Either you are being intellectually dishonest or despite our earlier conversation you don't understand counter-factuals.
It is true that yar does not have to believe that his dog has brown fur to engage this discussion of compatibility. What is important is that when engaging the discussion, the proposition "dog has brown fur" and "catch a frisbee" need both be true for them to be compatible.
For if "dog has brown fur" is true implies "catch a frisbee" to be false, then the two are incompatible.
Given what "compatible" and "incompatible" mean.
I eagerly await an articulation of compatibility which does not utilize truth conditions.
Yes, if "the dog has brown fur" is true implies "catch a frisbee" is false then incompatible. The dog not in fact having brown fur does not mean that this implication is the case.
Let's look at two sets of belief for compatibility.
If Keith being in Mexico implies Keith is not in Europe, then the beliefs that Keith is in Europe and Mexico are incompatible.
likewise if Keith being in Canada implies Keith is not in North America, then the beliefs that Keith is in Canada and North America are incompatible.
So the incompatibility conditions, if we use a material implication
M(k) -> not E(k)
C(k) -> not N(k)
The actual case is that Keith is in Taiwan. Therefore both of these conditionals are true trivially - both antecedents are false. Thus we know that actually, believing that Keith can be in Canada and North America at the same time are incompatible beliefs!!111!!! Were Keith in Canada, he would not be in North America!
This is a retarded conclusion brought about by the misapplication of material implication. To use material implication in this sense is to willfully misinterpret what people mean.
Counter-factuals aren't as conceptually simple as material implication but they are more intuitive, are what people typically mean, and they are meaningful. The wikipedia page has a number of examples of how they may be interpreted in a philosophically rigorous way. Possible worlds which we discussed earlier are one.
When Yar says 'were determinism true, even then free will' he is speaking in this way. I maintain a similar position and also don't believe in determinism - though I think the compatibilist conception of free will significantly better than the libertarian one.
When Yar says 'were determinism true, even then free will' he is speaking in this way. I maintain a similar position and also don't believe in determinism - though I think the compatibilist conception of free will significantly better than the libertarian one.
This is the important part.
Compatibilism: Determinism is true. There is free will.
Incompatibilism: Either (Determinism is true. There is no free will.) Or (Determinism is false. There is free will.)
Yar does not think determinism is true. Therefore, Yar is not compatibilist.
Chake99 does not think determinism is true. Therefore, Chake99 is not compatibilist.
MrMister thinks determinism is true. MrMister thinks free will is true. Therefore, MrMister is a compatibilist.
So, i'm not sure why a bunch of incompatibilists are arguing that they are compatibilists.
There's also the question of why Yar would be addressing the hypothetical truth of determinism (could determinism be true), given that, per his previous statements, determinism is not useful despite whether it is true or false.
For Yar, determinism is fundamentally useless.
So, not sure why he isn't an incompatibilist...and why he would even care...
Is there something useful "compatibilism" does which "incompatibilism" does not do?
Compatibilism is the belief that the counterfactual implication "Were determinism the case, then it would be the case that no free will" is false.
Yar believing determinism is false doees not make him an incompatibilist (or necessarily, even a compatibilist, it says nothing of his stance of compatibilism).
Also Yar being a compatibilist follows from believing determinism useless - e.g. nothing specially significant is entailed by a deterministic universe, including a lack of free will
In the way you are using compatible believing Keith is in Canada and North American are incompatible beliefs if Keith is actually in Taiwan.
I believe that my last post contained a great deal of sense, though the point it was trying to establish was non-trivial.
Compatibilism is the belief that the counterfactual implication "Were determinism the case, then it would be the case that no free will" is false.
Yar believing determinism is false doees not make him an incompatibilist (or necessarily, even a compatibilist, it says nothing of his stance of compatibilism).
Also Yar being a compatibilist follows from believing determinism useless - e.g. nothing specially significant is entailed by a deterministic universe, including a lack of free will
That would be a very nice thing to mean by "compatibilism", but it is not what it means, at least in the context of this thread. In this thread, compatibilism was defined to be the belief not just that "Were determinism the case, then it would be the case that no free will" is false, but that determinism and free will are both the case.
Your point about Yar's stance seems correct though. That makes his participation in this thread rather confusing, mostly because he brings the "useful = true" stance with him, which makes it impossible to have a discussion with him about anything being the case.
it's not outright philosophical pragmatism which would be retarded.
It's "given words are tools for communication when there are multiple competing definitions for a word, the one most useful for its purpose of communication should be selected." Determinism is a different sort of useless from this.
It's also a stance I share.
I'm pretty sure the OP declares compatibilism to be as I describe it, but I don't have time to check now. At the very least it is what the position of compatiilism actually is.
(ii) Compatibilism, finally, is the attitude that determinism is true (or that it might as well be), but nonetheless our wills can be free.
You recall incorrectly, unless you are interpreting the "might as well be" differently.
Now, what you are saying I think is different than what Yar is saying. You are saying we should define our words in order to maximize the ability to communicate. I agree completely, and I think having a word for "causes internal to an agent (however we decide to define agent)" is a great idea.
Using the word "choice" or "free will" to describe those causes, when it leads to completely different conclusions than those normally justified, by folk or society, by choice and free will, is just confusing the issue at best, and trying to mislead at worst.
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
(ii) Compatibilism, finally, is the attitude that determinism is true (or that it might as well be), but nonetheless our wills can be free.
You recall incorrectly, unless you are interpreting the "might as well be" differently.
I may have been unclear, however, the 'might as well be' was indeed intended to indicate that the Compatibilist is not committed to the truth of determinism. Rather, for the compatibilist it is all the same either way.
i have a very hard time understanding you sometimes not because you are not clear, but because sometimes you say x and then you say ~x.
The problem is that you are reading my posts as one continual narrative throughout the entire thread. I am not making one coherent narrative; I am making a wealth of arguments AGAINST compatibilism. Therre is not only one argument against compatibilism, there are many. I am employing as many as I can.
i dont understand how you, as a hardline determinist, can make a distinction between "i" and "love". i thought the whole point you were making is that there is no "i", there is no "agency", there is nothing to be "affected". so how can "i" be affected by "love"?
arent we all just billiard balls?
Again, that is not the argument in the above post. The above post is explaining how "I feel love" and "I feel free will" can be explained to be different.
if the "i" falls apart in your above explanation, then doesnt the distinction you make between "acting on me" (love) and "being a part of me" (free will) just fall apart also?
The "i" does not fall apart in the above explanation. The "I" is acted upon, for example, love and hate and free will.
The point is that "I am acted upon by love" is sensible whereas "I am acted upon by free will" is nonsense, given what free will must be in a compatibilist narrative. The I would have to be "free will", a will that is free. There is, in compatibilism, not an I acted upon by free will, whereas a compatibilist could maintain that the "i" was causally impacted upon by "love".
Player A seeks to defend position P.
Player B seeks to defeat position P.
Player A must maintain the position it seeks to defend, P.
Player B can argue whatever the crap it wants against P.
Player A must articulate a coherent, consitent narrative.
Player B can utilize a new argumentative attack at every step, if it so chooses.
Think of an argument as trying to construct a building. Player A wants to build a particular building, so Player A has a set goal: the construction of the building.
Player B wants only to destroy the building. So while Player A is restricted, Player B can do whatever the crap it wants. Player B can throw a walrus at the construction, dynamite at the construction, legal sanctions at the construction. Player B could dig a giant tunnel under the construction. Player B can do anything which may result in the collapse of the building.
I am not arguing for determinism.
I am arguing against compatibilism.
