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I think it's a combination from column A and column B - privilege and a false sense of persecution. As AMFE commented earlier this anchor interviewed an author who personally was christian but wrote a book about Islam which I am sure did not receive the same poorly done grilling that this dude received on air, while at the same time tying it into Fox's "mission" to portray any discussion of Christianity, by those who don't fit into the approved framework, as "attacking" the faith or approaching it in a "biased" manner.
The belief that Islamic traditions excluded any differentiation of religion and politics has not quite disappeared from public discourse, but scholarly debates have effectively demolished it; it is now widely accepted that Islamic history is characterised by specific forms and trajectories of differentiation, neither identical with those of other civilisations nor reducible to a lower degree of the same dynamic.
Had a chance to attend a Very Interesting talk by the lady who wrote this book about recent Iraqi history since Iran-Iraq, and the psychological impact of basically constant warfare.
She looks at a lot of the Iraqi-side propaganda, especially political cartoons. There's this phenomena where the Iraqis are very careful in how they portray the Iranians. Specifically, the Iranian public and Iranian soldiers are usually depicted as either misguided/duped, or as young naive children (a common Iranian tactic was to send waves and waves of what were basically kamikaze's at the Iraqi lines, armed with nothing but Qur'ans and wooden keys that are part of Shi'a ritual). They're depicted as being led astray by the mullahs. The cartoons and other propaganda are very careful not to paint the conflict as one between Sunnis and Shi'a -- Iraq is a ~60-40 split in favor of Shi'a -- but as one between the modern, militarized Iraq and the backwards, traditional Iran.
Which further reinforces the common assessment that the Middle East doesn't really turn overtly sectarian in a big way until 2003 -- though when I asked her, the author said it was more around the First Intifada (1990-91) and not necessarily 2003.
Interesting. I'm reminded of some of the Imperial Japanese propaganda I'd seen directed against the United States during that war, specifically mentioning the the Black population and the power of Jim Crow society. A similar tactic was used, much more effectively, against the British in India, mobilizing Indian National Army.
Just putting this out there, but "Mohammedan" is usually considered to be an offensive slur when used to refer to Muslims. Even within western literature it's an archaic term which is never used currently in any official or scholarly settings. I would have to guess that most Shia Muslims would also take offense at being compared to an obscene term for feces, also.
New here, but I do not see threads about black people using terms like "colored" or "Negro" in the title.
With the title of this thread constituting borderline hate speech at a moment when actual hate crimes against Muslims in the US are happening at frightening frequency, could we possibly close this thread and make another about Islam with a more appropriate title? I would guess very few Muslims themselves would want to comment here with such an offensive title, and it makes the entire community here look kind of bad.
Ham could probably just change the thread title if you feel if the joke (which is about the kind of people who would still use 'mohammedan' in a modern context) is too harsh.
Just putting this out there, but "Mohammedan" is usually considered to be an offensive slur when used to refer to Muslims. Even within western literature it's an archaic term which is never used currently in any official or scholarly settings. I would have to guess that most Shia Muslims would also take offense at being compared to an obscene term for feces, also.
New here, but I do not see threads about black people using terms like "colored" or "Negro" in the title.
With the title of this thread constituting borderline hate speech at a moment when actual hate crimes against Muslims in the US are happening at frightening frequency, could we possibly close this thread and make another about Islam with a more appropriate title? I would guess very few Muslims themselves would want to comment here with such an offensive title, and it makes the entire community here look kind of bad.
So it was in fact an attempt at satire. It's intended as a stab at the old-school German/European orientalists -- Schacht, Goldziher, etc. -- who insisted on using that term for a good while, either totally oblivious to its terribility or just unconcerned about it.
As a Wayward Mohammedan myself, I don't particularly find it offensive (I mean, unless someone intends it to be I guess)... but if folks feel it crosses the line into insensitivity, I'm perfectly willing to change the title.
What are some of the Islamic ideas about the afterlife?
Is it more symbolic being one with God stuff or more concrete paradise stuff? Who goes there, are their levels.
You know, that sort of stuff.
I hate to just redirect you to the Wiki entry on Islamic eschatology, but it's a really good -- and really basic -- compilation of the bare facts of Islamic theological notions of the hereafter.
