I don't think the US should put itself in the position of redrawing the borders of Middle Eastern states against their governments' consent. Formally recognizing separatist movements' state declarations and effectively backing annexations of Iraqi/Syrian/Turkish/Iranian territory seems like a dangerous policy. Doing so in Iraq would piss off Baghdad and Tehran, and doing so in Syria would piss off Damascus and Ankara.
I completely agree.
However, what about current support for Kurdish groups? The weapons and training we're giving to them will inevitably be used against their central governments, other ethnic groups, and other Kurdish groups. Formal recognition would allow a legal framework that could... define some boundaries. What we're doing now is throwing fuel on a future fire and not planning for it.
I agree that there are dangers to the US's current policy of support for the PYD in Syria and KRG in Iraq. We've already seen some of these dangers demonstrated - by the YPG's fighting with US-backed rebels and the Turkish reaction in Syria, and by the Peshmerga's expansion into disputed territories/areas previously under Baghdad's control in Iraq. There's really no way for the US to militarily intervene in this region without upsetting delicate balances of power in this way, I think.
However, despite these dangers, I've come to think that the US was right to not let Kobane canton get completely destroyed by IS, to protect the KRG capital of Erbil from the 2014 assault, and to initially intervene in Sinjar. Past that things get a bit more nuanced, IMO - I think the intervention on the YPG's behalf in Syria, especially its later stages where the US helped them connect two cantons and expand into new areas, might be more problematic than the assistance given to the KRG in Iraq, which Baghdad gets some say over, in part because the US is simultaneously giving support to the central Iraqi government. But the YPG's advances in Syria have severely wounded IS in that country, so from that perspective it has gone pretty well. I'm curious to see whether or not the US will provide air support against IS if the YPG tries to connect Kobane and Afrin; Turkey will be pretty pissed if so.
I don't think calling the Iraqi government a puppet is accurate when its government included members who actively fought an insurgency against the US, it quickly cozied up to Iran, and couldn't come to a status of forces agreement.
And I wouldn't describe the post-occupation Iraqi government as a US puppet, either; if anything it was more beholden to Iran, but Baghdad has been playing a careful balancing act between Tehran and Washington for some years now.
Of course, this might require we modify our definitions of "puppet governments" and "puppet states"--the government of Democratic Afghanistan, after all, included local and even national leaders who had actively opposed to the Soviet government, and in extreme cases, continue to oppose them, but were seen as absolutely crucial to Kabul's survival. Units formally under the DRA's armed forces, on more than one occasion, actively exchanged fire with allies or even units of the Soviet military--not to mention other parts of the armed forces. We also know from Soviet archives that, especially in the later years, Kabul deliberately refuted instructions from Moscow, particularly on internal affairs (this was the beginning of the rollback of the socialist policies enacted by the Karmal government after his removal). It was a serious shitstorm after all.
This is actually one of the reasons cited for Kabul's ability to fight the Mujaheddin and other opposition forces to an effective standstill after the Soviet withdrawal--until Soviet financial and industrial support evaporated with the country itself...
But the standard description of the DRA was, in Washington and elsewhere, "a Soviet puppet state." Are we willing to consider it not one? There are valid points to either argument (the USSR, obviously, did not call it as such).
As I've mentioned in the past, there is a noteworthy distinction within puppet governments--there are times were Iraq barely has a functioning government at all, whether or not it is a puppet. A failed puppet government is still a puppet government, in the sense that it survives thanks to the involvement of its patron (or it might be beholden to multiple patrons). Of course, maybe that just means "puppet government" is more useful as a pejorative than an actual meaningful descriptor (how about "client state," or amid this sexy rival of medieval fantasy, "vassal kingdom"). It's not definitely not a perfect metaphor for the real-life object (though I suppose even a puppet doesn't do exactly what the puppeteer intends it to do), but then again, the arms of a government don't necessarily obey the head or heart of the same government either.
I don't think the US should put itself in the position of redrawing the borders of Middle Eastern states against their governments' consent. Formally recognizing separatist movements' state declarations and effectively backing annexations of Iraqi/Syrian/Turkish/Iranian territory seems like a dangerous policy. Doing so in Iraq would piss off Baghdad and Tehran, and doing so in Syria would piss off Damascus and Ankara.
I completely agree.