Edit: You're like the person who read the Euthyphro and says "But why does Socrates keep asking different questions?!" Socrates is not trying to build an argument; he is trying to destroy Euthyphro's argument.
i see what the problem is now. youre arguing, but im discussing. i guess it's not a big deal, but just to let you in on something: nobody likes that guy.
whatever the case, youre argument is terrible. because you are arguing against compatibilism, but by assuming "i", you've already conceded defeat. in order to muster an argument against a concept, you cannot concede its fundamental conclusion.
it's like saying, "strawberries don't exist but they sure are delicious."
The OP acknowledged that from his compatabilist point of view, debating physical determinism wasn't even relevant. I repeated this when I first brought up attacking determinism itself. But I brought it up anyway, because unfortunately much of the incompatabilist position is absed upon a fundamentally untenable and incoherent concept of what determinism is or means. I was hoping, am hoping, that through discarding the internal contradictions within certain beliefs about determinism, some of you can then understand the compatabilist truth.
It remains, however, that my stance is "There is no logical discrepancy whatsoever in the coexistence of a coherent concept of determinism and a coherent concept of free will." I can still say that determinism is meaningless in its own right, for different reasons, even if it doesn't conflict with free will.
Furthermore, I have always acknowledged an alternate concept of ontology and determinism, in which free will isn't true, but only because nothing at all is true and truth can't exist. But I also argue this entire concept to be useless and meaningless.
SUPPOSE there were indivisible entities and that any divisible entity was composed of an amalgamation of these indivisible entities. Would the amalgamation have the same kind of being as every distinct indivisible entity?
Practically speaking, yes, because the indivisible entities are inaccessible to us. They are beyond a point of singularity, just like the cause of the Big Bang. There can be no truth for us with respect to them. To have truth of them is paradox. All truth is necessarily one of these illusory amalgamations of them. We distinguish truth or non-truth based on context and utility, and always necessarily to some degree of fuzziness and uncertainty. The idea that some truths are more physical than others, or more certain than others, or more illusory than others, is itself an illusion, based on perceived qualities of the composition, context, usefulness, or dependability of the type of truth in question.
rocks are said to exist on the basis of sense data, free will is said to exist on the basis of feelings.
Feelings are not the same sort of things as sense data. So, that's how they can be said to be different.
Sure, there is a meaningful difference, even one that significantly affects how we arrive at truths in varying contexts. But there is not the difference you claim. Before, you talked about the truth of "((A -> & A) -> B". Such truth, for example, is not gained through sense data. You can't see it or touch it. It is a reasoned abstraction that assists in organizing sense data for useful purposes. It is an illusory feeling. Not exactly like free will, but for purposes of this description, quite very similar.
I've let you get away with a lot of nonsense in this thread, but this shit will not stand.
That's charming. First of all, no, you haven't let me get away with a lot of nonsense. You have been enlightened by my more advanced philosophical understanding of the concepts being discussed, or in other cases, have failed to grasp the next rung of the ladder in front of you. Secondly, the shit you don't want to let stand is in fact how the issues are framed in pretty much all contemporary philosophical literaure. In many cases compatabilism and incompatabilism are defensible stances even if one is agnostic or skeptical on the truths of free will and/or determinism.
So, you think free will is true. Do you think determinism is true?
I think that under rationally consistent notions of truth, determinism, compatabilism, and free will: free will is true, compatabilism is true, and determinism is meaningless. It can be true or not, doesn't matter, and in fact I'm even fine with concluding that the meaningless of something's truth makes it therefore not true. None of these will really affect my argument.
Determinism in this regard is like saying "God did it." Sure, fine, God did it. When we conduct an experiment and get results, God did it. When a cause has an effect, God did it. The Big Bang, God did it. Your skepticism of God, that's just God testing you. And so on. When you then ask me whether or not it's true, well, I can say that introducing "God did it" as the root answer to everything doesn't actually change anything, it doesn't contradict anything, and so therefore I'm indifferent and non-confrontational towards anyone who insists on it being a premise. As a premise, it necessarily cannot affect the truth or falsehood of anything else, because it explains everything. It is therefore entirely compatible with any and all arguments I might choose to make. But as a non-falsifiable, unprovable, concept, no, I generally don't argue for such things as being positively true themselves. Determinism is perfectly inconsequential. On a number line, where + is true and - is false, determinism is exactly 0. It isn't saying or leading to anything that ever could be considered true or false. It's just a statement that "everything is in fact everything - there isn't something that isn't something." That doesn't qualify anything else we might want to argue about, but I'm not really going to say "that's false!"
It's only by getting trapped in your personal relationships with time and consciouness that you start fooling yourself into thinking that this means anything about past and future, causes and effects, or could have and otherwise. Those concepts all have meaning only to your conscious self at a point that self perceives to be the current time. Determinism cares not for your concept of self nor your experience of a point in time. It's what you care about that creates truth.
If you guys want to argue the computer / human thing we did Turing machines like 10 pages ago, ultimately concluding that they had nothing to do with the conversation.
The "i" does not fall apart in the above explanation. The "I" is acted upon, for example, love and hate and free will.
You have dodged the question of what this "I" is far too many times. I'm thinking that you are already well aware that this is a key point where your argument betrays its inconsistency and contradiction, but you are hoping we can skip over it.
Player B can utilize a new argumentative attack at every step, if it so chooses.
Again, you are unfortunately incorrect about this. If the step being attacked was one that was only arrived at by a fork spawned from a previous argument by B, then the new attack cannot be inconsistent with previous argument. Else, you return to the previous step where the fork occurred, rather than advance to a next step along the forked path. This is what Keth is referring to here. When your challenges contradict one another, that can be meaningful to the attack you believe yourself to be waging. I hate that we've resorted to debating rhetoric itself now, though I have come to expect from you that you will resort to anything, including trying to rewrite the logic of how an argument works, in order to avoid acknowledging that your stance has been shown illogical.
Again, I do not have to offer a consistent argument throughout the thread; I am not defending anything.
Yes, you are defending what is known as incompatabilism. We are attacking it. Quite successfully. And to assert that you need not make a consistent argument is off-the-charts ridiculous and trollish. Yes, your stance must be consistent. It must not contradict itself. Showing an attack to be self-contradictory is an entirely valid defense.
You guys who are defending compatibilism have to give a coherent account throughout the discussion.
Because that's how argument works.
No, it isn't (olol). But seriously, your account of how arguments work is incorrect. You claiming that you get to be inconsistent and self-contradictory and still win is incorrect. You claiming that you aren't defending something, but we are, is incorrect. And you know it. You always pull this shit and it drives me nuts and I can't beleive I let myself get this far into a discussion with you yet again. You always pull out the most ridiculous thread-murdering nonsense, like saying that you are allowed to be self-contradictory, whenever the argument turns against your previous beleifs.
I mean, holy shit, give me a break. Is your stance not "free will and determinism aren't compatible"? We both have postitions to defend here.
And, by the way, we have given a coherent account throughout the discussion.
EDIT: I declare Yar, MrMister, and Chake to be the undisputed winners of this thread.
Ok I will declare me being unaware of the last 300ish posts of this thread, but I saw this and could not resist:
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In P17S I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge. But to explain the matter more fully, I shall give one or two examples: men are deceived in that they think themselves free, i.e., they think that, of their own free will, they can either do a thing or forbear doing it, an opinion which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom--that they do not know any cause of their actions. They say, of course, that human actions depend on the will, but these are only words for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what the will is, and how it moves the Body; those who boast of something else, who feign seats and dwelling places of the soul, usually provoke either ridicule or disgust.
That adds nothing. We are all of us, at some point, necessarily ignorant of the causes of things. Calling a tree a tree is only our ignornace of the causes of us perceiving a tree. And so on. Nothing new here, nothing changed.
That adds nothing. We are all of us, at some point, necessarily ignorant of the causes of things. Calling a tree a tree is only our ignornace of the causes of us perceiving a tree. And so on. Nothing new here, nothing changed.