To answer your specific questions: to my knowledge*, conventional Sunni and Shi'i positions posit it very similarly to the Christian notion of heaven -- a Gated Community with seven levels, rivers of wine, the works. Mystical Sufis might describe it more metaphysically as becoming one with God's Essence, etc. -- but (afaik) this is more symbolic/metaphoric language that doesn't (necessarily) contradict the more conventional 'heaven as a physical place' idea.
*To be clear: I definitely don't purport to be well-versed in the specifics of Islamic theology/eschatology; my training is more in expressly political Islam and Islamic Modernism (and I don't claim to be an expert even on those topics), so please consider the above quite provisional.
+3
Captain Marcusnow arrives the hour of actionRegistered Userregular
Hamurabi, is there a Shia equivalent to Wahhabism? (as in, is there an equivalent Shia sect with equally terrible ideas, like the Wahhabist "Jihad for All" and "Let's bulldoze our own holy sites*")
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
*splitting off from this, how are the Saudis reconciling being good Muslims to bulldozing ancient Islamic tombs and mosques? I know the answer's "Wahhabism" somehow but it'd be like a Buddhist burning down the Mahabodhi Temple or a Christian demolishing the Church of the Nativity.
The Saudis reconcile it because prizing old tombs and mosques is idolatry, which isn't allowed in Islam. No ancient prized objects around, no idolatry. To be a good Muslim you need to submit to God, you don't need idols to do that.
I'm kind of curious how the Kaaba fits into that viewpoint, if anyone could clarify that.
Hamurabi, is there a Shia equivalent to Wahhabism? (as in, is there an equivalent Shia sect with equally terrible ideas, like the Wahhabist "Jihad for All" and "Let's bulldoze our own holy sites*")
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
There really isn't an equivalent in Shia Islam. Shias follow an ayatollah (which would be like a cardinal I guess? I'm not really sure on what to compare it to, but it's lower than the pope for example.) Iran is one example, where most people follow Khamenai, who in turn is basically following Khomeini and just filling in the gaps as needed. But there are many different ayatollahs, with different interpretations/rulings on various subjects, depending on the results of their own study and experience.
The idea is that, as new moral questions arise, the ayatollahs have studied the Quran and related teachings closely and can rule on whether or not it should be permitted. For example, smoking has always been common in the middle east, but there have been some recent rulings declaring it to be forbidden because of its harmful effects.
Edit: It's important to note that there's a certain level of study somebody has to reach before claiming to be an ayatollah, and the ayatollahs basically have a council saying "Yes this person is legit you can follow them." They are also able to revoke that endorsement if one goes off the deep end and starts up ISIS-Lite.
This is an interesting thread. I have a question, though I'm not sure if it'll be easy to answer.
I was curious about the situation of women in the armies of predominantly Muslim countries. Pakistan, for example, seems to have a history of allowing women in their army more openly than the USA. Though I'm not sure how many women make up which roles, or if there is prejudice amongst the ranks. I haven't been able to get good data on other nations, though I have seen a number of photos of female soldiers.
My main interest was the subject of female officers in predominantly Muslim nations, and how their ability to climb the ranks and their treatment by fellow soldiers compares to the US military.
If someone could enlighten me in this subject, I'd appreciate it. I understand it's probably beyond the scope of this thread, and will delete this post if it is any trouble. Thank you for considering this question.
This is an interesting thread. I have a question, though I'm not sure if it'll be easy to answer.
I was curious about the situation of women in the armies of predominantly Muslim countries. Pakistan, for example, seems to have a history of allowing women in their army more openly than the USA. Though I'm not sure how many women make up which roles, or if there is prejudice amongst the ranks. I haven't been able to get good data on other nations, though I have seen a number of photos of female soldiers.
My main interest was the subject of female officers in predominantly Muslim nations, and how their ability to climb the ranks and their treatment by fellow soldiers compares to the US military.
If someone could enlighten me in this subject, I'd appreciate it. I understand it's probably beyond the scope of this thread, and will delete this post if it is any trouble. Thank you for considering this question.
