Good rule of thumb: if communication is possible, and reasoning with said non-human entity is possible, you have to treat them well. If communication is impossible, or reasoning with them is not, you don't have to treat them well (particularly if they are having a negative effect on humanity).
To paraphrase Bentham: the question is not can they talk?, it's can they suffer? Animals can clearly suffer. That they can't talk doesn't excuse that suffering as innocuous.
How do you define suffering? For some definition of 'suffer' every complex system in existence can 'suffer'. Do we draw the line at things which are aware of their own suffering? Things which are capable of feeling pain? Things which are capable of death? Things which become less when they lose a part of themselves? Things which change states upon interaction? Why is any definition of 'suffer' better than any other except in that it is closer to what we experience as suffering?
If something can be self-aware of it's own negative experiences, then I think we need to be mindful of exactly what those experiences are to it. This isn't a subject which can be dealt with by generalities though - we need to accurately consider whether something can be regarded as suffering in a meaningful way and that's going to vary on a case by case basis.
Good rule of thumb: if communication is possible, and reasoning with said non-human entity is possible, you have to treat them well. If communication is impossible, or reasoning with them is not, you don't have to treat them well (particularly if they are having a negative effect on humanity).
To paraphrase Bentham: the question is not can they talk?, it's can they suffer? Animals can clearly suffer. That they can't talk doesn't excuse that suffering as innocuous.
How do you define suffering? For some definition of 'suffer' every complex system in existence can 'suffer'. Do we draw the line at things which are aware of their own suffering? Things which are capable of feeling pain? Things which are capable of death? Things which become less when they lose a part of themselves? Things which change states upon interaction? Why is any definition of 'suffer' better than any other except in that it is closer to what we experience as suffering?
We recognize our suffering as self-evidently bad.
Why wouldn't we extend the same judgement now that scientific inquiry has shown an analogous process to be taking place in species with nervous systems similar to our own?
Alternately, one could ask why we bother extending it to members of our own species. In fact, our history is full of examples of us not caring about the suffering of other humans, or even intentionally causing it. Why should we assume that "suffering avoidance" is a desirable or attainable state?
Posts
If something can be self-aware of it's own negative experiences, then I think we need to be mindful of exactly what those experiences are to it. This isn't a subject which can be dealt with by generalities though - we need to accurately consider whether something can be regarded as suffering in a meaningful way and that's going to vary on a case by case basis.
We recognize our suffering as self-evidently bad.
Why wouldn't we extend the same judgement now that scientific inquiry has shown an analogous process to be taking place in species with nervous systems similar to our own?