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Anything you post in here will appear in my English Coursework
Ben G
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Hi PA forums, I am conducting a research project based around internet forums, I have posted this same thread in multiple forums and I will compare them, do your forum proud and give me some good stuff, it can be whatever you want, cant be worse than what 4chan write back.
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Do you have anything more specific in mind? I bet J is in the mood to discuss personal responsibility.
But only if the results get posted along with the why this was done to begin with.
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Asking people to volunteer in a non-specific manner for supposed research for a school paper is just about the silly goosiest thing the student can do, and his / her instructor or professor should fail him / her for not putting effort into his / her work.
Murder Obama Taliban Osama Nuclear Jihad Silly Goose Biological Terrorism North Korea Infiltrate Nerve Gas.
Please let us know how your submission turns out.
STEAM
Every thinking being believes
A) god exists, *or
The "or" is inclusive rather than exlusive. One may, of course, believe in god while denying the existence of qualia or vice versa, but you are also permitted to believe both. It is not possible, however, to deny both (A) and (B).
God is that which is infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient. This is the core trait of any single god, godhead, or godhood. If a proposed godhead or godhood fails to meet all these descriptions, they are not the divine. We can imagine a four-dimensional non-sensible being, Klaxog. Klaxog can will it such that I explode should he so choose. However, Klaxog can do this for me alone. We would not refer to this being as a god, but rather a supernatural being, because while he posses super-natural abilities, he is still severely limited.
Qualia is a "whatness," a (perhaps) sensible, non-quantifiable property which gives a being its identity. Blue is blue because it has an essential blueness, etc etc. Blueness can be quantified by the light spectrum, but to believe in qualia is the belief that it is not the quantifiable identity alone which makes something blue.
Because of heideggerian ontotheological problems which may pop up later on, we can simply say now that to exist is to not not-exist, and existence is the is-ing of the Being of a being. To propose that God exists is to say that God exists per se. An atheist, of course, would deny this, saying that god does not exist, god has no being outside of human minds.
Technical ontotheological terms: Being is the differed existence of beings. The act of existence, the is-ing of an existent, is being, and the existent itself is a being. The capitalized Being is the Being of a being in its being.
Again, each thinking thing must believe either
A) God exists, or
Let us take the physicalist stance, that everything that exists is reducible to physical processes. In a few of his excellent posts on physics, Cpt.Hamilton has posited that all physical matter, processes, and laws are ultimately reducible to the energy and the way energy behaves; essentially, that energy is the singular foundation of the universe. Is this energy, however, not always presented by God? Remember that God is that being which is that being which is infinite, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. (After all, God has been formulated as existentia since medieval times.) If everything that exists is reducible to energy, and each instance of energy is and has Being, then wherever there is energy so is there Being. It also seems that to be a physicalist posits the subsistence of Being alone, since there can be Being without energy whereas there can be no energy without Being. We must also point that while E=mc ^2, Energy is not synonymous with Being. We refer back to Kant's dictum that Being is not a predicate. The Being of a firetruck is not contained in the firetruck itself, but is differentiated from the firetruck. Predicates about Podly -- male, blonde haired, born in 1987 -- refer to me, not my Being. (For more on this, see Kant's "Table of Categories") Whereas the predicates that I existed in 1994 and I ate a sandwich for lunch constitute true predicates of Podly, my mere is-ing is no more a part of me than are my typing or my breathing.
Two oppositions:
1) Being is a shorthand way of saying that a being is composed of matter/energy.
2) Being is a physcological construct.
(2) can be dealt with rather easily. If Being is a psychological construct, then existence ceases whenever there is no thought or brains. Not mere trees and pancakes and liberty and the number "5", but also protons and quarks and energy. If Being is the opposite of nothingness, then we can say that if there is no thought then there is nothingness, and that existence itself is predicated on thought. This position is fine if you are a Hegelian (Hegel posited that Being is absolute thought thinking itself) but I imagine that many would object to this and would instead posit that Being is not a psychological construct.
