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@CptH: I would say that there is no reason why there couldn't be Being++ or what-have-you. Your comparison to dimensional geometry is an apt one. What Heidegger argues, however, is that to be able to think like that means that we would have to "leap out" of metaphysics and logic -- we literally have to "think" in a completely and radically different way.
@CptH: I would say that there is no reason why there couldn't be Being++ or what-have-you. Your comparison to dimensional geometry is an apt one. What Heidegger argues, however, is that to be able to think like that means that we would have to "leap out" of metaphysics and logic -- we literally have to "think" in a completely and radically different way.
Right, which is my point. Just because we are incapable of conceiving of a thing, or because our language (mathematics, metaphysics, logic, whatever) is incapable of expressing it does not preclude its existence. The ontological argument presupposes limitations in order to posit God. If those limitations can be in any manner considered to be arbitrary or false then it defeats the necessity of God. Being, as defined, clearly is, but if it is possible to posit a greater or more fundamental sort of being and to continue the chain indefinitely then there is no bottom on which all else stands.
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@CptH: I would say that there is no reason why there couldn't be Being++ or what-have-you. Your comparison to dimensional geometry is an apt one. What Heidegger argues, however, is that to be able to think like that means that we would have to "leap out" of metaphysics and logic -- we literally have to "think" in a completely and radically different way.
Right, which is my point. Just because we are incapable of conceiving of a thing, or because our language (mathematics, metaphysics, logic, whatever) is incapable of expressing it does not preclude its existence. The ontological argument presupposes limitations in order to posit God. If those limitations can be in any manner considered to be arbitrary or false then it defeats the necessity of God. Being, as defined, clearly is, but if it is possible to posit a greater or more fundamental sort of being and to continue the chain indefinitely then there is no bottom on which all else stands.
But then you return the Anslem argument -- that God is the most perfect Being which can be thought. If you say that there are limitations to our thinking, then God is that which is outside our thinking. I don't think that just saying "yeah, but there could be" is a valid argument, unless you posit a path to a thinking which allows for us to think of what that would even resemble.
@CptH: I would say that there is no reason why there couldn't be Being++ or what-have-you. Your comparison to dimensional geometry is an apt one. What Heidegger argues, however, is that to be able to think like that means that we would have to "leap out" of metaphysics and logic -- we literally have to "think" in a completely and radically different way.
Right, which is my point. Just because we are incapable of conceiving of a thing, or because our language (mathematics, metaphysics, logic, whatever) is incapable of expressing it does not preclude its existence. The ontological argument presupposes limitations in order to posit God. If those limitations can be in any manner considered to be arbitrary or false then it defeats the necessity of God. Being, as defined, clearly is, but if it is possible to posit a greater or more fundamental sort of being and to continue the chain indefinitely then there is no bottom on which all else stands.
But then you return the Anslem argument -- that God is the most perfect Being which can be thought. If you say that there are limitations to our thinking, then God is that which is outside our thinking. I don't think that just saying "yeah, but there could be" is a valid argument, unless you posit a path to a thinking which allows for us to think of what that would even resemble.
Now that I view it from this perspective, I think Anslem's definition is itself flawed. God is traditionally not defined as the greatest thing of which we can conceive. Generally God (in the Abrahamic sense which Anslem is clearly speaking of) is beyond human comprehension. We are crafted in his image but are incapable of ever truly achieving his level of compassion, comprehension, etc. The Bible (which I know you aren't talking about, necessarily, but which Anslem definitely was thinking about based on his language) states that God is both in and beyond the world. The line, "The Lord works in mysterious ways" is an allusion to the unknowable nature of God. So if you are defining God as the greatest thing of which humans can conceive, then unless you allow for conceptualization in the abstract (eg: "A thing which is greater than all the things which I can conceive of") it's a more limited definition that the one he was apparently trying to describe.
If you do allow for such abstract conceptualization as "A thing which is greater than all things that I can conceive of" then I don't see how the argument works. If you can conceive of things you can't conceive of, what's the upper limit? Why isn't it an infinite chain as I described?
Beyond that, why is human conceptualization a limit on the universe? The universe as described by Everett's Universal Wave Theorem (popularized as the Many Worlds Theorem) literally describes a universe beyond human comprehension. We view wave functions as collapsing (as described in the Copenhagen Interpretation that I think you mentioned being familiar with, Podly) because we are coupled inextricably with the wave function of the universe around us. In actuality those functions never collapse and all possible outcomes remain only a probabilistic distribution. As far as modern physics can tell, this is true. So maybe it's just our conflicting backgrounds, but I don't see why the failure of human reasoning to internalize all that is should be a limitation on what may be.
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If you do allow for such abstract conceptualization as "A thing which is greater than all things that I can conceive of" then I don't see how the argument works. If you can conceive of things you can't conceive of, what's the upper limit? Why isn't it an infinite chain as I described?
Beyond that, why is human conceptualization a limit on the universe? The universe as described by Everett's Universal Wave Theorem (popularized as the Many Worlds Theorem) literally describes a universe beyond human comprehension. We view wave functions as collapsing (as described in the Copenhagen Interpretation that I think you mentioned being familiar with, Podly) because we are coupled inextricably with the wave function of the universe around us. In actuality those functions never collapse and all possible outcomes remain only a probabilistic distribution. As far as modern physics can tell, this is true. So maybe it's just our conflicting backgrounds, but I don't see why the failure of human reasoning to internalize all that is should be a limitation on what may be.
Two problems here. (1) If you introduce the idea of an infinite chain, you introduce the idea of infinity. One of the better ways to attack a divine ontology is to deny infinity. If you introduce infinity, you justify the concept. By justifying the concept of the infinite, you introduce the Being of infinity, which would relate to the Divine. (2) Introducing the many worlds theorem is also problematic, because then you, by the very nature of the many worlds theorem, introduce all the possible worlds of modal logic. This confirms my argument that whatever is possible exists. God, being possible exists somewhere. If God exists somewhere, he exists everywhere.