However, what about current support for Kurdish groups? The weapons and training we're giving to them will inevitably be used against their central governments, other ethnic groups, and other Kurdish groups. Formal recognition would allow a legal framework that could... define some boundaries. What we're doing now is throwing fuel on a future fire and not planning for it.
From what I have heard we have been very enthusiastic about arming the Kurds. I have heard of rebel groups complaining that the US does not do enough to arm them, but the Kurds are getting way more in weapons.
And of course none of that shit is just going to vanish once if the Syrian conflict ends.
I know the Syrian government has been pretty happy and optimistic lately about the way they have been taking land. They have been trying to put off a ceasefire, because things have been going pretty well.
But I don't know how the monster gets put back in its box at this point.
I mean the Syrian government is shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
The problem is the rebels are shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
And the problem with war is that once you start one, and once people get accustomed to solving their problems with violence, they tend to keep going until everybody involved is ground down to the point where they can no longer fight.
I know that Kerry and Lavrov have been optimistic about a ceasefire, but I am most decidedly not.
Should the US or other countries formally support/recognise an independent Kurdistan, in Iraq, Syria or both, if these groups make a formal declaration?
I'd like anyone's opinions on this, regulars or lurkers or outside sources or whatever.
Absent larger changes to the situation, I'd go with no simply based on the fact that the region in question does not need to turn into an even bigger horrible death-filled clusterfuck.
There does not seem to me to be any theoretical path from said recognition to any kind of stability.
I know the Syrian government has been pretty happy and optimistic lately about the way they have been taking land. They have been trying to put off a ceasefire, because things have been going pretty well.
But I don't know how the monster gets put back in its box at this point.
I mean the Syrian government is shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
The problem is the rebels are shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
And the problem with war is that once you start one, and once people get accustomed to solving their problems with violence, they tend to keep going until everybody involved is ground down to the point where they can no longer fight.
I know that Kerry and Lavrov have been optimistic about a ceasefire, but I am most decidedly not.
The same way the monster got put back in the box in the Algerian Civil War, or in the Second Chechen War, or maybe somewhere between those two. The population will be massively displaced, the cities will be largely destroyed and the countryside will be ravaged, the authoritarian state will reassert its dominance in at least as oppressive a manner as before, and most resistance will be crushed. The continuation of some form of insurgency seems plausible, but if the rebels are defeated conventionally then their ability to successfully destabilize the state afterwards might be limited. If the SDF is lucky they'll get a semi-autonomous region in the north. At least, that's what I'm thinking will happen, unless the US/KSA/Turkey/etc. decides to intervene or give the rebels AA capabilities.
I could, of course, be way off base here - even successful offensives come at a cost, and if the loss of SAA soldiers becomes too great to maintain an offensive posture, or if foreign ground forces fighting alongside the government were to reduce their presence, things could turn around. But right now it looks like the combination of a relatively competent and motivated ground force and a powerful air force is simply too much for the rebels to handle as a conventional fighting force.
I know the Syrian government has been pretty happy and optimistic lately about the way they have been taking land. They have been trying to put off a ceasefire, because things have been going pretty well.
But I don't know how the monster gets put back in its box at this point.
I mean the Syrian government is shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
The problem is the rebels are shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
And the problem with war is that once you start one, and once people get accustomed to solving their problems with violence, they tend to keep going until everybody involved is ground down to the point where they can no longer fight.
I know that Kerry and Lavrov have been optimistic about a ceasefire, but I am most decidedly not.
The same way the monster got put back in the box in the Algerian Civil War, or in the Second Chechen War, or maybe somewhere between those two. The population will be massively displaced, the cities will be largely destroyed and the countryside will be ravaged, the authoritarian state will reassert its dominance in at least as oppressive a manner as before, and most resistance will be crushed. The continuation of some form of insurgency seems plausible, but if the rebels are defeated conventionally then their ability to successfully destabilize the state afterwards might be limited. If the SDF is lucky they'll get a semi-autonomous region in the north. At least, that's what I'm thinking will happen, unless the US/KSA/Turkey/etc. decides to intervene or give the rebels AA capabilities.
I could, of course, be way off base here - even successful offensives come at a cost, and if the loss of SAA soldiers becomes too great to maintain an offensive posture, or if foreign ground forces fighting alongside the government were to reduce their presence, things could turn around. But right now it looks like the combination of a relatively competent and motivated ground force and a powerful air force is simply too much for the rebels to handle as a conventional fighting force.
