I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
ronya on
0
Options
surrealitychecklonely, but not unloveddreaming of faulty keys and latchesRegistered Userregular
I actually feel the "man with tits" argument in video games.
If there were a spectrum of female character types that covered a better range of emotional make-ups (including aggressive/nurturing tendencies) then I don't think anyone would complain about the female character who is rather masculine.
The issue is that game writers seem to have issues writing female characters who occupy the middle ground between girly and "man with tits" and without that it makes the latter more annoying than it probably should be.
If you prowl through 1990s foreign aid literature, during the height of the reaction against aid, you'll notice that "well, we need to subsidize these governments against communist revolution" completely vanished as a concern. It was almost wholly "we should think about long-term growth". The stability of the regimes, or actually for any pre-existing social structures or institutions, was essentially ignored.
Now I'm saying that the reason for this is, if you think about it, pretty damned obvious. Without a Cold War, why worry about some tinpot dictatorship self-destructing without aid? It's not like the aid was helping anyway. So on and so forth. Then at some point American geopolitical interests abruptly changed and suddenly regime stability was highly desirable, against some new enemy, but IMF policies did not update immediately.
... well, now they are; the IMF is endorsing capital controls again, fifteen years after 1997. What has been, will be again; what has been done, will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.
Also, badass aggressive female characters don't deserve to be saddled with the emotional range of half-squeezed bottles of toothpaste, and they invariably are.
That said, badass aggressive male characters tend to have a similar emotional range; it's the exceptions who don't who stand out and make their 2-d female counterparts seem extra shallow.
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
0
Options
CindersWhose sails were black when it was windyRegistered Userregular
If you prowl through 1990s foreign aid literature, during the height of the reaction against aid, you'll notice that "well, we need to subsidize these governments against communist revolution" completely vanished as a concern. It was almost wholly "we should think about long-term growth". The stability of the regimes, or actually for any pre-existing social structures or institutions, was essentially ignored.
Now I'm saying that the reason for this is, if you think about it, pretty damned obvious. Without a Cold War, why worry about some tinpot dictatorship self-destructing without aid? It's not like the aid was helping anyway. So on and so forth. Then at some point American geopolitical interests abruptly changed and suddenly regime stability was highly desirable, against some new enemy, but IMF policies did not update immediately.
... well, now they are; the IMF is endorsing capital controls again, fifteen years after 1997. What has been, will be again; what has been done, will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.
Most late 90's development writing is basically considered a perfect example of how not to do things btw.
I have a couple of books that are great examples of 90's got development aid wrong and why it doesn't work.
+1
Options
JacobkoshGamble a stamp.I can show you how to be a real man!Moderatormod
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
Of course, every politician is going to insist that if only things were done Their Way, growth would be tremendous and they'd certainly be able to repay any loan extended to them. Wait, what do you mean nobody believes me? Not even the LOLR? DAMN IT, I DESERVE TO HAVE MY FANTASIES ENDORSED BY THE IMF
0
Options
surrealitychecklonely, but not unloveddreaming of faulty keys and latchesRegistered Userregular
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
Of course, every politician is going to insist that if only things were done Their Way, growth would be tremendous and they'd certainly be able to repay any loan extended to them. Wait, what do you mean nobody believes me? Not even the LOLR? DAMN IT, I DESERVE TO HAVE MY FANTASIES ENDORSED BY THE IMF
I think this is missing the point from the populations perspective, especially in countries like Egypt where you had decaying services from the 1980's on and they accelerated under the IMF.
Also quit having me arguing the Post-Colonialist view point here. I don't want to fling myself out of a window.
+1
Options
JeanHeartbroken papa bearGatineau, QuébecRegistered Userregular
i have never done this describe the experience to me
It was not a cheese burger.
How unamerican of you! How dare you!
"You won't destroy us, You won't destroy our democracy. We are a small but proud nation. No one can bomb us to silence. No one can scare us from being Norway. This evening and tonight, we'll take care of each other. That's what we do best when attacked'' - Jens Stoltenberg
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
Of course, every politician is going to insist that if only things were done Their Way, growth would be tremendous and they'd certainly be able to repay any loan extended to them. Wait, what do you mean nobody believes me? Not even the LOLR? DAMN IT, I DESERVE TO HAVE MY FANTASIES ENDORSED BY THE IMF
I think this is missing the point from the populations perspective, especially in countries like Egypt where you had decaying services from the 1980's on and they accelerated under the IMF.
Also quit having me arguing the Post-Colonialist view point here. I don't want to fling myself out of a window.