Part of the point is that predicating an argument upon ignorance is silly insofar as that ignorance follows through the argument. So, if one thinks one's self to be free as a result of ignorance, then the thinking of one's self to be free is, itself, ignorant.
It raises the question, I think, of the merit of any position which is fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. So, for example, an argument against creationism will be predicated upon something something something there was a big bang. Yet that idea of "big bang", if only from the phrase alone, is entirely ignorant.
So, if we want to tell a complete, coherent narrative it seems odd to found the entire thing on a fundamental position of ignorance.
That adds nothing. We are all of us, at some point, necessarily ignorant of the causes of things. Calling a tree a tree is only our ignornace of the causes of us perceiving a tree. And so on. Nothing new here, nothing changed.
Part of the point is that predicating an argument upon ignorance is silly insofar as that ignorance follows through the argument. So, if one thinks one's self to be free as a result of ignorance, then the thinking of one's self to be free is, itself, ignorant.
It raises the question, I think, of the merit of any position which is fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. So, for example, an argument against creationism will be predicated upon something something something there was a big bang. Yet that idea of "big bang", if only from the phrase alone, is entirely ignorant.
So, if we want to tell a complete, coherent narrative it seems odd to found the entire thing on a fundamental position of ignorance.
Which is exactly why I feel that you can't make any claims about reality whatsoever.
But I'm fairly sure you don't actually agree with what you just said.
Those two statements are completely incoherent. Not just when put together, but also when taken seperately. I'm going to pretend that they do make sense for the purposes of this discussion.
It seems to me that those in the thread arguing for Free Will define it as the process of "weighing your own options", whereas not having free will to them would mean "being mind-controlled / zombified / forced to take an action."
Those arguing against Free Will are saying that the above definitions are silly, and that Free Will does not exist, because the difference between "being mind-controlled" and "making your own decision" is that in one case you have one puppetmaster, and in the other you have many.
Part of the point is that predicating an argument upon ignorance is silly insofar as that ignorance follows through the argument. So, if one thinks one's self to be free as a result of ignorance, then the thinking of one's self to be free is, itself, ignorant.
It raises the question, I think, of the merit of any position which is fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. So, for example, an argument against creationism will be predicated upon something something something there was a big bang. Yet that idea of "big bang", if only from the phrase alone, is entirely ignorant.
So, if we want to tell a complete, coherent narrative it seems odd to found the entire thing on a fundamental position of ignorance.
As jothki pointed out, you are still, as you have been so repeatedly, failing to establish why this applies to free will any more so than it applies to any truth or notion you are capable of imagining. All positions on anything are fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. Because you don't know the ultimate causes of things, and necessarily can't possibly ever know them. Presuming that I accept, for the sake of argument, this incoherent notion of there being "ignorance" simply because we have taken a collection of significance and given it a name, such that we may pretend to be ignorant of that which comprises, well then everything is therefore ignorance.
It seems to me that those in the thread arguing for Free Will define it as the process of "weighing your own options", whereas not having free will to them would mean "being mind-controlled / zombified / forced to take an action."
Those arguing against Free Will are saying that the above definitions are silly, and that Free Will does not exist, because the difference between "being mind-controlled" and "making your own decision" is that in one case you have one puppetmaster, and in the other you have many.
Sort of, but I think you've oversimplified to the point of neglecting some things. Would a puppetmaster necessarily be one who thinks and makes decisions himself? The name would imply that he is, but your argument implies the opposite.
It seems to me that those in the thread arguing for Free Will define it as the process of "weighing your own options", whereas not having free will to them would mean "being mind-controlled / zombified / forced to take an action."
Those arguing against Free Will are saying that the above definitions are silly, and that Free Will does not exist, because the difference between "being mind-controlled" and "making your own decision" is that in one case you have one puppet master, and in the other you have many.
Sort of, but I think you've oversimplified to the point of neglecting some things. Would a puppetmaster necessarily be one who thinks and makes decisions himself? The name would imply that he is, but your argument implies the opposite.
I would say that the puppet master only makes decisions or thinks in the sense that the puppet does - that neither have free will. It's just a causal chain. Turtles all the way down.
It seems trivially true to me that all human actions are influenced by the outside world - and thus, the cause of all human actions is deterministic and unfree.
Is it silly to say that I find the entire question of free will irrelevant?
Let me explain:
The free will "problem" is only a problem (or "question" is only a question worth asking) because of the ramifications it has for ethical philosophy -- for normative judgment/statement. Otherwise it is, at best, an intellectual curiosity, no more a "problem" than some arcane puzzle.
If there is no free will -- if we are deterministic, in the sense of efficacy that Mr^2 poses (which I think is correct, but not particularly illuminating because that is generally how the debate already exists, as if accepting his clarification. Useful to laypeople, perhaps, who think that indeterministic natural processes like "uncertainty principle" are "solutions" to the problem of free will) -- then normative philosophy is pointless. Not because of issues of responsibility or guilt or what-have-you, but because people would be incapable of choosing to follow such dictums! People are either bound to accept your point of view or not, so the whole idea of arguing a normative standpoint is pretty much unnecessary. How can we argue about people how they ought to act if we accept that they are not capable of controlling those actions?
If there is free will, then normative statements make sense (in that they may actually be acted upon because agents exist who may act in the first place).
So, if we are to ever engage in normative philosophy of any sort, we must accept free-will as a precondition. For all intents and purposes then, free-will exists because the problematic nature of free will is problematic only in reference to normative statements, but normative statements necessitate the existence of free will.
However, there are some other things to consider.
One, many normative ethical philosophies hinge on questions of responsibility, fault, guilt, etc. And if we examine these questions, many people inevitably revert to a scientific framework and begin undermining concepts of agency with things like psychological/biological/natural causation which are overwhelmingly apparently beyond our control. If we maintain consistency, we naturally come back to a sort of deterministic position in that everything observable in the material world thus far is the product of deterministic or indeterministic but nevertheless not sui generis forces, therefore agency does not exist. And now we're back to not being able to make normative statements.
The solution then, is to excise any question of free will from normative/ethical philosophy, because these questions will ultimately always undermine the very premise of normative statements -- contradicting the very activity we are engaging in.
edit: or believe in some kind of completely unabridged form of free-will. But of course there's the whole issue that everything we know about the material world contradicts this.
Thus, the "problem" of free will is really just a way of pointing out that questions of free-will have no place in normative statements (because they ultimately will just contradict normativity itself), and essentially it's just an argument for a consequentialist (or other stances unconcerned with intent/agency) outlook on ethical philosophy.
edit: Oh, and if you look at this and say "well then you should argue that normative statements should be eliminated if they hinge on an entity which almost surely does not exist" you sort of have an inherent problem there because to advocate against normativity is, in fact, a normative position and you've implicitly accepted free-will.
Basically the way I see it, free will doesn't exist, can't exist, and everything we do is a sort of meaningless illusion but if we actually were rigorous about that it would have all sorts of silly consequences so it's best to just ignore the whole thing.
If there is no free will [...] then normative philosophy is pointless. Not because of issues of responsibility or guilt or what-have-you, but because people would be incapable of choosing to follow such dictums!
They may not be able to "choose" to follow, but they can follow.
People are either bound to accept your point of view or not, so the whole idea of arguing a normative standpoint is pretty much unnecessary. How can we argue about people how they ought to act if we accept that they are not capable of controlling those actions?
An "ought" statement is merely one more to add to the mix of causal forces at play. It isn't as though moral people spring into being with their understanding of how to behave fully realized and immutable.
They may not be able to "choose" to follow, but they can follow.
What does that word even mean? Either something is going to follow, or it is not going to follow. What does it mean when you say that something 'can' do something?
