would be 2, truth created. They all have their truths (they make their truths) because they are looking to make statements (2).

    I do not think you are rejecting the options of 1 or 2 because you continually use 1 and 2 in your explanation as I understand it.

    _J_ on
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    saggiosaggio Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Podly wrote: »
    HamHamJ wrote: »
    Truth is how things actually are.

    So Truth is Being?

    Truth and falsity refer to all possible states of affairs in all possible worlds.

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    DasUberEdwardDasUberEdward Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Sure truth exist without perception because it is the status of an object or thing in relation to it's being that object or thing.

    But what we consider to be truth is this. . .How close does X resemble our perception of what X should be. It's ascribed from our perspective.

    DasUberEdward on
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Sure truth exist without perception because it is the status of an object or thing in relation to it's being that object or thing.

    But what we consider to be truth is this. . .How close does X resemble our perception of what X should be. It's ascribed from our perspective.

    Is the "should" there making an appeal to an ideal state independent of the fact of the matter?

    _J_ on
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    PodlyPodly you unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    If truth is a declaration then it only exists in its being declared.

    Truth itself does not exist, but existence [strike]is[/strike] truth. Western languages have combined a notion of "truth" with the notion of being. There is no truth without something BEING truth. What is true is what is.
    "when something is true it stands with it self, it is itself the same as itself." That would be 1.

    With your example of the car crash specialist and the quantum physicist that would be 2, truth created. They all have their truths (they make their truths) because they are looking to make statements (2).

    There is no creation. A situation happens. Because of the way in which exist, there cannot but be all the truths that I outlined. They were not created to be true. They were always-already true necessarily.

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    jothkijothki Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Can I claim that "creation" and "discovery" are fundamentally the same thing?

    jothki on
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Podly wrote: »
    Truth itself does not exist, but existence [strike]is[/strike] truth. Western languages have combined a notion of "truth" with the notion of being. There is no truth without something BEING truth. What is true is what is.

    So truth is that which is the case.
    Podly wrote: »
    There is no creation. A situation happens. Because of the way in which exist, there cannot but be all the truths that I outlined. They were not created to be true. They were always-already true necessarily.

    Would not the happening of the situation be that which creates truth? If truth is that which is would not the creation of truth be the creation of that which is?

    Here is the situation about which I am thinking: You create a cup. Now, if truth is that which is then the truth of that cup did not exist prior to that cup's being.

    That would seem to make truth created rather than discovered. If truth were discovered rather than created, however, we could tell this story:

    The coming-to-be of a cup was not a process of creation but rather a process of actualizing a necessary eventuality. I happen upon the truth of this cup not by creating the cup (nothing is created) but rather I engage in those actions necessary to make that cup which has to exist at this moment come to be.

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    jothki wrote: »
    Can I claim that "creation" and "discovery" are fundamentally the same thing?

    You can. The trick is how to tell that story.

    Create a cup.
    Discover a cup.

    I think that "create" has a connotation of a positing of a will and intention which manipulates that which is into something else.

    I think "discover" has a connotation of realization and understanding of that which is without modification.

    So, for me, the problem would be how to get "creation modifies that which is the case" and "discovery understands that which is the case" to play nicely together.

    Creation is an act of modification whereas discovery does not modify...I think that would be the biggest problem.

    _J_ on
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    themightypuckthemightypuck MontanaRegistered User regular
    edited July 2009
    1) can never be known as epistemology and ontological metaphysics are not all that useful truth finding tools. It is, however, an interesting solution to problems of logic--like how can I use the word truth in the previous sentence.

    2) is OK if you are willing to play a bit fast and loose with the idea of truth: something like truth is the limit condition of some bayesian "truth" seeking function.

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    jothkijothki Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    If you created a random object and realize only upon its completion that it has the properties of a cup, did you create the cup or discover the cup? If you stumble across a rock shaped like a cup, fill it with water, and drink from it, did you create the cup or discover the cup?

    Edit: Looking at your post, I think I'll revise this into something less hypothetical.

    Say Albert creates a painting, and thinks that it's so awesome that he eagerly shows it to his friend, Bruce, who is an experienced art critic and for the purposes of this example an infallible judge of the quality of artwork. Bruce examines the painting and decides that it is lousy.