If you do allow for such abstract conceptualization as "A thing which is greater than all things that I can conceive of" then I don't see how the argument works. If you can conceive of things you can't conceive of, what's the upper limit? Why isn't it an infinite chain as I described?
Beyond that, why is human conceptualization a limit on the universe? The universe as described by Everett's Universal Wave Theorem (popularized as the Many Worlds Theorem) literally describes a universe beyond human comprehension. We view wave functions as collapsing (as described in the Copenhagen Interpretation that I think you mentioned being familiar with, Podly) because we are coupled inextricably with the wave function of the universe around us. In actuality those functions never collapse and all possible outcomes remain only a probabilistic distribution. As far as modern physics can tell, this is true. So maybe it's just our conflicting backgrounds, but I don't see why the failure of human reasoning to internalize all that is should be a limitation on what may be.
Two problems here. (1) If you introduce the idea of an infinite chain, you introduce the idea of infinity. One of the better ways to attack a divine ontology is to deny infinity. If you introduce infinity, you justify the concept. By justifying the concept of the infinite, you introduce the Being of infinity, which would relate to the Divine. (2) Introducing the many worlds theorem is also problematic, because then you, by the very nature of the many worlds theorem, introduce all the possible worlds of modal logic. This confirms my argument that whatever is possible exists. God, being possible exists somewhere. If God exists somewhere, he exists everywhere.
It depends on which kind of infinity we talk about. There's the infinity of mathematics, which is not divine in that it is impossible to pin down. You can't have a mathematically infinite God because in this sense 'infinite' means 'of no definable limit'. No existence, even one as nebulous as Being, can be of no definable limit.
If you want the kind of infinity that we speak of in saying "The Universe is infinite" then it's okay, because the Universe is only infinite in that there is nothing which is outside of the Universe. Hawking said, "The universe is infinite, but it has an edge."
The kind of infinity I'm talking about with an infinite chain of imponderables is of the mathematical variety. If you accept a Being which supports all of being and which is beyond our comprehension, then you can posit a Being beyond that and beyond that with no definable limitation. I am unconvinced that this sort of infinity has anything to do with divinity or God.
The many worlds theorem does not mean what you think it means, which is an unfortunate consequence of popular media. It says merely that the universe (a finite or infinite collection of energy) exists as a distribution of probabilistic configuration states. Every state which can be occupied has an associated probability. In day to day life we view states as being definitely occupied or not because our own state vectors are coupled to the state vectors of what we observe. Each of the large but finite collection of state vectors which define Podly is coupled to each of the large but finite collection of state vectors which define a given double-slit experiment, yielding an apparent wave function collapse. Your consciousness, in this theorem, independently inhabits each state vector independently.
So yes, all things which are possible are true in this theorem, but 'things which are possible' are still limited to the collection of things which are possible according to the laws of physics. It does not allow for 'universes' wherein the laws of physics are different or non existent. Such things could exist, but there is and (barring a revolution) cannot be a valid theorem to describe them.
God could only be possible in any 'world' of the 'many worlds' if he were possible in every world, so the introduction the theorem only serves to highlight the incomprehensibility of the universe without otherwise altering the argument.
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So yes, all things which are possible are true in this theorem, but 'things which are possible' are still limited to the collection of things which are possible according to the laws of physics. It does not allow for 'universes' wherein the laws of physics are different or non existent. Such things could exist, but there is and (barring a revolution) cannot be a valid theorem to describe them.
God could only be possible in any 'world' of the 'many worlds' if he were possible in every world, so the introduction the theorem only serves to highlight the incomprehensibility of the universe without otherwise altering the argument.
No, this is what I was talking about. The possible worlds argument is that actualization in this world does not mean that something is actualized in all world. Rather, that actualization is contingent in remaining in this world. Thus, if something is possible in this world (I argued in the philosophy of mind thread that physical laws are necessary in all possible worlds) that it could be actualized in another possible world.
So yes, all things which are possible are true in this theorem, but 'things which are possible' are still limited to the collection of things which are possible according to the laws of physics. It does not allow for 'universes' wherein the laws of physics are different or non existent. Such things could exist, but there is and (barring a revolution) cannot be a valid theorem to describe them.
God could only be possible in any 'world' of the 'many worlds' if he were possible in every world, so the introduction the theorem only serves to highlight the incomprehensibility of the universe without otherwise altering the argument.
No, this is what I was talking about. The possible worlds argument is that actualization in this world does not mean that something is actualized in all world. Rather, that actualization is contingent in remaining in this world. Thus, if something is possible in this world (I argued in the philosophy of mind thread that physical laws are necessary in all possible worlds) that it could be actualized in another possible world.
But then how does it predicate existence of God? If you're talking about all 'possible' worlds in the sense of 'any world which could, conceivably, exist' then I'd concur but in the limited set of worlds allowed by Everett's theorem, God (as an infinite observer) would have to be actualized in every world, like the laws of physics themselves.
The 'all conceivable worlds' version of the statement doesn't work because not every conceivable world must exist. In the philosophy of mind thread we talked about universes with radically different basic properties, like a lack of gravity. Such a world is conceivable, but its existence is not required by Everett's theorem (or even allowed by it... it would have to exist in a completely different way than any of the 'possible worlds' of the theorem). Yes, a universe with an Abrahamic God capable of spanning the interuniversal gulf is conceivable, but it is not necessary and debating its existence falls to debating the validity of the bible.
So yes, all things which are possible are true in this theorem, but 'things which are possible' are still limited to the collection of things which are possible according to the laws of physics. It does not allow for 'universes' wherein the laws of physics are different or non existent. Such things could exist, but there is and (barring a revolution) cannot be a valid theorem to describe them.
