amateurhourOne day I'll be professionalhourThe woods somewhere in TennesseeRegistered Userregular
I just want my tombstone to say "something cool"
are YOU on the beer list?
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cptruggedI think it has something to do with free will.Registered Userregular
I had a dream on Sunday night that I did Karaoke of a Jay Z song and some black fella came up to me afterword and got on my case for using the word "Jigga"
I woke up with a strong feeling of guilt.
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amateurhourOne day I'll be professionalhourThe woods somewhere in TennesseeRegistered Userregular
I had a dream on Sunday night that I did Karaoke of a Jay Z song and some black fella came up to me afterword and got on my case for using the word "Jigga"
last year growth 9%
hit 85% of bonus targets (with 9% growth? who set those bullshit targets) and as such we'll get 85% of our bonuses so that's not too bad
next years bonus targets only account for 6% growth so that's better
life's a game that you're bound to lose / like using a hammer to pound in screws
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
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TL DRNot at all confident in his reflexive opinions of thingsRegistered Userregular
It seems trivial to me that we exist only as molecules in motion, rather than static arrangements, and that as molecules are replaceable by identical ones, all essential things cannot be due to the identity of individual particles. Thus, the person that exists from t1 to t2 is fundamentally different from the person who exists from t2 to t3, and that relationship would be the same whether nothing happened at t2 or the person were suddenly switched three feet to the right, but otherwise identical.
Therefore get over it and teleport everywhere :P
This makes a lot of assumptions about identity re: particles
Also particles are never identical as one of their properties is always necessarily different, i.e. their locations in space!
Assumptions which are true, and can be shown by destructive and constructive interference, iirc?
I recall reading a blog post by an angry quantum guy who wanted to yell at philosophers over this very thing :P
But in any case there is no such thing as absolute position, so all that matters is relative position...
the real issue is that we don't understand consciousness or even qualitative experience enough to make assumptions about duplicating or destroying brains. i wouldn't step into that thing.
Hmm
I am torn, because on the one hand, I want to go "ok, fair"
On the other hand I approach 100% certain that everything we experience is somewhere in the brain, in the form of various processes that only are affected by relative positions and forces that are constantly shifting and would not be affected by such a thing.
(I am legitimately surprised that you would not step into a teleporter, actually.)
to clarify, i'm talking about the one that destroys the original and makes a copy
i am troubled by e.g. a thought experiment in which the machine simply creates a copy without destroying the original; obviously this would not transfer or disrupt my consciousness in any way so copies are not "me" and would not "transfer" my consciousness
i rather think that such duplication may actually be completely physically impossible, though
I'm only troubled by that insofar as there are limited resources (such as.. Querry...) that one me is going to be heartbroken to lose :P
I see your point; I think, however, that my objection is to what you are treating as axiomatic - that there is one "you" and that consciousness is a thing that is transferred independently of the continuing motion and interaction of particles, which I think silently lies under everything here. If you accept that consciousnesses require constant interactions, and that you are not the same person as ten years ago because the interactions are different*, then it follows pretty easily that identity is constantly shifting as its components move around, and that that is the only thing we really need bee concerned with
*this might be hard for some to swallow, but I don't think you can actually meaningfully say that you are without relying on non-physicalist stuff
Unrelatedly, grading is hard.
The whole difficulty of consciousness is exactly that: we experience it as singular and continuous even though it is presumably ever-changing.
Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that my consciousness is distinct from that of other individuals. As a result, if you copy me exactly and produce a clone, it is not me, necessarily. It's not as though I will experience a consciousness of two experiences, as there is no soul being divided between them. I (as in, that self which perceives a continuous conscious experience) will continue to be conscious as my original. I don't see how this would be altered by destroying the original, or how that scenario would be different from destroying the original while making no copy.
Basically, it seems that consciousness necessarily requires a kind of continuity, and that continuity does exist. If that continuity does not exist then consciousness does not exist in a meaningful way, I think.
Right - I'm saying that this is constantly happening every moment. In the case of cloning, you both will have the perception of continuity. You could argue that it doesn't exist in one case, and is only a perception... but I think that equally applies to the non-cloned case, and our treatment of them as different cases is a mental kludge to make things easier. The me of yesterday had different knowledge, different feelings, would react to situations (slightly) differently based on a host of things... and for a while, this meat bag was unconscious! I'm not sure why I should think that I'm the same person of yesterday, and if I do, I'm not sure why, in a case where I was killed and rebuilt at the end of sleep as though I'd slept, I should think that it's any different.
