I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
Sorry, but no. The reason I use the term is to point out that these people aren't just acting as experts, but they have an underlying ideology that is driving their position. In that sense, the analogy to neckbeard is quite on the mark, as the same mentality is in play.
Besides, I don't look highly on trying to redefine the playing field.
If you don't feel like people are making arguments that are correct, then just say so. When you use dismissive labels you are actually attacking the person and not their argument. It also increases the volatility of discourse, and doesn't help people to see the points you would like them to evaluate. No, it shouldn't be like that, and people should examine claims regardless of how they are delivered, but the reality is that these threads have been very passionate on both sides and I think they could stand to cool off a little bit.
Now, I absolutely agree with you on a number of issues. I agree with your stance that corporations are attempting to gain more information from people and that this needs checks. I agree with your position on the NYPD Demographics Unit. And I am certainly not saying that we agree on everything, but I feel like you and I are basically on the same side of the political spectrum and our disagreement over certain aspects of this particular issue don't warrant the level of vitriol that is eventually reached when dismissive labels and other passion-escalating terminology is used.
I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
The first mention of "crypto nerd" in this thread was when I posted the XKCD comic.
Do you think that the guy who writes XKCD uses the phrase "crypto nerd" for the reason you're stating?
Also, what is the politically correct term we should be using? Because it's not helpful to tell people to stop using a phrase if you haven't given anyone a different phrase to use instead.
I didn't realize the "StopWatchingUs" rally constituted everyone who has an issue w/r/t the "surveillance state," the recent and historic actions of the NSA et al., yadda yadda. But if you want to keep cherry picking specific examples of people off their rocker and then throwing your hands in the air at the prospect of debating this issue on Penny Arcade, then by all means.
I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
The first mention of "crypto nerd" in this thread was when I posted the XKCD comic.
Do you think that the guy who writes XKCD uses the phrase "crypto nerd" for the reason you're stating?
Also, what is the politically correct term we should be using? Because it's not helpful to tell people to stop using a phrase if you haven't given anyone a different phrase to use instead.
Maybe a term is wholly unnecessary and slapping people with labels because they don't agree with you is unproductive?
That may have been the first mention of it but it seems to have been adopted and used multiple times thereafter.
If you can't address a person's argument, and need to resort to a term in order to converse, your argument might have problems.
If you feel like somebody is overemphasizing their knowledge of cryptography, then say so, and say why. Adding "cryptonerd" to the discussion is remarkably useless. So far it seems to me like the argument is revolving around whether or not a backdoor in a cryptosystem is potentially damaging, and who it is damaging to. When multiple people responding to the one person I've seen who seems to have a good grasp on the fundamentals and theory of cryptography admit to not knowing much about cryptography, and simultaneously argue that he is overstating his claims for why a backdoor in a national standard for cryptography is a bad thing, I will point out useless pejoratives all day long if that's what it takes.
I don't even know if those claims are valid myself, and I'm not exactly taking a side one way or the other because I am not a cryptographer. But one side is using this term to dismiss all claims made by somebody who appears to know what he's talking about (I haven't seen a big "oh yeah, one side of the issue is definitely right" here, but feel free to show me I'm wrong).
On my phone so no quoting as it's a pain. Just some things to note
1) the NIST does not provide security assurances for any of the prngs listed in SP 800-90a. You can read it yourself if you don't believe me.
2) as already linked by xrdd there is a security proof for dual_EC_drbg. It requires solving the ECDLP which is hard if another well regarded as hard problem is hard(I don't recall which one).
There are two potential problems both of which are discussed and discussed as to how to avoid them in the NIST SP 800-90a.
3) all prngs are subject to the type of attack that xrdd is ranting about. Having the d or e in this instance is equivalent to having the hash for a hash based design. The hash is equivalent to the key so if you have it you have the keys to the kingdom just as much as you do with having e or d in dual ec drbg.
1) is true but irrelevant. Everything else you said is complete and utter nonsense (there is no security reduction for Dual_EC_DRBG, other PRNGs aren't subject to this type of attack). You have also failed to demonstrate a similar kind of attack against other PRNGs (I challenged you to do so for HMAC_DRBG pages ago, because you kept making this unfounded, stupid claim). I'm not going to bother with this discussion anymore because it is very obvious at this point that you either don't know what you are talking about or are deliberately attempting to mislead people.
EDIT: Just want to call this bullshit out specifically:
as already linked by xrdd there is a security proof for dual_EC_drbg.
I linked an article that stated that similar designs could be provably secure, but that no security reduction for Dual_EC_DRBG exists. I have pointed this out to you repeatedly when you made this claim. I have also repeatedly linked not one but two papers that clearly demonstrate that Dual_EC_DRBG isn't provably secure. Yet you keep making this completely unsupported, stupid and wrong claim. Arguing with a concrete wall would make more sense than this. So, for my exit from this discussion, I'm going to quote some of the materials that I linked. You know, the ones that you say claim that there is a security proof for Dual_EC_DRBG.
From Green:
Flaw #1: Dual-EC has no security proof.
From Schoenmakers and Sidorenko:
Our result shows that the Dual Elliptic Curve pseudorandom generator is not done correctly. The authors of [2] only claim the generator to be secure, no security proof is given. We present an effcient algorithm that distinguishes the output of the generator from the sequence of uniformly distributed random bits, which demonstrates that the generator is in fact insecure.
From Gjosteen:
We have shown that while the point sequence generation is cryptographically sound, the way a bit string is derived from the point sequence is flawed. We have given heuristic arguments that there exists a distinguisher for the output bit strings and calculated its effectiveness. Our heuristics are validated by experimental evidence. While the practical impact of these results are modest, it is hard to see how these flaws would be acceptable in a pseudo-random bit generator based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. They should not be accepted in a generator based on number-theoretic assumptions.
Here is a quick rundown of what’s happened since the last thread (mostly compiled from Al Jazeera's detailed timeline):
1)US and UK spy agencies have invested heavily in defeating common forms of encryption.
2)US government tapped into corporate intranets.
3)India among top targets of spying by NSA.
4)NSA spied on Martin Luther King Jr. and two sitting US Senators.
5)Love interests followed by NSA.
6)NSA creating maps of Americans' social contacts.
7)NSA uses massive databases to store metadata, including web searches, email activity and browsing histories on millions of web users for up to a year.