God could only be possible in any 'world' of the 'many worlds' if he were possible in every world, so the introduction the theorem only serves to highlight the incomprehensibility of the universe without otherwise altering the argument.
No, this is what I was talking about. The possible worlds argument is that actualization in this world does not mean that something is actualized in all world. Rather, that actualization is contingent in remaining in this world. Thus, if something is possible in this world (I argued in the philosophy of mind thread that physical laws are necessary in all possible worlds) that it could be actualized in another possible world.
But then how does it predicate existence of God? If you're talking about all 'possible' worlds in the sense of 'any world which could, conceivably, exist' then I'd concur but in the limited set of worlds allowed by Everett's theorem, God (as an infinite observer) would have to be actualized in every world, like the laws of physics themselves.
The 'all conceivable worlds' version of the statement doesn't work because not every conceivable world must exist. In the philosophy of mind thread we talked about universes with radically different basic properties, like a lack of gravity. Such a world is conceivable, but its existence is not required by Everett's theorem (or even allowed by it... it would have to exist in a completely different way than any of the 'possible worlds' of the theorem). Yes, a universe with an Abrahamic God capable of spanning the interuniversal gulf is conceivable, but it is not necessary and debating its existence falls to debating the validity of the bible.
Well I argued that Being is absolute presence. Thus, it is necessarily present in every world. It is not necessary that one thinks in terms of beings -- in fact, we just mentioned how that hinders our talking about dimensions and something like being ++, etc. Thus, there could be a possible world where there are beings which can think of Time as removed from objects and Being itself. Perhaps this people act in a completely different way and are in some sort of state of Nirvana, because they can think absolutely or something like that. The existence of such in that world could be a possibility for us as well.
I really don't think that metaphysics can or should validate the Bible. Personally -- and not that it matters for this thread -- think that theological progress is equally important as the Bible, if not more so. But that's not important for this thread. Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
Such a Being is one I readily acknowledge might be the case and yet I am a firm atheist.
It seems you would do well to find a more fruitful divine presence to contemplate than Being alone.
Well I argued that Being is absolute presence. Thus, it is necessarily present in every world. It is not necessary that one thinks in terms of beings -- in fact, we just mentioned how that hinders our talking about dimensions and something like being ++, etc. Thus, there could be a possible world where there are beings which can think of Time as removed from objects and Being itself. Perhaps this people act in a completely different way and are in some sort of state of Nirvana, because they can think absolutely or something like that. The existence of such in that world could be a possibility for us as well.
I really don't think that metaphysics can or should validate the Bible. Personally -- and not that it matters for this thread -- think that theological progress is equally important as the Bible, if not more so. But that's not important for this thread. Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
I know nothing of pure theology divorced from any particular religion (I don't think I was even aware that such a pursuit existed), but I think that this argument runs into the faith boundary. There is certainly a logical argument for Being as you describe it, but going from Being to divinity seems, to me, to require a leap of faith.
Even with the definition of divinity that you've presented here (which is an argument with no resolution as to whether they constitute a good definition) I see no firm logical evidence that Being fulfills your definition. Absolute presence, yes, but lesser things than Being are absolutely present (energy, information, even regular lower-case being). Support, yes, but fundamental support... not so much.
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Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
Such a Being is one I readily acknowledge might be the case and yet I am a firm atheist.
It seems you would do well to find a more fruitful divine presence to contemplate than Being alone.
I agree that the sole, fundamental description equivocating God as Being is lacking. However, I also feel that if you acknowledge Being as absolute presence, then "atheism" does not mean "rejection of any divine or non-physically reducible being," but rather "rejection of an anthropomophic God."
Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
Such a Being is one I readily acknowledge might be the case and yet I am a firm atheist.
It seems you would do well to find a more fruitful divine presence to contemplate than Being alone.
I agree that the sole, fundamental description equivocating God as Being is lacking. However, I also feel that if you acknowledge Being as absolute presence, then "atheism" does not mean "rejection of any divine or non-physically reducible being," but rather "rejection of an anthropomophic God."
I'm pretty sure that MikeMan, I, and someone else gave definitions for atheism that basically said that way up the thread. There was also a bit of discussion about the fact that most atheists don't reject pantheism.
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I know nothing of pure theology divorced from any particular religion (I don't think I was even aware that such a pursuit existed), but I think that this argument runs into the faith boundary. There is certainly a logical argument for Being as you describe it, but going from Being to divinity seems, to me, to require a leap of faith.
It depends on what you mean by faith. If you mean "something of which there is no evidence for," I disagree. If you mean "something which you cannot prove or disprove, and for which you have reasons," I agree. However, if it is the latter, then ALL of our main beliefs are Wittgensteinian "Hinge Propositions" which we accept to make thinking work.
Even with the definition of divinity that you've presented here (which is an argument with no resolution as to whether they constitute a good definition) I see no firm logical evidence that Being fulfills your definition. Absolute presence, yes, but lesser things than Being are absolutely present (energy, information, even regular lower-case being). Support, yes, but fundamental support... not so much.
But we say that "energy" and "information" exist in the same way, that their Being is the same.
Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
Such a Being is one I readily acknowledge might be the case and yet I am a firm atheist.
It seems you would do well to find a more fruitful divine presence to contemplate than Being alone.
I agree that the sole, fundamental description equivocating God as Being is lacking. However, I also feel that if you acknowledge Being as absolute presence, then "atheism" does not mean "rejection of any divine or non-physically reducible being," but rather "rejection of an anthropomophic God."
I'm pretty sure that MikeMan, I, and someone else gave definitions for atheism that basically said that way up the thread. There was also a bit of discussion about the fact that most atheists don't reject pantheism.
To which I argued that pantheism is the base of all theology, but that Being also fits with a theological christian conception of God. Afterall, the scholastic definition of God is the being for whom existence is his essence.