I think this is an easier, clearer case, but I also think that it applies moment to moment as our memories, emotions, and thoughts change. Reducing the time on that to zero changes nothing, we are still beings that exist only through change. Given that, the particular structure and changes are all that matters.
I actually do have a weird gut feeling about this, I just think that gut feeling is wrong.
(incidentally, I don't think that continuity exists. I think during sleep the body is basically someone else - it's so different, how could it be me? I wake up with the hallucinations of a different being, who's affected deeply by me, in my mind.)
I'm certainly not arguing that the clone's continuity doesn't exist. To the clone, he is me. If both continued to exist, I wouldn't even say that the original would have a better claim to the identity. It would be a bureaucratic nightmare. Your consciousness, arguably, has essentially branched, because both individuals have that sense of continuity.
But the two individuals are separate people, axiomatically, by their very existence. Here's another thought experiment: you are cloned, and then you wait an hour, and then you are shot in the head. Is this worse than destroying the original immediately upon duplication? Must we achieve a perfect, impossible, simultaneous duplication+destruction to preserve that continuity? How would it, in fact, be different for you than being shot in the head without having been duplicated at all?
Hmmm
I think I would say that duplication and immediate destruction of the original is sort of how life constantly works, so doing that is probably the same as allowing time to pass, which I don't think we do just because we can't not.
I think the last bit of your question is what I was getting at with my poorly formed question earlier:
Can you define what it would mean for, in the case of this transporter thing, your consciousness to cease and someone else's to be there? Especially in a way that's distinguishable from sleep and whatnot?
I just realized that I don't even think I can do that.
I'm not sure what you're asking (which someone else, where is "there", etc.)?
You seem to be concerned with your consciousness disappearing, if I'm reading you correctly. My question then is: what does it actually mean for this to happen, in a way that it's broken by a transporter? What actual phenomenon is occurring that you object to? I formed it incorrectly because I temporarily forgot we're 90% on the same side philosophically and I'm used to talking about this with people who consider the clone to be a different person somehow.
I am asking, in the case of a simultaneous dissolution of you and reconstruction of an identical you elsewhere, what it is you feel is lost that is not lost every moment of every day, when the exact structure and interactions that are you break down by virtue of changing into a new structure and set of interactions.
It is sort of a Ship of Theseus problem, except that the ship in question is not a totally abstract notion of thingness projected arbitrarily onto a collection of matter.
Really, this strikes to the heart of it: in all other areas, human perception of things, of beings, as such is arbitrary and abstract. When we ask about the Ship of Theseus, we are not asking "what are the physical properties of the molecules in question that dictate whether it is the same ship," we are asking "what are the boundaries and specifics of the arbitrary ideas we use to label and define entities?"
But consciousness is inherently different--or seems to be. We experience it (or rather live it through experiencing) as an entity in itself, one whose boundaries are defined by our perceptions; it is the only non-arbitrary entity we can define. That's the cogito, really. The self is a thing.
And people have argued against the cogito pretty convincingly, and suggested as you have (and as i agree) that no, it isn't nearly a thing in the traditional sense. It's a disparate collection of processes and structures and it can be interrupted and altered and split and transformed, and all that is certainly true of "the self," which may be separate from consciousness, which is simply the capacity of experiencing selfhood.
But there is still a fundamental difference there--the very illusion of self or consciousness or will or awareness is fundamentally different from its absence. So it can't be treated as functioning in the same way as other processes, necessarily.
All this to say, messily, that the difference is kind of obvious: "structures and interactions that change from moment to moment in a given superstructure" is different from "a new set of identical structures and interactions assembled from other superstructures." We can recognize it as different already, as we are having this discussion. What aspect of that difference might be important? I don't know. Does spatial location matter, maybe? If consciousness is inherently related to time and experience of time, might it also be inherently related to space? Is that question even coherent? Do distinct but identical particles have distinct identities in some relevant way? Obviously identical particles are, nonetheless, different, as they are distinct from each other and do not occupy the same space and there's, like, more than one.
All of this is bullshit, but we cannot yet even conceive of how qualitative experience exists. If we are to explain how consciousness/subjectivity can exist, we are going to need to connect quantitative description to qualitative experience, and that might require a... post-quantitative physics, or something. It might require a paradigm shift, like uniting special relativity and quantum and etc.
I don't think that our current understanding of physical reality is sufficient to explain or understand consciousness, and I am uncomfortable at relying wholly on that understanding of reality when making decisions that would impact the continued existence of a consciousness.