Thanks for the analysis.
I think the rebels might fold as far as conventional fighting goes.
I think unconventional might get a bit worse. A lot worse actually.
If KSA and the gulf and Turkey decide to keep pushing funds and weapons to the rebels, but with no AA then holding conventional ground is indeed probably impossible.
Large scale terrorist/guerrilla chaos seems more likely. Hell it's what the Saudi's/Pakistani's/Iranian's/Qatari's have been doing for decades.
Should the US or other countries formally support/recognise an independent Kurdistan, in Iraq, Syria or both, if these groups make a formal declaration?
I'd like anyone's opinions on this, regulars or lurkers or outside sources or whatever.
I think magical christmasland scenario would be that the middle east could get their shit together for 5 minutes and fix their borders, figure out a solution to israel/palestine, and give the kurds the land they are running anyway. I know it's not going to happen but with much of the former british/french colonies currently not really being ruled in an effective way, it is probably about as good a time as any to redraw the lines.
Really the only ones who are going to flip shit are the turks, and well I personally don't give a crap about them (mostly erdogan). The iraqi government might complain but the U.S. government would just tell them to be quiet. I don't think iran would complain too much except for maybe the parts syria would lose. The kurds in iran are already very integrated in the society and I don't think they would want to secede northwest iran or anything. It would really be turkey that would be the biggest dissenter. The kurds would probably be more pro america just because of the support we've given them, and the u.s. might favor them over dealing with turkey.
Should the US or other countries formally support/recognise an independent Kurdistan, in Iraq, Syria or both, if these groups make a formal declaration?
I'd like anyone's opinions on this, regulars or lurkers or outside sources or whatever.
I think magical christmasland scenario would be that the middle east could get their shit together for 5 minutes and fix their borders, figure out a solution to israel/palestine, and give the kurds the land they are running anyway. I know it's not going to happen but with much of the former british/french colonies currently not really being ruled in an effective way, it is probably about as good a time as any to redraw the lines.
Really the only ones who are going to flip shit are the turks, and well I personally don't give a crap about them (mostly erdogan). The iraqi government might complain but the U.S. government would just tell them to be quiet. I don't think iran would complain too much except for maybe the parts syria would lose. The kurds in iran are already very integrated in the society and I don't think they would want to secede northwest iran or anything. It would really be turkey that would be the biggest dissenter. The kurds would probably be more pro america just because of the support we've given them, and the u.s. might favor them over dealing with turkey.
Iran would 100% flip it's shit too. You don't invite the creation of a state on your border with major ties to a region within your border like that.
In Syria, a salafi-jihadist rebel group called Jund al-Aqsa (regarded by some as more extreme than AQ, comparable to IS but without allegiance to al-Baghdadi) and IS have launched a seemingly coordinated assault on the Syrian government's supply line to Aleppo, successfully severing it. It's not the first time this road has been cut - IS managed to do the same late last year, but the SAA repelled them pretty quickly. This instance is a bit different, though, since IS teamed up with the rebels for the attack - it's the first significant example of rebel-IS cooperation I've seen since the declaration of the Caliphate. The road to Aleppo is immensely important to the government, so I think they'll expend every effort to retake it ASAP - I'd be surprised if IS/rebels managed to hold their positions. Nonetheless, this will force the SAA to divert forces from its ongoing offensives in the north. And it will be interesting to see if this is an isolated incident or if the rebels and IS continue to cooperate against the SAA; the latter outcome could be very dangerous for the Syrian government.
In Syria, a salafi-jihadist rebel group called Jund al-Aqsa (regarded by some as more extreme than AQ, comparable to IS but without allegiance to al-Baghdadi) and IS have launched a seemingly coordinated assault on the Syrian government's supply line to Aleppo, successfully severing it. It's not the first time this road has been cut - IS managed to do the same late last year, but the SAA repelled them pretty quickly. This instance is a bit different, though, since IS teamed up with the rebels for the attack - it's the first significant example of rebel-IS cooperation I've seen since the declaration of the Caliphate. The road to Aleppo is immensely important to the government, so I think they'll expend every effort to retake it ASAP - I'd be surprised if IS/rebels managed to hold their positions. Nonetheless, this will force the SAA to divert forces from its ongoing offensives in the north. And it will be interesting to see if this is an isolated incident or if the rebels and IS continue to cooperate against the SAA; the latter outcome could be very dangerous for the Syrian government.
