there actually are circumstances under which pirate #1 (the highest ranked) would vote yes, but that will come up naturally once you understand the right way to approach the riddle.
slym is on the right track
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SpudgeWitty commentsgo next to this blue dot thingyRegistered Userregular
edit: oh, and when discussing this in a group, it helps to come up with a convention for what you're going to call the pirates. let's say the lowest ranked pirate is #5 and the highest is #1. helps cut down on confusion when multiple people post answers.
Propose an even split between the lowest three pirates.
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MrMonroepassed outon the floor nowRegistered Userregular
edited November 2010
Offer the bulk to the second and third pirates, and a small share for himself. The lowest three pirates then vote in favor of the plan. This is a better deal than the second will get if he waits for the next round, (when he must take an even lower cut in order to make it worthwhile to pirates 3 & 4) and a better deal for the third pirate. The key is to offer the second and third pirates at least their highest possible value, which is, at maximum, 49 to the third pirate and some lesser number to the second which I cannot bother to calculate right now. You win with a 3-2 vote, a small share, and your life.
So shouldn't he offer 1 and 2 a pair of coins each, because if they say no they get stuck with 4 who can offer them 1 each?
Wait, this assumes 3 will veto anything until he is the lowest, which probably isn't true.
Shit.
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Munkus BeaverYou don't have to attend every argument you are invited to.Philosophy: Stoicism. Politics: Democratic SocialistRegistered User, ClubPAregular
50/50 to pirates one and two, then one two and five vote yes to it. #1 and #2 won't vote yes to anything else, they'll just wait until everyone else is dead.
Or you realize that pirates three and four realize the same thing, so you vote to split the money evenly among 3, 4, and 5.
Munkus Beaver on
Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but dies in the process.
50/50 to pirates one and two, then one two and five vote yes to it. #1 and #2 won't vote yes to anything else, they'll just wait until everyone else is dead.
Or you realize that pirates three and four realize the same thing, so you vote to split the money evenly among 3, 4, and 5.
if #1 can kill all the other pirates by voting no for everything he will because he'll then get all the money
The process won't go beyond the round of 3, because of slym's point. Pirate 3 is getting all the coins in that round, and since he knows it, he won't vote for anything in the round of 4 or the round of 5 that doesn't give him all the coins. Knowing his behavior, everyone's proposal will always be that Pirate 3 gets all the coins.
But if all things are equal, and everyone knows that the functional end of the process is the round of 3, won't Pirate 3 just vote against proposals until his round, because he wants to see death?
wait that's it! Pirate 3's vote doesn't actually matter in rounds 4 and 5 because pirates 2 and 4 KNOW he's voting no until his round
pirate 1 always votes no
pirate 3 votes no until round of 3 because he wants to see guys die and then get all 100 coins
pirate 2, without any monetary reason, votes no until round of 3 because he wants to see guys die
so a proposal can't win in the round of 4, since pirates 1 and 3 will vote no in round 4 no matter what, meaning pirate 4's going to vote for whatever pirate 5 suggests--he'll die in the round of 4 otherwise. in the rounds of 3 and 4, pirate 2 won't get any money at all, so he'll vote for any proposal by pirate 5 that gives him money.
Pirate 5 should suggest that Pirate 2 gets 1 coin and that he himself keeps the other 99 coins.
Munkus BeaverYou don't have to attend every argument you are invited to.Philosophy: Stoicism. Politics: Democratic SocialistRegistered User, ClubPAregular
50/50 to pirates one and two, then one two and five vote yes to it. #1 and #2 won't vote yes to anything else, they'll just wait until everyone else is dead.
Or you realize that pirates three and four realize the same thing, so you vote to split the money evenly among 3, 4, and 5.
if #1 can kill all the other pirates by voting no for everything he will because he'll then get all the money
...that's why you give the money to 3, 4, and 5. You don't have to give them anything more than one coin, really, because if you die, then 1 and 2 will vote no on each proposal until they split it 50/50. So anything you propose to 3 and 4 that gives them even one coin will benefit them more than rejecting your plan.
Munkus Beaver on
Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but dies in the process.
How can 3 sabotage 4 and 5? he'd die before they would. #4 just has to vote against it, and then give #5 all the money to stay alive himself. Although then he has no reason to vote against it, because he'd be getting nothing either way...
50/50 to pirates one and two, then one two and five vote yes to it. #1 and #2 won't vote yes to anything else, they'll just wait until everyone else is dead.