8)TOR network attacked by NSA.
9)NSA collects online contact lists en masse.
10)German, European Officials to Confront US Over Spy Allegations.
1) Is something thats pretty much the NSAs core function, and has been since its inception.
2) Is another..and yeah? All internet traffic is through private corporations at this point. If you want to intercept AlQuidaGranny@IranOnLine you have to penetrate a private network. This is a double durr on banking interests.
3)Is really just all kinds of stupid. India a country with 1.3 billion people situated right next to Pakistan accounts for a lot of NSA intercepts. Its a stupid story as it conflates amount of data gathered by 2 vacuum programs as 'focus of efforts'.
4)This is not news at all. CONINTELPRO stuff has been pretty well know for quite a while. I mean really, NEWSFLASH: MLKjr has been dead for 40+ years.
5) This is pretty much standard low level abuse of power crap. You can find this in any sort of investigative agency from the NSA to Podunk County Sheriffs dept to corporate IT. Is it creepy sure, but its not exactly something that is a huge deal to 99.999% of the US.
6) FINALLY something that actually has something to it. Ongoing, intentional, authorized spying on US citizens. Personally I don't have a huge issue with the program. I'd question its effectiveness, and would like some more details in how its actually used. But really that the NSA knows that I know someone who knows someone who might be a terrorist doesn't bother me, unless I actually face some sort of harm because of it.
7) This is the same thing as 6.
8) Good on them? Should I weep for the drug dealers and kiddy smut peddlers? I mean just on its face the NSA shouldn't tolerate there being a secure and anonymous communications channel available to everyone, because everyone includes all the people its their job to spy on.
9)This is the same as #6 to me. It's a who knows who web building exercise.
10) The NSA spies on foreign governments. That's its job. Why would I be upset about it except that they happen to get caught.
Like I read this list and the only thing on it that I see as even remotely questionable is the MetaData/Social Networks/Contacts PRISM stuff. The other stuff is the NSA doing its job.
I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
The first mention of "crypto nerd" in this thread was when I posted the XKCD comic.
Do you think that the guy who writes XKCD uses the phrase "crypto nerd" for the reason you're stating?
Also, what is the politically correct term we should be using? Because it's not helpful to tell people to stop using a phrase if you haven't given anyone a different phrase to use instead.
Maybe a term is wholly unnecessary and slapping people with labels because they don't agree with you is unproductive?
That may have been the first mention of it but it seems to have been adopted and used multiple times thereafter.
I count two cases of the word being used prior to you bringing it up, via the control-f feature.
One case was me defending the xkcd comic, and using the phrase "crypto nerd" specifically in reference to bitcoin enthusiasts.
The other was ELM stating "Or you know, lay off this point because by any metric the evidence that anything nefarious has happened here is incredibly weak except by the standards of cryptonerds."
Since ELM is one of the few people on this thread with a technical understanding of cryptography, I doubt he's using the phrase the way you describe.
If you can't address a person's argument, and need to resort to a term in order to converse, your argument might have problems.
If you feel like somebody is overemphasizing their knowledge of cryptography, then say so, and say why.
Crypto nerds aren't being labeled by having an understanding of cryptography. They're being labeled as a sub culture with a certain interest in cryptography.
It's the same way "gamer" doesn't describe mathematicians in game theory, and "goth" doesn't describe architechs well versed in medieval design, and "furry" doesn't describe wealthy women in mink coats.
Note that as a label, the subculture aspect far outweighs the knowledge aspect. i.e., you can be a gamer who's really bad at playing games. You can be a "hacker" who's just a script kiddie. You can be a crypto nerd who's really bad at security but who really likes the idea of bitcoins.
In this thread, the phrase has generally been used to describe people who hype up the theoretical strengths/weaknesses of cryptography implementations over the actual real world impact. And by "generally," I mean "on two occasions, plus 1 comic strip."
When multiple people responding to the one person I've seen who seems to have a good grasp on the fundamentals and theory of cryptography admit to not knowing much about cryptography, and simultaneously argue that he is overstating his claims for why a backdoor in a national standard for cryptography is a bad thing, I will point out useless pejoratives all day long if that's what it takes.
I openly admit to not knowing a lot about cryptography, but I'm not the one making the claim that you're attributing. My contention has consistently been, "Can you put these weaknesses in perspective by telling us what sort of resources would be required to exploit them?"
The people making the claim that you're attributing are Goumindong and ELM. I don't see Goumindong and ELM openly admitting to not knowing a lot about cryptography, however.
If you keep claiming that the lack of an NIST provided security proof is relevant then the fact that none are provided for others is also relevant.
WRT HMAC_DRBG i can just, again, quote the SP800-90 at you
The security of HMAC_DRBG is based on the assumption that an Approved hash function used in the HMAC construction is a pseudorandom function family. Informally, this means that when an attacker doesn’t know the key used, HMAC outputs look random, even given knowledge and control over the inputs. In general, even relatively weak hash functions seem to be quite strong when used in the HMAC construction. On the other hand, there is not a reduction proof from the hash function’s collision resistance properties to the security of the DRBG;
Emphasis is mine. Knowing the d or e is equivalent to knowing the key used in an HMAC_DRBG and makes that implementation of HMAC_DRBG just as weak as the specific implementation of DUAL_EC_DRBG in NIST SP800-90A
You can ignore the last sentence because a reduction proof has been found which ties the security of the DRBG to the security of the hash.
Goose.
From Green: [him referencing Gjosteen]
Just like on the graph at right, an elliptic curve point is a pair (x, y) that satisfies an elliptic curve equation. In general, both x and y are elements of a finite field, which for our purposes means they're just large integers.***
The main operation of the PRNG is to apply mathematical operations to points on the elliptic curve, in order to generate new points that are pseudorandom -- i.e., are indistinguishable from random points in some subgroup.
And the good news is that Dual-EC seems to do this first part beautifully! In fact Brown and Gjøsteen even proved that this part of the generator is sound provided that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the specific elliptic curve subgroup. This is a well studied hardness assumption so we can probably feel pretty confident in this proof.
The part that isn't secure is the backing out of the point. Its not secure because they present too many digits from the X coordinate. This is done ostensibly because people complained that the algorithm wasn't efficient enough but as mentioned in the NIST SP800-90A you can pull any multiple of 8 you want out of it as the cost of efficiency.