(1) is a bit harder. My immediate inclination is to argue modally. It does not seem necessary that we have a universe which is founded on the physical interactions of energy. There does not seem to be any hindrance to a world in which energy is the supervenience of information, as Qingu has posted, and may very well be true to this world. However, while a universe need not be fundamentally composed of energy, it necessarily must exist, it must be and have Being.
While this does away with the immediate approximation of energy and Being, it does not address the ultimate structural question: namely, that if a universe is physically reducible to an essential element (a physically fundamental composition, or pfc), then what we call Being is really that element, and that to say that "X" exists is to affirm the proposition that "X" is composed of pfc "Y."
But we must look at the question and consider whether the fundamental question is being avoided. Let us assume that the term "existence" designates not that mode of being for beings, but rather the affirmation of a being's pfc, and that Being itself is nothing other than this pfc. If we believe this, we do not have the luxury of saying that the Being of the being "presences" the being. For all beings composed of the pfc, we can say that they are reducible to that pfc, and that it is the particular arrangement of the pfc that "presences" those super-pfc beings. We are at a loss, however, at the level of the pfc. The pfc cannot "exist" because existence is the affirmation of pfc constitution. We run into an existential problem: for all other things, we can say that we know its existence because we can demonstrate is pfc constitution; however, if we ask for proof of pfc, we will be presented with pfc. We are asked to recognize the Being of pfc! I believe that any attempt to remove Being from the problematic will always clandestinely affirm the being of Being.
Thus, I find it necessary for the Being of beings to be differentiated from the beings themselves. If this is the case, it seems then that Being fits all the definitions of God: infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient. The infinite and omnipresent nature of Being is the easiest to articulate. Wherever there is any possible being, there is always-alread Being. Being is necessarily omnipresence because Being is presence itself. To demonstrate the infinite standing of Being, we only need the natural number line. Numbers can extend to the infinite and thereby so can Being. To omnipotence we point out the substantiative nature of Being: everything is subsistent to the being of Being; i.e., there is nothing if there is no Being. No being can "will" that it overcome Being, that it be present and exist without being and having Being. In my experience, the most difficult to articulate is the omniscience of Being. The problem is that omniscience is usually equivocated with "all-knowing." "All-knowing" implies a thinking process, whereas an infinite and omnipresent being could not be limited to the dialectical and temporal process that is thought. Rather, I argue that Being is omniscient because Being is knowledge itself. Being is truth. There can be no truth to be known unless it "is true." Predication and knowledge is based upon the ability to for the Being of something to be disclosed and presenced. If truth is knowable, it has Being. If a truth is unknowable, it still has being so long as it is a truth. Being is omniscient whether or not there are unknowable truths, which cannot necessarily be said for an "all-knowing" being. There is no knowledge outside of Being, because Being is knowledge itself.
Therefore, I find it impossible for a physicalist to also be an atheist. If someone wants to believe that all that exists is quantifiable physical processes, they are also positing the existence of God qua Being. To be an atheist, to deny the existence of a Being which is infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient, is to deny the existence of an ultimately reducible physically fundamental composition.
...unless, of course you posit the existence of qualia. In the recent atheist/agnostic thread, Qingu argued that things can exist in different ways:
Qingu wrote:
The problem with your question is you are talking about "existence" as this either-or thing when in fact there are many different ways things can exist. A horse can exist as an animal, as an image held in another animal's brain, as a painting, or as part of a composite painting or video-game creature. It's overly simplistic to say that only the animal horse is "real" and the others "don't exist." They obviously do exist as patterns of some sort. Of course, the word horse only exists as a word, as something that refers to something else.
Mathematical entities are the same way. They are basically words that refer to and codify other things. Some of those things may exist, or may describe the behavior of the physical universe. Others are like centaurs, "existing" only in the minds of mathematicians or in the shared virtual space of theoretical mathematical exploration. (Though oftentimes it turns out such entities can be used to accurately describe the physical universe's behavior)
In other words, the "is" as an existential in "energy is" and "this atom is" and "the number 7 is" and "a centaur is" is in each case different. If the existence of energy is not the same as the existence of an atom or a centaur then Being is neither infinite nor omnipresent, neither omnipotent nor omniscient, and thus cannot be said to fall under the definition of God. This can be accomplished in a few ways, by proposing:
1) Qualia exist.