I'm somewhat preoccupied or I'd go into it further, but in Syria General Zubaida al-Meeki was the first female flag officer to defect from the army to the opposition well back into 2012. Emphasis on first--al-Meeki was not the only woman to hold the commission of general (it's probably a safe assumption that, with the Syrian Navy being the smallest branch of the military and headed by a vice-admiral, there are no female admirals). The other female flag officers scattered across the historically-large Syrian armed forces are largely on the side of the government (like their male counterparts), and I've heard no indication that any other woman of equal rank defected after al-Meeki.
Of course, Syria's history is exceptional--it has a colonial history with France that is widely overlooked in the west, deeply-established historical ties with the Soviet Union, and a longstanding socialist and Marxist tradition, elements of which are deeply rooted in the Syrian Ba'athist Party, the ruling party. There was a established political lobby advocating the advancement of educated women in particular. Cosmopolitan minorities, like urban Alawites, Armenians, etc., are known to have an accordingly cosmopolitan view of women's roles in society (certainly when compared to rural Sunnis, who represent a major constituency in the Syrian opposition). The first woman of Syria, the British-born Sunni Ms. Asma al-Assad, was famously (now infamously?) lauded for years as an unwavering advocate of Syrian women's rights and their occupations from the traditional limitations imposed in the region--of course, the wavering western non-governmental perspective of the Assad clique (which I would charitably describe as "schizophrenic") later resulted in a lot of those women's interest articles being removed or stricken from the record when it became public policy to declare the Assad family the "number one enemy" in America's Syria policy (before the rise of the Islamic State).
I'm on the run just meow, but I wanted to take a quick second to plug a book that has already caused a lot of (positive) waves in the Islamic Studies field (small as it is), and that I think is also accessible to a general audience interested in learning more about the rich history of 'Islamic civilization' and that also has a lot to say about contemporary Islam and how it came to be. Case-in-point: how Muslims find it not to be at all a Problem to be a devout believer and also to be a wine aficionado.
Hamurabi, is there a Shia equivalent to Wahhabism? (as in, is there an equivalent Shia sect with equally terrible ideas, like the Wahhabist "Jihad for All" and "Let's bulldoze our own holy sites*")
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
There really isn't an equivalent in Shia Islam. Shias follow an ayatollah (which would be like a cardinal I guess? I'm not really sure on what to compare it to, but it's lower than the pope for example.) Iran is one example, where most people follow Khamenai, who in turn is basically following Khomeini and just filling in the gaps as needed. But there are many different ayatollahs, with different interpretations/rulings on various subjects, depending on the results of their own study and experience.
The idea is that, as new moral questions arise, the ayatollahs have studied the Quran and related teachings closely and can rule on whether or not it should be permitted. For example, smoking has always been common in the middle east, but there have been some recent rulings declaring it to be forbidden because of its harmful effects.
Edit: It's important to note that there's a certain level of study somebody has to reach before claiming to be an ayatollah, and the ayatollahs basically have a council saying "Yes this person is legit you can follow them." They are also able to revoke that endorsement if one goes off the deep end and starts up ISIS-Lite.
It's worth noting that in general sunni islam is a lot more (little c) conservative than shia. Up until fairly recently, like late 19th and 20th century, it was basically thought that all reasonable argument about jurisprudence and interpretation of koranic law had taken place so basically the choice of interpretation open to the individual was which of 4 or so 800 year old interpretations most fit what you agrees with. Going outside the established though through independent reasoning was basically heresy.
In the 1800s as the west started really colonizing Islamic areas the consensus view changed somewhat to allow more individual interpretation in the form of reasoned interpretation, or ijtihad.
Followers of the principle of ijtihad today (and there are certainly plenty of people that reject the concept and stick to one of the 4 schools, iirc thats still the official position of the Saudi government and a big problem Osama bin Laden had with them) basically fall into 3 groups:
Liberals who want to reconcile sunni islam with humanism, equality, etc.
People who for the most part think traditional islamic jurisprudence should be stuck to as much as possible but just doesn't fully fit with the modern world and needs some interpretation to functionally integrate into modern society. People like the Muslim Brotherhood fit here.
People who looked back at the guys 800 years ago and said "shit those guys just weren't hardcore enough, we need to be even more radical and reactionary than conventional jurisprudence allows." These are the salafists and wahabis.
