I have to admit, except for what I remember Feinstein explaining, it's all speculative. Maybe my own knowledge is way out of date in the last 5 years. It's not a topic that's easy to find information on, and it's a very depressing one when you do.
This is one reason why the line people put forward that only a very small number of members of the military are "monsters" and the overwhelming majority are well-intentioned, which causes a general presumption by Americans that civilian casualties caused by the US during war are almost always "accidents," seems inaccurate. I have never served in any military and I have no sense for how the US military differs from others, but in the US military there seems to be an entrenched culture of abuse which actually defines the hierarchy itself. Unleashing this force against other populations seems criminal in itself, regardless of other motives and causes involved.
It's quit astonishing, given the sacrosanct nature of the military in the United States for as long as I've lived here, that this is the situation. There's not many other words for it besides that and, again, horrifying.
In Taiwan, the military sucks. This is no secret. They won't win a war against China, it's not a good job (unless you become an officer on the career path, maybe), and it's largely responsible for having young men dig ditches, do laundry, and, occasionally, do push-ups until they have a heart-attack and die, and the Minister of Defense has to resign in shame. That, and be a giant pit to through piles of money into, just for those reasons. But I never thought there was some sort of epidemic of rape against women in uniform. Practically every woman I knew during my mobilization was either a civilian expert like a doctor, or an officer--I don't recall any enlisted women whatsoever. And accordingly, they were about as popular as male officers (which is to say while I was stuck there, not at all, fuck all of them).
Apparently, between ten and eleven percent of the military is women in Taiwan. Is that high compared to the United States? Low? I can bet it would be high because, every year since I was demobbed, the government has been forced to cut future conscription length to practically nothing, because the whole military is about as popular as intestinal parasites. That's why for recruitment, they have to inflate cute, Japanese-style mascots in front of Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. But I never heard of anything like this--during the Corporal Hung Chungchiu Scandal, when he died of over-exertion, the Defense Minister had to tender his resignation and at least 15 officers had criminal charges brought on them. For one corporal. I have to imagine that if the military was concealing an epidemic of rape, the general population would literally lynch the entire defense ministry (and as crappy soldiers as I was, they probably wouldn't have that much trouble).
I know a woman who was previously a 'career soldier' in the Russian Army (she left and had a family), who would tell me first-hand accounts of infamous army hazing 'traditions', that have basically become a serious problem since Russia became independent and even before that, despite some token efforts to crack down on it. There were lots of Corporal Hungs in the Russian Army, no doubt. But the idea of rampant rape of women in uniform was totally alien to her. She couldn't understand why Americans, who for the most part weren't killing their own recruits in hazing (not including the Marine Corps, apparently) would stand for it.
But the military, even as an institution, is extremely well-respected. Not just "the troops", but the entire armed forces. It makes my head spinning just trying to reconcile it.
EDIT: I guess this is sort-of related to the topic on hand, because we're probably only going to see more American fighting men and women sent to Iraq and maybe even Syria down the line.
The issue is tolerated because the military is so well respected. They police themselves and anyone who tries to add in accountability or training is accused of hating the troops and treason. This is a gross oversimplification, but that is why it has been allowed.
He's a shy overambitious dog-catcher on the wrong side of the law. She's an orphaned psychic mercenary with the power to bend men's minds. They fight crime!
Kaspersky says it assigned a team to watch its movements, and the team members found out they were dealing with Duqu — a malware program that previous reports had connected to the Israeli government.
Subsequently, Kaspersky launched a worldwide search for the virus on millions of computers and discovered it in three luxury hotels in Europe. All of those hotels, Kaspersky says, were used during talks between Iran and Western powers over Iran's nuclear deal.
The sectarian terror group won’t be defeated by the western states that incubated it in the first place ...
A revealing light on how we got here has now been shone by a recently declassified secret US intelligence report, written in August 2012, which uncannily predicts – and effectively welcomes – the prospect of a “Salafist principality” in eastern Syria and an al-Qaida-controlled Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. In stark contrast to western claims at the time, the Defense Intelligence Agency document identifies al-Qaida in Iraq (which became Isis) and fellow Salafists as the “major forces driving the insurgency in Syria” – and states that “western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey” were supporting the opposition’s efforts to take control of eastern Syria.
Raising the “possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality”, the Pentagon report goes on, “this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)”.
Which is pretty well exactly what happened two years later. The report isn’t a policy document. It’s heavily redacted and there are ambiguities in the language. But the implications are clear enough. A year into the Syrian rebellion, the US and its allies weren’t only supporting and arming an opposition they knew to be dominated by extreme sectarian groups; they were prepared to countenance the creation of some sort of “Islamic state” – despite the “grave danger” to Iraq’s unity – as a Sunni buffer to weaken Syria.