Which is to say that if you do that, the complaints go away. And we have the security proof.
If you keep claiming that the lack of an NIST provided security proof is relevant then the fact that none are provided for others is also relevant.
Oh, were to start... I'm not the one who started claiming that Dual_EC_DRBG was provably secure, you did that. I refuted that claim. There is also not just no NIST-provided security reduction, there is no security reduction at all.
WRT HMAC_DRBG i can just, again, quote the SP800-90 at you
You can, but it would help if you understood what you're quoting.
The security of HMAC_DRBG is based on the assumption that an Approved hash function used in the HMAC construction is a pseudorandom function family. Informally, this means that when an attacker doesn’t know the key used, HMAC outputs look random, even given knowledge and control over the inputs. In general, even relatively weak hash functions seem to be quite strong when used in the HMAC construction. On the other hand, there is not a reduction proof from the hash function’s collision resistance properties to the security of the DRBG;
Emphasis is mine. Knowing the d or e is equivalent to knowing the key used in an HMAC_DRBG and makes that implementation of HMAC_DRBG just as weak as the specific implementation of DUAL_EC_DRBG in NIST SP800-90A
Oh you silliest of geese. The key is part of the internal state, it changes every time the DRBG generates pseudorandom bits and is different for every instance of the PRNG. e is a constant which allows you to determine the internal state of any Dual_EC_DRBG instance that use the corresponding P and Q with just 32 bytes of output. Not even remotely the same thing.
You can ignore the last sentence because a reduction proof has been found which ties the security of the DRBG to the security of the hash.
Cite.
From Green: [him referencing Gjosteen]
Just like on the graph at right, an elliptic curve point is a pair (x, y) that satisfies an elliptic curve equation. In general, both x and y are elements of a finite field, which for our purposes means they're just large integers.***
The main operation of the PRNG is to apply mathematical operations to points on the elliptic curve, in order to generate new points that are pseudorandom -- i.e., are indistinguishable from random points in some subgroup.
And the good news is that Dual-EC seems to do this first part beautifully! In fact Brown and Gjøsteen even proved that this part of the generator is sound provided that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the specific elliptic curve subgroup. This is a well studied hardness assumption so we can probably feel pretty confident in this proof.
The part that isn't secure is the backing out of the point. Its not secure because they present too many digits from the X coordinate. This is done ostensibly because people complained that the algorithm wasn't efficient enough but as mentioned in the NIST SP800-90A you can pull any multiple of 8 you want out of it as the cost of efficiency.
Which is to say that if you do that, the complaints go away. And we have the security proof.
Wrong, for two reasons:
1) The standard for Dual_EC_DRBG does not require this fix, therefore Dual_EC_DRBG as specified is not proven not to be provably secure (which is what you have kept claiming yet have never been able to provide even a single source for).
2) Even if the standard did require the fix, you still wouldn't have a security reduction. Fixing one issue that prevented Dual_EC_DRBG from being provably secure doesn't automatically mean that there aren't any other issues.
EDIT: Regarding 2), from the Schoenmakers and Sidorenko paper:
However, extracting less random bits does not guarantee that there exists no other attack that successfully breaks the pseudorandom generator. The reason is that the DEC PRG is not provably secure, its security does not provably rely on the intractability of the ECDLP. To make a real provably secure pseudorandom generator one has to construct a security reduction, that is, to show that breaking the generator does imply solving a well-known and supposedly difficult problem (e.g., ECDLP, factoring, etc.)
Seriously, maybe try actually reading the papers.
Xrdd on
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jmcdonaldI voted, did you?DC(ish)Registered Userregular
Here is a quick rundown of what’s happened since the last thread (mostly compiled from Al Jazeera's detailed timeline):
1)US and UK spy agencies have invested heavily in defeating common forms of encryption.
2)US government tapped into corporate intranets.
3)India among top targets of spying by NSA.
4)NSA spied on Martin Luther King Jr. and two sitting US Senators.
5)Love interests followed by NSA.
6)NSA creating maps of Americans' social contacts.
7)NSA uses massive databases to store metadata, including web searches, email activity and browsing histories on millions of web users for up to a year.
8)TOR network attacked by NSA.
9)NSA collects online contact lists en masse.
10)German, European Officials to Confront US Over Spy Allegations.
1) Is something thats pretty much the NSAs core function, and has been since its inception.
2) Is another..and yeah? All internet traffic is through private corporations at this point. If you want to intercept AlQuidaGranny@IranOnLine you have to penetrate a private network. This is a double durr on banking interests.
3)Is really just all kinds of stupid. India a country with 1.3 billion people situated right next to Pakistan accounts for a lot of NSA intercepts. Its a stupid story as it conflates amount of data gathered by 2 vacuum programs as 'focus of efforts'.
4)This is not news at all. CONINTELPRO stuff has been pretty well know for quite a while. I mean really, NEWSFLASH: MLKjr has been dead for 40+ years.
5) This is pretty much standard low level abuse of power crap. You can find this in any sort of investigative agency from the NSA to Podunk County Sheriffs dept to corporate IT. Is it creepy sure, but its not exactly something that is a huge deal to 99.999% of the US.
6) FINALLY something that actually has something to it. Ongoing, intentional, authorized spying on US citizens. Personally I don't have a huge issue with the program. I'd question its effectiveness, and would like some more details in how its actually used. But really that the NSA knows that I know someone who knows someone who might be a terrorist doesn't bother me, unless I actually face some sort of harm because of it.
7) This is the same thing as 6.
8) Good on them? Should I weep for the drug dealers and kiddy smut peddlers? I mean just on its face the NSA shouldn't tolerate there being a secure and anonymous communications channel available to everyone, because everyone includes all the people its their job to spy on.
9)This is the same as #6 to me. It's a who knows who web building exercise.
10) The NSA spies on foreign governments. That's its job. Why would I be upset about it except that they happen to get caught.
Like I read this list and the only thing on it that I see as even remotely questionable is the MetaData/Social Networks/Contacts PRISM stuff. The other stuff is the NSA doing its job.
1) The standard for Dual_EC_DRBG does not require this fix, therefore Dual_EC_DRBG as specified is not proven not to be provably secure (which is what you have kept claiming yet have never been able to provide even a single source for).