I have more thoughts but I am slacking on doing work and that's not good.
(I'm not actually certain the difference you call obvious is meaningful, is kind of what I'm getting at - plus, it seems to me you are concerned with the self-as-consciousness rather than the structures and such, and I think it's not exactly proper to then say "well, the structures are different in ways we can define" when I'm asking about the consciousness. But I cannot give this the reply it deserves right now, since these posts take much more time than most posts!)
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ChanusHarbinger of the Spicy Rooster ApocalypseThe Flames of a Thousand Collapsed StarsRegistered Userregular
chomsky wasn't exactly predicting the future there
i mean, the FBI had been saying the same thing since the 90s
It seems trivial to me that we exist only as molecules in motion, rather than static arrangements, and that as molecules are replaceable by identical ones, all essential things cannot be due to the identity of individual particles. Thus, the person that exists from t1 to t2 is fundamentally different from the person who exists from t2 to t3, and that relationship would be the same whether nothing happened at t2 or the person were suddenly switched three feet to the right, but otherwise identical.
Therefore get over it and teleport everywhere :P
This makes a lot of assumptions about identity re: particles
Also particles are never identical as one of their properties is always necessarily different, i.e. their locations in space!
Assumptions which are true, and can be shown by destructive and constructive interference, iirc?
I recall reading a blog post by an angry quantum guy who wanted to yell at philosophers over this very thing :P
But in any case there is no such thing as absolute position, so all that matters is relative position...
the real issue is that we don't understand consciousness or even qualitative experience enough to make assumptions about duplicating or destroying brains. i wouldn't step into that thing.
Hmm
I am torn, because on the one hand, I want to go "ok, fair"
On the other hand I approach 100% certain that everything we experience is somewhere in the brain, in the form of various processes that only are affected by relative positions and forces that are constantly shifting and would not be affected by such a thing.
(I am legitimately surprised that you would not step into a teleporter, actually.)
to clarify, i'm talking about the one that destroys the original and makes a copy
i am troubled by e.g. a thought experiment in which the machine simply creates a copy without destroying the original; obviously this would not transfer or disrupt my consciousness in any way so copies are not "me" and would not "transfer" my consciousness
i rather think that such duplication may actually be completely physically impossible, though
I'm only troubled by that insofar as there are limited resources (such as.. Querry...) that one me is going to be heartbroken to lose :P
I see your point; I think, however, that my objection is to what you are treating as axiomatic - that there is one "you" and that consciousness is a thing that is transferred independently of the continuing motion and interaction of particles, which I think silently lies under everything here. If you accept that consciousnesses require constant interactions, and that you are not the same person as ten years ago because the interactions are different*, then it follows pretty easily that identity is constantly shifting as its components move around, and that that is the only thing we really need bee concerned with
*this might be hard for some to swallow, but I don't think you can actually meaningfully say that you are without relying on non-physicalist stuff
Unrelatedly, grading is hard.
The whole difficulty of consciousness is exactly that: we experience it as singular and continuous even though it is presumably ever-changing.
Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that my consciousness is distinct from that of other individuals. As a result, if you copy me exactly and produce a clone, it is not me, necessarily. It's not as though I will experience a consciousness of two experiences, as there is no soul being divided between them. I (as in, that self which perceives a continuous conscious experience) will continue to be conscious as my original. I don't see how this would be altered by destroying the original, or how that scenario would be different from destroying the original while making no copy.
Basically, it seems that consciousness necessarily requires a kind of continuity, and that continuity does exist. If that continuity does not exist then consciousness does not exist in a meaningful way, I think.
Right - I'm saying that this is constantly happening every moment. In the case of cloning, you both will have the perception of continuity. You could argue that it doesn't exist in one case, and is only a perception... but I think that equally applies to the non-cloned case, and our treatment of them as different cases is a mental kludge to make things easier. The me of yesterday had different knowledge, different feelings, would react to situations (slightly) differently based on a host of things... and for a while, this meat bag was unconscious! I'm not sure why I should think that I'm the same person of yesterday, and if I do, I'm not sure why, in a case where I was killed and rebuilt at the end of sleep as though I'd slept, I should think that it's any different.
I think this is an easier, clearer case, but I also think that it applies moment to moment as our memories, emotions, and thoughts change. Reducing the time on that to zero changes nothing, we are still beings that exist only through change. Given that, the particular structure and changes are all that matters.