They may not be able to "choose" to follow, but they can follow.
What does that word even mean? Either something is going to follow, or it is not going to follow. What does it mean when you say that something 'can' do something?
It means that I don't know if it's going to or not.
If you want me to phrase it differently: nobody will "choose" to follow, but some people will follow.
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
Basically the way I see it, free will doesn't exist, can't exist, and everything we do is a sort of meaningless illusion but if we actually were rigorous about that it would have all sorts of silly consequences so it's best to just ignore the whole thing.
That, of course, is also a normative statement. But, forgetting about that, it's also worth noting that ethical norms are not the only norms there are: there are also norms of proper reasoning. For instance, presumably you want to represent yourself as following correct standards of reasoning in coming up with your arguments, and you want to represent them as arguments which others should heed if they themselves want to follow correct standards of reasoning.
But it looks like you cannot do that, on your view, because you are claiming that normativity is based on an illusion. Which leaves you in a rather schizophrenic position, simultaneously representing your opinions to yourself as the correct result of the application of theoretical norms of proper reasoning, and yet at the same deducing from those self-same opinions that one can never actually apply those norms. So the conflicts in your attitude run deep and apparently necessitate a contradictory attitude. That does not seem like a badge of merit in any sort of philosophical position.
Basically the way I see it, free will doesn't exist, can't exist, and everything we do is a sort of meaningless illusion but if we actually were rigorous about that it would have all sorts of silly consequences so it's best to just ignore the whole thing.
That, of course, is also a normative statement. But, forgetting about that, it's also worth noting that ethical norms are not the only norms there are: there are also norms of proper reasoning. For instance, presumably you want to represent yourself as following correct standards of reasoning in coming up with your arguments, and you want to represent them as arguments which others should heed if they themselves want to follow correct standards of reasoning.
But it looks like you cannot do that, on your view, because you are claiming that normativity is based on an illusion. Which leaves you in a rather schizophrenic position, simultaneously representing your opinions to yourself as the correct result of the application of theoretical norms of proper reasoning, and yet at the same deducing from those self-same opinions that one can never actually apply those norms. So the conflicts in your attitude run deep and apparently necessitate a contradictory attitude. That does not seem like a badge of merit in any sort of philosophical position.
Well I think to some extent that's a shortcoming of philosophy. The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality. We may find ourselves in positions that require a certain amount of cognitive dissonance to even approach (due to the human brain, and its modes of interpreting and relating to physical reality), but I think it's somewhat biased to suggest that positions that require cognitive dissonance to explore aren't true, or closer to truth merely because of that fact.
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
Well I think to some extent that's a shortcoming of philosophy. The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality. We may find ourselves in positions that require a certain amount of cognitive dissonance to even approach (due to the human brain, and its modes of interpreting and relating to physical reality), but I think it's somewhat biased to suggest that positions that require cognitive dissonance to explore aren't true, or closer to truth merely because of that fact.
Something that's deeply counter-intuitive may be true, but something which is actually self-contradictory certainly cannot be. But even if something is merely "dissonant" rather than flatly contradictory, do you at least agree that said dissonance counts as a prima facie, though not decisive, reason against it?
Part of the point is that predicating an argument upon ignorance is silly insofar as that ignorance follows through the argument. So, if one thinks one's self to be free as a result of ignorance, then the thinking of one's self to be free is, itself, ignorant.
It raises the question, I think, of the merit of any position which is fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. So, for example, an argument against creationism will be predicated upon something something something there was a big bang. Yet that idea of "big bang", if only from the phrase alone, is entirely ignorant.
So, if we want to tell a complete, coherent narrative it seems odd to found the entire thing on a fundamental position of ignorance.
As jothki pointed out, you are still, as you have been so repeatedly, failing to establish why this applies to free will any more so than it applies to any truth or notion you are capable of imagining. All positions on anything are fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. Because you don't know the ultimate causes of things, and necessarily can't possibly ever know them. Presuming that I accept, for the sake of argument, this incoherent notion of there being "ignorance" simply because we have taken a collection of significance and given it a name, such that we may pretend to be ignorant of that which comprises, well then everything is therefore ignorance.
Something you do quite often, which I state not as an attack but rather as a description, is to invoke a notion of "all" or "every" with regard to this kind of critique. Summarized, your position is that "any criticism to which all positions are subject is not, actually, a criticism." So, when I articulate the above position of a flaw within positions predicated upon ignorance, you reply that "all" positions are subject to this criticism.
The difficulty I have with your utilization of this defense is that your articulation is, quite simply, wrong. The reason for this is that there is a difference between "all" and "a very high finite number" and "every position, except for one."
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
I mention this not to argue for solipsism, or even to argue for Spinoza. Rather, I wish to articulate that your constant attempt to subsume the entirety of philosophy into one bucket, and then claim that particular critiques persons suggest are critiques of the entirety of the bucket, fails insofar as there are arguments which exist which are not constitutive components of your "all"; there are philosophical positions which exist outside of and immune from the bucket of "positions predicated upon ignorance".
There are positions which are immune from the ignorance critique I articulated above; there are positions which either articulate the first cause of things (Spinoza), or rest upon a fundamentally self-evident premise (solipsism).
Now, you are welcome to remedy your articulation to be such that "_J_'s critique of ignorance applies to all positions on everything EXCEPT FOR Spinozism and Solipsism and Cartesianism and da da da." However, I wonder if your critique will still stand, given that, previously, your argument was that "Any criticism which is applicable to all positions is not a genuine criticism."
Given that I have articulated at least two positions to which the critique is not applicable.
Edit: TL;DR: If a particular critique is applicable to 99% of positions, then 99% of positions are subject to the critique. A critique cannot be dismissed simply as a result of there being many, many, many incorrect philosophical positions and systems. Hell, a good critique will undermine all philosophical systems and positions which are incorrect, leaving the few correct articulations undamaged.
That, of course, is also a normative statement. But, forgetting about that, it's also worth noting that ethical norms are not the only norms there are: there are also norms of proper reasoning.
Things which philosophically irritate me: Persons who claim that ethical normativity is akin to normativity of reason. Or, said another way, that the "ought" of the ethical is the "ought" of reasoning.
Which is simply not the case.
Ethical normativity can be understood as an "oughtness", an ethical norm is an articulation of how one "ought to act". Reason does not have an "ought to" of similar qualities to the "ought to" of ethics. Ultimately, reason is not defined by normativity. One does not define a normativity to reason. Rather, one simply articulates that which reason is.
A properly schooled philosopher will never claim, "You ought to reason in manner X." Rather, a properly schooled philosopher will stated, "X is reason. Y is not reason." When teaching logic, one does not tell one's students "You ought to do modus ponens this way." Rather, one tells one's students, "This is how you fucking do Modus Ponens." Not as an "ought", but as a statement of the way things are.
There is no normativity to reason, there is no "how one ought to reason", as if there were multiple brands of reasoning, multiple flavors of reasoning. There is simply "reason" and "nonsense".
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
But that isn't a certain premise.
I can understand why accepting that would give you trouble, seeing as all of your philosophy relies strongly on it. But it isn't.
The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality.
Or, the human mind and deductive reasoning are truly bound to perfectly mirror reality, and all other manners of "knowing" are flawed.
Zeno of Elea wrote that it is impossible to traverse any distance, given that to walk from point A to point B requires that one first walk halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to halfway to point B. Persons say, "zomg look! I be walking!"
Well, either
1) Zeno is incorrect as a result of reasoning is flawed.
2) The person "walking" is incorrect as a result of sense data being flawed.
I do not know which is the case, but there is a question to be asked of how one knows that which truly is the case. 1 and 2 cannot both be correct. So, which is correct?
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
But that isn't a certain premise.