2) Even if the standard did require the fix, you still wouldn't have a security reduction. Fixing one issue that prevented Dual_EC_DRBG from being provably secure doesn't automatically mean that there aren't any other issues.
EDIT: Regarding 2), from the Schoenmakers and Sidorenko paper:
However, extracting less random bits does not guarantee that there exists no other attack that successfully breaks the pseudorandom generator. The reason is that the DEC PRG is not provably secure, its security does not provably rely on the intractability of the ECDLP. To make a real provably secure pseudorandom generator one has to construct a security reduction, that is, to show that breaking the generator does imply solving a well-known and supposedly difficult problem (e.g., ECDLP, factoring, etc.)
I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
Sorry, but no. The reason I use the term is to point out that these people aren't just acting as experts, but they have an underlying ideology that is driving their position. In that sense, the analogy to neckbeard is quite on the mark, as the same mentality is in play.
Besides, I don't look highly on trying to redefine the playing field.
If you don't feel like people are making arguments that are correct, then just say so. When you use dismissive labels you are actually attacking the person and not their argument. It also increases the volatility of discourse, and doesn't help people to see the points you would like them to evaluate. No, it shouldn't be like that, and people should examine claims regardless of how they are delivered, but the reality is that these threads have been very passionate on both sides and I think they could stand to cool off a little bit.
Now, I absolutely agree with you on a number of issues. I agree with your stance that corporations are attempting to gain more information from people and that this needs checks. I agree with your position on the NYPD Demographics Unit. And I am certainly not saying that we agree on everything, but I feel like you and I are basically on the same side of the political spectrum and our disagreement over certain aspects of this particular issue don't warrant the level of vitriol that is eventually reached when dismissive labels and other passion-escalating terminology is used.
I got way too invested and passionate in the last thread, so I'm reading this thread and will chime in if I feel like it will actually matter. But I do want to ask if we can stop using phrases like "cryptonerds". Because to me, it comes across as dismissive of somebody who actually may know more about cryptography than you do. It might not be what you mean, but it just isn't a useful term to throw out there. It's like the Surveillance State Thread equivalent of "neckbeard".
Sorry, but no. The reason I use the term is to point out that these people aren't just acting as experts, but they have an underlying ideology that is driving their position. In that sense, the analogy to neckbeard is quite on the mark, as the same mentality is in play.
Besides, I don't look highly on trying to redefine the playing field.
If you don't feel like people are making arguments that are correct, then just say so. When you use dismissive labels you are actually attacking the person and not their argument. It also increases the volatility of discourse, and doesn't help people to see the points you would like them to evaluate. No, it shouldn't be like that, and people should examine claims regardless of how they are delivered, but the reality is that these threads have been very passionate on both sides and I think they could stand to cool off a little bit.
Now, I absolutely agree with you on a number of issues. I agree with your stance that corporations are attempting to gain more information from people and that this needs checks. I agree with your position on the NYPD Demographics Unit. And I am certainly not saying that we agree on everything, but I feel like you and I are basically on the same side of the political spectrum and our disagreement over certain aspects of this particular issue don't warrant the level of vitriol that is eventually reached when dismissive labels and other passion-escalating terminology is used.
Hedgie just doesn't disagree with ad hom.
That's the long and short if it.
No, it's that I grasp what the actual ad hominem fallacy is. Pointing out that someone has an ulterior motive for their position isn't fallacious.
I was actually just about to post about how excellent your posts were, and that I (despite knowing maths very poorly) was able to deduce that Guo etc didn't seem to be addressing your points at all.
I think all of your posts in this thread have been awesome, and I was worried that Hedgie et al were going to drive you off or get you angry enough to self-infract.
But I think you convinced me and others of your argument.
I don't know a lot about cryptography and have openly stated it several times. My general contention is that people who are implying they know a lot seem to be using the jargon, but don't present a well-reasoned argument as to why the things they're talking about are important in context.
And that's the problem: cryptographically, in a strict mathematical sense lots of things are possible - but whether they lead to practical attacks is a big issue (i.e. SHA-1 has some theoretical attacks but none has been implemented, or they're prohibitively expensive to implement).
Which is the core problem with everything about "NSA backdoored an encryption standard". Where is the evidence? Where is the document which shows this clearly? The largest quote on the matter claimed to be coming from the NSA is that writing the standard was "an exercise in finesse". That quite literally could mean just about anything, and is notably not any sort of actual evidence of nefariousness.
The USA Freedom Act would end the NSA’s bulk daily collection of virtually all Americans’ phone records as part of a sweeping program first revealed in June, when the Guardian published a secret court order. The law would also bring in new limits on the retention of data on Americans gathered by the NSA “incidentally” through Internet surveillance programs like Prism. Additionally, it would strengthen the oversight process by introducing a “special advocate” who would promote privacy interests in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And transparency measures would be introduced, too, forcing the government to make public secret legal interpretations and allowing companies to reveal the amount of spying orders they receive.
Since Snowden’s leaks, there have now been more than 20 bills aimed at reforming government surveillance powers introduced on Capitol Hill. However, the USA Freedom Act is by far one of the most comprehensive. That is reflected in the support it has attracted from a diverse range of groups, including the ACLU, the NRA, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Association of American Publishers. Mozilla is also lending its backing, saying that the bill “takes an important step toward rebuilding user trust by adding limitations on government collection of data in the name of national security.”
According to Rep. Sensenbrenner, two consecutive White Houses have wrongly used his Patriot Act to collect the phone records of innocent Americans, and he wants it to stop. "This misinterpretation of the law threatens our First, Second and Fourth Amendment rights," Rep. Sensenbrenner recently said. "Congress never intended this. I will rein in the abuse of both the Patriot Act and the U.S. Constitution with the support of the American public."
End bulk collection of Americans’ communications records
• The USA Freedom Act ends bulk collection under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
• The bill would strengthen the prohibition on "reverse targeting" of Americans—that is, targeting a foreigner with the goal of obtaining communications involving an American.
• The bill requires the government to more aggressively filter and discard information about Americans accidentally collected through PRISM and related programs.
Reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
• The USA Freedom Act creates an Office of the Special Advocate (OSA) tasked with promoting privacy interests before the FISA court’s closed proceedings. The OSA will have the authority to appeal decisions of the FISA court.
• The bill creates new and more robust reporting requirements to ensure that Congress is aware of actions by the FISC and intelligence community as a whole.