That doesn’t mean the US created Isis, of course, though some of its Gulf allies certainly played a role in it – as the US vice-president, Joe Biden, acknowledged last year.
Isn't that the same report that was talked about like weeks ago that is being grossly misinterpreted?
Cause it sure looked like the same one.
How do you feel the report is being "misinterpreted"? The text is redacted, but a lot of the language there seems clear enough, or even remarkably clear.
I'm just surprised anyone in the western media is allowed to report this.
But seriously asokolov, you're not allowed to have alts on the forum
A trap is for fish: when you've got the fish, you can forget the trap. A snare is for rabbits: when you've got the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words are for meaning: when you've got the meaning, you can forget the words.
Speaking as a rape survivor, the way the US military handles (or rewards) mass rape committed by its soldiers definitely should be relevant to discussions about US soldiers being redeployed into warzones. And the US military really is a force operating "within" the Middle East that has had presence there for decades. At least for the foreseeable future, until they eventually get their asses kicked out, the US military is a part of the region, as much as the nation-states there.
Isn't that the same report that was talked about like weeks ago that is being grossly misinterpreted?
Cause it sure looked like the same one.
How do you feel the report is being "misinterpreted"? The text is redacted, but a lot of the language there seems clear enough, or even remarkably clear.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
I'm just surprised anyone in the western media is allowed to report this.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
What I get from that report is not that Western countries necessarily "welcomed" IS, but that the US government decided that the value of overthrowing the Syrian government outweighed the danger of empowering the jihadist factions, and aided its regional allies in that endeavor despite being well aware of the consequences.
Not exactly the same as being all "Fuck yeah, let's create ISIS," but still a pretty awful policy in my view.
edit - The Obama administration's much-maligned reluctance to arm the Syrian rebels more heavily than it did is perhaps evidence of some degree of wariness of this danger
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
What I get from that report is not that Western countries necessarily "welcomed" IS, but that the US government decided that the value of overthrowing the Syrian government outweighed the danger of empowering the jihadist factions, and aided its regional allies in that endeavor despite being well aware of the consequences.
Not exactly the same as being all "Fuck yeah, let's create ISIS," but still a pretty awful policy in my view.
The document reads:
IF THE SITUATION UNRAVELS THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A DECLARED OR UNDECLARED SALAFIST PRINCIPALITY IN EASTERN SYRIA (HASAKA AND DER ZOR), AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE SUPPORTING POWERS TO THE OPPOSITION WANT, IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH IS CONSIDERED THE STRATEGIC DEPTH OF THE SHIA EXPANSION (IRAQ AND IRAN)
It would need to be referring to distinct "supporting powers" in different parts of a relatively short document. This is possible, but it would still mean Saudis, Turkey, etc wanted the result to happen, and also that the US was aware of this years ahead of time and still continued a policy it knew would likely lead to this result.
edit - The Obama administration's much-maligned reluctance to arm the Syrian rebels more heavily than it did is perhaps evidence of some degree of wariness of this danger
Potential Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton pointed out her differences with President Barack Obama on Tuesday over his decision not to arm moderate Syrian rebels, as neighboring Iraq struggles to cope with extremist spillover from Syria.
"We pushed very hard. But as I say in my book, I believe that Harry Truman was right, the buck stops with the president," Clinton said in a CNN interview.
The former secretary of state said she, along with the then heads of the Pentagon and CIA tried but failed to persuade Obama to arm the rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but that the White House resisted.
It was of course known that the rebels fighting Assad were not "moderate." If you note who this report was distributed to, well, the State Department is there but the President is not. There is no evidence Obama ever saw the report. I think it is possible/probable this policy was implemented without Obama's knowledge.
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
The report is so specific that it predicts events that happened two years later almost exactly as they actually happened.
A policy as complex as support for an Islamist insurgency in Syria presumably involved, you know, coordination between the powers involved. The US Defense Intelligence Agency would have necessarily been had some communication with the intelligence agencies of the others in coordinating this support. Note that the report was written 2 years after the beginning of the insurgency in Syria, after the role of Nusra Front (then still a part of AQI) was highly-publicized, and after Turkish and Saudi intelligence support for Nusra Front was itself publicized.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
Kaputa on
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AManFromEarthLet's get to twerk!The King in the SwampRegistered Userregular
Australia is warning that ISIS could have enough material to make a dirty bomb.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here.
It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
But seriously asokolov, you're not allowed to have alts on the forum
Hi. Presumably you caused my previous account to be banned. This is not an 'alt' account, based on my understanding of the rules and how they apply to transgender people, this is an account actually reflecting my real gender. (If I can change my gender on my state ID card, being constrained to a male gendered account here would feel pretty backward for 2015.) I very honestly no longer felt comfortable using an account with male gender specified (which caused people to speak to me in 'hostile' manner as if I were a man, and left me feeling pretty constantly upset). I have never been a man. Posting under a male account is not in keeping with who I really am, or my demeanor in real life.