I can understand why accepting that would give you trouble, seeing as all of your philosophy relies strongly on it. But it isn't.
Which? Spinoza or the other one?
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HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality.
Or, the human mind and deductive reasoning are truly bound to perfectly mirror reality, and all other manners of "knowing" are flawed.
Zeno of Elea wrote that it is impossible to traverse any distance, given that to walk from point A to point B requires that one first walk halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to halfway to point B. Persons say, "zomg look! I be walking!"
Well, either
1) Zeno is incorrect as a result of reasoning is flawed.
2) The person "walking" is incorrect as a result of sense data being flawed.
I do not know which is the case, but there is a question to be asked of how one knows that which truly is the case. 1 and 2 cannot both be correct. So, which is correct?
It is almost certainly #1. Space is probably not infinitely divisible.
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
But that isn't a certain premise.
I can understand why accepting that would give you trouble, seeing as all of your philosophy relies strongly on it. But it isn't.
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
But that isn't a certain premise.
I can understand why accepting that would give you trouble, seeing as all of your philosophy relies strongly on it. But it isn't.
The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality.
Or, the human mind and deductive reasoning are truly bound to perfectly mirror reality, and all other manners of "knowing" are flawed.
Zeno of Elea wrote that it is impossible to traverse any distance, given that to walk from point A to point B requires that one first walk halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to halfway to point B. Persons say, "zomg look! I be walking!"
Well, either
1) Zeno is incorrect as a result of reasoning is flawed.
2) The person "walking" is incorrect as a result of sense data being flawed.
I do not know which is the case, but there is a question to be asked of how one knows that which truly is the case. 1 and 2 cannot both be correct. So, which is correct?
To be brief, #1.
Although I don't buy that if Zeno is wrong, reasoning itself is necessarily flawed, at least not in the way that you mean it, I think.
However I think Zeno is a perfect illustration of the reality that the human brain is built to make models -- simplified versions of reality that collect data most relevant to survival and reproduction (taken very broadly, mind you), and ignore the rest. I mean, we know for a fact that the brain filters out irrelevant information fro moment-to-moment, but even more egregious is when we are building models, either unconsciously (desire/emotion), or consciously (reason).
Hell, our entire investigation of the physical world has always been built on models and still is. From the model of the heavens put forward by Ptolemy or Aristotle to the one put forward by Copernicus to what we now use as a model today -- these models are always simplifications of reality, ignoring "irrelevant" data.
Our models become increasingly complex as we test them against reality -- a model that is overly simplistic will fail to predict observed reality as effectively as one that more closely mimics/contains reality itself. Thus we have gone from phrenology (which did at least get localization of function correct), to modern neuroscience, ever complicating our model as we go, increasingly reflecting the vastness of data in the real world.
I wonder if it is even possible to create models that fully mimic reality -- if we did, would that not in fact be a complete and separate reality? To contain all the information there is, wouldn't that essentially be a simulation that is reality? Imagine all the computation expressed in the molecular motion of a crashing wave -- one wonders if we can ever practically replicate such complexity, or if it would ever be worthwhile.
Anyway, my point is that deductive reasoning is actually the worst sort of reasoning, if we are measuring "worst" as "the ability to accurately predict observed reality." Hence Zeno. Terrible at predicting observed reality (and since observed realit
edit: I also forgot to mention that philosophy is intellectually stagnant (by a certain understanding of "stagnant").
We still argue over Plato and Aristotle -- many of their arguments are still considered to be under the umbrella of acceptable opinion. This is not the case with Ptolemy or Galen, in their respective scientific fields.
In fact, deductive reasoning never can definitively move forward, because "truth" can never be found in it, beyond literally truistic statements (and those aren't interesting, because they're just definitional masturbation). Truth in deduction is always a matter of being able to convince an audience -- it is entirely dependent on being challenged by other people. This is how philosophical dictums can be accepted as true for centuries before being challenged, but even upon being challenged, they are not necessarily discarded! Since deduction is the creation of pitifully simple models (absent the complicating effect of observing reality), rebutting deductive claims is merely a matter of dreaming up a different or slightly more complex model, which thanks to the lack of influence from observed reality, are nearly infinite in nature.
Science meanwhile, does firmly discard theories as it goes along. And this is represented also in the physical correlate of advancing technology -- we are, certainly, able to build things we could not build before, to perform tasks and manipulate reality to extents which were impossible before.
Philosophy meanders, still debating 5,000 year-old doctrines, and its physical correlate (policy/society) has failed to produce any significant or consistent gains in human satisfaction/happiness, if you consider all the way back to hunter-gatherers.
A pretty abysmal record.
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MorninglordI'm tired of being Batman,so today I'll be Owl.Registered Userregular
edit: I also forgot to mention that philosophy is intellectually stagnant (by a certain understanding of "stagnant").
We still argue over Plato and Aristotle -- many of their arguments are still considered to be under the umbrella of acceptable opinion. This is not the case with Ptolemy or Galen, in their respective scientific fields.
In fact, deductive reasoning never can definitively move forward, because "truth" can never be found in it, beyond literally truistic statements (and those aren't interesting, because they're just definitional masturbation). Truth in deduction is always a matter of being able to convince an audience -- it is entirely dependent on being challenged by other people. This is how philosophical dictums can be accepted as true for centuries before being challenged, but even upon being challenged, they are not necessarily discarded! Since deduction is the creation of pitifully simple models (absent the complicating effect of observing reality), rebutting deductive claims is merely a matter of dreaming up a different or slightly more complex model, which thanks to the lack of influence from observed reality, are nearly infinite in nature.
Science meanwhile, does firmly discard theories as it goes along. And this is represented also in the physical correlate of advancing technology -- we are, certainly, able to build things we could not build before, to perform tasks and manipulate reality to extents which were impossible before.
Philosophy meanders, still debating 5,000 year-old doctrines, and its physical correlate (policy/society) has failed to produce any significant or consistent gains in human satisfaction/happiness, if you consider all the way back to hunter-gatherers.
A pretty abysmal record.
I used to think this until I learnt something about current philosophy and realised I'm making a grand, pompous argument based on complete and utter ignorance.
So no, sorry, most contemporary philosophy does not, in fact, argue about plato and aristotle. You might want to go read up a bit like I did so you know how wrong you are just like I do.
Also while you are at it, realise that science is philosophy, is influenced by philosophy, has always been influenced by philosophy and changed by philosophy and this is clearly evident if you read through history. As a scientist, when you are interpreting your hard empirical data, you are doing philosophy. It doesn't matter if you claim you are not. It just makes you a hypocrite, rather than right.
Sure there's some philosophy that probably doesn't mean much. This does not mean it is all alike or equally useless. To brush it all aside is to attack the very principles science itself is founded upon. This is...not very bright. Nor is it at all convincing.
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Things which philosophically irritate me: Persons who claim that ethical normativity is akin to normativity of reason.
Okay.
I don't think anything you said is relevant, though. Even if reason and nonsense represent a binary distinction, reasoning still involves the proper application of norms, and representing yourself as having correctly reasoned involves representing yourself as having correctly applied those norms. That's all the normativity I needed for my point.
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
Anyway, my point is that deductive reasoning is actually the worst sort of reasoning, if we are measuring "worst" as "the ability to accurately predict observed reality." Hence Zeno. Terrible at predicting observed reality (and since observed realit
Zeno's paradoxes are not deductively sound arguments. I am not sure you understand what a deductive argument is, given the things you have said about them. A deductively valid argument is one whose premises logically guarantee the truth of its conclusion, and a deductively sound argument is one which not only is valid but also has true premises.
Models and observed reality have nothing particularly to do with it.
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Yes, if "the dog has brown fur" is true implies "catch a frisbee" is false then incompatible. The dog not in fact having brown fur does not mean that this implication is the case.