• The bill would grant the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board subpoena authority to investigate issues related to privacy and national security.
Increase Transparency
• The USA Freedom Act would end secret laws by requiring the Attorney General to publicly disclose all FISC decisions issued after July 10, 2003 that contain a significant construction or interpretation of law.
• Under the bill, Internet and telecom companies would be allowed to publicly report an estimate of (1) the number of FISA orders and national security letters received, (2) the number of such orders and letters complied with, and (3) the number of users or accounts on whom information was demanded under the orders and letters.
• The bill would require the government to make annual or semiannual public reports estimating the total number of individuals and U.S. persons that were subject to FISA orders authorizing electronic surveillance, pen/trap devices, and access to business records.
The operation to infiltrate data links exploits a fundamental weakness in systems architecture. To guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo maintain fortress-like data centers across four continents and connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable. These globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of investment, are known as “clouds” because data moves seamlessly around them.
In order for the data centers to operate effectively, they synchronize high volumes of information about account holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits entire e-mail archives — years of messages and attachments — from one data center to another.
Tapping the Google and Yahoo clouds allows the NSA to intercept communications in real time and to take “a retrospective look at target activity,” according to one internal NSA document.
...
Because digital communications and cloud storage do not usually adhere to national boundaries, MUSCULAR and a previously disclosed NSA operation to collect Internet address books have amassed content and metadata on a previously unknown scale from U.S. citizens and residents. Those operations have gone undebated in public or on the floor of Congress because their existence was classified.
So, even though the NSA has been granted great privileges from cloud data companies with PRISM, they’ve chosen to attack the data center traffic when it moves across borders thus avoiding the FISA entirely.
I also find it shocking that Google and Yahoo haven’t been encrypting data between data centers. That’s a shocking security oversight.
centraldogma on
When people unite together, they become stronger than the sum of their parts.
Don't assume bad intentions over neglect and misunderstanding.
This would still all be terribly interesting were it not for the fact that "mass surveillance by the government" is being held up in direct opposition to "mass surveillance by a private multinational corporation".
This would still all be terribly interesting were it not for the fact that "mass surveillance by the government" is being held up in direct opposition to "mass surveillance by a private multinational corporation".
I don’t think it’s called spying when you willingly give your data to the corporations.
If you’re taking about datamining, that’s a different subject, and I’m not sure how it relates.
When people unite together, they become stronger than the sum of their parts.
Don't assume bad intentions over neglect and misunderstanding.
The operation to infiltrate data links exploits a fundamental weakness in systems architecture. To guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo maintain fortress-like data centers across four continents and connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable. These globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of investment, are known as “clouds” because data moves seamlessly around them.
In order for the data centers to operate effectively, they synchronize high volumes of information about account holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits entire e-mail archives — years of messages and attachments — from one data center to another.
Tapping the Google and Yahoo clouds allows the NSA to intercept communications in real time and to take “a retrospective look at target activity,” according to one internal NSA document.
...
Because digital communications and cloud storage do not usually adhere to national boundaries, MUSCULAR and a previously disclosed NSA operation to collect Internet address books have amassed content and metadata on a previously unknown scale from U.S. citizens and residents. Those operations have gone undebated in public or on the floor of Congress because their existence was classified.
So, even though the NSA has been granted great privileges from cloud data companies with PRISM, they’ve chosen to attack the data center traffic when it moves across borders thus avoiding the FISA entirely.
I also find it shocking that Google and Yahoo haven’t been encrypting data between data centers. That’s a shocking security oversight.
Inter-data centre traffic isn't really travelling on the public internet, it's all on dedicated fibre links with the only endpoints controlled. I guess there was an assumption that the cables wouldn't be dug up and spliced, or that if that's what they did it would be detectable
The operation to infiltrate data links exploits a fundamental weakness in systems architecture. To guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo maintain fortress-like data centers across four continents and connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable. These globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of investment, are known as “clouds” because data moves seamlessly around them.
In order for the data centers to operate effectively, they synchronize high volumes of information about account holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits entire e-mail archives — years of messages and attachments — from one data center to another.
Tapping the Google and Yahoo clouds allows the NSA to intercept communications in real time and to take “a retrospective look at target activity,” according to one internal NSA document.
...
Because digital communications and cloud storage do not usually adhere to national boundaries, MUSCULAR and a previously disclosed NSA operation to collect Internet address books have amassed content and metadata on a previously unknown scale from U.S. citizens and residents. Those operations have gone undebated in public or on the floor of Congress because their existence was classified.
So, even though the NSA has been granted great privileges from cloud data companies with PRISM, they’ve chosen to attack the data center traffic when it moves across borders thus avoiding the FISA entirely.
I also find it shocking that Google and Yahoo haven’t been encrypting data between data centers. That’s a shocking security oversight.
Inter-data centre traffic isn't really travelling on the public internet, it's all on dedicated fibre links with the only endpoints controlled. I guess there was an assumption that the cables wouldn't be dug up and spliced, or that if that's what they did it would be detectable
They attacked the link endpoints overseas. Which, again, falls under "the NSA doing its job".
The operation to infiltrate data links exploits a fundamental weakness in systems architecture. To guard against data loss and system slowdowns, Google and Yahoo maintain fortress-like data centers across four continents and connect them with thousands of miles of fiber-optic cable. These globe-spanning networks, representing billions of dollars of investment, are known as “clouds” because data moves seamlessly around them.
In order for the data centers to operate effectively, they synchronize high volumes of information about account holders. Yahoo’s internal network, for example, sometimes transmits entire e-mail archives — years of messages and attachments — from one data center to another.
Tapping the Google and Yahoo clouds allows the NSA to intercept communications in real time and to take “a retrospective look at target activity,” according to one internal NSA document.
...
Because digital communications and cloud storage do not usually adhere to national boundaries, MUSCULAR and a previously disclosed NSA operation to collect Internet address books have amassed content and metadata on a previously unknown scale from U.S. citizens and residents. Those operations have gone undebated in public or on the floor of Congress because their existence was classified.
So, even though the NSA has been granted great privileges from cloud data companies with PRISM, they’ve chosen to attack the data center traffic when it moves across borders thus avoiding the FISA entirely.
I also find it shocking that Google and Yahoo haven’t been encrypting data between data centers. That’s a shocking security oversight.