I'm not arguing with that, nor what the population perspective is. The role of the IMF and WB is commonly misunderstood to begin with, which is why the complaint is always voiced with the implicit assumption that the money should be owed to the borrower states without any conditions (or with plenty of conditions, if the sympathetic speaker is in the opposition).
If you prowl through 1990s foreign aid literature, during the height of the reaction against aid, you'll notice that "well, we need to subsidize these governments against communist revolution" completely vanished as a concern. It was almost wholly "we should think about long-term growth". The stability of the regimes, or actually for any pre-existing social structures or institutions, was essentially ignored.
Now I'm saying that the reason for this is, if you think about it, pretty damned obvious. Without a Cold War, why worry about some tinpot dictatorship self-destructing without aid? It's not like the aid was helping anyway. So on and so forth. Then at some point American geopolitical interests abruptly changed and suddenly regime stability was highly desirable, against some new enemy, but IMF policies did not update immediately.
... well, now they are; the IMF is endorsing capital controls again, fifteen years after 1997. What has been, will be again; what has been done, will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.
Most late 90's development writing is basically considered a perfect example of how not to do things btw.
I have a couple of books that are great examples of 90's got development aid wrong and why it doesn't work.
quite. there was a lot of naïveté and/or convenient amnesia about the role of government in the postwar miracle states, and an astonishing amount of Western economists reading their own domestic disputes into other nations with vastly different systems.
I find it interesting much of the writing on the Arab Spring, especially Egypt points to the protest as major rebuke of neoliberalism and that till there is a shift in economic policy by the new governments away from this mentality they will remain unstable.
I find it interesting too, but my suspicion is that their domestic politics isn't terribly "about" neoliberalism; rather many authors reading are reading their own foreign disputes into it. Arab socialism, in its secular or Muslim variants, was never terribly similar to Western socialism, even ethnic-nationalist Western socialism.
The argument tends to go like this:
1. Countries like Egypt and Tunisia were following IMF liberalization schemes which are designed around the philosophy of neoliberalism.
2. Since this began in the 1990's there has been a dramatic shift in inequality and a rising percentage of poor in the country.
3. This economic inequality is the underlying force that drove the protesters to Tahrir Square.
It isn't a flawed premise. There are huge economic undertones in many of the Arab Spring protest. But I am not sure it is the rebuke the authors are making. Especially in places like Egypt where liberalization was never fully implemented and where it was, it was done in a way to help regime allies not the economy. Plus a huge chunk is still state or military owned and run.
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
Of course, every politician is going to insist that if only things were done Their Way, growth would be tremendous and they'd certainly be able to repay any loan extended to them. Wait, what do you mean nobody believes me? Not even the LOLR? DAMN IT, I DESERVE TO HAVE MY FANTASIES ENDORSED BY THE IMF
I think this is missing the point from the populations perspective, especially in countries like Egypt where you had decaying services from the 1980's on and they accelerated under the IMF.
Also quit having me arguing the Post-Colonialist view point here. I don't want to fling myself out of a window.
I'm not arguing with that, nor what the population perspective is. The role of the IMF and WB is commonly misunderstood to begin with, which is why the complaint is always voiced with the implicit assumption that the money should be owed to the borrower states without any conditions (or with plenty of conditions, if the sympathetic speaker is in the opposition).
The population perspective is the important one at least at the moment with Arab Spring literature.
Also I know the role of the IMF and WB. But there is some weight to the arguments on how they are run is detrimental in general to the developing world. I may not agree with them, but at least they have some support to point to.
Posts
There's a lack of historical perspective here; before the 1990s, the critique of cold-war capitalism was that the IMF was subsidizing populist authoritarianism, bribing the poor away from (then, obviously communist) revolution.
IMF support for anything was always motivated by an ideological certainty that pursuing some economic model would allow states to grow their economy, which would allow them to then pay back the IMF loans; only atop this was the geopolitics imposed. In the Keynesian era, these were overtly Keynesian programs, albeit structured to benefit reliably anti-communist cronies.
It was quite hilarious, and I needed a background to my light coding assignment. And it turns out that industrialists do not fuck ruthlessly.
i do
no mercy
I think you have a point. But again, historical perspective is one thing to an academic but isn't worth its salt to a revolutionary unless it can be used to provide legitimacy to the movement.
There has been a major increase in income inequality in many of these states along with a decrease of services. The blame isn't just pure neoliberal economic policies, especially since none of these states have instituted such policies. But there is a point that restructuring of that by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990's and early 2000's did increase inequality and did dismantle many state provided services in many countries which has lead to blow back by the populace.