2) In each case the word "is" refers to something different.
3) That we should divide the domains in which existence applies.
(2) Seems to have no real foundation because it either obliquely posits qualia ("refers to something different" which is never explained more) or secretly posits the univocal Being it asserts to deny.
(3) Could hold its own water. The common attempt is to posit that there are certain ontological domains within the universe: that the "is" used in existence of quarks and energy pertains to a specific domain, and that it is different from the is-ing in the statements "whole numbers exist" and "Sherlock Holmes is at his house at 221B Baker Street." We can posit that "reality" is the pfc, super-reality is the natural phenomena which are reducible to the pfc, and thought-contingent being is the being of phenomena which are contingent upon being-thought. Thus, the "is" used in the domain of super-reality is a different is from the one used in descriptions of reality. However, if super-reality is merely a result of the is-ing of reality, whence comes the difference between the ontological domains? You can argue that super-reality is an emergent property, but unless you posit some sort of Hegelian triad, the mere quantifiable existence is not changed. To change it would be to introduce some sort of weird physicalized negation, in which "existence" is met with an equally real "not-existence" to produce some sort of existential bizarria. There might be different ontological domains, but there is never more than one form of Being.
If, however, you posit the existence of qualia, you are afforded an escape. So long as the existence of qualia is metaphysical, in that there are qualitatively different "forms" of Being regardless of whether or not a physical world exists, then Being is not univocal and not the divine.
The problems with the existence of qualia are numerous and well-documented. There are a few ways out of the razor I have proposed, but I cannot think of a physicalist way out. One could adopt a Deleuzian empiricism of endlessly repeated sense-data, but this still retains a psuedo-Cartesian subject, which I imagine many physicalists would be loathe to adopt. Perhaps someone out there has a different way out, or can find inconsistencies in my argument?
Commas are not the same as periods. Learn what a "comma splice" is.
You also need to brush up on your verb tenses.
"Cant" means a form of dialect or secret language. "Can't" is a contraction of the phrase "can not".
Have fun earning that D.
Also: testicles.
Just thought I'd add that I did not have permission to reproduce podly's work here and any use you make of it is a clear violation of copyright. Allow me to make reference to s3rial one's work (which again I have no right to reproduce and you have no right to use):
John Tehranian wrote:
To illustrate the unwitting infringement that has become quotidian for the average American, take an ordinary day in the life of a hypothetical law professor named John. For the purposes of this Gedankenexperiment, we assume the worst case scenario of full enforcement of rights by copyright holders and an uncharitable, though perfectly plausible, reading of existing case law and the fair use doctrine. Fair use is, after all, notoriously fickle and the defense offers little ex ante refuge to users of copyrighted works.
John's day continues in the spoiler.
Spoiler:
show spoiler
hide spoiler
John Tehranian wrote:
In the morning, John checks his email, and, in so doing, begins to tally up the liability. Following common practice, he has set his mail browser to automatically reproduce the text to which he is responding in any email he drafts. Each unauthorized reproduction of someone else’s copyrighted text—their email— represents a separate act of brazen infringement, as does each instance of email forwarding. Within an hour, the twenty reply and forward emails sent by John have exposed him to $3 million in statutory damages.
After spending some time catching up on the latest news, John attends his Constitutional Law class, where he distributes copies of three just-published Internet articles presenting analyses of a Supreme Court decision handed down only hours ago. Unfortunately, despite his concern for his students’ edification, John has just engaged in the unauthorized reproduction of three literary works in violation of the Copyright Act.
Professor John then attends a faculty meeting that fails to capture his full attention. Doodling on his notepad provides an ideal escape. A fan of post-modern architecture, he finds himself thinking of Frank Gehry’s early sketches for the Bilbao Guggenheim as he draws a series of swirling lines that roughly approximate the design of the building. He has created an unauthorized derivative of a copyrighted architectural rendering.