Inter-data centre traffic isn't really travelling on the public internet, it's all on dedicated fibre links with the only endpoints controlled. I guess there was an assumption that the cables wouldn't be dug up and spliced, or that if that's what they did it would be detectable
They attacked the link endpoints overseas. Which, again, falls under "the NSA doing its job".
It's the NSA's job to collect communications on a US corp's computers talking on its own network? There's a decent chance that much of that data is simply a replica of data stored in the US ones too. Besides, everything is going to be encrypted soon anyway.
Fairfax (and I guess others) are writing very excited articles about Australian embassies being used for signals intercept work in Asia. Surprising no one in the intelligence community, but a retarded thing to be bringing to the public.
This idiot bandwagon is going to continue until a bunch of people get murdered from being burned. I mean I'm sure there's absolutely no need for us to spy on Indonesia "we wiped out about a third of the East Timorese population in the late 90s", or Papua New Guinea "who knows what the fuck is going on here", or Malaysia, or the Phillipines or pretty much any South East Asian country where you'll be lucky if their diplomats have any idea what the guy they directly report to is intending to do.
The Commonwealth Bank is way ahead of them on this, and I'd be surprised if other banks didn't do it with their banking websites too - that's just the one I have direct knowledge of.
The Commonwealth Bank is way ahead of them on this, and I'd be surprised if other banks didn't do it with their banking websites too - that's just the one I have direct knowledge of.
Frankly I'm skeptical that privacy has done all that much for modern civilization. Most of the modern uprisings and civil rights victories are steadily being won in part through the power of deanonymizing the participants of both sides. Its much harder to ignore a person then a mob.
There's a subtle but important distinction between no one being possibly able to see what you do, and someone taking that one facet and using their hegemonic power to broadcast it and target people. The latter is more problematic: the Google Hangouts "so and so endorsed this product!" is a really troubling modern example of the latter.
Frankly I'm skeptical that privacy has done all that much for modern civilization. Most of the modern uprisings and civil rights victories are steadily being won in part through the power of deanonymizing the participants of both sides. Its much harder to ignore a person then a mob.
There's a subtle but important distinction between no one being possibly able to see what you do, and someone taking that one facet and using their hegemonic power to broadcast it and target people. The latter is more problematic: the Google Hangouts "so and so endorsed this product!" is a really troubling modern example of the latter.
I'd recommend talking to one of the trans members of D&D. They've discussed how important privacy is for them in the past.
Another reason privacy is extremely important is that if you wanted to ruin somebody's life, say, because they are your political opponent, violating their privacy would be a fairly easy way to do so.
Everybody has something they would rather everybody not know. Everybody.
Another reason privacy is extremely important is that if you wanted to ruin somebody's life, say, because they are your political opponent, violating their privacy would be a fairly easy way to do so.
Everybody has something they would rather everybody not know. Everybody.
This isn't hypothetical, either - read up on what the LaRoucheites did to Eagleton in 72 (which is another reason that their presence at the rally was offensive and compromised it.)
Another reason privacy is extremely important is that if you wanted to ruin somebody's life, say, because they are your political opponent, violating their privacy would be a fairly easy way to do so.
Everybody has something they would rather everybody not know. Everybody.
And that is why you should not post everything about yourself online.
As long as the intelligence gathering is reserved to meta data, i don't really see any problem (well, apart from possible waste of time).
If they start bugging phones of the people in their own country without warrants or authorizations, or following them around, then there is a problem.
Another reason privacy is extremely important is that if you wanted to ruin somebody's life, say, because they are your political opponent, violating their privacy would be a fairly easy way to do so.
Everybody has something they would rather everybody not know. Everybody.
And that is why you should not post everything about yourself online.
As long as the intelligence gathering is reserved to meta data, i don't really see any problem (well, apart from possible waste of time).
If they start bugging phones of the people in their own country without warrants or authorizations, or following them around, then there is a problem.
And women should not wear short skirts as well?
The reality is that more and more, our lives are digitized. The problem is that there is little protection for ourselves from the corporations who seek to exploit this for their own gain. Worse, they've co-opted the groups who are ostensibly protecting us (see the EFF attacking the right of publicity).
Frankly I'm skeptical that privacy has done all that much for modern civilization. Most of the modern uprisings and civil rights victories are steadily being won in part through the power of deanonymizing the participants of both sides. Its much harder to ignore a person then a mob.
There's a subtle but important distinction between no one being possibly able to see what you do, and someone taking that one facet and using their hegemonic power to broadcast it and target people. The latter is more problematic: the Google Hangouts "so and so endorsed this product!" is a really troubling modern example of the latter.
I'd recommend talking to one of the trans members of D&D. They've discussed how important privacy is for them in the past.
The trans members of D&D aren't defined by no one being able to see what they do. But they are defined by expecting the type of privacy one gets from being in a crowd - the expectation they won't suddenly be on jumbo-tron.
If we're not going to bother defining what we want to accomplish, then the only thing we're accomplishing is feeling smug while nothing changes.
Posts
Remind me why I'm taking this seriously?
More on this here.
If you don't feel like people are making arguments that are correct, then just say so. When you use dismissive labels you are actually attacking the person and not their argument. It also increases the volatility of discourse, and doesn't help people to see the points you would like them to evaluate. No, it shouldn't be like that, and people should examine claims regardless of how they are delivered, but the reality is that these threads have been very passionate on both sides and I think they could stand to cool off a little bit.
Now, I absolutely agree with you on a number of issues. I agree with your stance that corporations are attempting to gain more information from people and that this needs checks. I agree with your position on the NYPD Demographics Unit. And I am certainly not saying that we agree on everything, but I feel like you and I are basically on the same side of the political spectrum and our disagreement over certain aspects of this particular issue don't warrant the level of vitriol that is eventually reached when dismissive labels and other passion-escalating terminology is used.
The first mention of "crypto nerd" in this thread was when I posted the XKCD comic.
Do you think that the guy who writes XKCD uses the phrase "crypto nerd" for the reason you're stating?
Also, what is the politically correct term we should be using? Because it's not helpful to tell people to stop using a phrase if you haven't given anyone a different phrase to use instead.