Or you realize that pirates three and four realize the same thing, so you vote to split the money evenly among 3, 4, and 5.
if #1 can kill all the other pirates by voting no for everything he will because he'll then get all the money
...that's why you give the money to 3, 4, and 5. You don't have to give them anything more than one coin, really, because if you die, then 1 and 2 will vote no on each proposal until they split it 50/50. So anything you propose to 3 and 4 that gives them even one coin will benefit them more than rejecting your plan.
1 and 2 won't agree to split it because 1 can just say no, kill 2 and take it all.
This is the exact oppisate of true. When 3 are left, 3 says it all goes to him, 2 has to agree or else he goes mano a mano with 1 and loses no matter what he does.
SLyM on
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5 votes to save his life, 2 votes to take the money. 4 also votes to save his life - 3,1 will shoot down anything he suggests.
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Munkus BeaverYou don't have to attend every argument you are invited to.Philosophy: Stoicism. Politics: Democratic SocialistRegistered User, ClubPAregular
edited November 2010
My final answer: 51 coins to pirate 3, 1 to pirate 4, and 49 to pirate 5.
Munkus Beaver on
Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but dies in the process.
How can 3 sabotage 4 and 5? he'd die before they would. #4 just has to vote against it, and then give #5 all the money to stay alive himself. Although then he has no reason to vote against it, because he'd be getting nothing either way...
oh, if they prefer to see death if they get no money, then 3 is definitely fucked if it gets to the round of 3.
They prefer to kill you, but they also prefer to stay alive, so 2 will vote with 3 when there are 3 left because it is logically impossible to have 2 people left and have them agree to anything.
SLyM on
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in the round of 3 #3 would offer 1 coin to #2 and keep the rest, which would be more than #2 would get in the round of 2 since he'd have to give everything to #1.
the pirates are bloodthirsty and will cause other pirates to die if they can do so without harming their other goals
they're greedier than they are bloodthirsty, and would rather get a single gold coin than cause someone else to die
but more than all of that they have a very strong survival instinct--they'd rather live with 0 coins than die with all 100 (because then what good does the gold do them)
also, because this sometimes gets forgotten when people are trying to solve this, it's important to remember that tied votes result in death. you have to get more than half the pirates to vote for your proposal.
not that it seemed like any of you were necessarily misunderstanding any of that, just clarification for general purposes/those following along at home
I'm just trying to figure out what would happen if you get voted off. What would 4 do?
He would offer 1 and 2 one coin each, because otherwise they have no incentive not to let him die and let 3 get it all instead, right?
Therefore you have to offer 1 and 2 something better than what 4 would give them, which should be 2 each. This was confirmed as not true, so I assume that there is something I'm missing here.
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MrMonroepassed outon the floor nowRegistered Userregular
no, he can give the second to last pirate a 51% share, larger than the one he can get when it's just him and the last pirate, and he should vote for it
read it backwards temporally
if it does get down to just the last two pirates, there essentially has to be a 50/50 split, otherwise you can't get a majority vote, no one dies, no one goes home with money.
if it's the last three, the bottom pirate can offer a 51/49 split to the second to last pirate, a better deal (by one gold piece) than he can get out of the last pirate. Being logical, he will vote for it, and it makes the middle pirate's best possible outcome 49 gold pieces.
if it's the last four, the bottom pirate must get three votes in order to save his life. He has to pay as much or more to two other pirates as their highest possible share to do this. The cheapest way to do that is to pay 50.5 to the second to last pirate and 49.5 to the third. He gets nothing.
In the first round, the lowest ranked pirate can offer 50 to the middle pirate, which he should accept as it's better than anything he can get if he waits, and any amount of money over 0 to the second lowest pirate, as it's better than the nothing he'll be able to dictate in the second round. This gets him two votes in addition to his own.
The lowest pirate, the one proposing the first plan, can take the remainder. (theoretically 49 if he just gives the fourth guy a pittance of one gold piece)
edit: hey look, Munkus got the same answer last page but without typing out the reasoning that rat bastard:
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slym is on the right track
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Wait, in this riddle did he even offer her a choice? Or is it like "I'm gonna kill that one no matter what"
Cause...
Yeah.
This riddle works better when you tell it to a woman with 2 kids in a secluded location.
???
if who offered one better than what, who would accept it?
This gives #1 and #2 nothing but gives #2 no other option unless he wants to die.
If you can give either of them something better than this and better than what they would get under #4, they should accept it.
E: let's do some clarification.
If 5 offers 1 or 2 something better than what 1 or 2 would get under 4, they should accept it because it's better than what they get under 3 (nothing)
Propose an even split between the lowest three pirates.