I actually do have a weird gut feeling about this, I just think that gut feeling is wrong.
(incidentally, I don't think that continuity exists. I think during sleep the body is basically someone else - it's so different, how could it be me? I wake up with the hallucinations of a different being, who's affected deeply by me, in my mind.)
I'm certainly not arguing that the clone's continuity doesn't exist. To the clone, he is me. If both continued to exist, I wouldn't even say that the original would have a better claim to the identity. It would be a bureaucratic nightmare. Your consciousness, arguably, has essentially branched, because both individuals have that sense of continuity.
But the two individuals are separate people, axiomatically, by their very existence. Here's another thought experiment: you are cloned, and then you wait an hour, and then you are shot in the head. Is this worse than destroying the original immediately upon duplication? Must we achieve a perfect, impossible, simultaneous duplication+destruction to preserve that continuity? How would it, in fact, be different for you than being shot in the head without having been duplicated at all?
Hmmm
I think I would say that duplication and immediate destruction of the original is sort of how life constantly works, so doing that is probably the same as allowing time to pass, which I don't think we do just because we can't not.
I think the last bit of your question is what I was getting at with my poorly formed question earlier:
Can you define what it would mean for, in the case of this transporter thing, your consciousness to cease and someone else's to be there? Especially in a way that's distinguishable from sleep and whatnot?
I just realized that I don't even think I can do that.
I'm not sure what you're asking (which someone else, where is "there", etc.)?
You seem to be concerned with your consciousness disappearing, if I'm reading you correctly. My question then is: what does it actually mean for this to happen, in a way that it's broken by a transporter? What actual phenomenon is occurring that you object to? I formed it incorrectly because I temporarily forgot we're 90% on the same side philosophically and I'm used to talking about this with people who consider the clone to be a different person somehow.
I am asking, in the case of a simultaneous dissolution of you and reconstruction of an identical you elsewhere, what it is you feel is lost that is not lost every moment of every day, when the exact structure and interactions that are you break down by virtue of changing into a new structure and set of interactions.
It is sort of a Ship of Theseus problem, except that the ship in question is not a totally abstract notion of thingness projected arbitrarily onto a collection of matter.
Really, this strikes to the heart of it: in all other areas, human perception of things, of beings, as such is arbitrary and abstract. When we ask about the Ship of Theseus, we are not asking "what are the physical properties of the molecules in question that dictate whether it is the same ship," we are asking "what are the boundaries and specifics of the arbitrary ideas we use to label and define entities?"
But consciousness is inherently different--or seems to be. We experience it (or rather live it through experiencing) as an entity in itself, one whose boundaries are defined by our perceptions; it is the only non-arbitrary entity we can define. That's the cogito, really. The self is a thing.
And people have argued against the cogito pretty convincingly, and suggested as you have (and as i agree) that no, it isn't nearly a thing in the traditional sense. It's a disparate collection of processes and structures and it can be interrupted and altered and split and transformed, and all that is certainly true of "the self," which may be separate from consciousness, which is simply the capacity of experiencing selfhood.
But there is still a fundamental difference there--the very illusion of self or consciousness or will or awareness is fundamentally different from its absence. So it can't be treated as functioning in the same way as other processes, necessarily.
All this to say, messily, that the difference is kind of obvious: "structures and interactions that change from moment to moment in a given superstructure" is different from "a new set of identical structures and interactions assembled from other superstructures." We can recognize it as different already, as we are having this discussion. What aspect of that difference might be important? I don't know. Does spatial location matter, maybe? If consciousness is inherently related to time and experience of time, might it also be inherently related to space? Is that question even coherent? Do distinct but identical particles have distinct identities in some relevant way? Obviously identical particles are, nonetheless, different, as they are distinct from each other and do not occupy the same space and there's, like, more than one.
All of this is bullshit, but we cannot yet even conceive of how qualitative experience exists. If we are to explain how consciousness/subjectivity can exist, we are going to need to connect quantitative description to qualitative experience, and that might require a... post-quantitative physics, or something. It might require a paradigm shift, like uniting special relativity and quantum and etc.
I don't think that our current understanding of physical reality is sufficient to explain or understand consciousness, and I am uncomfortable at relying wholly on that understanding of reality when making decisions that would impact the continued existence of a consciousness.
I have more thoughts but I am slacking on doing work and that's not good.