If the Syrian government maintains the advantage, I would not be surprised to see the rebels - with their U.S. supplied arms and training - fold themselves into ISIS proper. The rebel groups have maintained independence because they could each hold territory against Assad on their own, but a resurgent government will most likely lead to consolidation among the Sunni rebels, whose ideological differences are primarily centered around which government has thus far sponsored them.
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daveNYCWhy universe hate Waspinator?Registered Userregular
In Syria, a salafi-jihadist rebel group called Jund al-Aqsa (regarded by some as more extreme than AQ, comparable to IS but without allegiance to al-Baghdadi) and IS have launched a seemingly coordinated assault on the Syrian government's supply line to Aleppo, successfully severing it. It's not the first time this road has been cut - IS managed to do the same late last year, but the SAA repelled them pretty quickly. This instance is a bit different, though, since IS teamed up with the rebels for the attack - it's the first significant example of rebel-IS cooperation I've seen since the declaration of the Caliphate. The road to Aleppo is immensely important to the government, so I think they'll expend every effort to retake it ASAP - I'd be surprised if IS/rebels managed to hold their positions. Nonetheless, this will force the SAA to divert forces from its ongoing offensives in the north. And it will be interesting to see if this is an isolated incident or if the rebels and IS continue to cooperate against the SAA; the latter outcome could be very dangerous for the Syrian government.
If the Syrian government maintains the advantage, I would not be surprised to see the rebels - with their U.S. supplied arms and training - fold themselves into ISIS proper. The rebel groups have maintained independence because they could each hold territory against Assad on their own, but a resurgent government will most likely lead to consolidation among the Sunni rebels, whose ideological differences are primarily centered around which government has thus far sponsored them.
I've been wondering what will happen to the rebels if they reach such a critical stage. Most of Jund al-Aqsa joined Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria) a couple days ago, and I imagine whoever didn't will probably join up with IS now. And LWJ reported today that two small jihadist groups in the Damascus area pledged allegiance to JaN as well. A week or two ago there were reports that JaN was trying to convince Ahrar ash-Sham and other northern rebels to merge into one entity, but that didn't go anywhere (and I'm not 100% on the veracity of those reports).
I can't see the leadership of JaN defecting to IS. Their allegiance to al-Qaeda seems pretty deeply rooted, and in some ways AQ regards IS as more of a threat than Russia/the US/Middle Eastern governments etc. If anything, in the near future I could see more rebel groups rallying around AQ than defecting to IS, since AQ has worked to maintain relationships and alliances with these groups and is present in strength in their areas. IS territory and rebel territory are also generally separated by government territory at this point (aside from today's new point of contact), which might help deter rebels joining IS en masse. On the other hand, JaN and Ahrar are being pummeled harder than anyone by the government offensives, and if they are degraded enough then their leadership's bitterness toward IS might not keep the rank and file from defecting. And declaring allegiance to IS doesn't require territorial contiguity. Plus, unification of the rebels and IS could be seen by some as the only way to prevent a Syrian government victory, and it may be that most rebels regard the latter outcome as the worst. Others, however, would probably rather surrender to the government than rebrand themselves as IS and continue the war.
So the scenario you describe doesn't sound entirely implausible to me. I don't think all of the rebels would ever join IS willingly, but if enough factions defected to reach a critical mass, some rebel territory could potentially morph into IS territory. Thing is, I think such an event could end up helping the government in the long term, even if it hurt them in the short term - external political and material support for the rebels would dissipate and international solidarity with the government would increase.
In Syria, a salafi-jihadist rebel group called Jund al-Aqsa (regarded by some as more extreme than AQ, comparable to IS but without allegiance to al-Baghdadi) and IS have launched a seemingly coordinated assault on the Syrian government's supply line to Aleppo, successfully severing it. It's not the first time this road has been cut - IS managed to do the same late last year, but the SAA repelled them pretty quickly. This instance is a bit different, though, since IS teamed up with the rebels for the attack - it's the first significant example of rebel-IS cooperation I've seen since the declaration of the Caliphate. The road to Aleppo is immensely important to the government, so I think they'll expend every effort to retake it ASAP - I'd be surprised if IS/rebels managed to hold their positions. Nonetheless, this will force the SAA to divert forces from its ongoing offensives in the north. And it will be interesting to see if this is an isolated incident or if the rebels and IS continue to cooperate against the SAA; the latter outcome could be very dangerous for the Syrian government.