Let's look at two sets of belief for compatibility.
If Keith being in Mexico implies Keith is not in Europe, then the beliefs that Keith is in Europe and Mexico are incompatible.
likewise if Keith being in Canada implies Keith is not in North America, then the beliefs that Keith is in Canada and North America are incompatible.
So the incompatibility conditions, if we use a material implication
M(k) -> not E(k)
C(k) -> not N(k)
The actual case is that Keith is in Taiwan. Therefore both of these conditionals are true trivially - both antecedents are false. Thus we know that actually, believing that Keith can be in Canada and North America at the same time are incompatible beliefs!!111!!! Were Keith in Canada, he would not be in North America!
This is a retarded conclusion brought about by the misapplication of material implication. To use material implication in this sense is to willfully misinterpret what people mean.
Counter-factuals aren't as conceptually simple as material implication but they are more intuitive, are what people typically mean, and they are meaningful. The wikipedia page has a number of examples of how they may be interpreted in a philosophically rigorous way. Possible worlds which we discussed earlier are one.
When Yar says 'were determinism true, even then free will' he is speaking in this way. I maintain a similar position and also don't believe in determinism - though I think the compatibilist conception of free will significantly better than the libertarian one.
This is the important part.
Compatibilism: Determinism is true. There is free will.
Incompatibilism: Either (Determinism is true. There is no free will.) Or (Determinism is false. There is free will.)
Yar does not think determinism is true. Therefore, Yar is not compatibilist.
Chake99 does not think determinism is true. Therefore, Chake99 is not compatibilist.
MrMister thinks determinism is true. MrMister thinks free will is true. Therefore, MrMister is a compatibilist.
So, i'm not sure why a bunch of incompatibilists are arguing that they are compatibilists.
For Yar, determinism is fundamentally useless.
So, not sure why he isn't an incompatibilist...and why he would even care...
Is there something useful "compatibilism" does which "incompatibilism" does not do?
Yar believing determinism is false doees not make him an incompatibilist (or necessarily, even a compatibilist, it says nothing of his stance of compatibilism).
Also Yar being a compatibilist follows from believing determinism useless - e.g. nothing specially significant is entailed by a deterministic universe, including a lack of free will
In the way you are using compatible believing Keith is in Canada and North American are incompatible beliefs if Keith is actually in Taiwan.
I believe that my last post contained a great deal of sense, though the point it was trying to establish was non-trivial.
That would be a very nice thing to mean by "compatibilism", but it is not what it means, at least in the context of this thread. In this thread, compatibilism was defined to be the belief not just that "Were determinism the case, then it would be the case that no free will" is false, but that determinism and free will are both the case.
Your point about Yar's stance seems correct though. That makes his participation in this thread rather confusing, mostly because he brings the "useful = true" stance with him, which makes it impossible to have a discussion with him about anything being the case.
It's "given words are tools for communication when there are multiple competing definitions for a word, the one most useful for its purpose of communication should be selected." Determinism is a different sort of useless from this.
It's also a stance I share.
I'm pretty sure the OP declares compatibilism to be as I describe it, but I don't have time to check now. At the very least it is what the position of compatiilism actually is.
You recall incorrectly, unless you are interpreting the "might as well be" differently.
Now, what you are saying I think is different than what Yar is saying. You are saying we should define our words in order to maximize the ability to communicate. I agree completely, and I think having a word for "causes internal to an agent (however we decide to define agent)" is a great idea.
Using the word "choice" or "free will" to describe those causes, when it leads to completely different conclusions than those normally justified, by folk or society, by choice and free will, is just confusing the issue at best, and trying to mislead at worst.
I may have been unclear, however, the 'might as well be' was indeed intended to indicate that the Compatibilist is not committed to the truth of determinism. Rather, for the compatibilist it is all the same either way.
i see what the problem is now. youre arguing, but im discussing. i guess it's not a big deal, but just to let you in on something: nobody likes that guy.
whatever the case, youre argument is terrible. because you are arguing against compatibilism, but by assuming "i", you've already conceded defeat. in order to muster an argument against a concept, you cannot concede its fundamental conclusion.
it's like saying, "strawberries don't exist but they sure are delicious."
It remains, however, that my stance is "There is no logical discrepancy whatsoever in the coexistence of a coherent concept of determinism and a coherent concept of free will." I can still say that determinism is meaningless in its own right, for different reasons, even if it doesn't conflict with free will.
Furthermore, I have always acknowledged an alternate concept of ontology and determinism, in which free will isn't true, but only because nothing at all is true and truth can't exist. But I also argue this entire concept to be useless and meaningless.
Practically speaking, yes, because the indivisible entities are inaccessible to us. They are beyond a point of singularity, just like the cause of the Big Bang. There can be no truth for us with respect to them. To have truth of them is paradox. All truth is necessarily one of these illusory amalgamations of them. We distinguish truth or non-truth based on context and utility, and always necessarily to some degree of fuzziness and uncertainty. The idea that some truths are more physical than others, or more certain than others, or more illusory than others, is itself an illusion, based on perceived qualities of the composition, context, usefulness, or dependability of the type of truth in question.
For example:
Sure, there is a meaningful difference, even one that significantly affects how we arrive at truths in varying contexts. But there is not the difference you claim. Before, you talked about the truth of "((A ->
That's charming. First of all, no, you haven't let me get away with a lot of nonsense. You have been enlightened by my more advanced philosophical understanding of the concepts being discussed, or in other cases, have failed to grasp the next rung of the ladder in front of you. Secondly, the shit you don't want to let stand is in fact how the issues are framed in pretty much all contemporary philosophical literaure. In many cases compatabilism and incompatabilism are defensible stances even if one is agnostic or skeptical on the truths of free will and/or determinism.
This is, unfortunately, not logical or correct.
I think that under rationally consistent notions of truth, determinism, compatabilism, and free will: free will is true, compatabilism is true, and determinism is meaningless. It can be true or not, doesn't matter, and in fact I'm even fine with concluding that the meaningless of something's truth makes it therefore not true. None of these will really affect my argument.
Determinism in this regard is like saying "God did it." Sure, fine, God did it. When we conduct an experiment and get results, God did it. When a cause has an effect, God did it. The Big Bang, God did it. Your skepticism of God, that's just God testing you. And so on. When you then ask me whether or not it's true, well, I can say that introducing "God did it" as the root answer to everything doesn't actually change anything, it doesn't contradict anything, and so therefore I'm indifferent and non-confrontational towards anyone who insists on it being a premise. As a premise, it necessarily cannot affect the truth or falsehood of anything else, because it explains everything. It is therefore entirely compatible with any and all arguments I might choose to make. But as a non-falsifiable, unprovable, concept, no, I generally don't argue for such things as being positively true themselves. Determinism is perfectly inconsequential. On a number line, where + is true and - is false, determinism is exactly 0. It isn't saying or leading to anything that ever could be considered true or false. It's just a statement that "everything is in fact everything - there isn't something that isn't something." That doesn't qualify anything else we might want to argue about, but I'm not really going to say "that's false!"
It's only by getting trapped in your personal relationships with time and consciouness that you start fooling yourself into thinking that this means anything about past and future, causes and effects, or could have and otherwise. Those concepts all have meaning only to your conscious self at a point that self perceives to be the current time. Determinism cares not for your concept of self nor your experience of a point in time. It's what you care about that creates truth.
Agreed!
You have dodged the question of what this "I" is far too many times. I'm thinking that you are already well aware that this is a key point where your argument betrays its inconsistency and contradiction, but you are hoping we can skip over it.
