Every person makes their own decisions. I cannot even demonstrate objectively that anything besides my own consciousness exists. How can I possibly posit an objective moral code?
You, as a conscious being, have some experiences that are pleasant, and others that are unpleasant. If there are other conscious beings, they will also have some experiences that are pleasant and others that are unpleasant. Since, by definition, nobody likes unpleasant experiences and everybody likes pleasant experiences, unpleasant experiences are bad and pleasant experiences are good. You would like good things and not like bad things to happen to you, other conscious beings - if they exist - would like good things and not like bad things done to them, and nobody has any claim to greater importance than any other conscious being. Therefore, you must not interfere with another conscious being's preferences towards good things and against bad things, and they mustn't interfere with yours (at the very least, you should probably actively support the perferences towards good things of other conscious beings).
Additionally, you, as a conscious being, exhibit certain traits that mark you as a conscious being. Some things in the world do not exhibit those traits. Other things in the world do exhibit those traits. It may be the case that the things that don't exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually possess consciousness, and it may be the case that the things that do exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually do not possess consciousness, but it's much more reasonable to assume that things that behave as though they are conscious are in fact conscious, and to treat them as outlined above.
Every person makes their own decisions. I cannot even demonstrate objectively that anything besides my own consciousness exists. How can I possibly posit an objective moral code?
You, as a conscious being, have some experiences that are pleasant, and others that are unpleasant. If there are other conscious beings, they will also have some experiences that are pleasant and others that are unpleasant. Since, by definition, nobody likes unpleasant experiences and everybody likes pleasant experiences, unpleasant experiences are bad and pleasant experiences are good. You would like good things and not like bad things to happen to you, other conscious beings - if they exist - would like good things and not like bad things done to them, and nobody has any claim to greater importance than any other conscious being. Therefore, you must not interfere with another conscious being's preferences towards good things and against bad things, and they mustn't interfere with yours.
Additionally, you, as a conscious being, exhibit certain traits that mark you as a conscious being. Some things in the world do not exhibit those traits. Other things in the world do exhibit those traits. It may be the case that the things that don't exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually possess consciousness, and it may be the case that the things that do exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually do not possess consciousness, but it's much more reasonable to assume that things that behave as though they are conscious are in fact conscious, and to treat them as outlined above.
Also, what moniker and Mr^2 said. Seriously.
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
By the claim that it's all true. Argue the facts if you want, but I did just assert an objective moral code that doesn't care whether or not there are any real people aside from you.
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
If you aren't an asshole to other people, they will be less likely to act like an asshole to you.
I'll grant that as a sociological phenomenon. I don't see how it's a moral imperative.
It's not an imperative in the sense that someone is forcing you, or keeping tally on you. It's an imperative in the sense that it's the smart thing to do. Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
If you aren't an asshole to other people, they will be less likely to act like an asshole to you.
I'll grant that as a sociological phenomenon. I don't see how it's a moral imperative.
It's not an imperative in the sense that someone is forcing you, or keeping tally on you. It's an imperative in the sense that it's the smart thing to do. Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
Okay, so now you need to define wisdom. Why is it smarter to be nice to people if I have the power to force them to be nice to me anyway?
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
If you aren't an asshole to other people, they will be less likely to act like an asshole to you.
I'll grant that as a sociological phenomenon. I don't see how it's a moral imperative.
It's not an imperative in the sense that someone is forcing you, or keeping tally on you. It's an imperative in the sense that it's the smart thing to do. Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
Okay, so now you need to define wisdom. Why is it smarter to be nice to people if I have the power to force them to be nice to me anyway?
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
If you aren't an asshole to other people, they will be less likely to act like an asshole to you.
I'll grant that as a sociological phenomenon. I don't see how it's a moral imperative.
It's not an imperative in the sense that someone is forcing you, or keeping tally on you. It's an imperative in the sense that it's the smart thing to do. Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
Okay, so now you need to define wisdom. Why is it smarter to be nice to people if I have the power to force them to be nice to me anyway?
Because you do not have that power?
Also the whole "But... Why?" thing is not really the deepest end of the philosophy pool.
There is no more reason a theist should have a definite moral compass than a non-theist. Why should you do what God says? If the reason is that the alternative condemns you to hellfire and brimstone, then that doesn't mean God's laws are moral; it's just an appeal to force on a cosmic scale.