Hamurabi, is there a Shia equivalent to Wahhabism? (as in, is there an equivalent Shia sect with equally terrible ideas, like the Wahhabist "Jihad for All" and "Let's bulldoze our own holy sites*")
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
There really isn't an equivalent in Shia Islam. Shias follow an ayatollah (which would be like a cardinal I guess? I'm not really sure on what to compare it to, but it's lower than the pope for example.) Iran is one example, where most people follow Khamenai, who in turn is basically following Khomeini and just filling in the gaps as needed. But there are many different ayatollahs, with different interpretations/rulings on various subjects, depending on the results of their own study and experience.
The idea is that, as new moral questions arise, the ayatollahs have studied the Quran and related teachings closely and can rule on whether or not it should be permitted. For example, smoking has always been common in the middle east, but there have been some recent rulings declaring it to be forbidden because of its harmful effects.
Edit: It's important to note that there's a certain level of study somebody has to reach before claiming to be an ayatollah, and the ayatollahs basically have a council saying "Yes this person is legit you can follow them." They are also able to revoke that endorsement if one goes off the deep end and starts up ISIS-Lite.
It's worth noting that in general sunni islam is a lot more (little c) conservative than shia. Up until fairly recently, like late 19th and 20th century, it was basically thought that all reasonable argument about jurisprudence and interpretation of koranic law had taken place so basically the choice of interpretation open to the individual was which of 4 or so 800 year old interpretations most fit what you agrees with. Going outside the established though through independent reasoning was basically heresy.
In the 1800s as the west started really colonizing Islamic areas the consensus view changed somewhat to allow more individual interpretation in the form of reasoned interpretation, or ijtihad.
Followers of the principle of ijtihad today (and there are certainly plenty of people that reject the concept and stick to one of the 4 schools, iirc thats still the official position of the Saudi government and a big problem Osama bin Laden had with them) basically fall into 3 groups:
Liberals who want to reconcile sunni islam with humanism, equality, etc.
People who for the most part think traditional islamic jurisprudence should be stuck to as much as possible but just doesn't fully fit with the modern world and needs some interpretation to functionally integrate into modern society. People like the Muslim Brotherhood fit here.
People who looked back at the guys 800 years ago and said "shit those guys just weren't hardcore enough, we need to be even more radical and reactionary than conventional jurisprudence allows." These are the salafists and wahabis.
So I would (gently) disagree with most of the assertions in this post.
1. Sunni jurisprudence is not generally more conservative than Shi'a jurisprudence. If any kind of grossly generalized statement can be made, it is perhaps that Sunni jurisprudence -- or at least the strains privileged by historic political powers -- is actually more 'permissive' than other kinds (but of course "Sunni jurisprudence" is an outrageously large category). Hanafi fiqh, in particular, is historically associated with laxity, and was the official state school of the Ottoman Empire specifically for its exceptions/autonomy in matters of statecraft (land tax, autonomy for Jews and other non-Muslims, etc.).
2. The "Gates of Ijtihad" were never actually closed, and radical (re)interpretation and accommodation went on unabated during and after the Medieval period. Baber Johansen and others have made their careers showing that individual jurors sometimes totally reinterpeted the foundational texts of their respective madhahib (schools).
3. I would not lump Modernists into those three narrow categories. People interested in substantially reinterpreting the canonical/consensus stands on various issues within Islam run the gamut, and there're plenty of people -- Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for instance -- who defy simple categorization because they may be 'conservative' (ie. traditional) on some issues but 'progressive' (ie. in favor of substantial reinterpretation) on others. Trying to pigeonhole people/movements into convenient boxes is sometimes helpful, yes, but imho ultimately does more harm then good if the aim is to try and understand the actual richness of Islam in the postcolonial period.
How much is the concept taqlid still associated with taking statements of authority at face value? Its a concept that came up constantly when I was listening to the Islamic Philosophy section of the History of Philosophy podcast. Its a very interesting concept to me, the philosophers of those eras really liked throwing that one around whenever possible, but how is the term handled in modern discourse?
How much is the concept taqlid still associated with taking statements of authority at face value? Its a concept that came up constantly when I was listening to the Islamic Philosophy section of the History of Philosophy podcast. Its a very interesting concept to me, the philosophers of those eras really liked throwing that one around whenever possible, but how is the term handled in modern discourse?
My understanding is that, in common usage, it has a slightly pejorative connotation of, yes, blind imitation.