If the Syrian government maintains the advantage, I would not be surprised to see the rebels - with their U.S. supplied arms and training - fold themselves into ISIS proper. The rebel groups have maintained independence because they could each hold territory against Assad on their own, but a resurgent government will most likely lead to consolidation among the Sunni rebels, whose ideological differences are primarily centered around which government has thus far sponsored them.
I've been wondering what will happen to the rebels if they reach such a critical stage. Most of Jund al-Aqsa joined Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria) a couple days ago, and I imagine whoever didn't will probably join up with IS now. And LWJ reported today that two small jihadist groups in the Damascus area pledged allegiance to JaN as well. A week or two ago there were reports that JaN was trying to convince Ahrar ash-Sham and other northern rebels to merge into one entity, but that didn't go anywhere (and I'm not 100% on the veracity of those reports).
I can't see the leadership of JaN defecting to IS. Their allegiance to al-Qaeda seems pretty deeply rooted, and in some ways AQ regards IS as more of a threat than Russia/the US/Middle Eastern governments etc. If anything, in the near future I could see more rebel groups rallying around AQ than defecting to IS, since AQ has worked to maintain relationships and alliances with these groups and is present in strength in their areas. IS territory and rebel territory are also generally separated by government territory at this point (aside from today's new point of contact), which might help deter rebels joining IS en masse. On the other hand, JaN and Ahrar are being pummeled harder than anyone by the government offensives, and if they are degraded enough then their leadership's bitterness toward IS might not keep the rank and file from defecting. And declaring allegiance to IS doesn't require territorial contiguity. Plus, unification of the rebels and IS could be seen by some as the only way to prevent a Syrian government victory, and it may be that most rebels regard the latter outcome as the worst. Others, however, would probably rather surrender to the government than rebrand themselves as IS and continue the war.
So the scenario you describe doesn't sound entirely implausible to me. I don't think all of the rebels would ever join IS willingly, but if enough factions defected to reach a critical mass, some rebel territory could potentially morph into IS territory. Thing is, I think such an event could end up helping the government in the long term, even if it hurt them in the short term - external political and material support for the rebels would dissipate and international solidarity with the government would increase.
I'd hate to be the U.S. Presidential speechwriter who has to sell "The U.S., and its strong ally Al Qaeda, will destroy ISIS!" to the American people.
Ankara (AFP) - A Turkish truck driver has lodged a legal complaint against his own wife for insulting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, pro-government media reported on Monday.
Ali D., 40, who married G.D. three years ago, warned his wife repeatedly not to curse at the president when he appeared on television, Yeni Safak newspaper reported on its website.
But her wife defied his warning and challenged her husband, saying: "Record and lodge a complaint."
The man duly recorded his wife's "insults" as evidence for the case and lodged a complaint with Izmir prosecutors.
She's divorcing his dweeb ass.
But apparently this isn't unique, legal repercussions against citizens criticizing Dear Leader are on the rise.
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KadokenGiving Ends to my Friends and it Feels StupendousRegistered Userregular
I am glad I live in a country where I can call my president an incompetent pusilanimous pigskin of fuckfaced shitheeled puffery.
And they can't do shit.
(Note: these are not my true sentiments toward the president)
Well, uh, you're pretty blatantly wrong about that one, State Department. They should have used some wishy washy language like "not the same organization as." Erdogan must have flipped his shit when he heard this.
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TraceGNU Terry Pratchett; GNU Gus; GNU Carrie Fisher; GNU Adam WeRegistered Userregular
I wonder if that was a deliberate thing they said.