I feel conversations here could actually be more harmonious if people understand this about me.
I respectfully ask to not be misidentified with male pronouns here, or referred to under past male screen names. (You can note the Asokolov account was created in 2010; I had not even begun to transition at that point and really was still completely confused about who I was.)
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
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jmcdonaldI voted, did you?DC(ish)Registered Userregular
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
So easy it was like taking candy from the Iraqi army
A trap is for fish: when you've got the fish, you can forget the trap. A snare is for rabbits: when you've got the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words are for meaning: when you've got the meaning, you can forget the words.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing they'd still have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
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jmcdonaldI voted, did you?DC(ish)Registered Userregular
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
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jmcdonaldI voted, did you?DC(ish)Registered Userregular
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
Edit
Also, August 2012 is fifteen months after the civil war started. You're acting as if this was (hyperbole) weeks afterwards.
Seriously.
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Captain Marcusnow arrives the hour of actionRegistered Userregular
Asokolov? The mods reaaaally don't like people who make alts to get around bans.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Yeah, Kaputa is dead on here. This report isn't using vague language. It makes direct links and direct predictions.
I think I did this a few pages ago, but I'll again transcribe directly the last section, which is the most controversial:
...
On the other hand, opposition forces are trying to control the eastern areas (hasaka and der zor), adjacent to the western iraqi provinces (mosul and anbar), in addition to neighboring turkish borders. Western countries, the gulf states and turkey are supporting these efforts. This hypothesis is most likely in accordance with the data from recent events, which will help prepare safe havens under international sheltering, similar to what transpired in libya when benghazi was chosen as the command center of the temporary government.
C. If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared salafist principality in eastern syria (hasaka and der zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the syrian regime, which is considered the strategic depth of the shia expansion (iraq and iran).
--1 This creates the ideal atmosphere for aqi to return to its old pockets in mosul and ramadi, and will provide a renewed momentum under the presumption of unifying the jihad among sunni iraq and syria, and the rest of the sunnis in the arab world against what it considers one enemy, the dissenters. Isi could also declare and islamic state through its union with other terrorist organizations in iraq and syria, which will create grave danger in regards to unifying iraq and the protection of its territory.
[redacted]
--3 The renewing facilitation of terrorist elements from all over the arab world entering into iraqi arena.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
It would have played well to the many people, in America and elsewhere, who opposed the US's decision to arm and otherwise support the Syrian insurgency. It would also have played well to Syrian Christians and Alawites, or at least more so than the extant policy. It would have gone over poorly in Tel Aviv, Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh, but Netanyahu, Erdogan, and the Gulf monarchies have horrible ideas and should not dictate US foreign policy. The Iranian, Russian, and Iraqi governments (and Hezbollah) would have been cool with it - I specifically remember the previous Iraqi prime minister begging the US not to arm the Syrian rebels, as he knew doing so would help to destroy his own government. The Obama administration ignored his warnings, just as it disregarded its own intelligence.
Shryke's point, if I was understanding him correctly, was that the report does not link US policy in Syria to the rise of ISIS-like groups; I endeavored to show that the report does indeed clearly make this connection. Whether or not al-Qaeda's prominence was apparent before the report was published was not the point of contention - as I said, the US's policy might have been more defensible if, after reaching a better understanding of the situation on the ground, it had reconsidered its actions. My point is that after receiving this information the US should not have continued to arm the Syrian rebels and support its allies efforts to do the same. I'm actually sort of surprised at how controversial this viewpoint is.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
It would have played well to the many people, in America and elsewhere, who opposed the US's decision to arm and otherwise support the Syrian insurgency. It would also have played well to Syrian Christians and Alawites, or at least more so than the extant policy. It would have gone over poorly in Tel Aviv, Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh, but Netanyahu, Erdogan, and the Gulf monarchies have horrible ideas and should not dictate US foreign policy. The Iranian, Russian, and Iraqi governments (and Hezbollah) would have been cool with it - I specifically remember the previous Iraqi prime minister begging the US not to arm the Syrian rebels, as he knew doing so would help to destroy his own government. The Obama administration ignored his warnings, just as it disregarded its own intelligence.
Shryke's point, if I was understanding him correctly, was that the report does not link US policy in Syria to the rise of ISIS-like groups; I endeavored to show that the report does indeed clearly make this connection. Whether or not al-Qaeda's prominence was apparent before the report was published was not the point of contention - as I said, the US's policy might have been more defensible if, after reaching a better understanding of the situation on the ground, it had reconsidered its actions. My point is that after receiving this information the US should not have continued to arm the Syrian rebels and support its allies efforts to do the same. I'm actually sort of surprised at how controversial this viewpoint is.