The Arabic root, قلد (q-l-d) refers both to "blind imitation" and "uncritical faith" as well as, more generally, to convention or customary practice.
I would say it 'characterizes' Islamic philosophy or thought more generally to the extent that, say, precedent 'characterizes' canon law within the Catholic Church or within common law. It's there, but it's not like all of Islamic law is just people repeating each other for 14 centuries.
Hamurabi, is there a Shia equivalent to Wahhabism? (as in, is there an equivalent Shia sect with equally terrible ideas, like the Wahhabist "Jihad for All" and "Let's bulldoze our own holy sites*")
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
There really isn't an equivalent in Shia Islam. Shias follow an ayatollah (which would be like a cardinal I guess? I'm not really sure on what to compare it to, but it's lower than the pope for example.) Iran is one example, where most people follow Khamenai, who in turn is basically following Khomeini and just filling in the gaps as needed. But there are many different ayatollahs, with different interpretations/rulings on various subjects, depending on the results of their own study and experience.
The idea is that, as new moral questions arise, the ayatollahs have studied the Quran and related teachings closely and can rule on whether or not it should be permitted. For example, smoking has always been common in the middle east, but there have been some recent rulings declaring it to be forbidden because of its harmful effects.
Edit: It's important to note that there's a certain level of study somebody has to reach before claiming to be an ayatollah, and the ayatollahs basically have a council saying "Yes this person is legit you can follow them." They are also able to revoke that endorsement if one goes off the deep end and starts up ISIS-Lite.
It's worth noting that in general sunni islam is a lot more (little c) conservative than shia. Up until fairly recently, like late 19th and 20th century, it was basically thought that all reasonable argument about jurisprudence and interpretation of koranic law had taken place so basically the choice of interpretation open to the individual was which of 4 or so 800 year old interpretations most fit what you agrees with. Going outside the established though through independent reasoning was basically heresy.
In the 1800s as the west started really colonizing Islamic areas the consensus view changed somewhat to allow more individual interpretation in the form of reasoned interpretation, or ijtihad.
Followers of the principle of ijtihad today (and there are certainly plenty of people that reject the concept and stick to one of the 4 schools, iirc thats still the official position of the Saudi government and a big problem Osama bin Laden had with them) basically fall into 3 groups:
Liberals who want to reconcile sunni islam with humanism, equality, etc.
People who for the most part think traditional islamic jurisprudence should be stuck to as much as possible but just doesn't fully fit with the modern world and needs some interpretation to functionally integrate into modern society. People like the Muslim Brotherhood fit here.
People who looked back at the guys 800 years ago and said "shit those guys just weren't hardcore enough, we need to be even more radical and reactionary than conventional jurisprudence allows." These are the salafists and wahabis.
So I would (gently) disagree with most of the assertions in this post.
1. Sunni jurisprudence is not generally more conservative than Shi'a jurisprudence. If any kind of grossly generalized statement can be made, it is perhaps that Sunni jurisprudence -- or at least the strains privileged by historic political powers -- is actually more 'permissive' than other kinds (but of course "Sunni jurisprudence" is an outrageously large category). Hanafi fiqh, in particular, is historically associated with laxity, and was the official state school of the Ottoman Empire specifically for its exceptions/autonomy in matters of statecraft (land tax, autonomy for Jews and other non-Muslims, etc.).
2. The "Gates of Ijtihad" were never actually closed, and radical (re)interpretation and accommodation went on unabated during and after the Medieval period. Baber Johansen and others have made their careers showing that individual jurors sometimes totally reinterpeted the foundational texts of their respective madhahib (schools).
3. I would not lump Modernists into those three narrow categories. People interested in substantially reinterpreting the canonical/consensus stands on various issues within Islam run the gamut, and there're plenty of people -- Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for instance -- who defy simple categorization because they may be 'conservative' (ie. traditional) on some issues but 'progressive' (ie. in favor of substantial reinterpretation) on others. Trying to pigeonhole people/movements into convenient boxes is sometimes helpful, yes, but imho ultimately does more harm then good if the aim is to try and understand the actual richness of Islam in the postcolonial period.