So theism doesn't imply absolute morality. That doesn't get us very far, because now we seem really lost--if absolute morality doesn't come from God, where does it come from? Greeper, you wrote that you base your moral compass on yourself. It should be immediately obvious why that's not satisfactory: if you were, hypothetically, a sociopath incapable of feeling empathy and went around murdering people, you would still pass whatever personal moral test you adhere to. That's the essence of relativism.
I am, thankfully, however, not. So it's okay.
On the other hand, I would never not-do something just cause there's some vague threat against it from a questionable deity.
Okay, so now you need to define wisdom. Why is it smarter to be nice to people if I have the power to force them to be nice to me anyway?
Why is it smarter to say 1+1=2 if you can say 1+1=red instead?
Because it's smarter to be right, that's why.
Mathematics being nothing more than a shared assumption, there is nothing inherently wrong with the statement that 1+1=red. For that matter none of those symbols have any inherent meaning. If I reject the consensus, am I wrong?
And now you're saying there is no conceivable situation in which oppressing people could be more beneficial to my self-interest that treating them fairly.
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
And now you're saying there is no conceivable situation in which oppressing people could be more beneficial to my self-interest that treating them fairly.
It's conceivable, but unlikely. Treating them fairly is a sure thing.
And now you're saying there is no conceivable situation in which oppressing people could be more beneficial to my self-interest that treating them fairly.
It's conceivable, but unlikely. Treating them fairly is a sure thing.
That's not really being moral, though, is it? It's acting in my own self-interest. Do you actually think that if oppressing people were the more surely beneficial thing for me, it would therefore be the more moral?
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
That's not really being moral, though, is it? It's acting in my own self-interest. Do you actually think that if oppressing people were the more surely beneficial thing for me, it would therefore be the more moral?
I don't know where you people get the idea that self-interest and morality are incompatible. I blame Kant.
I'm sorry, I was responding to your claim that they are synonymous. Is that wrong?
Mathematics being nothing more than a shared assumption, there is nothing inherently wrong with the statement that 1+1=red. For that matter none of those symbols have any inherent meaning. If I reject the consensus, am I wrong?
Yes. You can reject the standard linguistic constructs that represent the concepts, but if you assert that the concept represented by the symbol "1" when made to interact with itself according to the parameters represented by the symbol "+" results in the colour represented by the word "red" then you've committed some kind of fundamental category error.
Similarly, if you treat people as though they are not people - that is, if you do not treat them according to the rough guidelines I provided earlier - then you've committed a fundamental category error. As people they deserve certain treatment, and in denying them that you deny that they are people. That is factually wrong.
Grid System on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
That's not really being moral, though, is it? It's acting in my own self-interest. Do you actually think that if oppressing people were the more surely beneficial thing for me, it would therefore be the more moral?
I don't know where you people get the idea that self-interest and morality are incompatible. I blame Kant.
I'm sorry, I was responding to your claim that they are synonymous. Is that wrong?
I don't think I'd call them synonymous, but I do think that acting morally is in your best interest. This is because I believe that helping others is a requirement to happiness. Ruling over your peasant slaves as a decadent king might please same of your baser desires, but it will not make you fulfilled.
Mathematics being nothing more than a shared assumption, there is nothing inherently wrong with the statement that 1+1=red. For that matter none of those symbols have any inherent meaning. If I reject the consensus, am I wrong?
Yes. You can reject the standard linguistic constructs that represent the concepts, but if you assert that the concept represented by the symbol "1" when made to interact with itself according to the parameters represented by the symbol "+" results in the colour represented by the word "red" then you've committed some kind of fundamental category error.
This is interesting, but not totally relevant. I really don't want to get off on perceptual relativity here. Let's stick to the meaty bits:
Similarly, if you treat people as though they are not people - that is, if you do not treat them according to the rough guidelines I provided earlier - then you've committed a fundamental category error. As people they deserve certain treatment, and in denying them that you deny that they are people. That is factually wrong.
We will have to agree, in the interests of a shared reality, that there are things which we call people, which appear and behave in a certain way. These are facts.