This doesn't mean it is a direct rebuke, which I don't think it is, but the economic under tones are there and should be an important part of the research into these revolutionary movements.
yayyyy
we're current...ish
On the black screen
i have never done this describe the experience to me
No ruthless fucking? Poor adaptation of book, 2/10
http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/best-steakhouses-in-the-us/16
i've been to this one
shit was bomb
It was not a cheese burger.
Duolinguo, this is not a better way to say She has thirst.
The restructuring supported by the IMF and the WB. They can't force any government to do anything if that government doesn't want to borrow the money.
But regardless, the blow-back was rather the point of the roll-back of IMF support for generous state welfare here - the perception that the funds were going toward bribery writ large rather than investment. Pulling the plug meant that the regimes had to adapt or die, and the regimes failed to adapt.
terrible
I forgot how much of a dick Picard was.
If there were a spectrum of female character types that covered a better range of emotional make-ups (including aggressive/nurturing tendencies) then I don't think anyone would complain about the female character who is rather masculine.
The issue is that game writers seem to have issues writing female characters who occupy the middle ground between girly and "man with tits" and without that it makes the latter more annoying than it probably should be.
/2 cents
Now I'm saying that the reason for this is, if you think about it, pretty damned obvious. Without a Cold War, why worry about some tinpot dictatorship self-destructing without aid? It's not like the aid was helping anyway. So on and so forth. Then at some point American geopolitical interests abruptly changed and suddenly regime stability was highly desirable, against some new enemy, but IMF policies did not update immediately.
... well, now they are; the IMF is endorsing capital controls again, fifteen years after 1997. What has been, will be again; what has been done, will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.
That said, badass aggressive male characters tend to have a similar emotional range; it's the exceptions who don't who stand out and make their 2-d female counterparts seem extra shallow.
Except the fact that by the time most countries reach the point of getting IMF and World Bank loans they are reaching the lender of last resort territory which is what the two organizations were set up to be. There is a very strong perception in the developing world that the IMF and WB are tools of the developed world to keep the developing world down or to keep stable authoritarian regimes in power. And they are not without cause for this view. Of course it isn't true either but the IMF coming into a country is rarely looked at as a good thing. And tends to lead to the dismantling of what many populations consider important government services that get moved to the private sector and so on.
I do not think the revolts were a rebuke of neoliberalism in the way writers state it is. But I do think there is a good discussion to be had about perspectives and the actual effects of such policies have on governments and populations who are still developing their economy and infrastructure.
Oh my god, it's so cute.
Most late 90's development writing is basically considered a perfect example of how not to do things btw.
I have a couple of books that are great examples of 90's got development aid wrong and why it doesn't work.
@Elldren
sorry I missed this! D&D ended and I got a sub on the way home.
things are good!
Of course, every politician is going to insist that if only things were done Their Way, growth would be tremendous and they'd certainly be able to repay any loan extended to them. Wait, what do you mean nobody believes me? Not even the LOLR? DAMN IT, I DESERVE TO HAVE MY FANTASIES ENDORSED BY THE IMF
pensi
ownau
I think this is missing the point from the populations perspective, especially in countries like Egypt where you had decaying services from the 1980's on and they accelerated under the IMF.
Also quit having me arguing the Post-Colonialist view point here. I don't want to fling myself out of a window.
How unamerican of you! How dare you!
I'm not arguing with that, nor what the population perspective is. The role of the IMF and WB is commonly misunderstood to begin with, which is why the complaint is always voiced with the implicit assumption that the money should be owed to the borrower states without any conditions (or with plenty of conditions, if the sympathetic speaker is in the opposition).
Three Mimosas and one beer in
are you doing 1-3 or going through 4 and then going to see the new one
also haha it's not even 1 there! I like the pace you're setting.
quite. there was a lot of naïveté and/or convenient amnesia about the role of government in the postwar miracle states, and an astonishing amount of Western economists reading their own domestic disputes into other nations with vastly different systems.
The population perspective is the important one at least at the moment with Arab Spring literature.
Also I know the role of the IMF and WB. But there is some weight to the arguments on how they are run is detrimental in general to the developing world. I may not agree with them, but at least they have some support to point to.
Die Hard with Mimosas, eh?
You. Go. Girl.
'cause I keep finding them
and I wanna send 'em
to ladies
that's just hilerical.
though nothing beats the mayor's description.
We talked about this bro!