Agreed I was probably oversimplifying quite a bit, and on the first term I probably should have said orthodox vs heterodox. At least in my experience Shia beliefs tend to be a lot more divergent than Sunni, this may just be a bias of my experiences and education though, the Shia I have known personally have been Alevis and western Iranians/Persians (which is interesting because even the ethnonym someone identifies with seems to say a lot about them in that case), who are probably not entirely typical of an 'average' Shia practitioner in any case.
How much is the concept taqlid still associated with taking statements of authority at face value? Its a concept that came up constantly when I was listening to the Islamic Philosophy section of the History of Philosophy podcast. Its a very interesting concept to me, the philosophers of those eras really liked throwing that one around whenever possible, but how is the term handled in modern discourse?
My understanding is that, in common usage, it has a slightly pejorative connotation of, yes, blind imitation.
The Arabic root, قلد (q-l-d) refers both to "blind imitation" and "uncritical faith" as well as, more generally, to convention or customary practice.
I would say it 'characterizes' Islamic philosophy or thought more generally to the extent that, say, precedent 'characterizes' canon law within the Catholic Church or within common law. It's there, but it's not like all of Islamic law is just people repeating each other for 14 centuries.
Thanks,
Yeah I didn't mean they were repeating, it was more like a common objection that philosophers would level against one another. I listened to them a while ago so I can't remember any specific examples. Here's the podcast though. Peter Adamson's main field is in the history of Islamic philosophy, I'm just doing a poor job of talking about what he said .
I'll defer to Hamurabi who has more background but my understanding is that independent reasoning and even analogical resoning in some cases were looked down upon through the middle ages and into the modern ages. That doesn't mean that someone might not take an older text or ruling and use it to support a conclusion vastly different than intended by the additional author, but the fig leaf of precedent had to be there.
I'll defer to Hamurabi who has more background but my understanding is that independent reasoning and even analogical resoning in some cases were looked down upon through the middle ages and into the modern ages. That doesn't mean that someone might not take an older text or ruling and use it to support a conclusion vastly different than intended by the additional author, but the fig leaf of precedent had to be there.
I mean, people were using these older seminal texts and in the marginalia (literally) were totally reinterpreting them. It's a very old and well-established position that the decline narrative offered by the old German/European Orientalists re: Muslim intellectual history just never happened.
Posts
Now with more pictures!
She looks at a lot of the Iraqi-side propaganda, especially political cartoons. There's this phenomena where the Iraqis are very careful in how they portray the Iranians. Specifically, the Iranian public and Iranian soldiers are usually depicted as either misguided/duped, or as young naive children (a common Iranian tactic was to send waves and waves of what were basically kamikaze's at the Iraqi lines, armed with nothing but Qur'ans and wooden keys that are part of Shi'a ritual). They're depicted as being led astray by the mullahs. The cartoons and other propaganda are very careful not to paint the conflict as one between Sunnis and Shi'a -- Iraq is a ~60-40 split in favor of Shi'a -- but as one between the modern, militarized Iraq and the backwards, traditional Iran.
Which further reinforces the common assessment that the Middle East doesn't really turn overtly sectarian in a big way until 2003 -- though when I asked her, the author said it was more around the First Intifada (1990-91) and not necessarily 2003.
(Apologies for the necro post.)
More than ever
What are some of the Islamic ideas about the afterlife?
Is it more symbolic being one with God stuff or more concrete paradise stuff? Who goes there, are their levels.
You know, that sort of stuff.
New here, but I do not see threads about black people using terms like "colored" or "Negro" in the title.
With the title of this thread constituting borderline hate speech at a moment when actual hate crimes against Muslims in the US are happening at frightening frequency, could we possibly close this thread and make another about Islam with a more appropriate title? I would guess very few Muslims themselves would want to comment here with such an offensive title, and it makes the entire community here look kind of bad.
@Hamurabi
So it was in fact an attempt at satire. It's intended as a stab at the old-school German/European orientalists -- Schacht, Goldziher, etc. -- who insisted on using that term for a good while, either totally oblivious to its terribility or just unconcerned about it.
As a Wayward Mohammedan myself, I don't particularly find it offensive (I mean, unless someone intends it to be I guess)... but if folks feel it crosses the line into insensitivity, I'm perfectly willing to change the title.