To which I argued that pantheism is the base of all theology, but that Being also fits with a theological christian conception of God.
Even if pantheism were the basis of all theology (which it's not, there are plenty of examples of religions in which the creator is not the creation or in which there exist gods of equal power alongside or even created by the creator... in fact I'm not sure that Norse paganism even had a real creation myth... the universe just Was before the gods got there), that is not the same as saying that pantheism is the same as all theology. One can be pantheistic without believing in a specific God or assigning any particular properties beyond existence to the divine, so to say that an atheist who can accept a pantheistic view of the universe is the same as a person who worships a specific deity is inaccurate.
1capitalized : the supreme or ultimate reality: as a: the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the universe
Christian Science : the incorporeal divine Principle ruling over all as eternal Spirit : infinite Mind
2: a being or object believed to have more than natural attributes and powers and to require human worship ; specifically : one controlling a particular aspect or part of reality
3: a person or thing of supreme value
4: a powerful ruler
None of these require that God's existence be his essence.
1 applies to Being, though 1a does not in that Being's 'wisdom' and 'goodness' are highly debatable. Also, while Being (accepting your definition for purpose of discussion) supports all reality, it did not 'create' reality. The 'existence' of Being is synonymous with reality and 'it' did not 'do' anything to 'create' reality. It certainly does not rule reality.
2 does not apply. Being does not require human worship and from what you've said is firmly a part of the natural order.
3 this is debatable as it depends on what 'thing' means as well as 'value'
4 again, Being does not rule anything
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Scholasticism is the school of philosophy from around the carolignian times to the rise of the rationalists. Most christian theology has its foundation in scholastic theology and philosohy. Scotus, Anselm, Aquinas, and Suarez all define God essentia dei est existentia. Despite revolting against Scholastic philosophy, the rationalist philosophers Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza all carry over this definition of God.
Well, how could it not be. All discussion of God, I argue, will regress back to absolute presence and substantiality. I cannot demonstrate how it could be otherwise.
Afterall, the scholastic definition of God is the being for whom existence is his essence.
That definition of God has no relation to the modern definition of God in Abrahamic religions. Please demonstrate a clear link between the two.
That is the working definition of God that I know about.
Since he is one, singular, completely simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, he must be declared to be in reality and in essence, distinct from the world, supremely happy in himself and from himself, and inexpressibly loftier than anything besides himself which either exists or can be imagined.
Well, how could it not be. All discussion of God, I argue, will regress back to absolute presence and substantiality. I cannot demonstrate how it could be otherwise.
All discussions of god regress down to absolute presence because that's the only logical thing left when you think it through. But that absolute presence is not God.
How is a formless attribute of the universe a "He"?
is one, singular, completely simple and unchangeable spiritual substance,
No complaints there, other than the weasel word "spiritual."
he must be declared to be in reality and in essence, distinct from the world,
Again with the "he."
supremely happy in himself and from himself,
An aspect of a personality. Being has no personality.
and inexpressibly loftier than anything besides himself which either exists or can be imagined.
Nonsense words which convey nothing.
You are pretending that the Scholastic definition of God is volitionless. That is disingenuous.
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edited May 2009
I would argue that your concern over he stems from Catholic tradition, not that it bears full theological weight. To argue about the he is a small argument that is a fulcrum about the whole history of the functioning of the Church. The supremely happy part signifies the perfection of God, that he could not possibly be lacking anything. The "nonsense words which convey nothing' is a rearrangement of Anselm's conception of God as "that which nothing greater can be though."
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edited May 2009
Not to mention--how could Being, and why would Being, father a son through virgin birth, part the red sea, write the text of the Koran across the sky in fire, or do any of that shit? Because God is supposed to have done that shit.
But MrMister, can't you not believe in those miracles and still be a Christian, Muslim, or whatnot? No, according to the Nicean creed you can't. You're a heretic. You can continue to celebrate whatever hippy harmony-with-the-universe religion appeals to you, but let's call a duck a duck.
As far as I can tell, you're really hemming and hawing when you try to make being into God.
I would argue that your concern over he stems from Catholic tradition, not that it bears full theological weight. To argue about the he is a small argument that is a fulcrum about the whole history of the functioning of the Church. The supremely happy part signifies the perfection of God, that he could not possibly be lacking anything. The "nonsense words which convey nothing' is a rearrangement of Anselm's conception of God as "that which nothing greater can be though."
They convey nothing precisely because they are a rearrangement of Anselm's conception. That's not a God.
You are pretending it is a God. It is not a God. It doesn't have a personality, it doesn't deserve worship, it only relates to the Christian God in that it shares exactly one attribute. Well, newsflash, I share more than one attribute with a sea anemone, but I'll be fucked if you confuse me with it.
The "he" is the foundation for any meaningful conception of God. God has a personality. Here maybe I should try a different font.
God has a personality.
To pretend otherwise is essentially baiting and switching. Sorry man.
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Not to mention--how could Being, and why would Being, father a son through virgin birth, part the red sea, write the text of the Koran across the sky in fire, or do any of that shit? Because God is supposed to have done that shit.
But MrMister, can't you not believe in those miracles and still be a Christian, Muslim, or whatnot? No, according to the Nicean creed you can't. You're a heretic. You can continue to celebrate whatever hippy harmony-with-the-universe religion appeals to you, but let's call a duck a duck.
As far as I can tell, you're really hemming and hawing when you try to make being into God.
Why can't I believe in those things? My argument here is not theodicy: I am not arguing that Being=God. I am arguing that the metaphysics of Being are such that I believe an atheist cannot outright deny that Being is a metaphysical being, not physically reducible to mechanics, and unknowable and unperceptable in itself. It is also causa sui -- it exists of itself. I have argued that these are the fundamental constitutions of a divine being.