Now, you are asking me to accept that people are, factually, more than just these things which we both acknowledge. They carry with them a collection of duties and responsibilities to me personally, in that I am obligated to clothe and feed them, give them a safe place to sleep, not kill their babies, et cetera et cetera.
So I say, that's a very interesting thought, but I don't see it. Nothing about what I see suggests these responsibilities. What is it about these things, I ask, that you feel I should treat them this way? Can you point it out to me?
I'm sorry, I was responding to your claim that they are synonymous. Is that wrong?
I don't think I'd call them synonymous, but I do think that acting morally is in your best interest. This is because I believe that helping others is a requirement to happiness. Ruling over your peasant slaves as a decadent king might please same of your baser desires, but it will not make you fulfilled.
Okay, this is great. The bolded bit is super important.
Let's say I am happy abusing others. This isn't a bullshit hypothetical of any sort, this is something that happens to people. Is it still immoral to do so?
We will have to agree, in the interests of a shared reality, that there are things which we call people, which appear and behave in a certain way. These are facts.
Now, you are asking me to accept that people are, factually, more than just these things which we both acknowledge. They carry with them a collection of duties and responsibilities to me personally, in that I am obligated to clothe and feed them, give them a safe place to sleep, not kill their babies, et cetera et cetera.
So I say, that's a very interesting thought, but I don't see it. Nothing about what I see suggests these responsibilities. What is it about these things, I ask, that you feel I should treat them this way? Can you point it out to me?
You, as a conscious being, have some experiences that are pleasant, and others that are unpleasant. If there are other conscious beings, they will also have some experiences that are pleasant and others that are unpleasant. Since, by definition, nobody likes unpleasant experiences and everybody likes pleasant experiences, unpleasant experiences are bad and pleasant experiences are good. You would like good things and not like bad things to happen to you, other conscious beings - if they exist - would like good things and not like bad things done to them, and nobody has any claim to greater importance than any other conscious being. Therefore, you must not interfere with another conscious being's preferences towards good things and against bad things, and they mustn't interfere with yours (at the very least, you should probably actively support the perferences towards good things of other conscious beings).
You're welcome to challenge any of these arguments I've already made.
We will have to agree, in the interests of a shared reality, that there are things which we call people, which appear and behave in a certain way. These are facts.
Now, you are asking me to accept that people are, factually, more than just these things which we both acknowledge. They carry with them a collection of duties and responsibilities to me personally, in that I am obligated to clothe and feed them, give them a safe place to sleep, not kill their babies, et cetera et cetera.
So I say, that's a very interesting thought, but I don't see it. Nothing about what I see suggests these responsibilities. What is it about these things, I ask, that you feel I should treat them this way? Can you point it out to me?
You, as a conscious being, have some experiences that are pleasant, and others that are unpleasant. If there are other conscious beings, they will also have some experiences that are pleasant and others that are unpleasant. Since, by definition, nobody likes unpleasant experiences and everybody likes pleasant experiences, unpleasant experiences are bad and pleasant experiences are good. You would like good things and not like bad things to happen to you, other conscious beings - if they exist - would like good things and not like bad things done to them, and nobody has any claim to greater importance than any other conscious being. Therefore, you must not interfere with another conscious being's preferences towards good things and against bad things, and they mustn't interfere with yours (at the very least, you should probably actively support the perferences towards good things of other conscious beings).
You're welcome to challenge any of these arguments I've already made.
I don't see why I need to challenge your assertion when the whole of my argument is that it is your assertion.
I understand what you're saying. You still haven't demonstrated that it's anything but your opinion.
Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
No they are not.
You can define wisdom as the ability to distinguish between what is moral and what is immoral, and even that would be a shaky and somewhat narrow definition.
Or you can argue that acting morally is a wise thing to do, but again that would be arguable.
Wisdom and morality are totally different concepts.
I don't see why I need to challenge your assertion when the whole of my argument is that it is your assertion.
Because if my assertion accurately describes the way the world is, and if you do not behave accordingly, then you are behaving wrongly.
I understand what you're saying. You still haven't demonstrated that it's anything but your opinion.
What about it isn't fact? I've made positive claims about the way the world is. If you disagree, you have to mobilize evidence to disprove me. You can't just say, "well, that's your opinion" and call it a day. Well, I suppose you can but doing so is kind of dumb. It doesn't bring anything new to the table.