I didn't realize the "StopWatchingUs" rally constituted everyone who has an issue w/r/t the "surveillance state," the recent and historic actions of the NSA et al., yadda yadda. But if you want to keep cherry picking specific examples of people off their rocker and then throwing your hands in the air at the prospect of debating this issue on Penny Arcade, then by all means.
I don't think anyone has ever accused you of taking this seriously.
Maybe a term is wholly unnecessary and slapping people with labels because they don't agree with you is unproductive?
That may have been the first mention of it but it seems to have been adopted and used multiple times thereafter.
If you can't address a person's argument, and need to resort to a term in order to converse, your argument might have problems.
If you feel like somebody is overemphasizing their knowledge of cryptography, then say so, and say why. Adding "cryptonerd" to the discussion is remarkably useless. So far it seems to me like the argument is revolving around whether or not a backdoor in a cryptosystem is potentially damaging, and who it is damaging to. When multiple people responding to the one person I've seen who seems to have a good grasp on the fundamentals and theory of cryptography admit to not knowing much about cryptography, and simultaneously argue that he is overstating his claims for why a backdoor in a national standard for cryptography is a bad thing, I will point out useless pejoratives all day long if that's what it takes.
I don't even know if those claims are valid myself, and I'm not exactly taking a side one way or the other because I am not a cryptographer. But one side is using this term to dismiss all claims made by somebody who appears to know what he's talking about (I haven't seen a big "oh yeah, one side of the issue is definitely right" here, but feel free to show me I'm wrong).
1) is true but irrelevant. Everything else you said is complete and utter nonsense (there is no security reduction for Dual_EC_DRBG, other PRNGs aren't subject to this type of attack). You have also failed to demonstrate a similar kind of attack against other PRNGs (I challenged you to do so for HMAC_DRBG pages ago, because you kept making this unfounded, stupid claim). I'm not going to bother with this discussion anymore because it is very obvious at this point that you either don't know what you are talking about or are deliberately attempting to mislead people.
EDIT: Just want to call this bullshit out specifically: I linked an article that stated that similar designs could be provably secure, but that no security reduction for Dual_EC_DRBG exists. I have pointed this out to you repeatedly when you made this claim. I have also repeatedly linked not one but two papers that clearly demonstrate that Dual_EC_DRBG isn't provably secure. Yet you keep making this completely unsupported, stupid and wrong claim. Arguing with a concrete wall would make more sense than this. So, for my exit from this discussion, I'm going to quote some of the materials that I linked. You know, the ones that you say claim that there is a security proof for Dual_EC_DRBG.
From Green:
From Schoenmakers and Sidorenko:
From Gjosteen:
Goose.
1) Is something thats pretty much the NSAs core function, and has been since its inception.
2) Is another..and yeah? All internet traffic is through private corporations at this point. If you want to intercept AlQuidaGranny@IranOnLine you have to penetrate a private network. This is a double durr on banking interests.
3)Is really just all kinds of stupid. India a country with 1.3 billion people situated right next to Pakistan accounts for a lot of NSA intercepts. Its a stupid story as it conflates amount of data gathered by 2 vacuum programs as 'focus of efforts'.
4)This is not news at all. CONINTELPRO stuff has been pretty well know for quite a while. I mean really, NEWSFLASH: MLKjr has been dead for 40+ years.
5) This is pretty much standard low level abuse of power crap. You can find this in any sort of investigative agency from the NSA to Podunk County Sheriffs dept to corporate IT. Is it creepy sure, but its not exactly something that is a huge deal to 99.999% of the US.
6) FINALLY something that actually has something to it. Ongoing, intentional, authorized spying on US citizens. Personally I don't have a huge issue with the program. I'd question its effectiveness, and would like some more details in how its actually used. But really that the NSA knows that I know someone who knows someone who might be a terrorist doesn't bother me, unless I actually face some sort of harm because of it.
7) This is the same thing as 6.
8) Good on them? Should I weep for the drug dealers and kiddy smut peddlers? I mean just on its face the NSA shouldn't tolerate there being a secure and anonymous communications channel available to everyone, because everyone includes all the people its their job to spy on.
9)This is the same as #6 to me. It's a who knows who web building exercise.
10) The NSA spies on foreign governments. That's its job. Why would I be upset about it except that they happen to get caught.
Like I read this list and the only thing on it that I see as even remotely questionable is the MetaData/Social Networks/Contacts PRISM stuff. The other stuff is the NSA doing its job.
I count two cases of the word being used prior to you bringing it up, via the control-f feature.
One case was me defending the xkcd comic, and using the phrase "crypto nerd" specifically in reference to bitcoin enthusiasts.
The other was ELM stating "Or you know, lay off this point because by any metric the evidence that anything nefarious has happened here is incredibly weak except by the standards of cryptonerds."
Since ELM is one of the few people on this thread with a technical understanding of cryptography, I doubt he's using the phrase the way you describe.
Crypto nerds aren't being labeled by having an understanding of cryptography. They're being labeled as a sub culture with a certain interest in cryptography.
It's the same way "gamer" doesn't describe mathematicians in game theory, and "goth" doesn't describe architechs well versed in medieval design, and "furry" doesn't describe wealthy women in mink coats.
Note that as a label, the subculture aspect far outweighs the knowledge aspect. i.e., you can be a gamer who's really bad at playing games. You can be a "hacker" who's just a script kiddie. You can be a crypto nerd who's really bad at security but who really likes the idea of bitcoins.
In this thread, the phrase has generally been used to describe people who hype up the theoretical strengths/weaknesses of cryptography implementations over the actual real world impact. And by "generally," I mean "on two occasions, plus 1 comic strip."
I openly admit to not knowing a lot about cryptography, but I'm not the one making the claim that you're attributing. My contention has consistently been, "Can you put these weaknesses in perspective by telling us what sort of resources would be required to exploit them?"
The people making the claim that you're attributing are Goumindong and ELM. I don't see Goumindong and ELM openly admitting to not knowing a lot about cryptography, however.
If you keep claiming that the lack of an NIST provided security proof is relevant then the fact that none are provided for others is also relevant.
WRT HMAC_DRBG i can just, again, quote the SP800-90 at you
Emphasis is mine. Knowing the d or e is equivalent to knowing the key used in an HMAC_DRBG and makes that implementation of HMAC_DRBG just as weak as the specific implementation of DUAL_EC_DRBG in NIST SP800-90A
You can ignore the last sentence because a reduction proof has been found which ties the security of the DRBG to the security of the hash.