    At this point, I believe that everyone would agree that "the painting that Albert showed Bruce is a lousy painting" is true.

    However, was that truth created or discovered? Albert intended to create a painting, true, but he intended to create an awesome painting, and failed to realize that it was a lousy painting until Bruce told him. Albert had no authorship over the lousiness, but it still was arguably lousy from the moment that is was created. Bruce discovered that the painting was lousy, but did that actually change anything?

    Shoot, I just realized I screwed up by groundlessly assuming that properties are objective. That may be the case, but I really should have attempted a proof, which I really don't have time to do and may be impossible anyway.

    jothki on
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    RiemannLivesRiemannLives Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    ronya wrote: »
    Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?

    All men are mortal
    Socrates is a man
    (Therefore,) Socrates is mortal

    In this deductive argument the truth of the conclusion follows from the truth of the two premises. The truths which are known are the truths of the premises and the truth which is deduced is the conclusion. Yet the truth "Socrates is mortal" is not known in itself. Rather, its truth is contingent on the truth of the two premises.

    In a deductive argument the conclusion is of the form "This is true if the premises are true"; the conclusion cannot be known to be true in itself independent of those premises. If the conclusion could be known to be true independent of the premises then its truth would not be contingent. However, one would have to ask why it was involved in a deductive argument in the first place.

    So you've pointed out how deduction works. The conclusion is true if all premises are true.

    You have 3 statements. Two you calling premises and one a conclusion. And you have shown that perhaps how the premises are known to be true is different from how the conclusion is known to be true - if it is at all. But if it is at all true it is no less so than the premises (and in your example here if somehow the conclusion were shown to be false then you also know at least one if not both of the premises are as well).

    But how does that answer ronya's question? - "Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?".

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    jothki wrote: »
    If you created a random object and realize only upon its completion that it has the properties of a cup, did you create the cup or discover the cup? If you stumble across a rock shaped like a cup, fill it with water, and drink from it, did you create the cup or discover the cup?

    At the moment I do not want to distinguish between a label applied to a thing and the thing in itself with regard to the creation / discovery conversation. So perhaps "cup" is a bad example insofar as "cup" defines a utility rather than a thing in itself, at least in some understandings.

    So, you create X. Upon creating X you do not discover that X is X. X was X in its being created to be X insofar as we understand "created to be X" as its being created to conform to the intended design.

    With your description it would be sensible to say that one could CREATE a thing and then DISCOVER that the thing is a cup if we take creation to deal with the physical object and discovery to deal with the utility of the object. The problem is that then creation deals with X and discovery deals with Y where X is the thing in itself and Y is the use of X.

    Is there a way to tell the story such that "discovery" and "creation" deal with one and the same thing in the same way?

    _J_ on
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    PodlyPodly you unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    But how does that answer ronya's question? - "Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?".

    Because it rests on appeals. It is only true because other things are true. In the famous syllogism, the truth is that socrates is mortal, aka, Socrates will die. How do you know this? How do you know that you will die? It hasn't happened yet, so it isn't true empirically. Nevertheless, your death is true.

    Riemann is human.
    All humans will die one day.
    Riemann will die one day.

    You, by all measures of of truth, are a human. No humans have ever lived forever, and by pretty much all measures of truth, all humans die. Therefore, you too will die. You realize your death only by things that are more epistemologically certain.

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    So you've pointed out how deduction works. The conclusion is true if all premises are true.

    You have 3 statements. Two you calling premises and one a conclusion. And you have shown that perhaps how the premises are known to be true is different from how the conclusion is known to be true - if it is at all. But if it is at all true it is no less so than the premises (and in your example here if somehow the conclusion were shown to be false then you also know at least one if not both of the premises are as well).

    But how does that answer ronya's question? - "Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?".

    The distinction is in how the claims are known to be true. The premises are known to be true in a different manner than the conclusion. The conclusion's truth rests upon the truth of the premises whereas the truth of the premises rests upon ____.

    That we can acknowledge that difference indicates that there is a difference. The premises are true in and of themselves. The conclusion is true based upon the truth of the premises, borrowing from the truth of the premises.