Also, August 2012 is fifteen months after the civil war started. You're acting as if this was (hyperbole) weeks afterwards.
Seriously.
I said "fairly early" because fifteen months is a lot less than four and a half years.
So, regardless of the option selected the US would have pissed off some groups and not others?
I'm shocked to hear that. Let's look at those lists and determine which are more important to the US strategic interests and which are less shall we?
Also, to the Egypt point - so the US fails to act and it is held against the country, and when the US actually acts in Syria, it is also held against the country?
Do you not see why the opinions of those who would find fault regardless of choice or outcome are not taken into consideration yet?
The mods don't care what gender you are, they just have a very firm rule of 1 account per person. You can, if you're sincere, ask for a name change if that's what you want. Ask atomika, they are pretty reasonable about that kind of thing when she came out.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
It would have played well to the many people, in America and elsewhere, who opposed the US's decision to arm and otherwise support the Syrian insurgency. It would also have played well to Syrian Christians and Alawites, or at least more so than the extant policy. It would have gone over poorly in Tel Aviv, Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh, but Netanyahu, Erdogan, and the Gulf monarchies have horrible ideas and should not dictate US foreign policy. The Iranian, Russian, and Iraqi governments (and Hezbollah) would have been cool with it - I specifically remember the previous Iraqi prime minister begging the US not to arm the Syrian rebels, as he knew doing so would help to destroy his own government. The Obama administration ignored his warnings, just as it disregarded its own intelligence.
Shryke's point, if I was understanding him correctly, was that the report does not link US policy in Syria to the rise of ISIS-like groups; I endeavored to show that the report does indeed clearly make this connection. Whether or not al-Qaeda's prominence was apparent before the report was published was not the point of contention - as I said, the US's policy might have been more defensible if, after reaching a better understanding of the situation on the ground, it had reconsidered its actions. My point is that after receiving this information the US should not have continued to arm the Syrian rebels and support its allies efforts to do the same. I'm actually sort of surprised at how controversial this viewpoint is.
Also, August 2012 is fifteen months after the civil war started. You're acting as if this was (hyperbole) weeks afterwards.
Seriously.
I said "fairly early" because fifteen months is a lot less than four and a half years.
So, regardless of the option selected the US would have pissed off some groups and not others?
I'm shocked to hear that. Let's look at those lists and determine which are more important to the US strategic interests and which are less shall we?
Now we're getting somewhere. I agree that the sort of calculus you outline here was probably important to the US's decision to get involved in Syria. However, at this point it's pretty clear that our allies' wishes do not necessarily benefit US interests. The implication of your post is that the US decided that assisting in its allies' plan to arm and fund an Islamist insurgency in Syria was more strategically beneficial than staying out and allowing Assad to crush the rebellion. From my perspective, the fact that most of Syria is now under the control of international jihadist movements demonstrates that this was a poor calculation. Unless you think a perpetual warzone in Syria and Iraq with al-Qaeda and IS conquering swathes of territory is actually better for US interests than the alternative of Iranian-backed states in both countries - this seems to be the sort of calculation made by our regional allies.
Also, to the Egypt point - so the US fails to act and it is held against the country, and when the US actually acts in Syria, it is also held against the country?
Do you not see why the opinions of those who would find fault regardless of choice or outcome are not taken into consideration yet?
The analogy doesn't hold water (or even rocks of decent size). I am emphatically not saying that the US should have armed jihadist movements in Egypt in response to the military coup. I was not even criticising the US's approach to Egypt in that post (although I have done so regularly in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future); just pointing out that the US's response to governments killing their own citizens varies widely, and that other factors are probably significant in explaining the reasoning behind its policy toward Syria.
edit - also, your accusation that I would find fault regardless of choice or outcome is nonsensical. You don't hear me bitching about Obama's detente with Iran, his (temporary) withdrawal from Iraq, or his opening to Cuba. I complain about the stupid/evil things the government does, not everything it does.
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jmcdonaldI voted, did you?DC(ish)Registered Userregular
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
It's more like: this US military intelligence agency, which is tasked with analyzing situations on the ground and possible outcomes of policy, correctly deduced that the strategy of the US and its allies to arm the Syrian rebels would likely result in salafi-jihadists establishing control over parts of Syria and reigniting war in Iraq, and warned the Obama administration about this potential. The administration continued in its policy anyway and later escalated it, despite this clear and accurate warning.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here. It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
I mean, it basically does:
The Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.
The West, Gulf countires, and Turkey support the opposition...
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
opposition forces are trying to control the Eastern areas (Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor), adjacent to the Western Iraqi provinces (Mosul and Anbar), in addition to neighboring Turkish borders. Western countries, the Gulf states, and Turkey are supporting these efforts.