I don't see why I need to challenge your assertion when the whole of my argument is that it is your assertion.
Because if my assertion accurately describes the way the world is, and if you do not behave accordingly, then you are behaving wrongly.
Let me see if I can paraphrase your argument.
Premise: People want to be happy.
Conclusion: The only right thing to do is to make people happy.
Now, I won't dispute your premise, I mean, it's simple, but not worth arguing about. The problem is that you seem to be saying your conclusion is fact, but you haven't connected it to anything I've agreed to. My entire point is that the conclusion is unfounded.
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
Let's say I am happy abusing others. This isn't a bullshit hypothetical of any sort, this is something that happens to people. Is it still immoral to do so?
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Let's say I am happy abusing others. This isn't a bullshit hypothetical of any sort, this is something that happens to people. Is it still immoral to do so?
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Your moral system doesn't account for sadists. That seems like something of an oversight.
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
Let's say I am happy abusing others. This isn't a bullshit hypothetical of any sort, this is something that happens to people. Is it still immoral to do so?
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Your moral system doesn't account for sadists. That seems like something of an oversight.
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Your moral system doesn't account for sadists. That seems like something of an oversight.
Bolded part.
So your system of morality is based on the idea that it is literally impossible to be happy without being moral?
I guess I'd just ask what the point is, then.
Adrien on
0
Options
HachfaceNot the Minister Farrakhan you're thinking ofDammit, Shepard!Registered Userregular
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Your moral system doesn't account for sadists. That seems like something of an oversight.
Bolded part.
So your system of morality is based on the idea that it is literally impossible to be happy without being moral?
I guess I'd just ask what the point is, then.
Happiness is as close as we're going to get to a self-evidently good thing. If you don't believe that, then you're just a nihilist.
Edit: And if you are a nihilist, good for you, but we don't really have anything to discuss further in that case, do we?
So your system of morality is based on the idea that it is literally impossible to be happy without being moral?
I guess I'd just ask what the point is, then.
Happiness is as close as we're going to get to a self-evidently good thing. If you don't believe that, then you're just a nihilist.
Edit: And if you are a nihilist, good for you, but we don't really have anything to discuss further in that case, do we?
Of course I'll grant that whatever makes me happy is moral. Is that what you're trying to say?
Yes, with the caveat that I'm not talking about immediate, idiosyncratic pleasure. I'm talking about capital-H profound-eudaimoniac-satisfaction-with-life Happiness. I submit that as a human being what makes you happy makes others happy as well. If morality isn't about minimizing agony and maximizing happiness, after all, what good is it?
Of course I'll grant that whatever makes me happy is moral. Is that what you're trying to say?
Yes, with the caveat that I'm not talking about immediate, idiosyncratic pleasure. I'm talking about capital-H profound-eudaimoniac-satisfaction-with-life Happiness. I submit that as a human being what makes you happy makes others happy as well. If morality isn't about minimizing agony and maximizing happiness, after all, what good is it?
You might need to be a bit less personal. I think it's a hard sell that empathy is as universal a quality as you or I might like it to be.
That's still not totally relevant, though, in that it's still just me saying that people should act a certain way.
Who gets to choose which values are best? or even just better? Tell me who the judge and jury are?
We haven't found a mechanistic method for solving moral dilemmas. Does that mean they have no answer? No, no it doesn't. Really, what should be clear is the absurdity of the opposing position. Do you think that, all other things being equal, it's better for a person to starve than not? If so, you committed yourself to a moral claim. Do you think that claim is only true for you? I'm not sure what it's even supposed to mean for a claim to be true for you.
I know that you would prefer for a person not to starve. But how do you justify that preference if not through reference to an actual fact of the matter? Or do you just not justify it at all? If that's the case, then there doesn't seem to be any reason for you to prefer the person not starve, and no reason for you to criticize someone who lets others starve. Why not switch your opinion to the other way around?
Relativism is just a mess.
i know this was a couple pages back but i just wanted to respond to this.
relativism is not about being unable to express your own opinion on a matter and i think objectivists strawman relativists too often with this line of thinking. i have an opinion on starving. it sucks. if i can stop someone from starving, i will do so.
but im not ready to say that everyone in the universe does and should hold the same opinion as me.
in other words, moral objectivists are all arrogant assholes. i keed, i keed.