Again, you are unfortunately incorrect about this. If the step being attacked was one that was only arrived at by a fork spawned from a previous argument by B, then the new attack cannot be inconsistent with previous argument. Else, you return to the previous step where the fork occurred, rather than advance to a next step along the forked path. This is what Keth is referring to here. When your challenges contradict one another, that can be meaningful to the attack you believe yourself to be waging. I hate that we've resorted to debating rhetoric itself now, though I have come to expect from you that you will resort to anything, including trying to rewrite the logic of how an argument works, in order to avoid acknowledging that your stance has been shown illogical.
Yes, you are defending what is known as incompatabilism. We are attacking it. Quite successfully. And to assert that you need not make a consistent argument is off-the-charts ridiculous and trollish. Yes, your stance must be consistent. It must not contradict itself. Showing an attack to be self-contradictory is an entirely valid defense.
No, it isn't (olol). But seriously, your account of how arguments work is incorrect. You claiming that you get to be inconsistent and self-contradictory and still win is incorrect. You claiming that you aren't defending something, but we are, is incorrect. And you know it. You always pull this shit and it drives me nuts and I can't beleive I let myself get this far into a discussion with you yet again. You always pull out the most ridiculous thread-murdering nonsense, like saying that you are allowed to be self-contradictory, whenever the argument turns against your previous beleifs.
I mean, holy shit, give me a break. Is your stance not "free will and determinism aren't compatible"? We both have postitions to defend here.
And, by the way, we have given a coherent account throughout the discussion.
EDIT: I declare Yar, MrMister, and Chake to be the undisputed winners of this thread.
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Part of the point is that predicating an argument upon ignorance is silly insofar as that ignorance follows through the argument. So, if one thinks one's self to be free as a result of ignorance, then the thinking of one's self to be free is, itself, ignorant.
It raises the question, I think, of the merit of any position which is fundamentally founded upon not knowing something. So, for example, an argument against creationism will be predicated upon something something something there was a big bang. Yet that idea of "big bang", if only from the phrase alone, is entirely ignorant.
So, if we want to tell a complete, coherent narrative it seems odd to found the entire thing on a fundamental position of ignorance.
Which is exactly why I feel that you can't make any claims about reality whatsoever.
But I'm fairly sure you don't actually agree with what you just said.
I'm not sure how "sure" or "makes" or "sense" or "I" make sense within determinism.
Those arguing against Free Will are saying that the above definitions are silly, and that Free Will does not exist, because the difference between "being mind-controlled" and "making your own decision" is that in one case you have one puppetmaster, and in the other you have many.
Sort of, but I think you've oversimplified to the point of neglecting some things. Would a puppetmaster necessarily be one who thinks and makes decisions himself? The name would imply that he is, but your argument implies the opposite.
I would say that the puppet master only makes decisions or thinks in the sense that the puppet does - that neither have free will. It's just a causal chain. Turtles all the way down.
It seems trivially true to me that all human actions are influenced by the outside world - and thus, the cause of all human actions is deterministic and unfree.
Let me explain:
The free will "problem" is only a problem (or "question" is only a question worth asking) because of the ramifications it has for ethical philosophy -- for normative judgment/statement. Otherwise it is, at best, an intellectual curiosity, no more a "problem" than some arcane puzzle.
If there is no free will -- if we are deterministic, in the sense of efficacy that Mr^2 poses (which I think is correct, but not particularly illuminating because that is generally how the debate already exists, as if accepting his clarification. Useful to laypeople, perhaps, who think that indeterministic natural processes like "uncertainty principle" are "solutions" to the problem of free will) -- then normative philosophy is pointless. Not because of issues of responsibility or guilt or what-have-you, but because people would be incapable of choosing to follow such dictums! People are either bound to accept your point of view or not, so the whole idea of arguing a normative standpoint is pretty much unnecessary. How can we argue about people how they ought to act if we accept that they are not capable of controlling those actions?
If there is free will, then normative statements make sense (in that they may actually be acted upon because agents exist who may act in the first place).
So, if we are to ever engage in normative philosophy of any sort, we must accept free-will as a precondition. For all intents and purposes then, free-will exists because the problematic nature of free will is problematic only in reference to normative statements, but normative statements necessitate the existence of free will.
However, there are some other things to consider.
One, many normative ethical philosophies hinge on questions of responsibility, fault, guilt, etc. And if we examine these questions, many people inevitably revert to a scientific framework and begin undermining concepts of agency with things like psychological/biological/natural causation which are overwhelmingly apparently beyond our control. If we maintain consistency, we naturally come back to a sort of deterministic position in that everything observable in the material world thus far is the product of deterministic or indeterministic but nevertheless not sui generis forces, therefore agency does not exist. And now we're back to not being able to make normative statements.
The solution then, is to excise any question of free will from normative/ethical philosophy, because these questions will ultimately always undermine the very premise of normative statements -- contradicting the very activity we are engaging in.
edit: or believe in some kind of completely unabridged form of free-will. But of course there's the whole issue that everything we know about the material world contradicts this.
Thus, the "problem" of free will is really just a way of pointing out that questions of free-will have no place in normative statements (because they ultimately will just contradict normativity itself), and essentially it's just an argument for a consequentialist (or other stances unconcerned with intent/agency) outlook on ethical philosophy.
edit: Oh, and if you look at this and say "well then you should argue that normative statements should be eliminated if they hinge on an entity which almost surely does not exist" you sort of have an inherent problem there because to advocate against normativity is, in fact, a normative position and you've implicitly accepted free-will.
Basically the way I see it, free will doesn't exist, can't exist, and everything we do is a sort of meaningless illusion but if we actually were rigorous about that it would have all sorts of silly consequences so it's best to just ignore the whole thing.
An "ought" statement is merely one more to add to the mix of causal forces at play. It isn't as though moral people spring into being with their understanding of how to behave fully realized and immutable.
What does that word even mean? Either something is going to follow, or it is not going to follow. What does it mean when you say that something 'can' do something?
It means that I don't know if it's going to or not.
If you want me to phrase it differently: nobody will "choose" to follow, but some people will follow.
That, of course, is also a normative statement. But, forgetting about that, it's also worth noting that ethical norms are not the only norms there are: there are also norms of proper reasoning. For instance, presumably you want to represent yourself as following correct standards of reasoning in coming up with your arguments, and you want to represent them as arguments which others should heed if they themselves want to follow correct standards of reasoning.
But it looks like you cannot do that, on your view, because you are claiming that normativity is based on an illusion. Which leaves you in a rather schizophrenic position, simultaneously representing your opinions to yourself as the correct result of the application of theoretical norms of proper reasoning, and yet at the same deducing from those self-same opinions that one can never actually apply those norms. So the conflicts in your attitude run deep and apparently necessitate a contradictory attitude. That does not seem like a badge of merit in any sort of philosophical position.
Well I think to some extent that's a shortcoming of philosophy. The human mind and its constructs, including deductive reasoning, are not bound to map perfectly to material reality. We may find ourselves in positions that require a certain amount of cognitive dissonance to even approach (due to the human brain, and its modes of interpreting and relating to physical reality), but I think it's somewhat biased to suggest that positions that require cognitive dissonance to explore aren't true, or closer to truth merely because of that fact.
Something that's deeply counter-intuitive may be true, but something which is actually self-contradictory certainly cannot be. But even if something is merely "dissonant" rather than flatly contradictory, do you at least agree that said dissonance counts as a prima facie, though not decisive, reason against it?
Something you do quite often, which I state not as an attack but rather as a description, is to invoke a notion of "all" or "every" with regard to this kind of critique. Summarized, your position is that "any criticism to which all positions are subject is not, actually, a criticism." So, when I articulate the above position of a flaw within positions predicated upon ignorance, you reply that "all" positions are subject to this criticism.