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
But... it is clearly linked! The report describes the jihadists as the primary force in the insurgency, describes the US and its allies as supporting this insurgency, describes the territories where this insurgency is most likely to establish control, then describes the potential results of this insurgency in Syria and Iraq. How do you perceive the "US supports insurgency" part and the "insurgency may establish an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq" part as not linked?
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
Most obviously, I wouldn't have helped arm a Syrian insurgency dominated by an international jihadist movement.
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing, they'd have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
Well in some circles, poorly in others, I'd imagine. Like most things the US does. I'm not at all convinced that the optics of the US staying out of the Syrian war would be worse than the optics of seeing al-Qaeda use US-supplied TOWs to conquer Syrian provinces, but even if I was, the optics are unimportant compared to the effects of the policy on the people of the region. It's worth noting that the US's actual policy didn't stop Assad from killing his own civilians either; three years later I'm still seeing scores of people killed by barrel bombs on a weekly basis.
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
It would have played well to the many people, in America and elsewhere, who opposed the US's decision to arm and otherwise support the Syrian insurgency. It would also have played well to Syrian Christians and Alawites, or at least more so than the extant policy. It would have gone over poorly in Tel Aviv, Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh, but Netanyahu, Erdogan, and the Gulf monarchies have horrible ideas and should not dictate US foreign policy. The Iranian, Russian, and Iraqi governments (and Hezbollah) would have been cool with it - I specifically remember the previous Iraqi prime minister begging the US not to arm the Syrian rebels, as he knew doing so would help to destroy his own government. The Obama administration ignored his warnings, just as it disregarded its own intelligence.
Shryke's point, if I was understanding him correctly, was that the report does not link US policy in Syria to the rise of ISIS-like groups; I endeavored to show that the report does indeed clearly make this connection. Whether or not al-Qaeda's prominence was apparent before the report was published was not the point of contention - as I said, the US's policy might have been more defensible if, after reaching a better understanding of the situation on the ground, it had reconsidered its actions. My point is that after receiving this information the US should not have continued to arm the Syrian rebels and support its allies efforts to do the same. I'm actually sort of surprised at how controversial this viewpoint is.
Also, August 2012 is fifteen months after the civil war started. You're acting as if this was (hyperbole) weeks afterwards.
Seriously.
I said "fairly early" because fifteen months is a lot less than four and a half years.
So, regardless of the option selected the US would have pissed off some groups and not others?
I'm shocked to hear that. Let's look at those lists and determine which are more important to the US strategic interests and which are less shall we?
Now we're getting somewhere. I agree that the sort of calculus you outline here was probably important to the US's decision to get involved in Syria. However, at this point it's pretty clear that our allies' wishes do not necessarily benefit US interests. The implication of your post is that the US decided that assisting in its allies' plan to arm and fund an Islamist insurgency in Syria was more strategically beneficial than staying out and allowing Assad to crush the rebellion. From my perspective, the fact that most of Syria is now under the control of international jihadist movements demonstrates that this was a poor calculation. Unless you think a perpetual warzone in Syria and Iraq with al-Qaeda and IS conquering swathes of territory is actually better for US interests than the alternative of Iranian-backed states in both countries - this seems to be the sort of calculation made by our regional allies.
Also, to the Egypt point - so the US fails to act and it is held against the country, and when the US actually acts in Syria, it is also held against the country?
Do you not see why the opinions of those who would find fault regardless of choice or outcome are not taken into consideration yet?
The analogy doesn't hold water (or even rocks of decent size). I am emphatically not saying that the US should have armed jihadist movements in Egypt in response to the military coup. I was not even criticising the US's approach to Egypt in that post (although I have done so regularly in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future); just pointing out that the US's response to governments killing their own citizens varies widely, and that other factors are probably significant in explaining the reasoning behind its policy toward Syria.
edit - also, your accusation that I would find fault regardless of choice or outcome is nonsensical. You don't hear me bitching about Obama's detente with Iran, his (temporary) withdrawal from Iraq, or his opening to Cuba. I complain about the stupid/evil things the government does, not everything it does.
Bullshit. You don't get to have it both ways. Either civilian casualties are enough to justify intervention or they aren't. If they aren't - bringing up the circumstances where the US has failed to intervene to support your current position is disingenuous at best, and bad faith at worst.
RE: political calculus. Why does that even have to be overtly stated? I would assume that every poster here understands that no single act (barring say, nuclear) would be enough to drive intervention without the considerations of relationships and outcomes.
Edit
And to you point about it being a bad decision to intervene - what of it? At the time it likely was decided it was the least bad option. Armchair quarterbacking doesn't really help resolve what we have now, and does nothing to strengthen your point about the initial report.
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Human Rights Watch released a report on this subject last month. It details that US military personnel who report sexual assault are 12 times more likely to face retaliation from commanding officers than to see their attacker convicted. Sen. Gillibrand also stated last year that a majority of the cases that were reported led to retaliation, while conviction was very rare.