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TraceGNU Terry Pratchett; GNU Gus; GNU Carrie Fisher; GNU Adam WeRegistered Userregular
I mean shit.
we don't really need to worry about Turkey and Russia teaming up now. maybe Turkey went from "someone to keep happy to help keep Putin's dick out of this" to "goddamn it Erdogan you're as bad as Arabia"
So a ceasefire in Syria has been formally agreed on by the US and Russia and is theoretically set to take effect on Saturday. The Syrian government and the Riyadh opposition have tentatively agreed to the deal, which is a good sign, but the details are problematic. IS and Jabhat al-Nusra are excluded from the ceasefire, and Damascus says it will continue fighting them. IS's exclusion isn't a problem (they are, of course, completely irrelevant to any peace process, and the rebels aren't going to come to their defense), but JaN is embroidered into rebel territory throughout Syria and is closely allied with other rebel groups. I don't really see how the government and its allies can continue fighting JaN without fighting the rebel factions in the process. Not that I think a ceasefire with JaN is really plausible - they have made clear that they regard such deals as capitulation or collaboration, and AQ recognizes the fact that it has no future in a post-war Syria, so they'll keep the fighting going as long as possible.
al-Qaeda really manages to make things more complicated sometimes.
And as an added complication, Turkey is saying it might still shell YPG positions after the ceasefire takes effect.
edit - and the Sunday Times' foreign correspondent claims that Ahrar ash-Sham (the other major salafi-jihadist faction among the rebels) has declared that it won't participate in the ceasefire if Jabhat al-Nusra is attacked.
So a ceasefire in Syria has been formally agreed on by the US and Russia and is theoretically set to take effect on Saturday. The Syrian government and the Riyadh opposition have tentatively agreed to the deal, which is a good sign, but the details are problematic. IS and Jabhat al-Nusra are excluded from the ceasefire, and Damascus says it will continue fighting them. IS's exclusion isn't a problem (they are, of course, completely irrelevant to any peace process, and the rebels aren't going to come to their defense), but JaN is embroidered into rebel territory throughout Syria and is closely allied with other rebel groups. I don't really see how the government and its allies can continue fighting JaN without fighting the rebel factions in the process. Not that I think a ceasefire with JaN is really plausible - they have made clear that they regard such deals as capitulation or collaboration, and AQ recognizes the fact that it has no future in a post-war Syria, so they'll keep the fighting going as long as possible.
al-Qaeda really manages to make things more complicated sometimes.
And as an added complication, Turkey is saying it might still shell YPG positions after the ceasefire takes effect.
edit - and the Sunday Times' foreign correspondent claims that Ahrar ash-Sham (the other major salafi-jihadist faction among the rebels) has declared that it won't participate in the ceasefire if Jabhat al-Nusra is attacked.
So the projected length of the ceasefire is roughly 6 hours.
Interesting video and article on events in Syria's southern Suwayda Governorate. Suwayda is a Druze majority province (like 90% IIRC) and has maintained a very unique position in this conflict - it has managed to avoid the war more than any other region in Syria, and has maintained a quasi-neutrality. The uprising against Assad didn't spread as much to Suwayda, and government forces are still present there, but the balance of local vs. national political control has been more in favor of the former than in most government controlled areas. Mass defections from and refusals to enlist in the SAA have occurred occasionally, and a movement called the Shaykhs of Dignity, led by Shaykh Wahid al-Balaus, has sheltered those defectors while vocally opposing efforts to enlist the Druze in the Syrian army. In this video, he talks about how government forces took weapons from one of his friends/allies at a checkpoint, and enthusiastically proclaims that the Druze must continue to arm themselves and defend their own territories. He talks about how they must maintain neutrality, says they don't care about siding with the Sunni or the Shia, and emphasizes that their goal must be to defend their mountains, religion, and country.
The government obviously doesn't like Balaus or his movement, but has avoided cracking down hard on it, presumably due to its popular support and Damascus's desire to prevent a full rebellion in Suwayda. The rebels (at least the non-jihadist ones) have in the past tried to reach out to Balaus, but he has refused to advocate the government's overthrow or to support the rebellion, so they don't have great relations either, although they don't actively fight each other. It's also worth nothing that the Shaykhs of Dignity is only one political faction in Suwayda, and that better relations with the government in Damascus are advocated by some. Nonetheless, it's interesting to see leaders in a minority enclave of Syria forming local militias with neither government or rebel affiliation. People (myself included) often forget about Suwayda and Syria's significant Druze minority when considering the situation the country, but it's nice to read news coming out a place that's remained intact over the last five years, even if things are tense there.
Iranians cast their ballots today, for the Majlis (parliament) and their Assembly of Experts. The election has already been controversial as large numbers of reformist candidates have been barred from running, including some big names that's sparked all sorts of claims and counter-claims. The election results can be seen as a barometer of Rouhani's performance, most especially with the nuclear deal and a general warming of relations with the west.