Why does being on a moral high ground matter at all?
Should a person constantly strive to be on morally higher ground?
Which should come first: their beliefs, or what is morally right or wrong?
What is morally right or wrong depends on your beliefs.
Morally it is perfectly alright for a Christian to slaughter and consume a cow because cows were given to man by God as a beast of burden and source of food.
To a Hindu that is morally outrageous because the cow is sacred.
To a Buddhist it is abhorent because all life is sacred and we can all be reborn as a cow.
To a Jew it would be wrong unless it was prepared in a way to make it koshur(sp?)
(not positive on the tenets of the particular religions though, feel free to correct me.)
Which of those people holds the moral high ground?
Premise: People want to be happy.
Conclusion: The only right thing to do is to make people happy.
You've missed the critical point.
Now, I won't dispute your premise, I mean, it's simple, but not worth arguing about. The problem is that you seem to be saying your conclusion is fact, but you haven't connected it to anything I've agreed to. My entire point is that the conclusion is unfounded.
Well, if you misunderstand (or simply miss entirely) the argument, then sure, it would look like the conclusion is unfounded.
The critical point is that everyone has an equal claim to happiness and the avoidance of suffering. If people are willing to say that their desires to be happy are sufficient reasons to make themselves happy, then they also have to say that other people's desires to be happy are sufficient reasons to make those other people happy (because the claims are identical in terms of basic content and overall force).
1. You need to answer this: Do you accept that it is the consequences of your action, not the intent, that defines whether it is an objective good?
2. I don't disagree there may be an 'objective good'. I disagree that people are able to agree on the definition. I also argue that if we cannot define an objective good, in practice, taking action to attain it is subjective; action depends on differing opinions of what the definition is.
To your original point, you are strawmanning the opposing view. There may well be some people who take the 'every action is inherently selfish' position, but then they are simplistic, as is your argument against them. There are people, however, who argue that every action - particularly those with a moral intent - is inherently influenced by your self. I would call this a subset of psychological egoism, but I don't really care about the semantics - let's call it Bob.
You've called this obvious before, and it is. But what it means is somewhat more complex, certainly a damn sight more so than your categorical and objective goods. Gnomus Interruptus & others have offered examples, but here are two more re: giving to charity.
1. There is a very popular advert on UK television at the moment, with lots of celebrities telling us to buy a charity goat for the poor, starving peoples of wherever instead of a present for our rich, fat, chavvy kids / relatives / partners. Unfortunate thing is, I know someone who worked Africa with many NGO's for 10 years, who knows this particular operation; it is disasterously bad on the ground. They have little to no expertise in delivery, meaning most of it gets lost in govt. corruption, and the principle is bad & developed in the West, not by asking the people themselves - generally, the poor, starving peoples don't actually need a goat, they need infrastructure.
Are UK people giving in response to the advert making a categorical good? Sure, some of it might get through. Some goats might help briefly, but some might hurt - using their milk can kill the poor starving African children, who tend to be totally lactose intolerant, through diarrhea. Certainly there are more effective ways to use that money, which means it is not an objective good.
2. American Evangelists donate a huge amount of aid to Israel, and increasingly to Palestine, both privately and publically. Israel (and since there is no Palestinian state, this also includes Palestine) recieves the largest aid flows in the world. There is obviously a question there as to how much good it is doing, but it's too complex for this forum.
There is a less complex question as to the intent behind their charity. Are they just giving away money to the poor, war-torn peoples of the Middle East? No. There is a specific Rapturist reasoning here which sees the problems of Israel as the herald of Armageddon, and contributes not necessarily to help them, but in the belief that the fall & overthrow of the state of Israel will be a marker for the start of the Rapture, so the sooner the better.
It is a very dubious moral intent, but it is a moral intent - their system of morality sees the 2nd Coming as an objective good, so they are willing to cause pain & suffering to make it happen. There is also no small degree of self-interest - who gets saved in the Rapture?
The first example is a demonstration of how simply giving to charity is not an objective or categorical good. The second demonstrates the dubious claims of moral objectivity, and the effects that acting on that principle can have.