Later that afternoon, John attends his Law and Literature class, where the focus of the day is on morality and duty. He has assigned e.e. cumming’s 1931 poem i sing of Olaf glad and big to the students. As a prelude to class discussion, he reads the poem in its entirety, thereby engaging in an unauthorized public performance of the copyrighted literary work.
Before leaving work, he remembers to email his family five photographs of the Utes football game he attended the previous Saturday. His friend had taken the photographs. And while she had given him the prints, ownership of the physical work and its underlying intellectual property are not tied together. Quite simply, the copyright to the photograph subsists in and remains with its author, John’s friend. As such, by copying, distributing, and publicly displaying the copyrighted photographs, John is once again piling up the infringements.
In the late afternoon, John takes his daily swim at the university pool. Before he jumps into the water, he discards his T-shirt, revealing a Captain Caveman tattoo on his right shoulder. Not only did he violate Hanna-Barbera’s copyright when he got the tattoo—after all, it is an unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work—he has now engaged in a unauthorized public display of the animated character. More ominously, the Copyright Act allows for the “impounding” and “destruction or other reasonable disposition” of any infringing work. Sporting the tattoo, John has become the infringing work. At best, therefore, he will have to undergo court-mandated laser tattoo removal. At worst, he faces imminent “destruction.”
That evening, John attends a restaurant dinner celebrating a friend’s birthday. At the end of the evening, he joins the other guests in singing “Happy Birthday.” The moment is captured on his cellphone camera. He has consequently infringed on the copyrighted musical composition by publicly performing the song and reproducing the song in the video recording without authorization. Additionally, his video footage captures not only his friend but clearly documents the art work hanging on the wall behind his friend—Wives with Knives—a print by renowned retro-themed painter Shag. John’s incidental and even accidental use of Wives with Knives in the video nevertheless constitutes an unauthorized reproduction of Shag’s work.
At the end of the day, John checks his mailbox, where he finds the latest issue of an artsy hipster rag to which he subscribes. The ’zine, named Found, is a nationally distributed quarterly that collects and catalogues curious notes,drawings, and other items of interest that readers find lying in city streets, public transportation, and other random places. In short, John has purchased a magazine containing the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and public display of fifty copyrighted notes and drawings. His knowing, material contribution to Found’s fifty acts of infringement subjects John to potential secondary liability in the amount of $7.5 million.
By the end of the day, John has infringed the copyrights of twenty emails, three legal articles, an architectural rendering, a poem, five photographs, an animated character, a musical composition, a painting, and fifty notes and drawings. All told, he has committed at least eighty-three acts of infringement and faces liability in the amount of $12.45 million (to say nothing of potential criminal charges). There is nothing particularly extraordinary about John’s activities. Yet if copyright holders were inclined to enforce their rights to the maximum extent allowed by law, barring last minute salvation from the notoriously ambiguous fair use defense, he would be liable for a mind-boggling $4.544 billion in potential damages each year. And, surprisingly, he has not even committed a single act of infringement through P2P file-sharing. Such an outcome flies in the face of our basic sense of justice. Indeed, one must either irrationally conclude that John is a criminal infringer—a veritable grand larcenist—or blithely surmise that copyright law must not mean what it appears to say. Something is clearly amiss. Moreover, the troublesome gap between copyright law and norms has grown only wider in recent
Ubisoft's new DRM, the PA comic/post about it, ACTA negotiations (and a leak)... there's a lot going on with copyright law right now. And, sadly, so very few people understand how it works, why it works like it does, and the problems its current incarnation presents to society at large.
...I'm also a law student in my last term, doing a mini-thesis on copyright law, the DMCA, and the constitution, so this is all rather infuriating horrifying interesting to me.
Here are some good resources for copyright law:
Chilling Effects
Copyright.gov
Wikipedia on copyright
Wikipedia on the most recent copyright term extension
(note that the picture they have of copyright term duration over the years is informative for a big picture sort of view, but it's slightly misleading)