Wait, this assumes 3 will veto anything until he is the lowest, which probably isn't true.
Shit.
Or you realize that pirates three and four realize the same thing, so you vote to split the money evenly among 3, 4, and 5.
NO IT'S NOT SUPPOSED TO HAVE A FUCKING SOLUTION GOD DAMMIT THAT IS NOT THE POINT
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if #1 can kill all the other pirates by voting no for everything he will because he'll then get all the money
so.....
along with my earlier 3-way split.
100% to pirate 5.
...but does that make it unsolvable?
The process won't go beyond the round of 3, because of slym's point. Pirate 3 is getting all the coins in that round, and since he knows it, he won't vote for anything in the round of 4 or the round of 5 that doesn't give him all the coins. Knowing his behavior, everyone's proposal will always be that Pirate 3 gets all the coins.
But if all things are equal, and everyone knows that the functional end of the process is the round of 3, won't Pirate 3 just vote against proposals until his round, because he wants to see death?
wait that's it! Pirate 3's vote doesn't actually matter in rounds 4 and 5 because pirates 2 and 4 KNOW he's voting no until his round
pirate 1 always votes no
pirate 3 votes no until round of 3 because he wants to see guys die and then get all 100 coins
pirate 2, without any monetary reason, votes no until round of 3 because he wants to see guys die
so a proposal can't win in the round of 4, since pirates 1 and 3 will vote no in round 4 no matter what, meaning pirate 4's going to vote for whatever pirate 5 suggests--he'll die in the round of 4 otherwise. in the rounds of 3 and 4, pirate 2 won't get any money at all, so he'll vote for any proposal by pirate 5 that gives him money.
Pirate 5 should suggest that Pirate 2 gets 1 coin and that he himself keeps the other 99 coins.
is that it?
3 is basically fucked.
...that's why you give the money to 3, 4, and 5. You don't have to give them anything more than one coin, really, because if you die, then 1 and 2 will vote no on each proposal until they split it 50/50. So anything you propose to 3 and 4 that gives them even one coin will benefit them more than rejecting your plan.
1 and 2 won't agree to split it because 1 can just say no, kill 2 and take it all.
This is the exact oppisate of true. When 3 are left, 3 says it all goes to him, 2 has to agree or else he goes mano a mano with 1 and loses no matter what he does.
e:dang
All to 2?
5 votes to save his life, 2 votes to take the money. 4 also votes to save his life - 3,1 will shoot down anything he suggests.
is 1 the most powerful or the least powerful
oh, if they prefer to see death if they get no money, then 3 is definitely fucked if it gets to the round of 3.
5 is the lowest ranked and makes the first proposal
they're greedier than they are bloodthirsty, and would rather get a single gold coin than cause someone else to die
but more than all of that they have a very strong survival instinct--they'd rather live with 0 coins than die with all 100 (because then what good does the gold do them)
also, because this sometimes gets forgotten when people are trying to solve this, it's important to remember that tied votes result in death. you have to get more than half the pirates to vote for your proposal.
He would offer 1 and 2 one coin each, because otherwise they have no incentive not to let him die and let 3 get it all instead, right?
Therefore you have to offer 1 and 2 something better than what 4 would give them, which should be 2 each. This was confirmed as not true, so I assume that there is something I'm missing here.
no, he can give the second to last pirate a 51% share, larger than the one he can get when it's just him and the last pirate, and he should vote for it
read it backwards temporally
if it does get down to just the last two pirates, there essentially has to be a 50/50 split, otherwise you can't get a majority vote, no one dies, no one goes home with money.
if it's the last three, the bottom pirate can offer a 51/49 split to the second to last pirate, a better deal (by one gold piece) than he can get out of the last pirate. Being logical, he will vote for it, and it makes the middle pirate's best possible outcome 49 gold pieces.
if it's the last four, the bottom pirate must get three votes in order to save his life. He has to pay as much or more to two other pirates as their highest possible share to do this. The cheapest way to do that is to pay 50.5 to the second to last pirate and 49.5 to the third. He gets nothing.
In the first round, the lowest ranked pirate can offer 50 to the middle pirate, which he should accept as it's better than anything he can get if he waits, and any amount of money over 0 to the second lowest pirate, as it's better than the nothing he'll be able to dictate in the second round. This gets him two votes in addition to his own.
The lowest pirate, the one proposing the first plan, can take the remainder. (theoretically 49 if he just gives the fourth guy a pittance of one gold piece)
edit: hey look, Munkus got the same answer last page but without typing out the reasoning that rat bastard:
with one small arithmetical error