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Morality
_J_
PedantRegistered User, __BANNED USERS regular
PedantRegistered User, __BANNED USERS regular
Beyond Good and Evil, 198, Nietzsche:
All these moralities that address themselves to the individual, for the sake of his “happiness,” as one says – what are they but counsels for behavior in relation to the degree of dangerousness in which the individual lives with himself; recipes against his passions, his good and bad inclinations insofar as they have the will to power and want to play the master; little and great prudences and artifices that exude the nook odor of old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them baroque and unreasonable in form-because they address themselves to “all,” because they generalize where one must not generalize. All of them speak unconditionally, take themselves for unconditional, all of them flavored with more than one grain of salt and tolerable only—at at times even seductive – when they begin to smell over-spiced and dangerous, especially “of the other world.” All of it is, measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot “science,” much less “wisdom,” but rather, to say it once more, three times more, prudence, prudence, prudence, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity—whether it be that indifference and statue coldness against the hot-headed folly of the affects which the Stoics advised and administered; or that laughing-no-more and weeping-no-more of Spinoza, his so naively advocated destruction of the affects through their analysis and vivisection; or that tuning down of the affects to a harmless mean according to which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; even morality as enjoyment of the affects in a deliberate thinness and spiritualization by means of the symbolism of art, say, as music, or as love of God and of man for God’s sake – for in religion that passions enjoy the rights of citizens again, assuming that ––; finally even that accommodating and playful surrender to the affects, as Hafiz and Goethe taught it, that bold dropping of the reins, that spiritual-physical licentia morum in the exceptional case of wise old owls and sots for whom it “no longer holds much danger.” This, too, for the chapter “Morality as Timidity.
Beyond Good and Evil, 201, Nietzsche
As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only gregarious utility, as long as the preservation of the community is only kept in view, and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no "morality of love to one's neighbour." Granted even that there is already a little constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual assistance, granted that even in this condition of society all those instincts are already active which are latterly distinguished by honourable names as "virtues," and eventually almost coincide with the conception "morality": in that period they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral valuations--they are still ULTRA-MORAL. A sympathetic action, for instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral nor immoral, in the best period of the Romans; and should it be praised, a sort of resentful disdain is compatible with this praise, even at the best, directly the sympathetic action is compared with one which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the RES PUBLICA.
After all, "love to our neighbour" is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our FEAR OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. After the fabric of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain strong and dangerous instincts, such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness, revengefulness, astuteness, rapacity, and love of power, which up till then had not only to be honoured from the point of view of general utility--under other names, of course, than those here given--but had to be fostered and cultivated (because they were perpetually required in the common danger against the common enemies), are now felt in their dangerousness to be doubly strong--when the outlets for them are lacking--and are gradually branded as immoral and given over to calumny.
The contrary instincts and inclinations now attain to moral honour, the gregarious instinct gradually draws its conclusions. How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment-- that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals.
It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks, consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect.
There is a point of diseased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair--it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!"--with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!
Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other--the will and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.
We had a nice discussion of Nietzsche's view of Morality in the [chat] thread a few days ago and I would like to revitalize it in its own thread, as many people had many awesome ideas.
What do you think? Is Nietzsche correct in his assessment of morality? What ought to be our basis for morality? Ought human beings concern themselves with morality?
All these moralities that address themselves to the individual, for the sake of his “happiness,” as one says – what are they but counsels for behavior in relation to the degree of dangerousness in which the individual lives with himself; recipes against his passions, his good and bad inclinations insofar as they have the will to power and want to play the master; little and great prudences and artifices that exude the nook odor of old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them baroque and unreasonable in form-because they address themselves to “all,” because they generalize where one must not generalize. All of them speak unconditionally, take themselves for unconditional, all of them flavored with more than one grain of salt and tolerable only—at at times even seductive – when they begin to smell over-spiced and dangerous, especially “of the other world.” All of it is, measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot “science,” much less “wisdom,” but rather, to say it once more, three times more, prudence, prudence, prudence, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity—whether it be that indifference and statue coldness against the hot-headed folly of the affects which the Stoics advised and administered; or that laughing-no-more and weeping-no-more of Spinoza, his so naively advocated destruction of the affects through their analysis and vivisection; or that tuning down of the affects to a harmless mean according to which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; even morality as enjoyment of the affects in a deliberate thinness and spiritualization by means of the symbolism of art, say, as music, or as love of God and of man for God’s sake – for in religion that passions enjoy the rights of citizens again, assuming that ––; finally even that accommodating and playful surrender to the affects, as Hafiz and Goethe taught it, that bold dropping of the reins, that spiritual-physical licentia morum in the exceptional case of wise old owls and sots for whom it “no longer holds much danger.” This, too, for the chapter “Morality as Timidity.