97.5% of all US military rapes are not punished. The conviction rate is very low, but commanding officers apparently can overturn convictions even when they occur?
A related story that received almost no US media coverage: US soldiers and defense contractors in Colombia raped dozens of children, with no fear of prosecution given diplomatic immunity status agreements between Washington and Bogota.
This is one reason why the line people put forward that only a very small number of members of the military are "monsters" and the overwhelming majority are well-intentioned, which causes a general presumption by Americans that civilian casualties caused by the US during war are almost always "accidents," seems inaccurate. I have never served in any military and I have no sense for how the US military differs from others, but in the US military there seems to be an entrenched culture of abuse which actually defines the hierarchy itself. Unleashing this force against other populations seems criminal in itself, regardless of other motives and causes involved.
In Taiwan, the military sucks. This is no secret. They won't win a war against China, it's not a good job (unless you become an officer on the career path, maybe), and it's largely responsible for having young men dig ditches, do laundry, and, occasionally, do push-ups until they have a heart-attack and die, and the Minister of Defense has to resign in shame. That, and be a giant pit to through piles of money into, just for those reasons. But I never thought there was some sort of epidemic of rape against women in uniform. Practically every woman I knew during my mobilization was either a civilian expert like a doctor, or an officer--I don't recall any enlisted women whatsoever. And accordingly, they were about as popular as male officers (which is to say while I was stuck there, not at all, fuck all of them).
Apparently, between ten and eleven percent of the military is women in Taiwan. Is that high compared to the United States? Low? I can bet it would be high because, every year since I was demobbed, the government has been forced to cut future conscription length to practically nothing, because the whole military is about as popular as intestinal parasites. That's why for recruitment, they have to inflate cute, Japanese-style mascots in front of Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. But I never heard of anything like this--during the Corporal Hung Chungchiu Scandal, when he died of over-exertion, the Defense Minister had to tender his resignation and at least 15 officers had criminal charges brought on them. For one corporal. I have to imagine that if the military was concealing an epidemic of rape, the general population would literally lynch the entire defense ministry (and as crappy soldiers as I was, they probably wouldn't have that much trouble).
I know a woman who was previously a 'career soldier' in the Russian Army (she left and had a family), who would tell me first-hand accounts of infamous army hazing 'traditions', that have basically become a serious problem since Russia became independent and even before that, despite some token efforts to crack down on it. There were lots of Corporal Hungs in the Russian Army, no doubt. But the idea of rampant rape of women in uniform was totally alien to her. She couldn't understand why Americans, who for the most part weren't killing their own recruits in hazing (not including the Marine Corps, apparently) would stand for it.
But the military, even as an institution, is extremely well-respected. Not just "the troops", but the entire armed forces. It makes my head spinning just trying to reconcile it.
EDIT: I guess this is sort-of related to the topic on hand, because we're probably only going to see more American fighting men and women sent to Iraq and maybe even Syria down the line.
The Guardian, uniquely among western media, recently reported on declassified DIA documents suggesting western countries welcomed the rise of Islamic State.
Cause it sure looked like the same one.
How do you feel the report is being "misinterpreted"? The text is redacted, but a lot of the language there seems clear enough, or even remarkably clear.
I'm just surprised anyone in the western media is allowed to report this.
Speaking as a rape survivor, the way the US military handles (or rewards) mass rape committed by its soldiers definitely should be relevant to discussions about US soldiers being redeployed into warzones. And the US military really is a force operating "within" the Middle East that has had presence there for decades. At least for the foreseeable future, until they eventually get their asses kicked out, the US military is a part of the region, as much as the nation-states there.
No, it's not. The two parts they are zeroing in are in the first case hypothetical (or seem to be) and the second does not make it clear who the "supporting powers" it refers to are.
You are not making it easy to take you seriously.
The powers supporting the Syrian opposition are identified as "western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey."
Not exactly the same as being all "Fuck yeah, let's create ISIS," but still a pretty awful policy in my view.
edit - The Obama administration's much-maligned reluctance to arm the Syrian rebels more heavily than it did is perhaps evidence of some degree of wariness of this danger
And they all believe exactly the same thing? This seems dubious on it's face.
And we are supposed to believe the report writer has the correct read on this desire? Based on what?
Like, this is the whole problem with the article you are linking. It's fundamentally taking a very unspecific report that says "This is what we think these other people think" and going "OMG those other people actually thought this all along!"
The issues with this should be obvious.
The document reads:
It would need to be referring to distinct "supporting powers" in different parts of a relatively short document. This is possible, but it would still mean Saudis, Turkey, etc wanted the result to happen, and also that the US was aware of this years ahead of time and still continued a policy it knew would likely lead to this result.