(I'm not actually certain the difference you call obvious is meaningful, is kind of what I'm getting at - plus, it seems to me you are concerned with the self-as-consciousness rather than the structures and such, and I think it's not exactly proper to then say "well, the structures are different in ways we can define" when I'm asking about the consciousness. But I cannot give this the reply it deserves right now, since these posts take much more time than most posts!)
that's cool i should work too
just @ me later i am always interested in this as it is v bizarre and abstract
It seems trivial to me that we exist only as molecules in motion, rather than static arrangements, and that as molecules are replaceable by identical ones, all essential things cannot be due to the identity of individual particles. Thus, the person that exists from t1 to t2 is fundamentally different from the person who exists from t2 to t3, and that relationship would be the same whether nothing happened at t2 or the person were suddenly switched three feet to the right, but otherwise identical.
Therefore get over it and teleport everywhere :P
This makes a lot of assumptions about identity re: particles
Also particles are never identical as one of their properties is always necessarily different, i.e. their locations in space!
Assumptions which are true, and can be shown by destructive and constructive interference, iirc?
I recall reading a blog post by an angry quantum guy who wanted to yell at philosophers over this very thing :P
But in any case there is no such thing as absolute position, so all that matters is relative position...
the real issue is that we don't understand consciousness or even qualitative experience enough to make assumptions about duplicating or destroying brains. i wouldn't step into that thing.
Hmm
I am torn, because on the one hand, I want to go "ok, fair"
On the other hand I approach 100% certain that everything we experience is somewhere in the brain, in the form of various processes that only are affected by relative positions and forces that are constantly shifting and would not be affected by such a thing.
(I am legitimately surprised that you would not step into a teleporter, actually.)
to clarify, i'm talking about the one that destroys the original and makes a copy
i am troubled by e.g. a thought experiment in which the machine simply creates a copy without destroying the original; obviously this would not transfer or disrupt my consciousness in any way so copies are not "me" and would not "transfer" my consciousness
i rather think that such duplication may actually be completely physically impossible, though
I'm only troubled by that insofar as there are limited resources (such as.. Querry...) that one me is going to be heartbroken to lose :P
I see your point; I think, however, that my objection is to what you are treating as axiomatic - that there is one "you" and that consciousness is a thing that is transferred independently of the continuing motion and interaction of particles, which I think silently lies under everything here. If you accept that consciousnesses require constant interactions, and that you are not the same person as ten years ago because the interactions are different*, then it follows pretty easily that identity is constantly shifting as its components move around, and that that is the only thing we really need bee concerned with
*this might be hard for some to swallow, but I don't think you can actually meaningfully say that you are without relying on non-physicalist stuff
Unrelatedly, grading is hard.
The whole difficulty of consciousness is exactly that: we experience it as singular and continuous even though it is presumably ever-changing.
Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that my consciousness is distinct from that of other individuals. As a result, if you copy me exactly and produce a clone, it is not me, necessarily. It's not as though I will experience a consciousness of two experiences, as there is no soul being divided between them. I (as in, that self which perceives a continuous conscious experience) will continue to be conscious as my original. I don't see how this would be altered by destroying the original, or how that scenario would be different from destroying the original while making no copy.
Basically, it seems that consciousness necessarily requires a kind of continuity, and that continuity does exist. If that continuity does not exist then consciousness does not exist in a meaningful way, I think.
Right - I'm saying that this is constantly happening every moment. In the case of cloning, you both will have the perception of continuity. You could argue that it doesn't exist in one case, and is only a perception... but I think that equally applies to the non-cloned case, and our treatment of them as different cases is a mental kludge to make things easier. The me of yesterday had different knowledge, different feelings, would react to situations (slightly) differently based on a host of things... and for a while, this meat bag was unconscious! I'm not sure why I should think that I'm the same person of yesterday, and if I do, I'm not sure why, in a case where I was killed and rebuilt at the end of sleep as though I'd slept, I should think that it's any different.
I think this is an easier, clearer case, but I also think that it applies moment to moment as our memories, emotions, and thoughts change. Reducing the time on that to zero changes nothing, we are still beings that exist only through change. Given that, the particular structure and changes are all that matters.
I actually do have a weird gut feeling about this, I just think that gut feeling is wrong.
(incidentally, I don't think that continuity exists. I think during sleep the body is basically someone else - it's so different, how could it be me? I wake up with the hallucinations of a different being, who's affected deeply by me, in my mind.)