I hate to just redirect you to the Wiki entry on Islamic eschatology, but it's a really good -- and really basic -- compilation of the bare facts of Islamic theological notions of the hereafter.
To answer your specific questions: to my knowledge*, conventional Sunni and Shi'i positions posit it very similarly to the Christian notion of heaven -- a Gated Community with seven levels, rivers of wine, the works. Mystical Sufis might describe it more metaphysically as becoming one with God's Essence, etc. -- but (afaik) this is more symbolic/metaphoric language that doesn't (necessarily) contradict the more conventional 'heaven as a physical place' idea.
*To be clear: I definitely don't purport to be well-versed in the specifics of Islamic theology/eschatology; my training is more in expressly political Islam and Islamic Modernism (and I don't claim to be an expert even on those topics), so please consider the above quite provisional.
I know Iran isn't the funnest place to live but it seems like the clerics in charge are sticking to What Would Khomeini Do instead of a sect with ready-made ideas, like Wahhabist al-Qaeda and the House of Saud.
*splitting off from this, how are the Saudis reconciling being good Muslims to bulldozing ancient Islamic tombs and mosques? I know the answer's "Wahhabism" somehow but it'd be like a Buddhist burning down the Mahabodhi Temple or a Christian demolishing the Church of the Nativity.
I'm kind of curious how the Kaaba fits into that viewpoint, if anyone could clarify that.
There really isn't an equivalent in Shia Islam. Shias follow an ayatollah (which would be like a cardinal I guess? I'm not really sure on what to compare it to, but it's lower than the pope for example.) Iran is one example, where most people follow Khamenai, who in turn is basically following Khomeini and just filling in the gaps as needed. But there are many different ayatollahs, with different interpretations/rulings on various subjects, depending on the results of their own study and experience.
The idea is that, as new moral questions arise, the ayatollahs have studied the Quran and related teachings closely and can rule on whether or not it should be permitted. For example, smoking has always been common in the middle east, but there have been some recent rulings declaring it to be forbidden because of its harmful effects.
Edit: It's important to note that there's a certain level of study somebody has to reach before claiming to be an ayatollah, and the ayatollahs basically have a council saying "Yes this person is legit you can follow them." They are also able to revoke that endorsement if one goes off the deep end and starts up ISIS-Lite.
You can't give someone a pirate ship in one game, and then take it back in the next game. It's rude.
I was curious about the situation of women in the armies of predominantly Muslim countries. Pakistan, for example, seems to have a history of allowing women in their army more openly than the USA. Though I'm not sure how many women make up which roles, or if there is prejudice amongst the ranks. I haven't been able to get good data on other nations, though I have seen a number of photos of female soldiers.
My main interest was the subject of female officers in predominantly Muslim nations, and how their ability to climb the ranks and their treatment by fellow soldiers compares to the US military.
If someone could enlighten me in this subject, I'd appreciate it. I understand it's probably beyond the scope of this thread, and will delete this post if it is any trouble. Thank you for considering this question.
I'm somewhat preoccupied or I'd go into it further, but in Syria General Zubaida al-Meeki was the first female flag officer to defect from the army to the opposition well back into 2012. Emphasis on first--al-Meeki was not the only woman to hold the commission of general (it's probably a safe assumption that, with the Syrian Navy being the smallest branch of the military and headed by a vice-admiral, there are no female admirals). The other female flag officers scattered across the historically-large Syrian armed forces are largely on the side of the government (like their male counterparts), and I've heard no indication that any other woman of equal rank defected after al-Meeki.
Of course, Syria's history is exceptional--it has a colonial history with France that is widely overlooked in the west, deeply-established historical ties with the Soviet Union, and a longstanding socialist and Marxist tradition, elements of which are deeply rooted in the Syrian Ba'athist Party, the ruling party. There was a established political lobby advocating the advancement of educated women in particular. Cosmopolitan minorities, like urban Alawites, Armenians, etc., are known to have an accordingly cosmopolitan view of women's roles in society (certainly when compared to rural Sunnis, who represent a major constituency in the Syrian opposition). The first woman of Syria, the British-born Sunni Ms. Asma al-Assad, was famously (now infamously?) lauded for years as an unwavering advocate of Syrian women's rights and their occupations from the traditional limitations imposed in the region--of course, the wavering western non-governmental perspective of the Assad clique (which I would charitably describe as "schizophrenic") later resulted in a lot of those women's interest articles being removed or stricken from the record when it became public policy to declare the Assad family the "number one enemy" in America's Syria policy (before the rise of the Islamic State).