    All men are mortal (true in itself)
    Socrates is a man (true in itself)
    (Therefore,) Socrates is mortal (true as a result of the two premises)

    The conclusion is not self-sufficiently true but rather it is true as a result of leeching truth from the premises, so to speak.

    _J_ on
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    RiemannLivesRiemannLives Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Podly wrote: »
    But how does that answer ronya's question? - "Why would a deduction from existing truths be any less true than its preceding truths?".

    Because it rests on appeals. It is only true because other things are true. In the famous syllogism, the truth is that socrates is mortal, aka, Socrates will die. How do you know this? How do you know that you will die? It hasn't happened yet, so it isn't true empirically. Nevertheless, your death is true.

    Riemann is human.
    All humans will die one day.
    Riemann will die one day.

    You, by all measures of of truth, are a human. No humans have ever lived forever, and by pretty much all measures of truth, all humans die. Therefore, you too will die. You realize your death only by things that are more epistemologically certain.

    So you are drawing the distinction between what in mathematics would be considered a postulate and everything else derived from said postulate(s).

    Fair enough.

    But if you are going to try and make this distinction then don't you have to clearly state what your postulates are? In the examples thus far the premesis are themselves only known as deductions of other premesis.

    Are we talking about Turtles all the Way Down? Or are you claiming that some truths do not "rest on appeals". And if so, how could you possibly prove that other than just stating "well, we haven't been able to find any appeals yet" (which is, essentially, how mathematics works)

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    CouscousCouscous Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    All men are mortal (true in itself)
    Socrates is a man (true in itself)
    (Therefore,) Socrates is mortal (true as a result of the two premises)
    Zombie Socrates disagrees.

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    Are we talking about Turtles all the Way Down? Or are you claiming that some truths do not "rest on appeals". And if so, how could you possibly prove that other than just stating "well, we haven't been able to find any appeals yet" (which is, essentially, how mathematics works)

    That's the question for the thread. Do we discover truths and then combine them to make other truths, are all truths discovered, or are all truths made?

    I mean, Nietzsche would say that there are no foundational truths and it is all a gigantic mess of circularity with references between truths. Others will say that there are discovered, self-evident truths which are true in themselves.

    _J_ on
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    RiemannLivesRiemannLives Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    Are we talking about Turtles all the Way Down? Or are you claiming that some truths do not "rest on appeals". And if so, how could you possibly prove that other than just stating "well, we haven't been able to find any appeals yet" (which is, essentially, how mathematics works)

    That's the question for the thread. Do we discover truths and then combine them to make other truths, are all truths discovered, or are all truths made?

    I mean, Nietzsche would say that there are no foundational truths and it is all a gigantic mess of circularity with references between truths. Others will say that there are discovered, self-evident truths which are true in themselves.

    See this is what I thought. It is not Known whether there are different kinds of truth and even if there are there certainly is not any way, at present, to tell one from the other (which from the point of view of actual human beings is the same thing as there not being different types).

    You could have answered ronya's question then. I find it quite interesting that you chose not to. And how.

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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    It's probably all of them. Why do we need to decide?

    Also I understood everything Podly said which is scaring me.

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    It's probably all of them. Why do we need to decide?

    Understanding what one means by truth influences the manner in which debates and discourse concerned with truth occur.

    If we are to claim that X is the case and understand that to be a truth claim understanding what, exactly, a truth claim is and signifies will let us know how to understand "X is the case".

    So, if you're Nietzsche, and you recognize that all truths are posited and co-dependent you will have a very different understanding of debates and discourse than, say, a Socrates who thinks that truths are discovered and exist independent of human posits.

    _J_ on
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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    I gotta say I have difficulty with multi use words, in that I have difficulty if a word appears to have multiple different meanings and can represent all of them.

    My instinct is to separate out the word and have different words for each meaning, rather than knock off one of the meanings entirely.

    It's represented by a feeling of cognitive dissonance whenever the word is used, because I immediately think of multiple different meanings that could be equally likely. Sort of like being overloaded with possibility.