My problem with your argument is that it has real, practical effects if people follow it. These effects are not always good. In the first case, much money gets wasted or misused - moreover, the mere act of giving to charity makes you 'fancy'. There is an economic term for 'fancy', it's called moral hazard. It means that while you are caught up in the glow of what you think is doin' good, you are ignoring the actual negative effects of your actions or letting bigger problems pass by unnoticed.
Another problem I have is that your claims of objective & categorical goods just don't play out in reality. I don't know any intelligent, open-minded people who have been out to Africa, war-zones, working with inner-city drug programs etc, who still believe in moral certainties & objectivity. And these are the people who spend their lives trying to attain those objective moral goods. Come back in 20 years and repeat what you are saying now, because I'm simply more inclined to listen to them than a college philosophy student - I salute you idealism, but not your experience.
This is your basic problem. Your argument often comes down to moral theory & principle, but it claims practical use & real application (voting, giving to charity). Reality isn't theoretical.
Mainly what I was going after in my post was the bullshit subjectivism and relativism that runs rampant around these parts. Specifically, there is a huge aversion to anyone ever making a definitive moral claim: for instance, witness the response in the other thread when I said it was wrong to vote based exclusively on self interest. Or, in this thread, when I said that giving money to charity is categorically good. I got a lot of "you think you're so fancy, but you're not so fancy."
Actually, most of the response in the other thread was to how you proposed it was right to vote (ie for the objective good) when you couldn't define what that was. Same question as here.
Again, and keeping my point 2. at the top in mind, I'll ask you to give a definitive moral claim that cannot be challenged by someone else's system of morality.
My question would be: why do you get to state there are definitive moral claims? I haven't seen one yet that hasn't been questioned by someone. On the other hand, I've seen lots of examples here of 'categorical' or 'objective' goods being, in fact, somewhat destructive and against their intent. Why should people be listening to your claims of objectivity, when the other lot actually have some objective evidence?
But if money makes me happy, how does me giving my money away to someone else to make them happy make any sense? Why arent they doing something to give me more money to make me more happy?
Posts
Additionally, you, as a conscious being, exhibit certain traits that mark you as a conscious being. Some things in the world do not exhibit those traits. Other things in the world do exhibit those traits. It may be the case that the things that don't exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually possess consciousness, and it may be the case that the things that do exhibit traits which indicate consciousness in you actually do not possess consciousness, but it's much more reasonable to assume that things that behave as though they are conscious are in fact conscious, and to treat them as outlined above.
Also, what moniker and Mr^2 said. Seriously.
And what if I reject all of that? By what claim do you assert it on me?
If you aren't an asshole to other people, they will be less likely to act like an asshole to you.
I'll grant that as a sociological phenomenon. I don't see how it's a moral imperative.
It's not an imperative in the sense that someone is forcing you, or keeping tally on you. It's an imperative in the sense that it's the smart thing to do. Ultimately, wisdom and morality are one and the same.
Okay, so now you need to define wisdom. Why is it smarter to be nice to people if I have the power to force them to be nice to me anyway?
Gee, I haven't any idea.
Because you do not have that power?
Also the whole "But... Why?" thing is not really the deepest end of the philosophy pool.
Don't make me eat your baby, Adrien.
Because it's smarter to be right, that's why.
Mathematics being nothing more than a shared assumption, there is nothing inherently wrong with the statement that 1+1=red. For that matter none of those symbols have any inherent meaning. If I reject the consensus, am I wrong?
You seem to be having some trouble with it regardless. Do you have an answer for my actual question?
And now you're saying there is no conceivable situation in which oppressing people could be more beneficial to my self-interest that treating them fairly.
It's conceivable, but unlikely. Treating them fairly is a sure thing.
That's not really being moral, though, is it? It's acting in my own self-interest. Do you actually think that if oppressing people were the more surely beneficial thing for me, it would therefore be the more moral?
I don't know where you people get the idea that self-interest and morality are incompatible. I blame Kant.
I'm sorry, I was responding to your claim that they are synonymous. Is that wrong?
Similarly, if you treat people as though they are not people - that is, if you do not treat them according to the rough guidelines I provided earlier - then you've committed a fundamental category error. As people they deserve certain treatment, and in denying them that you deny that they are people. That is factually wrong.