I'm certainly not arguing that the clone's continuity doesn't exist. To the clone, he is me. If both continued to exist, I wouldn't even say that the original would have a better claim to the identity. It would be a bureaucratic nightmare. Your consciousness, arguably, has essentially branched, because both individuals have that sense of continuity.
But the two individuals are separate people, axiomatically, by their very existence. Here's another thought experiment: you are cloned, and then you wait an hour, and then you are shot in the head. Is this worse than destroying the original immediately upon duplication? Must we achieve a perfect, impossible, simultaneous duplication+destruction to preserve that continuity? How would it, in fact, be different for you than being shot in the head without having been duplicated at all?
Hmmm
I think I would say that duplication and immediate destruction of the original is sort of how life constantly works, so doing that is probably the same as allowing time to pass, which I don't think we do just because we can't not.
I think the last bit of your question is what I was getting at with my poorly formed question earlier:
Can you define what it would mean for, in the case of this transporter thing, your consciousness to cease and someone else's to be there? Especially in a way that's distinguishable from sleep and whatnot?
I just realized that I don't even think I can do that.
I'm not sure what you're asking (which someone else, where is "there", etc.)?
You seem to be concerned with your consciousness disappearing, if I'm reading you correctly. My question then is: what does it actually mean for this to happen, in a way that it's broken by a transporter? What actual phenomenon is occurring that you object to? I formed it incorrectly because I temporarily forgot we're 90% on the same side philosophically and I'm used to talking about this with people who consider the clone to be a different person somehow.
I am asking, in the case of a simultaneous dissolution of you and reconstruction of an identical you elsewhere, what it is you feel is lost that is not lost every moment of every day, when the exact structure and interactions that are you break down by virtue of changing into a new structure and set of interactions.
It is sort of a Ship of Theseus problem, except that the ship in question is not a totally abstract notion of thingness projected arbitrarily onto a collection of matter.
Really, this strikes to the heart of it: in all other areas, human perception of things, of beings, as such is arbitrary and abstract. When we ask about the Ship of Theseus, we are not asking "what are the physical properties of the molecules in question that dictate whether it is the same ship," we are asking "what are the boundaries and specifics of the arbitrary ideas we use to label and define entities?"
But consciousness is inherently different--or seems to be. We experience it (or rather live it through experiencing) as an entity in itself, one whose boundaries are defined by our perceptions; it is the only non-arbitrary entity we can define. That's the cogito, really. The self is a thing.
And people have argued against the cogito pretty convincingly, and suggested as you have (and as i agree) that no, it isn't nearly a thing in the traditional sense. It's a disparate collection of processes and structures and it can be interrupted and altered and split and transformed, and all that is certainly true of "the self," which may be separate from consciousness, which is simply the capacity of experiencing selfhood.
But there is still a fundamental difference there--the very illusion of self or consciousness or will or awareness is fundamentally different from its absence. So it can't be treated as functioning in the same way as other processes, necessarily.
All this to say, messily, that the difference is kind of obvious: "structures and interactions that change from moment to moment in a given superstructure" is different from "a new set of identical structures and interactions assembled from other superstructures." We can recognize it as different already, as we are having this discussion. What aspect of that difference might be important? I don't know. Does spatial location matter, maybe? If consciousness is inherently related to time and experience of time, might it also be inherently related to space? Is that question even coherent? Do distinct but identical particles have distinct identities in some relevant way? Obviously identical particles are, nonetheless, different, as they are distinct from each other and do not occupy the same space and there's, like, more than one.
All of this is bullshit, but we cannot yet even conceive of how qualitative experience exists. If we are to explain how consciousness/subjectivity can exist, we are going to need to connect quantitative description to qualitative experience, and that might require a... post-quantitative physics, or something. It might require a paradigm shift, like uniting special relativity and quantum and etc.
I don't think that our current understanding of physical reality is sufficient to explain or understand consciousness, and I am uncomfortable at relying wholly on that understanding of reality when making decisions that would impact the continued existence of a consciousness.
I have more thoughts but I am slacking on doing work and that's not good.
(I'm not actually certain the difference you call obvious is meaningful, is kind of what I'm getting at - plus, it seems to me you are concerned with the self-as-consciousness rather than the structures and such, and I think it's not exactly proper to then say "well, the structures are different in ways we can define" when I'm asking about the consciousness. But I cannot give this the reply it deserves right now, since these posts take much more time than most posts!)
that's cool i should work too
just @ me later i am always interested in this as it is v bizarre and abstract
We could do each others' work
I don't like the subjectivity that comes with grading
If my dreams are actually just visions into parallel universes while I sleep then in different universes:
-There is an indoor amusement park thing like a chuck-e-cheese with animatronic dinosaurs that have come to live and are murdering children. (I remember seeing kids run into a room with windows while I was looking in waiting for them to finish and then one dropped through the ceiling behind them and tore into a kid.)