It's worth noting that in general sunni islam is a lot more (little c) conservative than shia. Up until fairly recently, like late 19th and 20th century, it was basically thought that all reasonable argument about jurisprudence and interpretation of koranic law had taken place so basically the choice of interpretation open to the individual was which of 4 or so 800 year old interpretations most fit what you agrees with. Going outside the established though through independent reasoning was basically heresy.
In the 1800s as the west started really colonizing Islamic areas the consensus view changed somewhat to allow more individual interpretation in the form of reasoned interpretation, or ijtihad.
Followers of the principle of ijtihad today (and there are certainly plenty of people that reject the concept and stick to one of the 4 schools, iirc thats still the official position of the Saudi government and a big problem Osama bin Laden had with them) basically fall into 3 groups:
Liberals who want to reconcile sunni islam with humanism, equality, etc.
People who for the most part think traditional islamic jurisprudence should be stuck to as much as possible but just doesn't fully fit with the modern world and needs some interpretation to functionally integrate into modern society. People like the Muslim Brotherhood fit here.
People who looked back at the guys 800 years ago and said "shit those guys just weren't hardcore enough, we need to be even more radical and reactionary than conventional jurisprudence allows." These are the salafists and wahabis.
So I would (gently) disagree with most of the assertions in this post.
1. Sunni jurisprudence is not generally more conservative than Shi'a jurisprudence. If any kind of grossly generalized statement can be made, it is perhaps that Sunni jurisprudence -- or at least the strains privileged by historic political powers -- is actually more 'permissive' than other kinds (but of course "Sunni jurisprudence" is an outrageously large category). Hanafi fiqh, in particular, is historically associated with laxity, and was the official state school of the Ottoman Empire specifically for its exceptions/autonomy in matters of statecraft (land tax, autonomy for Jews and other non-Muslims, etc.).
2. The "Gates of Ijtihad" were never actually closed, and radical (re)interpretation and accommodation went on unabated during and after the Medieval period. Baber Johansen and others have made their careers showing that individual jurors sometimes totally reinterpeted the foundational texts of their respective madhahib (schools).
3. I would not lump Modernists into those three narrow categories. People interested in substantially reinterpreting the canonical/consensus stands on various issues within Islam run the gamut, and there're plenty of people -- Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for instance -- who defy simple categorization because they may be 'conservative' (ie. traditional) on some issues but 'progressive' (ie. in favor of substantial reinterpretation) on others. Trying to pigeonhole people/movements into convenient boxes is sometimes helpful, yes, but imho ultimately does more harm then good if the aim is to try and understand the actual richness of Islam in the postcolonial period.
My understanding is that, in common usage, it has a slightly pejorative connotation of, yes, blind imitation.
The Arabic root, قلد (q-l-d) refers both to "blind imitation" and "uncritical faith" as well as, more generally, to convention or customary practice.
I would say it 'characterizes' Islamic philosophy or thought more generally to the extent that, say, precedent 'characterizes' canon law within the Catholic Church or within common law. It's there, but it's not like all of Islamic law is just people repeating each other for 14 centuries.
Agreed I was probably oversimplifying quite a bit, and on the first term I probably should have said orthodox vs heterodox. At least in my experience Shia beliefs tend to be a lot more divergent than Sunni, this may just be a bias of my experiences and education though, the Shia I have known personally have been Alevis and western Iranians/Persians (which is interesting because even the ethnonym someone identifies with seems to say a lot about them in that case), who are probably not entirely typical of an 'average' Shia practitioner in any case.
Yeah I didn't mean they were repeating, it was more like a common objection that philosophers would level against one another. I listened to them a while ago so I can't remember any specific examples. Here's the podcast though. Peter Adamson's main field is in the history of Islamic philosophy, I'm just doing a poor job of talking about what he said .
I mean, people were using these older seminal texts and in the marginalia (literally) were totally reinterpreting them. It's a very old and well-established position that the decline narrative offered by the old German/European Orientalists re: Muslim intellectual history just never happened.