    "Truth" has always done this to me. I have to consciously throttle back and just not think about it to get through a sentence with the word "truth" in it. Then after I've gotten through the sentence, I pick which meaning of "truth" the writer of the sentence intended based on the context of the rest of the other words they have employed. Basically as someone who has problems with even his native language, "truth" is incredibly imprecise and not very useful.
    This seems more rooted in the structure of the language itself as Podly says.

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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    I gotta say I have difficulty with multi use words, in that I have difficulty if a word appears to have multiple different meanings and can represent all of them.

    My instinct is to separate out the word and have different words for each meaning, rather than knock off one of the meanings entirely.

    It's represented by a feeling of cognitive dissonance whenever the word is used, because I immediately think of multiple different meanings that could be equally likely. Sort of like being overloaded with possibility.

    "Truth" has always done this to me. I have to consciously throttle back and just not think about it to get through a sentence with the word "truth" in it.

    There are days when I want to get rid of the word "truth" entirely and simply describe the process by which a position is maintained. So, for example, instead of talking about the correspondence theory of truth we could simply talk about correspondence.

    it seems like often in truth arguments what is argued is the process and then we apply "truth" to the process we like the best.

    _J_ on
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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    That would make a lot of people very annoyed and would be much more simply resolved with the standard english approach to complication which is add more syllables or words.
    Relative Truth
    Absolute Truth
    etc

    I don't disagree with your point, just being diplomatic.

    Morninglord on
    (PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
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    _J__J_ Pedant Registered User, __BANNED USERS regular
    edited July 2009
    That would make a lot of people very annoyed and would be much more simply resolved with the standard english approach to complication which is add more syllables or words.
    Relative Truth
    Absolute Truth
    etc

    I don't disagree with your point, just being diplomatic.

    My issue is that then we're fighting over a word.

    I can respect and desire and work towards truth qua truth. But when we're saying "truth is that which corresponds" and I say "So, why call it truth? Why not just say 'this corresponds?"

    When people are upset by that I do not know what to make of it. It's as if I am taking something from them which they do not think exists but still want.

    _J_ on
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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Yes J but diplomacy is not just about being right it's about getting along with the other person while still saying the same thing.

    I am aware of the irony of it being me who is saying this.

    Morninglord on
    (PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
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    saggiosaggio Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    _J_ wrote: »
    Are we talking about Turtles all the Way Down? Or are you claiming that some truths do not "rest on appeals". And if so, how could you possibly prove that other than just stating "well, we haven't been able to find any appeals yet" (which is, essentially, how mathematics works)

    That's the question for the thread. Do we discover truths and then combine them to make other truths, are all truths discovered, or are all truths made?

    I mean, Nietzsche would say that there are no foundational truths and it is all a gigantic mess of circularity with references between truths. Others will say that there are discovered, self-evident truths which are true in themselves.

    See this is what I thought. It is not Known whether there are different kinds of truth and even if there are there certainly is not any way, at present, to tell one from the other (which from the point of view of actual human beings is the same thing as there not being different types).

    You could have answered ronya's question then. I find it quite interesting that you chose not to. And how.

    There are absolutely different types of truths, and they are absolutely known. There are things which are necessarily true, and those which are true but don't necessarily have to be so. Hell, in modal logic, you can differentiate between three different types of "necessary" truths, only one of which is a logical truism.
    Niezsche wrote:
    So, if you're Nietzsche, and you recognize that all truths are posited and co-dependent you will have a very different understanding of debates and discourse than, say, a Socrates who thinks that truths are discovered and exist independent of human posits.

    The issue Nietzsche has with truth has to do with language use. The statement "there is a cup on the table" is usually judged according to something like Locke's correspondence theory of truth. The problem with that is the truth of the matter (the object in itself, the cup and the table) is never directly dealt with. We deal with the language game, the sounds and syllables that make up the words cup and table - all of which do not correspond to the "world" outside of language. Further, Nietzsche would object to the very notion of cups and tables, as he rejects objects as constructs themselves, simply used by humans to arrest the flux and change that is the world. More than that, Nietzsche would contend that, because the world is fundamentally in flux, and that language is a kind of retro-active attempt to arrest that change by creating sets and labels, the very notion of causality does not hold, at least in the conventional sense. Which would mean that we could never establish a relationship in a readily comprehensible manner between the cup and table, even if we could overcome a lot of the issues he has with language use and description.