I have also argued that, since Being is uncomprehendable in itself, that any authentic theology must be apophatic -- that one can only truly say what God is not. The rest comes on faith. To progress further is to argue on an epistemological grounds, which I feel is an entirely different debate.
My intent is not to justify the existence of God or pull some metaphysical magicks. Rather, I have argued against a grounds of atheistic certainty and posited how the ontological being-towards-Beings could result in something like a religious experience. My current belief is that any other positive arguments for religion hinges on faith.
See the problem, pods, is that acknowledging Being doesn't lead you any closer to modern conceptions of religion. "Faith" is still as stupid. So what's the point? It's not an argument against atheism, at all.
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See the problem, pods, is that acknowledging Being doesn't lead you any closer to modern conceptions of religion. "Faith" is still as stupid. So what's the point? It's not an argument against atheism, at all.
My argument is not "against" atheism at all, and I think that a great many of people, you included, have tried to force it to be that. I do not think that my objections are against atheism, or that my objections could even force someone away from atheism. Rather, I feel that my objections center around how atheists view their network of beliefs -- exactly what are they against? What does the term atheist describe? How "strong" of an atheist can one be, given that if one wants to hold Kant's claim that "being is not a predicate," if the universe cannot be completely physically or mathematically reducible?
See the problem, pods, is that acknowledging Being doesn't lead you any closer to modern conceptions of religion. "Faith" is still as stupid. So what's the point? It's not an argument against atheism, at all.
My argument is not "against" atheism at all, and I think that a great many of people, you included, have tried to force it to be that. I do not think that my objections are against atheism, or that my objections could even force someone away from atheism. Rather, I feel that my objections center around how atheists view their network of beliefs -- exactly what are they against? What does the term atheist describe? How "strong" of an atheist can one be, given that if one wants to hold Kant's claim that "being is not a predicate," if the universe cannot be completely physically or mathematically reducible?
Are you feigning ignorance or inviting others to participate?
Cause, like, several of us, me included, have laid out exactly what it means to us to be atheists and why we are so described.
I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window.
We're left with 18th century Deists and pantheists. I have no problem with those beliefs.
I am still an a-theist.
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
See the problem, pods, is that acknowledging Being doesn't lead you any closer to modern conceptions of religion. "Faith" is still as stupid. So what's the point? It's not an argument against atheism, at all.
My argument is not "against" atheism at all, and I think that a great many of people, you included, have tried to force it to be that. I do not think that my objections are against atheism, or that my objections could even force someone away from atheism. Rather, I feel that my objections center around how atheists view their network of beliefs -- exactly what are they against? What does the term atheist describe? How "strong" of an atheist can one be, given that if one wants to hold Kant's claim that "being is not a predicate," if the universe cannot be completely physically or mathematically reducible?
Are you feigning ignorance or inviting others to participate?
Cause, like, several of us, me included, have laid out exactly what it means to us to be atheists and why we are so described.
I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window.
We're left with 18th century Deists and pantheists. I have no problem with those beliefs.
I am still an a-theist.
But Deism argues solely for a first cause god. I have argued that Being constantly and absolutely sustains beings., that without Being there can be no beings. Thus, Being is constantly a force impacting all beings.
See the problem, pods, is that acknowledging Being doesn't lead you any closer to modern conceptions of religion. "Faith" is still as stupid. So what's the point? It's not an argument against atheism, at all.
My argument is not "against" atheism at all, and I think that a great many of people, you included, have tried to force it to be that. I do not think that my objections are against atheism, or that my objections could even force someone away from atheism. Rather, I feel that my objections center around how atheists view their network of beliefs -- exactly what are they against? What does the term atheist describe? How "strong" of an atheist can one be, given that if one wants to hold Kant's claim that "being is not a predicate," if the universe cannot be completely physically or mathematically reducible?
Are you feigning ignorance or inviting others to participate?
Cause, like, several of us, me included, have laid out exactly what it means to us to be atheists and why we are so described.
I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window.
We're left with 18th century Deists and pantheists. I have no problem with those beliefs.
I am still an a-theist.
But Deism argues solely for a first cause god. I have argued that Being constantly and absolutely sustains beings., that without Being there can be no beings. Thus, Being is constantly a force impacting all beings.
Your point? Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
MikeMan on
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
Well, it moves beyond first cause. It is the sustaining "force" of the universe. It is not merely the first cause -- it is something like the constant cause. That moves from the realm of deism into theism. Thus, if you posit this [strike]being,[/strike] how do you account for your atheism.
Read the argument before you say asinine and incorrect things about it.
okay . . .
It is all a circular argument.
"I believe it exists because it makes me believe that it exists "
That's pretty much the definition of crazy isn't it?
It's not a circular argument.
1) To exist is greater than to not exist.
2) That than which a greater cannot be thought must necessarily exist.
3) For, if that than which a greater cannot be thought did not exist then it would be (by 1) that than which a greater CAN be thought, which is a contradiction.
So, than than which a greater cannot be thought necessarily exists.
If a person claims "that than which a greater cannot be thought does not exist" then their claim is "that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought".
Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
Well, it moves beyond first cause. It is the sustaining "force" of the universe. It is not merely the first cause -- it is something like the constant cause. That moves from the realm of deism into theism. Thus, if you posit this [strike]being,[/strike] how do you account for your atheism.
Are you pretending now? I'm just trying to get at your angle.
If you're serious, maybe I'll try once more.
That moves from the realm of deism into theism
The fact that things continue to exist is not "theism."
MikeMan on
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Podlyyou unzipped me! it's all coming back! i don't like it!Registered Userregular
Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
Well, it moves beyond first cause. It is the sustaining "force" of the universe. It is not merely the first cause -- it is something like the constant cause. That moves from the realm of deism into theism. Thus, if you posit this [strike]being,[/strike] how do you account for your atheism.