From Green: [him referencing Gjosteen]
The part that isn't secure is the backing out of the point. Its not secure because they present too many digits from the X coordinate. This is done ostensibly because people complained that the algorithm wasn't efficient enough but as mentioned in the NIST SP800-90A you can pull any multiple of 8 you want out of it as the cost of efficiency.
Which is to say that if you do that, the complaints go away. And we have the security proof.
Oh, were to start... I'm not the one who started claiming that Dual_EC_DRBG was provably secure, you did that. I refuted that claim. There is also not just no NIST-provided security reduction, there is no security reduction at all.
You can, but it would help if you understood what you're quoting.
Oh you silliest of geese. The key is part of the internal state, it changes every time the DRBG generates pseudorandom bits and is different for every instance of the PRNG. e is a constant which allows you to determine the internal state of any Dual_EC_DRBG instance that use the corresponding P and Q with just 32 bytes of output. Not even remotely the same thing.
Cite.
Wrong, for two reasons:
1) The standard for Dual_EC_DRBG does not require this fix, therefore Dual_EC_DRBG as specified is not proven not to be provably secure (which is what you have kept claiming yet have never been able to provide even a single source for).
2) Even if the standard did require the fix, you still wouldn't have a security reduction. Fixing one issue that prevented Dual_EC_DRBG from being provably secure doesn't automatically mean that there aren't any other issues.
EDIT: Regarding 2), from the Schoenmakers and Sidorenko paper:
Seriously, maybe try actually reading the papers.
EXACTLY!
B&G has shown it!
Hedgie just doesn't disagree with ad hom.
That's the long and short if it.
No, it's that I grasp what the actual ad hominem fallacy is. Pointing out that someone has an ulterior motive for their position isn't fallacious.
Maybe he should start doing so.
Ah dammit.
I was actually just about to post about how excellent your posts were, and that I (despite knowing maths very poorly) was able to deduce that Guo etc didn't seem to be addressing your points at all.
I think all of your posts in this thread have been awesome, and I was worried that Hedgie et al were going to drive you off or get you angry enough to self-infract.
But I think you convinced me and others of your argument.
@Xrdd
And that's the problem: cryptographically, in a strict mathematical sense lots of things are possible - but whether they lead to practical attacks is a big issue (i.e. SHA-1 has some theoretical attacks but none has been implemented, or they're prohibitively expensive to implement).
Which is the core problem with everything about "NSA backdoored an encryption standard". Where is the evidence? Where is the document which shows this clearly? The largest quote on the matter claimed to be coming from the NSA is that writing the standard was "an exercise in finesse". That quite literally could mean just about anything, and is notably not any sort of actual evidence of nefariousness.
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/29/sensenbrenner_and_leahy_s_usa_freedom_act_seeks_to_curb_nsa_domestic_spying.html
The bill was introduced by Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, who was one of the chief architects of the Patriot Act. From the ACLU: https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/usa-freedom-act-real-spying-reform
A summary on Sensenbrenner's website: http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/legislation/theusafreedomact.htm
Full text PDF
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
So, even though the NSA has been granted great privileges from cloud data companies with PRISM, they’ve chosen to attack the data center traffic when it moves across borders thus avoiding the FISA entirely.
I also find it shocking that Google and Yahoo haven’t been encrypting data between data centers. That’s a shocking security oversight.
Don't assume bad intentions over neglect and misunderstanding.
I don’t think it’s called spying when you willingly give your data to the corporations.
If you’re taking about datamining, that’s a different subject, and I’m not sure how it relates.
Don't assume bad intentions over neglect and misunderstanding.
Inter-data centre traffic isn't really travelling on the public internet, it's all on dedicated fibre links with the only endpoints controlled. I guess there was an assumption that the cables wouldn't be dug up and spliced, or that if that's what they did it would be detectable
They attacked the link endpoints overseas. Which, again, falls under "the NSA doing its job".
It's the NSA's job to collect communications on a US corp's computers talking on its own network? There's a decent chance that much of that data is simply a replica of data stored in the US ones too. Besides, everything is going to be encrypted soon anyway.
Fairfax (and I guess others) are writing very excited articles about Australian embassies being used for signals intercept work in Asia. Surprising no one in the intelligence community, but a retarded thing to be bringing to the public.
This idiot bandwagon is going to continue until a bunch of people get murdered from being burned. I mean I'm sure there's absolutely no need for us to spy on Indonesia "we wiped out about a third of the East Timorese population in the late 90s", or Papua New Guinea "who knows what the fuck is going on here", or Malaysia, or the Phillipines or pretty much any South East Asian country where you'll be lucky if their diplomats have any idea what the guy they directly report to is intending to do.
The chief spy in an embassy is usually the military liason officer.
The Commonwealth Bank is way ahead of them on this, and I'd be surprised if other banks didn't do it with their banking websites too - that's just the one I have direct knowledge of.
Doesn't make it any less creepy.
There's a subtle but important distinction between no one being possibly able to see what you do, and someone taking that one facet and using their hegemonic power to broadcast it and target people. The latter is more problematic: the Google Hangouts "so and so endorsed this product!" is a really troubling modern example of the latter.
In disheartening news, the university president is chastising the students for doing so.
I'd recommend talking to one of the trans members of D&D. They've discussed how important privacy is for them in the past.
Everybody has something they would rather everybody not know. Everybody.
This isn't hypothetical, either - read up on what the LaRoucheites did to Eagleton in 72 (which is another reason that their presence at the rally was offensive and compromised it.)
And that is why you should not post everything about yourself online.
As long as the intelligence gathering is reserved to meta data, i don't really see any problem (well, apart from possible waste of time).
If they start bugging phones of the people in their own country without warrants or authorizations, or following them around, then there is a problem.
And women should not wear short skirts as well?
The reality is that more and more, our lives are digitized. The problem is that there is little protection for ourselves from the corporations who seek to exploit this for their own gain. Worse, they've co-opted the groups who are ostensibly protecting us (see the EFF attacking the right of publicity).
The trans members of D&D aren't defined by no one being able to see what they do. But they are defined by expecting the type of privacy one gets from being in a crowd - the expectation they won't suddenly be on jumbo-tron.
If we're not going to bother defining what we want to accomplish, then the only thing we're accomplishing is feeling smug while nothing changes.