Beyond Good and Evil, 201, Nietzsche
As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only gregarious utility, as long as the preservation of the community is only kept in view, and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no "morality of love to one's neighbour." Granted even that there is already a little constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual assistance, granted that even in this condition of society all those instincts are already active which are latterly distinguished by honourable names as "virtues," and eventually almost coincide with the conception "morality": in that period they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral valuations--they are still ULTRA-MORAL. A sympathetic action, for instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral nor immoral, in the best period of the Romans; and should it be praised, a sort of resentful disdain is compatible with this praise, even at the best, directly the sympathetic action is compared with one which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the RES PUBLICA.
After all, "love to our neighbour" is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our FEAR OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. After the fabric of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain strong and dangerous instincts, such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness, revengefulness, astuteness, rapacity, and love of power, which up till then had not only to be honoured from the point of view of general utility--under other names, of course, than those here given--but had to be fostered and cultivated (because they were perpetually required in the common danger against the common enemies), are now felt in their dangerousness to be doubly strong--when the outlets for them are lacking--and are gradually branded as immoral and given over to calumny.
The contrary instincts and inclinations now attain to moral honour, the gregarious instinct gradually draws its conclusions. How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment-- that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals.
It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks, consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect.
There is a point of diseased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair--it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!"--with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!
Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other--the will and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.
We had a nice discussion of Nietzsche's view of Morality in the [chat] thread a few days ago and I would like to revitalize it in its own thread, as many people had many awesome ideas.
What do you think? Is Nietzsche correct in his assessment of morality? What ought to be our basis for morality? Ought human beings concern themselves with morality?
_J_ on
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To add to this discussion: I think our sense of morality is derived from our evolutionary altruism which helped the species survive as a social entity. Morality is basic, and it affects us in basic ways. The complex nature of society today provides interesting, but difficult, situations for our very primitive sense of morality to influence. Housing loans, the internet, etc. There's no real moral basis for dealing with these things. That's only important so as to establish that morality deals only with very low laws, like stealing, murdering, etc.
If people are not willing to read the OP then this thread is not for them.
Corrected.
Morality is an important emotional/rational guide to what is right and wrong. Our morality can be affected by our upbringing, religious or otherwise, but there were discovered tribes in parts oaf Africa with no religious or spiritual ideas at all, throughout the whole tribe. And guess what? They had laws, and morality. It's natural. Morality is natural. That about ends it for me. Our morality is evolutionary altruism.
Socrates would have been upset that question was even asked. Ought humans be concerned with the way they ought to live?
Nietzsche's view of morality is centered around the belief that 'fear of our neighbor' is the ultimate motive that drives us to be moral.
"The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour."
When he says 'everything that elevates the individual above the herd' is called evil, this sentiment is highly influenced of how he viewed his personal surroundings (Germany in the 19th century). Present day Western society lifts up those who, under present day capitalism, aspire to and achieve their lofty desires.
"Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect. "
There is a time for severity and a time for peace. Obviously peaceful times don't breed 'rigour and severity of the feelings'. Harsh decisions and actions don't need to be made.
I obviously don't agree with his way of thinking.
edit: wow I'm late for class...
Socrates was incorrect.
Nietzsche's view is also founded on the lack of a foundation for all other Moral systems. For example, what is the foundation for the idea that humans ought to be concered for the way they ought to live?