Are you pretending now? I'm just trying to get at your angle.
If you're serious, maybe I'll try once more.
That moves from the realm of deism into theism
The fact that things continue to exist is not "theism."
My understanding is that the god of Deism is the first cause, and that's basically it. That God pressed a button and then has no involvement with the universe whatsoever. I think that a singular being which sustains the universe would be a God of Theism. If you account for this, how do you remain an atheist?
Read the argument before you say asinine and incorrect things about it.
okay . . .
It is all a circular argument.
"I believe it exists because it makes me believe that it exists "
That's pretty much the definition of crazy isn't it?
It's not a circular argument.
1) To exist is greater than to not exist.
2) That than which a greater cannot be thought must necessarily exist.
3) For, if that than which a greater cannot be thought did not exist then it would be (by 1) that than which a greater CAN be thought, which is a contradiction.
So, than than which a greater cannot be thought necessarily exists.
If a person claims "that than which a greater cannot be thought does not exist" then their claim is "that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought".
I continue to maintain that this is simply a picture-book Berry paradox.
I am an a-theist because I do not believe in a deity with a personality. As I've said.
A billion times.
perhaps the billion and oneth time will be fruitful.
You do not believe in a deity with a personality. I am inclined to believe this as well. But is that what atheist means "I reject that a God with a personality exists?" Is atheism that restricted?
Your point? Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
That sounds a lot like Spinoza's concept of God.
You wrote: "I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window."
That may be the problem. You have pigeonholed 99% of all concepts of God to a kind of anthropomorphized really-really-big person living in the sky.
The ontological argument, to bring the conversation back to the topic of this thread, is not necessarily talking about some guy living in the sky who throws lightning bolts or plagues when you piss him off. The ontological argument, as articulated by Anselm, and, really, most philosophers, is talking about THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT!
If we dump all of the anthropomorphized bullshit which seems to piss you off and, really, was never a factor in the conversation at all do you still take issue with THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT?
Your point? Being sustains you, me, and some random collection of asteroids that will annihilate all life on earth.
It is not "God."
That sounds a lot like Spinoza's concept of God.
You wrote: "I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window."
That may be the problem. You have pigeonholed 99% of all concepts of God to a kind of anthropomorphized really-really-big person living in the sky.
The ontological argument, to bring the conversation back to the topic of this thread, is not necessarily talking about some guy living in the sky who throws lightning bolts or plagues when you piss him off. The ontological argument, as articulated by Anselm, and, really, most philosophers, is talking about THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT!
If we dump all of the anthropomorphized bullshit which seems to piss you off and, really, was never a factor in the conversation at all do you still take issue with THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT?
Do we really have any idea what THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT would be like? What kind of an entity is it?
I am an a-theist because I do not believe in a deity with a personality. As I've said.
A billion times.
perhaps the billion and oneth time will be fruitful.
You do not believe in a deity with a personality. I am inclined to believe this as well. But is that what atheist means "I reject that a God with a personality exists?" Is atheism that restricted?
Posts
Right, which is my point. Just because we are incapable of conceiving of a thing, or because our language (mathematics, metaphysics, logic, whatever) is incapable of expressing it does not preclude its existence. The ontological argument presupposes limitations in order to posit God. If those limitations can be in any manner considered to be arbitrary or false then it defeats the necessity of God. Being, as defined, clearly is, but if it is possible to posit a greater or more fundamental sort of being and to continue the chain indefinitely then there is no bottom on which all else stands.
But then you return the Anslem argument -- that God is the most perfect Being which can be thought. If you say that there are limitations to our thinking, then God is that which is outside our thinking. I don't think that just saying "yeah, but there could be" is a valid argument, unless you posit a path to a thinking which allows for us to think of what that would even resemble.
Now that I view it from this perspective, I think Anslem's definition is itself flawed. God is traditionally not defined as the greatest thing of which we can conceive. Generally God (in the Abrahamic sense which Anslem is clearly speaking of) is beyond human comprehension. We are crafted in his image but are incapable of ever truly achieving his level of compassion, comprehension, etc. The Bible (which I know you aren't talking about, necessarily, but which Anslem definitely was thinking about based on his language) states that God is both in and beyond the world. The line, "The Lord works in mysterious ways" is an allusion to the unknowable nature of God. So if you are defining God as the greatest thing of which humans can conceive, then unless you allow for conceptualization in the abstract (eg: "A thing which is greater than all the things which I can conceive of") it's a more limited definition that the one he was apparently trying to describe.
If you do allow for such abstract conceptualization as "A thing which is greater than all things that I can conceive of" then I don't see how the argument works. If you can conceive of things you can't conceive of, what's the upper limit? Why isn't it an infinite chain as I described?
Beyond that, why is human conceptualization a limit on the universe? The universe as described by Everett's Universal Wave Theorem (popularized as the Many Worlds Theorem) literally describes a universe beyond human comprehension. We view wave functions as collapsing (as described in the Copenhagen Interpretation that I think you mentioned being familiar with, Podly) because we are coupled inextricably with the wave function of the universe around us. In actuality those functions never collapse and all possible outcomes remain only a probabilistic distribution. As far as modern physics can tell, this is true. So maybe it's just our conflicting backgrounds, but I don't see why the failure of human reasoning to internalize all that is should be a limitation on what may be.
Two problems here. (1) If you introduce the idea of an infinite chain, you introduce the idea of infinity. One of the better ways to attack a divine ontology is to deny infinity. If you introduce infinity, you justify the concept. By justifying the concept of the infinite, you introduce the Being of infinity, which would relate to the Divine. (2) Introducing the many worlds theorem is also problematic, because then you, by the very nature of the many worlds theorem, introduce all the possible worlds of modal logic. This confirms my argument that whatever is possible exists. God, being possible exists somewhere. If God exists somewhere, he exists everywhere.