The difficulty I have with your utilization of this defense is that your articulation is, quite simply, wrong. The reason for this is that there is a difference between "all" and "a very high finite number" and "every position, except for one."
First, you articulate that all positions are predicated upon an inability to know the ultimate cause of things. I do not grant this premise, which ought to be obvious given that my initial quote was from Spinoza. Second, a solipsistic argument [all will note that this is my first invocation of this kind of argument within this thread] is not subject to the infinite regress of ignorance, given that a solipsistic approach is predicated upon naught but one certain premise: I exist.
I mention this not to argue for solipsism, or even to argue for Spinoza. Rather, I wish to articulate that your constant attempt to subsume the entirety of philosophy into one bucket, and then claim that particular critiques persons suggest are critiques of the entirety of the bucket, fails insofar as there are arguments which exist which are not constitutive components of your "all"; there are philosophical positions which exist outside of and immune from the bucket of "positions predicated upon ignorance".
There are positions which are immune from the ignorance critique I articulated above; there are positions which either articulate the first cause of things (Spinoza), or rest upon a fundamentally self-evident premise (solipsism).
Now, you are welcome to remedy your articulation to be such that "_J_'s critique of ignorance applies to all positions on everything EXCEPT FOR Spinozism and Solipsism and Cartesianism and da da da." However, I wonder if your critique will still stand, given that, previously, your argument was that "Any criticism which is applicable to all positions is not a genuine criticism."
Given that I have articulated at least two positions to which the critique is not applicable.
Edit: TL;DR: If a particular critique is applicable to 99% of positions, then 99% of positions are subject to the critique. A critique cannot be dismissed simply as a result of there being many, many, many incorrect philosophical positions and systems. Hell, a good critique will undermine all philosophical systems and positions which are incorrect, leaving the few correct articulations undamaged.
Things which philosophically irritate me: Persons who claim that ethical normativity is akin to normativity of reason. Or, said another way, that the "ought" of the ethical is the "ought" of reasoning.
Which is simply not the case.
Ethical normativity can be understood as an "oughtness", an ethical norm is an articulation of how one "ought to act". Reason does not have an "ought to" of similar qualities to the "ought to" of ethics. Ultimately, reason is not defined by normativity. One does not define a normativity to reason. Rather, one simply articulates that which reason is.
A properly schooled philosopher will never claim, "You ought to reason in manner X." Rather, a properly schooled philosopher will stated, "X is reason. Y is not reason." When teaching logic, one does not tell one's students "You ought to do modus ponens this way." Rather, one tells one's students, "This is how you fucking do Modus Ponens." Not as an "ought", but as a statement of the way things are.
There is no normativity to reason, there is no "how one ought to reason", as if there were multiple brands of reasoning, multiple flavors of reasoning. There is simply "reason" and "nonsense".
But that isn't a certain premise.
I can understand why accepting that would give you trouble, seeing as all of your philosophy relies strongly on it. But it isn't.
Or, the human mind and deductive reasoning are truly bound to perfectly mirror reality, and all other manners of "knowing" are flawed.
Zeno of Elea wrote that it is impossible to traverse any distance, given that to walk from point A to point B requires that one first walk halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to point B, and then halfway to halfway to halfway to point B. Persons say, "zomg look! I be walking!"
Well, either
1) Zeno is incorrect as a result of reasoning is flawed.
2) The person "walking" is incorrect as a result of sense data being flawed.
I do not know which is the case, but there is a question to be asked of how one knows that which truly is the case. 1 and 2 cannot both be correct. So, which is correct?
Which? Spinoza or the other one?
It is almost certainly #1. Space is probably not infinitely divisible.
I exist.
Alrighty.
To be brief, #1.
Although I don't buy that if Zeno is wrong, reasoning itself is necessarily flawed, at least not in the way that you mean it, I think.
However I think Zeno is a perfect illustration of the reality that the human brain is built to make models -- simplified versions of reality that collect data most relevant to survival and reproduction (taken very broadly, mind you), and ignore the rest. I mean, we know for a fact that the brain filters out irrelevant information fro moment-to-moment, but even more egregious is when we are building models, either unconsciously (desire/emotion), or consciously (reason).
Hell, our entire investigation of the physical world has always been built on models and still is. From the model of the heavens put forward by Ptolemy or Aristotle to the one put forward by Copernicus to what we now use as a model today -- these models are always simplifications of reality, ignoring "irrelevant" data.
Our models become increasingly complex as we test them against reality -- a model that is overly simplistic will fail to predict observed reality as effectively as one that more closely mimics/contains reality itself. Thus we have gone from phrenology (which did at least get localization of function correct), to modern neuroscience, ever complicating our model as we go, increasingly reflecting the vastness of data in the real world.
I wonder if it is even possible to create models that fully mimic reality -- if we did, would that not in fact be a complete and separate reality? To contain all the information there is, wouldn't that essentially be a simulation that is reality? Imagine all the computation expressed in the molecular motion of a crashing wave -- one wonders if we can ever practically replicate such complexity, or if it would ever be worthwhile.
Anyway, my point is that deductive reasoning is actually the worst sort of reasoning, if we are measuring "worst" as "the ability to accurately predict observed reality." Hence Zeno. Terrible at predicting observed reality (and since observed realit
We still argue over Plato and Aristotle -- many of their arguments are still considered to be under the umbrella of acceptable opinion. This is not the case with Ptolemy or Galen, in their respective scientific fields.
In fact, deductive reasoning never can definitively move forward, because "truth" can never be found in it, beyond literally truistic statements (and those aren't interesting, because they're just definitional masturbation). Truth in deduction is always a matter of being able to convince an audience -- it is entirely dependent on being challenged by other people. This is how philosophical dictums can be accepted as true for centuries before being challenged, but even upon being challenged, they are not necessarily discarded! Since deduction is the creation of pitifully simple models (absent the complicating effect of observing reality), rebutting deductive claims is merely a matter of dreaming up a different or slightly more complex model, which thanks to the lack of influence from observed reality, are nearly infinite in nature.
Science meanwhile, does firmly discard theories as it goes along. And this is represented also in the physical correlate of advancing technology -- we are, certainly, able to build things we could not build before, to perform tasks and manipulate reality to extents which were impossible before.
Philosophy meanders, still debating 5,000 year-old doctrines, and its physical correlate (policy/society) has failed to produce any significant or consistent gains in human satisfaction/happiness, if you consider all the way back to hunter-gatherers.
A pretty abysmal record.
I used to think this until I learnt something about current philosophy and realised I'm making a grand, pompous argument based on complete and utter ignorance.
So no, sorry, most contemporary philosophy does not, in fact, argue about plato and aristotle. You might want to go read up a bit like I did so you know how wrong you are just like I do.
Also while you are at it, realise that science is philosophy, is influenced by philosophy, has always been influenced by philosophy and changed by philosophy and this is clearly evident if you read through history. As a scientist, when you are interpreting your hard empirical data, you are doing philosophy. It doesn't matter if you claim you are not. It just makes you a hypocrite, rather than right.
Sure there's some philosophy that probably doesn't mean much. This does not mean it is all alike or equally useless. To brush it all aside is to attack the very principles science itself is founded upon. This is...not very bright. Nor is it at all convincing.
that doesn't make any sense whatsoever.
Okay.
I don't think anything you said is relevant, though. Even if reason and nonsense represent a binary distinction, reasoning still involves the proper application of norms, and representing yourself as having correctly reasoned involves representing yourself as having correctly applied those norms. That's all the normativity I needed for my point.
Zeno's paradoxes are not deductively sound arguments. I am not sure you understand what a deductive argument is, given the things you have said about them. A deductively valid argument is one whose premises logically guarantee the truth of its conclusion, and a deductively sound argument is one which not only is valid but also has true premises.
Models and observed reality have nothing particularly to do with it.