You don't, there.
He goes and talks about how we are natural, how we can only live naturally, because as parts of nature, how else could we live? Then he goes and rails against us for suppressing our nature with religion and reason and morality, without taking a moment to realize that such constructs are themselves natural. That, of the thousand warring wills vying for supremacy that we call "I", many of those wills compel us to listen to what our reason tells us, our society tells us, our friends and family tell us.
Nietzsche was obsessed with tearing down, tearing down, tearing down, dismantling every last shred of held truth and belief, and in the context of his time, his destructive impulse was important to further philosophical thinking, to give rise to things like postmodernism, but to say it has value still? I am highly skeptical.
Nietzsche is also horribly essentializing, asserting such broad generalities, and of course all the while railing against the conceptions of universal truth. He is relentlessly hypocritical, but then again in his conception of the Ubermensch, consistency really has no value, and one is only a Free Spirit if one lives and says what one wishes in each moment, constantly evolving (But not necessarily towards any particular or valuable end). How surprising that his philosophy neatly rationalizes all his flaws.
I guess there is one thing I keep with me from Nietzsche -- I have a value that I have never felt compelled to rigorously and rationally defend. I value human happiness. I would like to see more of it. Why? Fuck you, J, that's why, you intolerable pedant.
And I believe, based on all the evidence I've seen, that our faculties of reason are fairly useful in determining how to bring about happiness. They are, at least, the most useful faculties we have to that end. And so, I believe in the evaluative capacity of human beings. I believe in better and worse, even if I don't believe in good and evil.
Why do I value happiness? Because I enjoy it. Because it makes life worth living. Because I want to be happy. Isn't that what all these competing wills really come down to? Can't they just be described as conditional manifestations of a single driving will? Nietzsche asserts that we instead may be reduced to a will-to-power. I disagree. Such a will can be further reduced to a desire for fulfillment, for happiness. Nietzsche intellectualizes, removes himself from reality and experience and in the context of mental masturbation his arguments about self-suppression and living a contemptible, repressed life make sense. But then one realizes, upon confrontation with reality, experience, that Nietzsche is the one who lived a contemptible, repressed existence. He is the one who failed to realize his will's desires.
After all, what could even drive Nietzsche to pursue the Free Spirit? There is obviously an implied notion that such a man is more authentic, more real, truer -- but why would Nietzsche value such things? Because he was compelled to. Because he lived in his mind, wrapped up in self-devouring lines of "logic" -- ironic for someone so opposed to philosophical structure -- which contorted into ever more absurd configurations in the absence of any kind of confrontation with reality to straighten them out. And he lived in his mind because at some level, at some instinctual level, there was a compulsion to logic, to understanding, to do away with illusion and confront what he felt must be confronted, and why would he do such a thing? Will to happiness. Because why do we value anything? We think it will do us some good, it will have some utility. All desires can be ultimately distilled down to a biological impulse to happiness -- we seek pleasure and avoid pain, simply put.
Even in seeking pain, Nietzsche sought pleasure -- by rejecting the fleeting, ephemeral emotional happiness, he hoped to achieve a kind of moral happiness, a kind of satisfaction and superiority and self-assurance. When one lacks tools with which to find emotional happiness in life, one will reasonably then turn away from it, and seek other kinds of satisfaction.
So if anyone can be said to be perverting and suppressing their will, it would be Nietzsche, rejecting as he did several forms of happiness. But of course, even such rejections themselves stem from an underlying impulse to happiness, because by devaluing such forms of happiness, Nietzsche was able to minimize the pain caused by their absence. It's one of the oldest tricks in the book.
Ultimately, we come to a conception of each and ever one of us as simply a mensch. Not an overmensch. As fundamentally similar, as fundamentally united in purpose at the deepest and most essential level. Nietzsche's disingenuous, cynical, isolating philosophy rings hollow in the presence of such a conception of humanity.
And so why not pursue our happiness? Why not value it? Why not value the things which we have found to bring about greater happiness? Why not devalue things which destroy it (like Nietzsche)? Why not evaluate, why not use our human faculties?