It depends on which kind of infinity we talk about. There's the infinity of mathematics, which is not divine in that it is impossible to pin down. You can't have a mathematically infinite God because in this sense 'infinite' means 'of no definable limit'. No existence, even one as nebulous as Being, can be of no definable limit.
If you want the kind of infinity that we speak of in saying "The Universe is infinite" then it's okay, because the Universe is only infinite in that there is nothing which is outside of the Universe. Hawking said, "The universe is infinite, but it has an edge."
The kind of infinity I'm talking about with an infinite chain of imponderables is of the mathematical variety. If you accept a Being which supports all of being and which is beyond our comprehension, then you can posit a Being beyond that and beyond that with no definable limitation. I am unconvinced that this sort of infinity has anything to do with divinity or God.
The many worlds theorem does not mean what you think it means, which is an unfortunate consequence of popular media. It says merely that the universe (a finite or infinite collection of energy) exists as a distribution of probabilistic configuration states. Every state which can be occupied has an associated probability. In day to day life we view states as being definitely occupied or not because our own state vectors are coupled to the state vectors of what we observe. Each of the large but finite collection of state vectors which define Podly is coupled to each of the large but finite collection of state vectors which define a given double-slit experiment, yielding an apparent wave function collapse. Your consciousness, in this theorem, independently inhabits each state vector independently.
So yes, all things which are possible are true in this theorem, but 'things which are possible' are still limited to the collection of things which are possible according to the laws of physics. It does not allow for 'universes' wherein the laws of physics are different or non existent. Such things could exist, but there is and (barring a revolution) cannot be a valid theorem to describe them.
God could only be possible in any 'world' of the 'many worlds' if he were possible in every world, so the introduction the theorem only serves to highlight the incomprehensibility of the universe without otherwise altering the argument.
No, this is what I was talking about. The possible worlds argument is that actualization in this world does not mean that something is actualized in all world. Rather, that actualization is contingent in remaining in this world. Thus, if something is possible in this world (I argued in the philosophy of mind thread that physical laws are necessary in all possible worlds) that it could be actualized in another possible world.
But then how does it predicate existence of God? If you're talking about all 'possible' worlds in the sense of 'any world which could, conceivably, exist' then I'd concur but in the limited set of worlds allowed by Everett's theorem, God (as an infinite observer) would have to be actualized in every world, like the laws of physics themselves.
The 'all conceivable worlds' version of the statement doesn't work because not every conceivable world must exist. In the philosophy of mind thread we talked about universes with radically different basic properties, like a lack of gravity. Such a world is conceivable, but its existence is not required by Everett's theorem (or even allowed by it... it would have to exist in a completely different way than any of the 'possible worlds' of the theorem). Yes, a universe with an Abrahamic God capable of spanning the interuniversal gulf is conceivable, but it is not necessary and debating its existence falls to debating the validity of the bible.
okay . . .
It is all a circular argument.
"I believe it exists because it makes me believe that it exists "
That's pretty much the definition of crazy isn't it?
Well I argued that Being is absolute presence. Thus, it is necessarily present in every world. It is not necessary that one thinks in terms of beings -- in fact, we just mentioned how that hinders our talking about dimensions and something like being ++, etc. Thus, there could be a possible world where there are beings which can think of Time as removed from objects and Being itself. Perhaps this people act in a completely different way and are in some sort of state of Nirvana, because they can think absolutely or something like that. The existence of such in that world could be a possibility for us as well.
I really don't think that metaphysics can or should validate the Bible. Personally -- and not that it matters for this thread -- think that theological progress is equally important as the Bible, if not more so. But that's not important for this thread. Rather, this thread is for the discussion of Being and its relation to the category of Divinity. Thus, I feel that Being, explored metaphysically, founds a basis for the divine.
It seems you would do well to find a more fruitful divine presence to contemplate than Being alone.
I know nothing of pure theology divorced from any particular religion (I don't think I was even aware that such a pursuit existed), but I think that this argument runs into the faith boundary. There is certainly a logical argument for Being as you describe it, but going from Being to divinity seems, to me, to require a leap of faith.
Even with the definition of divinity that you've presented here (which is an argument with no resolution as to whether they constitute a good definition) I see no firm logical evidence that Being fulfills your definition. Absolute presence, yes, but lesser things than Being are absolutely present (energy, information, even regular lower-case being). Support, yes, but fundamental support... not so much.
I agree that the sole, fundamental description equivocating God as Being is lacking. However, I also feel that if you acknowledge Being as absolute presence, then "atheism" does not mean "rejection of any divine or non-physically reducible being," but rather "rejection of an anthropomophic God."
I'm pretty sure that MikeMan, I, and someone else gave definitions for atheism that basically said that way up the thread. There was also a bit of discussion about the fact that most atheists don't reject pantheism.
It depends on what you mean by faith. If you mean "something of which there is no evidence for," I disagree. If you mean "something which you cannot prove or disprove, and for which you have reasons," I agree. However, if it is the latter, then ALL of our main beliefs are Wittgensteinian "Hinge Propositions" which we accept to make thinking work.
But we say that "energy" and "information" exist in the same way, that their Being is the same.
To which I argued that pantheism is the base of all theology, but that Being also fits with a theological christian conception of God. Afterall, the scholastic definition of God is the being for whom existence is his essence.
Even if pantheism were the basis of all theology (which it's not, there are plenty of examples of religions in which the creator is not the creation or in which there exist gods of equal power alongside or even created by the creator... in fact I'm not sure that Norse paganism even had a real creation myth... the universe just Was before the gods got there), that is not the same as saying that pantheism is the same as all theology. One can be pantheistic without believing in a specific God or assigning any particular properties beyond existence to the divine, so to say that an atheist who can accept a pantheistic view of the universe is the same as a person who worships a specific deity is inaccurate.