-I am a milkman running towards an elevator door to avoid being caught by someone in a trench coat following closely behind me but I drop the milk bottles and am probably murdered as that's when I usually wake up
-There is a T-Rex stomping around mississippi terrorizing residential neighborhoods (while I crouch in terror in a house getting the roof torn off of it)
-There is an otherworldly mall with patrons that seem to slowly disappear until it is very lonely in the mall and there are things hunting me that I never see.
And probably others I have written down somewhere. I have nightmares and then they reoccur and then they haunt my ass for weeks at a time. I have lost sleep due to being worried about falling asleep due to nightmares.
What I'm getting from this is that you played Five Nights at Freddy's, Resident Evil 2, Silent Hill 3, and watched Jurassic Park: The Lost World
3/4 decent taste
FF XIV - Qih'to Furishu (on Siren), Battle.Net - Ilpala#1975
Switch - SW-7373-3669-3011
Fuck Joe Manchin
got my bottle of Lizano in last night
gonna make some nachos today
life's a game that you're bound to lose / like using a hammer to pound in screws
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
If my dreams are actually just visions into parallel universes while I sleep then in different universes:
-There is an indoor amusement park thing like a chuck-e-cheese with animatronic dinosaurs that have come to live and are murdering children. (I remember seeing kids run into a room with windows while I was looking in waiting for them to finish and then one dropped through the ceiling behind them and tore into a kid.)
Isn't this basically the Five Night's at Freddies franchise?
If my dreams are actually just visions into parallel universes while I sleep then in different universes:
-There is an indoor amusement park thing like a chuck-e-cheese with animatronic dinosaurs that have come to live and are murdering children. (I remember seeing kids run into a room with windows while I was looking in waiting for them to finish and then one dropped through the ceiling behind them and tore into a kid.)
Isn't this basically the Five Night's at Freddies franchise?
Sorry can you repost this with face cam and then scream halfway through for no reason?
I would like some money because these are artisanal nuggets of wisdom philistine.
There are still 97 episodes of Doctor Who that are missing, almost certain never to be seen again. Full audio exists for all of them, because fans recorded the audio when it was broadcast and kept it forever and ever.
I just wish they did not sell "Power of the Daleks" for $20.
I'm trying to parse that Chomsky quote. I mean first off the idea that Nixon was charismatic threw me for a loop, but I'll just ignore that. Then when he said "honest, charismatic figure" my first thought was Obama, because I consider Obama charismatic and reasonably honest. But I guess by "figure" he means, like, "fascist, demagogic, racist figure"? So I guess he's saying if someone comes along who is charismatic, and honest, and a racist demagogue, then we'd be in trouble? But then how can you be both honest and also a racist demagogue? I guess if your racism was sincere and wasn't just craven? I don't know. Anyway I presume whatever definition of 'honest' he's using doesn't apply to Trump, so if Chomsky is right, Trump, as an "obvious crook", will eventually "destroy himself".
Probably just the pain of not paying your fair share.
I did at least help the person doing my taxes last night become aware the pain in her arm had nothing to do with how she was sitting but it was an extension of the cold she was suffering through.
I would like some money because these are artisanal nuggets of wisdom philistine.
If my dreams are actually just visions into parallel universes while I sleep then in different universes:
-There is an indoor amusement park thing like a chuck-e-cheese with animatronic dinosaurs that have come to live and are murdering children. (I remember seeing kids run into a room with windows while I was looking in waiting for them to finish and then one dropped through the ceiling behind them and tore into a kid.)
Isn't this basically the Five Night's at Freddies franchise?
I mean kinda, it felt more like I was watching kids play and waiting for them to finish so we could go home or whatever (babysitting or something I assume?) and then a cop showed up and was all AHH WHAT ARE YOU DOING and I was confused and then one of those tiny dinos dropped out of the ceiling and started attacking a kid and it seemed like they were trying to break out of their animatronic hell hole
Oh and now I'm remembering the creepy mall dream had a creepy arcade in it too. I wonder if those are related in weird dream world.