I think it's probable that, as often was the case, Obama was the smarter moderate resisting more extreme hawks. Hillary Clinton has attacked Obama publicly exactly for this reluctance to arm Syrian rebels more heavily.
It was of course known that the rebels fighting Assad were not "moderate." If you note who this report was distributed to, well, the State Department is there but the President is not. There is no evidence Obama ever saw the report. I think it is possible/probable this policy was implemented without Obama's knowledge.
The report is so specific that it predicts events that happened two years later almost exactly as they actually happened.
A policy as complex as support for an Islamist insurgency in Syria presumably involved, you know, coordination between the powers involved. The US Defense Intelligence Agency would have necessarily been had some communication with the intelligence agencies of the others in coordinating this support. Note that the report was written 2 years after the beginning of the insurgency in Syria, after the role of Nusra Front (then still a part of AQI) was highly-publicized, and after Turkish and Saudi intelligence support for Nusra Front was itself publicized.
And in regard to the actions of regional powers, Turkey's own military caught its intelligence agency secretly shipping weapons to jihadists in Syria, and Qatar has recently launched a subtle PR campaign in support of al-Nusra. The support of some of the US's regional allies for various jihadist groups, including those at war with the US, is a very poorly kept secret at this point.
Saw it on RT so grain of salt, maybe.
That would be a game changer, and not a good one.
There's no qualifiers like "likely". It says it's a possibility. That's an important distinction here.
It also doesn't directly link the support of the opposition to the rise of an ISIS-like entity. It says instead, essentially "if the situation continues to deteriorate".
The larger point being here is that you are colouring the report with your own assumptions and knowledge of future events.
Hi. Presumably you caused my previous account to be banned. This is not an 'alt' account, based on my understanding of the rules and how they apply to transgender people, this is an account actually reflecting my real gender. (If I can change my gender on my state ID card, being constrained to a male gendered account here would feel pretty backward for 2015.) I very honestly no longer felt comfortable using an account with male gender specified (which caused people to speak to me in 'hostile' manner as if I were a man, and left me feeling pretty constantly upset). I have never been a man. Posting under a male account is not in keeping with who I really am, or my demeanor in real life.
I feel conversations here could actually be more harmonious if people understand this about me.
I respectfully ask to not be misidentified with male pronouns here, or referred to under past male screen names. (You can note the Asokolov account was created in 2010; I had not even begun to transition at that point and really was still completely confused about who I was.)
Then it goes into a lengthy description of how AQI is likely to take advantage of the situation. Then:
This is literally a description of what would become IS's main territory! Finally, the report directly states that the US's regional allies want a salafist state in Syria. Since Qatar/Saudi Arabia/Turkey are at this point blatantly supporting an al-Qaeda led coalition's effort to conquer Syrian territory (and for other reasons), this seems like an accurate assessment. I don't think these regional powers wanted this salafist state to become international and declare its ownership of all Muslim lands, but, well, that's what happens when you arm legions of jihadists.
The DIA essentially told the Obama administration exactly how events would play out if they maintained their current trajectory, and the administration either foolishly ignored/doubted this warning or, like its allies, didn't find such an outcome concerning. Neither explanation makes the administration's policy remotely defensible. It ignored detailed and accurate warnings about its policy and facilitated the rise of IS.
I mean, doesn't just reading the declassified parts of that report set off some loud "BAD IDEA" alarms in your mind? This is exactly what many of us (without access to government intelligence) who opposed arming the rebels warned would happen; you could probably still go back and read those discussions on this very forum. It was a terrible idea from the start and this was obvious to many. How many times does the "don't arm a jihadist army to defeat your rival" lesson really have to be learned, and how many countries must be destroyed first?
And this is again the same thing I mentioned before. You are adding this bit here about how it's linked to US policy but it is not supported by the report you are talking about.
The report does not link US action to it's prediction of a potential rise of an ISIS-like entity.
And the entire thrust of any of the editorials I've seen on the report are claiming that as their smoking gun.
Again, I ask: if you read this report (even this unclassified version) and didn't think it was factually incorrect, would you think continuing to arm the rebels was a good plan?
Then what, pray tell, would you have done differently?
Reading this report it is clear that the proxy war was already underway, it is clear that the local players had already cast their die, and it is clear that the regime had already ceded the territory to the opposition! Even assuming "the west" is all inclusive of the US - what activity do you change?
Reporting on a fait accompli does not cause the result.
So easy it was like taking candy from the Iraqi army
Fixed
In terms of positive alternative policy prescriptions, I can think of a couple options. You could try to pressure regional allies to stop arming the insurgency as well, and/or attempt to use your massive economic and military influence to try and forge some sort of regional understanding (or at least some degree of detente) between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These policies would have been politically difficult and might not have been successful, but frankly even if such efforts accomplished absolutely nothing they'd still have been more defensible than the extant policy. "Not arming al-Qaeda" just seems clearly better than "arming al-Qaeda" as far as foreign policy goes, at least from my perspective.