    All of that may be true. But none of it contradicts my original post, which states that truth and falsity are possible states of affairs in all possible worlds.
    _J_ wrote:
    The distinction is in how the claims are known to be true. The premises are known to be true in a different manner than the conclusion. The conclusion's truth rests upon the truth of the premises whereas the truth of the premises rests upon ____.

    That we can acknowledge that difference indicates that there is a difference. The premises are true in and of themselves. The conclusion is true based upon the truth of the premises, borrowing from the truth of the premises.


    All men are mortal (true in itself)
    Socrates is a man (true in itself)
    (Therefore,) Socrates is mortal (true as a result of the two premises)

    The conclusion is not self-sufficiently true but rather it is true as a result of leeching truth from the premises, so to speak.

    No.

    There are three concepts that you are conflating here: validity, soundness, and cogency.

    Validity refers to deductive validity, which deals with the structure of the argument. We can judge validity of a deductive argument without dealing at all with the contents, and we can establish the truth and falsity of such an argument without the content being considered.

    1. If A, then B.
    2. A.
    3. Therefore, B.

    That is a deductively valid argument.

    1. If A, then B.
    2. ~B
    3. Therefore, ~A.

    That is also a deductively valid argument. In fact, it has a name: modus tollens.

    The second concept is soundness. Depending on how you conceive of soundness, you can have an argument that isn't valid and is sound, and an argument that is both valid and sound. I have a logic professor who holds that soundness requires validity, but I'm not so sure.

    Anyway, soundness refers to the actual state of affairs referred to by the premise set and the conclusion. So:

    1. Your name is _J_.
    2. Obama is the President of the U.S.
    3. Therefore, _J_ posts on the PA forums.

    This is an argument that is sound, but not valid. Both premises (1, 2) refer to states of affairs which are the case. Same with the conclusion (3). The problem is that there is no logical connection between any of them, and so this argument isn't valid.

    Now, cogency refers to an argument that is not necessarily deductively valid, but should still be heeded because it provides useful or insight information. So, all good inductive arguments are cogent (so, basically, all good scientific theories or statements can be considered cogent, but not valid), as are, arguably, arguments, such as the one above, that is not valid but still sound.

    Finally, when you say that the premises are true in and of themselves, that isn't the case. Premises may or may not be true (you can have a perfectly valid argument where all premises and all conclusions are false; basically, the garbage-in, garbage-out principle), and, especially in informal (that's non-symbolic logic) logic, premises generally derive from previous premises, so that in some cases, you must include a sub-argument in the premise set to justify the use of a particular premise before you are allowed to use it to get to the conclusion.

    saggio on
    3DS: 0232-9436-6893
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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    oooh i like the word cogency.

    it is a good word i am now going to consciously remembe that word in fact im writing it down on the wall where i keep a piece of paper to remind myself of things that i think are important

    i like this word

    cogency

    excellent

    thankyou for that explanation

    Morninglord on
    (PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
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    HamHamJHamHamJ Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    Podly wrote: »
    HamHamJ wrote: »
    Truth is how things actually are.

    So Truth is Being?

    No.

    HamHamJ on
    While racing light mechs, your Urbanmech comes in second place, but only because it ran out of ammo.
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    MorninglordMorninglord I'm tired of being Batman, so today I'll be Owl.Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    ham ham your argument lacks validity, but it is sound and it has a very small amount of cogency

    did i do this right

    Morninglord on
    (PSN: Morninglord) (Steam: Morninglord) (WiiU: Morninglord22) I like to record and toss up a lot of random gaming videos here.
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    saggiosaggio Registered User regular
    edited July 2009
    ham ham your argument lacks validity, but it is sound and it has a very small amount of cogency

    did i do this right

    It's not an argument. It's a language game.

    Edit: I should clarify. It's not an argument because there are no premises or conclusions, and there is no attempt to persuade or convince. An argument must have at least two premises, one conclusion, and must be attempting to persuade.

    saggio on
    3DS: 0232-9436-6893
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