Moralities -- that is, dogmas -- are indeed unappealing to me in their rigidity, and in that people often forget their human origin, but the fundamental concept of human evaluation and the ability to value certain actions over others, to come to conclusions of better and worse? That's something to hold onto.
But each for their self. Each making their own decision, for their self, on their own, on what constitutes "happy". Not conforming to the herd, not embracing the ideals of another.
Each person, on their own, defining for their self what is the best life.
You tremendous dolt.
Did I not explicitly and at great length explain how conforming to societal norms and shared ideas is indeed a way to live out one's own desire, and to embrace one's will to happiness? And how isolation and the illusion of independence and superiority are fundamentally flawed and generally the result of one's will to happiness being unfulfilled?
Also, I know for a fact that living the life of the Free Spirit is the worst kind of life. I lived it, _J.
You are not special. You are not the first person to discover Nietzsche. You are not a unique and beautiful snowflake. You are naive and inexperienced and I am telling you from experience that you are wrong beyond all capacity of human language to begin to express how fucking wrong you are.
Maybe you did it incorrectly?
And I think your experiment is proof of my Nietzsche's claim. You chose to leave the herd mentality and then you chose to return. And while returning may be problematic, you did chose for yourself to initially leave and then to return.
No.
Your point?
I doubt anyone who lives as a Nietzschean Free Spirit would ever be happy. I think you could manage it with only a few changes, and maybe not even particularly drastic ones, but to actually subscribe to the conception of the Free Spirit/Ubermensch/Overman that Nietzsche outlines -- well, I doubt anyone's going to find happiness in that.
Well then it's not for you.
I don't understand why you would make a broad generalization of "I don't think this would make anyone happy" if you think that Nietzsche's broad generalizations were idiotic because they were broad generalizations.
I think his broad generalizations are idiotic because (a) they're divorced from reality, and (b) he himself eschews broad generalities, and intellectual inconsistency is irritating.
Also, my generalizations are based on my own experience and that of everyone else I've ever known who's experimented with Nietzsche, and even the lives of those who've espoused similar philosophies. I mean, if I'd ever seen a shred of contradictory evidence, I might be more cautious, but I haven't.
What philosophies do you think are not divorced from reality?
Ones that at least make an effort to justify their claims with evidence, mostly. Although some of those fail, too. But hey, at least they try. Nietzsche's philosophy and nihilism in general are singularly infuriating.
That's just my opinion.
But as for morality, I'm only basing my opinions on the implications of that absurd scientific theory, "evolution." I mean, it is only a theory, so it's just a guess. But if it's right, it implies everything about us is the result of random mutations in a species which only survived because in competition for food and resources, our particular mutations helped us positively.
But it's just a theory, which applies to every single aspect of our lives including morality.
What I've gathered from very limited readings of his works is basic nihilism which, again, works fine and dandy if you work that way.
Nihilism is perfectly fine IF you are fine with absolute meaninglessness and a lack of morality having any meaning. Because hey, there's kittens and cookies and hugs and blow jobs and empathy so who needs meaning anyways.
But that doesn't work for everyone, so hey whatever. Whatever your psychology allows.
--
Also: Evolution is an observed fact. The theory actually applies to how it functions. Like with gravity.
That + fuck I hate Nietzsche.
Argument by fiat is never more irritating than when it's done at ridiculous length.
A great number of people in the intellectual circle are high on wit / low on will and can't simply face up to that fact. Thus, they blame a created existence [Society, whatever the hell that is] for forcing either a) hypocritical values which are designed to benefit the olligarchs, or b)values which are simply unattainable.
I believe, unlike Nietzsche, that there ARE moral absolutes. They may be attainable by reason; they may be attainable by experience. But they are out there.*
*I won't get into a discourse unless someone would like to reciprocate.
Mongol General: We have won again. That is good! But what is best in life?
Mongol Warrior: The open steppe, fleet horse, falcon on your wrist, wind in your hair!
Mongol General: Wrong! Conan, what is best in life?
Conan: To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women!
Mongol General: That is good.
Sigged.