None of these require that God's existence be his essence.
1 applies to Being, though 1a does not in that Being's 'wisdom' and 'goodness' are highly debatable. Also, while Being (accepting your definition for purpose of discussion) supports all reality, it did not 'create' reality. The 'existence' of Being is synonymous with reality and 'it' did not 'do' anything to 'create' reality. It certainly does not rule reality.
2 does not apply. Being does not require human worship and from what you've said is firmly a part of the natural order.
3 this is debatable as it depends on what 'thing' means as well as 'value'
4 again, Being does not rule anything
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholasticism
Scholasticism is the school of philosophy from around the carolignian times to the rise of the rationalists. Most christian theology has its foundation in scholastic theology and philosohy. Scotus, Anselm, Aquinas, and Suarez all define God essentia dei est existentia. Despite revolting against Scholastic philosophy, the rationalist philosophers Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza all carry over this definition of God.
That is the working definition of God that I know about.
All discussions of god regress down to absolute presence because that's the only logical thing left when you think it through. But that absolute presence is not God.
How is a formless attribute of the universe a "He"? No complaints there, other than the weasel word "spiritual." Again with the "he." An aspect of a personality. Being has no personality. Nonsense words which convey nothing.
You are pretending that the Scholastic definition of God is volitionless. That is disingenuous.
But MrMister, can't you not believe in those miracles and still be a Christian, Muslim, or whatnot? No, according to the Nicean creed you can't. You're a heretic. You can continue to celebrate whatever hippy harmony-with-the-universe religion appeals to you, but let's call a duck a duck.
As far as I can tell, you're really hemming and hawing when you try to make being into God.
You are pretending it is a God. It is not a God. It doesn't have a personality, it doesn't deserve worship, it only relates to the Christian God in that it shares exactly one attribute. Well, newsflash, I share more than one attribute with a sea anemone, but I'll be fucked if you confuse me with it.
The "he" is the foundation for any meaningful conception of God. God has a personality. Here maybe I should try a different font.
God has a personality.
To pretend otherwise is essentially baiting and switching. Sorry man.
Why can't I believe in those things? My argument here is not theodicy: I am not arguing that Being=God. I am arguing that the metaphysics of Being are such that I believe an atheist cannot outright deny that Being is a metaphysical being, not physically reducible to mechanics, and unknowable and unperceptable in itself. It is also causa sui -- it exists of itself. I have argued that these are the fundamental constitutions of a divine being.
I have also argued that, since Being is uncomprehendable in itself, that any authentic theology must be apophatic -- that one can only truly say what God is not. The rest comes on faith. To progress further is to argue on an epistemological grounds, which I feel is an entirely different debate.
My intent is not to justify the existence of God or pull some metaphysical magicks. Rather, I have argued against a grounds of atheistic certainty and posited how the ontological being-towards-Beings could result in something like a religious experience. My current belief is that any other positive arguments for religion hinges on faith.
My argument is not "against" atheism at all, and I think that a great many of people, you included, have tried to force it to be that. I do not think that my objections are against atheism, or that my objections could even force someone away from atheism. Rather, I feel that my objections center around how atheists view their network of beliefs -- exactly what are they against? What does the term atheist describe? How "strong" of an atheist can one be, given that if one wants to hold Kant's claim that "being is not a predicate," if the universe cannot be completely physically or mathematically reducible?
Cause, like, several of us, me included, have laid out exactly what it means to us to be atheists and why we are so described.
I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window.
We're left with 18th century Deists and pantheists. I have no problem with those beliefs.
I am still an a-theist.
But Deism argues solely for a first cause god. I have argued that Being constantly and absolutely sustains beings., that without Being there can be no beings. Thus, Being is constantly a force impacting all beings.
It is not "God."
Well, it moves beyond first cause. It is the sustaining "force" of the universe. It is not merely the first cause -- it is something like the constant cause. That moves from the realm of deism into theism. Thus, if you posit this [strike]being,[/strike] how do you account for your atheism.
It's not a circular argument.
1) To exist is greater than to not exist.
2) That than which a greater cannot be thought must necessarily exist.
3) For, if that than which a greater cannot be thought did not exist then it would be (by 1) that than which a greater CAN be thought, which is a contradiction.
So, than than which a greater cannot be thought necessarily exists.
If a person claims "that than which a greater cannot be thought does not exist" then their claim is "that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought".
If you're serious, maybe I'll try once more.
The fact that things continue to exist is not "theism."
My understanding is that the god of Deism is the first cause, and that's basically it. That God pressed a button and then has no involvement with the universe whatsoever. I think that a singular being which sustains the universe would be a God of Theism. If you account for this, how do you remain an atheist?
I continue to maintain that this is simply a picture-book Berry paradox.
A billion times.
perhaps the billion and oneth time will be fruitful.
You do not believe in a deity with a personality. I am inclined to believe this as well. But is that what atheist means "I reject that a God with a personality exists?" Is atheism that restricted?
That sounds a lot like Spinoza's concept of God.
You wrote: "I deny the relevant possibility of a deity that has a stake in human lives, a personality, and performs miracles. Bleep blorp, there goes 99% of all religious conceptions of God. Out da window."
That may be the problem. You have pigeonholed 99% of all concepts of God to a kind of anthropomorphized really-really-big person living in the sky.
The ontological argument, to bring the conversation back to the topic of this thread, is not necessarily talking about some guy living in the sky who throws lightning bolts or plagues when you piss him off. The ontological argument, as articulated by Anselm, and, really, most philosophers, is talking about THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT!
If we dump all of the anthropomorphized bullshit which seems to piss you off and, really, was never a factor in the conversation at all do you still take issue with THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT?
Do we really have any idea what THAT THAN WHICH A GREATER CANNOT BE THOUGHT would be like? What kind of an entity is it?