No, we can't define consciousness with a purely physical paradigm.
yet
life's a game that you're bound to lose / like using a hammer to pound in screws
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
+3
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Blameless Cleric An angel made of sapphires each more flawlessly cut than the last Registered Userregular
@Tcheldor are you a new chatter have you been properly welcomed yet
Tell us about yourself
Are you a happy camper
I usually just lurk chat during work. I don't' usually talk up much. Always feels a bit like you're standing on the outside ring of a circle of friends who are chatting.
Speak then. Be heard.
If I'm tolerated I'm certain you will be.
Not worried about being tolerated, just don't have a ton to say I suppose. I guess someone should introduce me to the [chat] crew. "Blameless Cleric"
YO
Apologies, I was in a cloud of romance
Anyway though
@Tcheldor is a totally rad lurker and sometimes poster who writes cool shit. We worked on an art thing for a while once before I kind of fell off the face of the planet due to school stress.
Neco they're going to switch me to injections if my labwork drawn yesterday isn't up to snuff
I can help instruct you on IM injections if you like
neco go to your doctor instead of getting injection methodology advice on the internet jesus christ.
Isn't this injection methodology advice, tho?
0
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amateurhourOne day I'll be professionalhourThe woods somewhere in TennesseeRegistered Userregular
Confirmed Bleric is magical because I was just about to ask spool where she was since I haven't seen her here in a morning or two and as I started drafting this she posted.
Posts
I woke up with a strong feeling of guilt.
You got Freddy Douglas'd
But...Nixon?
heh that idiot isn't even wearing makeup
well shit
last year growth 9%
hit 85% of bonus targets (with 9% growth? who set those bullshit targets) and as such we'll get 85% of our bonuses so that's not too bad
next years bonus targets only account for 6% growth so that's better
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
What about livejournal?
I have more thoughts but I am slacking on doing work and that's not good.
(I'm not actually certain the difference you call obvious is meaningful, is kind of what I'm getting at - plus, it seems to me you are concerned with the self-as-consciousness rather than the structures and such, and I think it's not exactly proper to then say "well, the structures are different in ways we can define" when I'm asking about the consciousness. But I cannot give this the reply it deserves right now, since these posts take much more time than most posts!)
i mean, the FBI had been saying the same thing since the 90s
that's cool i should work too
just @ me later i am always interested in this as it is v bizarre and abstract
I can't read this sentence.
We could do each others' work
I don't like the subjectivity that comes with grading
He ate something weird and chased it with coffee.
What I'm getting from this is that you played Five Nights at Freddy's, Resident Evil 2, Silent Hill 3, and watched Jurassic Park: The Lost World
3/4 decent taste
Switch - SW-7373-3669-3011
Fuck Joe Manchin
got my bottle of Lizano in last night
gonna make some nachos today
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
Sorry can you repost this with face cam and then scream halfway through for no reason?
pleasepaypreacher.net
IT'S AN ILLUSION, JUST LIKE THEIR PERCEPTION OF THEIR WRITING ABILITIES
Yay vindication.
I just wish they did not sell "Power of the Daleks" for $20.
It is an old show.
@neco go to your doctor instead of getting injection methodology advice on the internet jesus christ.
NO U !!! >:(
Fuck you, frail human body.
Probably just the pain of not paying your fair share.
I did at least help the person doing my taxes last night become aware the pain in her arm had nothing to do with how she was sitting but it was an extension of the cold she was suffering through.
pleasepaypreacher.net
No, we can't define consciousness with a purely physical paradigm.
I mean kinda, it felt more like I was watching kids play and waiting for them to finish so we could go home or whatever (babysitting or something I assume?) and then a cop showed up and was all AHH WHAT ARE YOU DOING and I was confused and then one of those tiny dinos dropped out of the ceiling and started attacking a kid and it seemed like they were trying to break out of their animatronic hell hole
Oh and now I'm remembering the creepy mall dream had a creepy arcade in it too. I wonder if those are related in weird dream world.
yet
fuck up once and you break your thumb / if you're happy at all then you're god damn dumb
that's right we're on a fucked up cruise / God is dead but at least we have booze
bad things happen, no one knows why / the sun burns out and everyone dies
YO
Apologies, I was in a cloud of romance
Anyway though
@Tcheldor is a totally rad lurker and sometimes poster who writes cool shit. We worked on an art thing for a while once before I kind of fell off the face of the planet due to school stress.
I'd love it if you took a look at my art and my PATREON!
Isn't this injection methodology advice, tho?
Am I horrifying
I feel like my philosophies are practically tailored to horrify you sometimes!