I don't think I'd call them synonymous, but I do think that acting morally is in your best interest. This is because I believe that helping others is a requirement to happiness. Ruling over your peasant slaves as a decadent king might please same of your baser desires, but it will not make you fulfilled.
This is interesting, but not totally relevant. I really don't want to get off on perceptual relativity here. Let's stick to the meaty bits:
We will have to agree, in the interests of a shared reality, that there are things which we call people, which appear and behave in a certain way. These are facts.
Now, you are asking me to accept that people are, factually, more than just these things which we both acknowledge. They carry with them a collection of duties and responsibilities to me personally, in that I am obligated to clothe and feed them, give them a safe place to sleep, not kill their babies, et cetera et cetera.
So I say, that's a very interesting thought, but I don't see it. Nothing about what I see suggests these responsibilities. What is it about these things, I ask, that you feel I should treat them this way? Can you point it out to me?
Okay, this is great. The bolded bit is super important.
Let's say I am happy abusing others. This isn't a bullshit hypothetical of any sort, this is something that happens to people. Is it still immoral to do so?
I don't see why I need to challenge your assertion when the whole of my argument is that it is your assertion.
I understand what you're saying. You still haven't demonstrated that it's anything but your opinion.
No they are not.
You can define wisdom as the ability to distinguish between what is moral and what is immoral, and even that would be a shaky and somewhat narrow definition.
Or you can argue that acting morally is a wise thing to do, but again that would be arguable.
Wisdom and morality are totally different concepts.
What about it isn't fact? I've made positive claims about the way the world is. If you disagree, you have to mobilize evidence to disprove me. You can't just say, "well, that's your opinion" and call it a day. Well, I suppose you can but doing so is kind of dumb. It doesn't bring anything new to the table.
Let me see if I can paraphrase your argument.
Premise: People want to be happy.
Conclusion: The only right thing to do is to make people happy.
Now, I won't dispute your premise, I mean, it's simple, but not worth arguing about. The problem is that you seem to be saying your conclusion is fact, but you haven't connected it to anything I've agreed to. My entire point is that the conclusion is unfounded.
I am 99% sure that you are not happy abusing others. Sociopaths are emotionally impoverished; they lack the capacity to be happy, because a robust ability to for empathy is a necessity to happiness. That's just the way people are. I suspect it's rooted in biology.
We can play the "what if" game forever ("What if I'm a shark? Is it OK to eat people then?"), but it's not exactly relevant.
Your moral system doesn't account for sadists. That seems like something of an oversight.
Bolded part.
I would suggest that they should be helped if possible, or contained if not.
So your system of morality is based on the idea that it is literally impossible to be happy without being moral?
I guess I'd just ask what the point is, then.
Happiness is as close as we're going to get to a self-evidently good thing. If you don't believe that, then you're just a nihilist.
Edit: And if you are a nihilist, good for you, but we don't really have anything to discuss further in that case, do we?
Of course I'll grant that whatever makes me happy is moral. Is that what you're trying to say?
Yes, with the caveat that I'm not talking about immediate, idiosyncratic pleasure. I'm talking about capital-H profound-eudaimoniac-satisfaction-with-life Happiness. I submit that as a human being what makes you happy makes others happy as well. If morality isn't about minimizing agony and maximizing happiness, after all, what good is it?
You might need to be a bit less personal. I think it's a hard sell that empathy is as universal a quality as you or I might like it to be.
That's still not totally relevant, though, in that it's still just me saying that people should act a certain way.
i know this was a couple pages back but i just wanted to respond to this.
relativism is not about being unable to express your own opinion on a matter and i think objectivists strawman relativists too often with this line of thinking. i have an opinion on starving. it sucks. if i can stop someone from starving, i will do so.
but im not ready to say that everyone in the universe does and should hold the same opinion as me.
in other words, moral objectivists are all arrogant assholes. i keed, i keed.
but you know what i mean.
Why does being on a moral high ground matter at all?
Should a person constantly strive to be on morally higher ground?
Which should come first: their beliefs, or what is morally right or wrong?
What is morally right or wrong depends on your beliefs.
Morally it is perfectly alright for a Christian to slaughter and consume a cow because cows were given to man by God as a beast of burden and source of food.