All while Assad is killing his own civilians?
How do those optics play out?
And again, you assume that when the initiatiation of opposition support was undertaken it was known what the nature of the opposition was. This is not borne out in this report, and there is no indication that it was the case.
Frankly, I don't think the US gave a hot shit what Assad was up to until he created an international incident and dragged the rest of the world into his fiefdom. Don't kill your own people, and we never would have blinked.
This report was composed in August 2012. This was a fairly early stage of the war, but the prevalence of multiple al-Qaeda branches within the insurgency was already apparent. If the US had backed the rebels until this became clear and then altered its policy, its actions would arguably be more defensible, instead, the US continued and seemingly escalated its support for the insurgency after the publication of this report. Even as late as 2015 we have seen al-Qaeda loot US-supplied anti-tank weapons from defeated rebel factions.
The US has long had a hostile relationship with Syria. They are a close Russian and Iranian (two major geopolitical rivals of the US) ally in a relatively important location. They are still technically at war with the US's closest regional "ally" (Israel) due to the latter's occupation of the Golan Heights. The US hardly blinked when Egypt was slaughtering its own people after the 2013 military coup (there was a brief hesitation in heavy weapons shipments), and continued its tepid support for the Iraqi regime even as it dropped barrel bombs on Fallujah - literally the same weapon that John Kerry pointed to as evidence of Assad's "barbarity." Geopolitical calculation (if excessively poor calculation) makes much more sense as an explanation for the US's actions than moral outrage.
edit - Also, we're arguably shifting the goalposts here; the discussion of what, if anything, the US should have done in Syria is a different subject than that debated by me and Shryke, which was essentially the meaning of the DIA report
And you have acknowledged shrykes point in this response by admitting that the report does not show that at the time the opposition support started it was obvious that this would be the result.
To the optics question - it would have played well to who exactly? I can see US inaction in that circumstance being just as effective a recruiting tool for ISIL/ISIS/AQI as US intervention (limited or full). When faced with multiple losing hands, including what appears to be your preferred play, you're crying over spilled milk.
Edit
Also, August 2012 is fifteen months after the civil war started. You're acting as if this was (hyperbole) weeks afterwards.
Seriously.
Yeah, Kaputa is dead on here. This report isn't using vague language. It makes direct links and direct predictions.
I mean, read the document. Linked below, it is very short. Not some editorial.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf
I think I did this a few pages ago, but I'll again transcribe directly the last section, which is the most controversial:
It's also getting kinda sad...
Shryke's point, if I was understanding him correctly, was that the report does not link US policy in Syria to the rise of ISIS-like groups; I endeavored to show that the report does indeed clearly make this connection. Whether or not al-Qaeda's prominence was apparent before the report was published was not the point of contention - as I said, the US's policy might have been more defensible if, after reaching a better understanding of the situation on the ground, it had reconsidered its actions. My point is that after receiving this information the US should not have continued to arm the Syrian rebels and support its allies efforts to do the same. I'm actually sort of surprised at how controversial this viewpoint is.
I said "fairly early" because fifteen months is a lot less than four and a half years.
So, regardless of the option selected the US would have pissed off some groups and not others?
I'm shocked to hear that. Let's look at those lists and determine which are more important to the US strategic interests and which are less shall we?
Also, to the Egypt point - so the US fails to act and it is held against the country, and when the US actually acts in Syria, it is also held against the country?
Do you not see why the opinions of those who would find fault regardless of choice or outcome are not taken into consideration yet?
The analogy doesn't hold water (or even rocks of decent size). I am emphatically not saying that the US should have armed jihadist movements in Egypt in response to the military coup. I was not even criticising the US's approach to Egypt in that post (although I have done so regularly in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future); just pointing out that the US's response to governments killing their own citizens varies widely, and that other factors are probably significant in explaining the reasoning behind its policy toward Syria.
edit - also, your accusation that I would find fault regardless of choice or outcome is nonsensical. You don't hear me bitching about Obama's detente with Iran, his (temporary) withdrawal from Iraq, or his opening to Cuba. I complain about the stupid/evil things the government does, not everything it does.
Bullshit. You don't get to have it both ways. Either civilian casualties are enough to justify intervention or they aren't. If they aren't - bringing up the circumstances where the US has failed to intervene to support your current position is disingenuous at best, and bad faith at worst.
RE: political calculus. Why does that even have to be overtly stated? I would assume that every poster here understands that no single act (barring say, nuclear) would be enough to drive intervention without the considerations of relationships and outcomes.
Edit
And to you point about it being a bad decision to intervene - what of it? At the time it likely was decided it was the least bad option. Armchair quarterbacking doesn't really help resolve what we have now, and does nothing to strengthen your point about the initial report.