To a Hindu that is morally outrageous because the cow is sacred.
To a Buddhist it is abhorent because all life is sacred and we can all be reborn as a cow.
To a Jew it would be wrong unless it was prepared in a way to make it koshur(sp?)
(not positive on the tenets of the particular religions though, feel free to correct me.)
Which of those people holds the moral high ground?
MWO: Adamski
Well, if you misunderstand (or simply miss entirely) the argument, then sure, it would look like the conclusion is unfounded.
The critical point is that everyone has an equal claim to happiness and the avoidance of suffering. If people are willing to say that their desires to be happy are sufficient reasons to make themselves happy, then they also have to say that other people's desires to be happy are sufficient reasons to make those other people happy (because the claims are identical in terms of basic content and overall force).
Two basic arguments:
1. You need to answer this: Do you accept that it is the consequences of your action, not the intent, that defines whether it is an objective good?
2. I don't disagree there may be an 'objective good'. I disagree that people are able to agree on the definition. I also argue that if we cannot define an objective good, in practice, taking action to attain it is subjective; action depends on differing opinions of what the definition is.
To your original point, you are strawmanning the opposing view. There may well be some people who take the 'every action is inherently selfish' position, but then they are simplistic, as is your argument against them. There are people, however, who argue that every action - particularly those with a moral intent - is inherently influenced by your self. I would call this a subset of psychological egoism, but I don't really care about the semantics - let's call it Bob.
You've called this obvious before, and it is. But what it means is somewhat more complex, certainly a damn sight more so than your categorical and objective goods. Gnomus Interruptus & others have offered examples, but here are two more re: giving to charity.
Are UK people giving in response to the advert making a categorical good? Sure, some of it might get through. Some goats might help briefly, but some might hurt - using their milk can kill the poor starving African children, who tend to be totally lactose intolerant, through diarrhea. Certainly there are more effective ways to use that money, which means it is not an objective good.
There is a less complex question as to the intent behind their charity. Are they just giving away money to the poor, war-torn peoples of the Middle East? No. There is a specific Rapturist reasoning here which sees the problems of Israel as the herald of Armageddon, and contributes not necessarily to help them, but in the belief that the fall & overthrow of the state of Israel will be a marker for the start of the Rapture, so the sooner the better.
It is a very dubious moral intent, but it is a moral intent - their system of morality sees the 2nd Coming as an objective good, so they are willing to cause pain & suffering to make it happen. There is also no small degree of self-interest - who gets saved in the Rapture?
The first example is a demonstration of how simply giving to charity is not an objective or categorical good. The second demonstrates the dubious claims of moral objectivity, and the effects that acting on that principle can have.
My problem with your argument is that it has real, practical effects if people follow it. These effects are not always good. In the first case, much money gets wasted or misused - moreover, the mere act of giving to charity makes you 'fancy'. There is an economic term for 'fancy', it's called moral hazard. It means that while you are caught up in the glow of what you think is doin' good, you are ignoring the actual negative effects of your actions or letting bigger problems pass by unnoticed.
Another problem I have is that your claims of objective & categorical goods just don't play out in reality. I don't know any intelligent, open-minded people who have been out to Africa, war-zones, working with inner-city drug programs etc, who still believe in moral certainties & objectivity. And these are the people who spend their lives trying to attain those objective moral goods. Come back in 20 years and repeat what you are saying now, because I'm simply more inclined to listen to them than a college philosophy student - I salute you idealism, but not your experience.
This is your basic problem. Your argument often comes down to moral theory & principle, but it claims practical use & real application (voting, giving to charity). Reality isn't theoretical.
Actually, most of the response in the other thread was to how you proposed it was right to vote (ie for the objective good) when you couldn't define what that was. Same question as here.
Again, and keeping my point 2. at the top in mind, I'll ask you to give a definitive moral claim that cannot be challenged by someone else's system of morality.
My question would be: why do you get to state there are definitive moral claims? I haven't seen one yet that hasn't been questioned by someone. On the other hand, I've seen lots of examples here of 'categorical' or 'objective' goods being, in fact, somewhat destructive and against their intent. Why should people be listening to your claims of objectivity, when the other lot actually have some objective evidence?
MWO: Adamski