The "green revolution" of 2009 still looms over Iranian elections. The last presidential ones went fine, and these probably will too, but its a tumultuous time in Iran these days between conservatives and reformists.
And remember al-Sadr? The firey, anti-US shia cleric in Iraq, based in a huge Baghdad suburb, created his Mahdi Army militia in response to the US occupation. After a bunch of violence he ended up disbanding the militia and going to Iran in a quasi exile. He returned a few years ago to rebuild his political organization.
This is an excellent Carnegie Endowment essay which compares and contrasts IS with Saudi Arabia. The author argues that the first Saudi-Wahhabi state, in the 18th century, was similar to IS in many important ways, including its virulent hatred of Shia, liberal approach to excommunicating and killing other Muslims (including Sunnis), and expansionist goals. Today's Saudi state (which is the third; the first was destroyed by the Egyptians and the second by other factions in the Arabian Peninsula) started out with more similarities, but has gradually differentiated itself by abandoning expansionism, currying favor with the West and others, and not trying to kill all of the Shia. IS ideologues condemn the modern Saudi regime for these failings and call its scholars hypocrites, while generally praising the first Saudi state and explicitly comparing it to their state in Syria and Iraq. The essay also discusses the most notable differences between IS's ideology and that of its Wahhabi forebears, including its apocalyptic tendencies and its goal to create a Caliphate immediately (which none of the Saudi-Wahhabi states have attempted). One interesting quote:
...in fact it is somewhat ironic that Wahhabism, which began as an anticaliphate movement, should become the instrument of a procaliphate movement.
Definitely worth a read if you've got the time, it's pretty lengthy but also well researched. The Saudi-Wahhabi pact has been an incredibly toxic and surprisingly resilient phenomenon over the last few centuries.
Then one has to ask why Ankara so hastily announced the identity of the bomber and why it relied on instinctive accusations. The well-placed sources in Ankara went mute when asked this question. Nowadays in Ankara, when the answer to your question is silence, it is an indication of the bottlenecks in Ankara’s crisis-management mechanisms. Ankara simply can’t deal with "gray" areas. This weakness contributes to political, ethnic and sectarian polarization internally, and further questioning of Ankara’s position on Syria in the international arena.
The real issue with that is going to be the facilities and airspace they let us use for the various Mideast catastrophes.
Not that I really think it would be hard to arrange a different infrastructure for our military there, but it would be really obvious when we started doing that, and Turkey would go berserk if it realized it was about to get shoved out of NATO.
Mostly because they'd immediately assume that was a precursor to recognizing a Kurdish state. Given how quick they are to start slinging artillery already, I'd expect things to get out of hand within days.
The real issue with that is going to be the facilities and airspace they let us use for the various Mideast catastrophes.
Not that I really think it would be hard to arrange a different infrastructure for our military there, but it would be really obvious when we started doing that, and Turkey would go berserk if it realized it was about to get shoved out of NATO.
Mostly because they'd immediately assume that was a precursor to recognizing a Kurdish state. Given how quick they are to start slinging artillery already, I'd expect things to get out of hand within days.
Not to mention that all the Strategic and geographical motivations we had for wanting them in in the first place still apply, especially with Russia spinning up "cold war 2 electric boogaloo". Short of Erdogan forming firing squads to shoot protesters in the streets NATO isn't going to boot Turkey out.
He's utterly torpedoed any shot they had at getting in the EU though.
The real issue with that is going to be the facilities and airspace they let us use for the various Mideast catastrophes.
Not that I really think it would be hard to arrange a different infrastructure for our military there, but it would be really obvious when we started doing that, and Turkey would go berserk if it realized it was about to get shoved out of NATO.
Mostly because they'd immediately assume that was a precursor to recognizing a Kurdish state. Given how quick they are to start slinging artillery already, I'd expect things to get out of hand within days.
Not to mention that all the Strategic and geographical motivations we had for wanting them in in the first place still apply, especially with Russia spinning up "cold war 2 electric boogaloo". Short of Erdogan forming firing squads to shoot protesters in the streets NATO isn't going to boot Turkey out.
He's utterly torpedoed any shot they had at getting in the EU though.
Pretty sure Turkey isn't besties with Russia at the moment.
The real issue with that is going to be the facilities and airspace they let us use for the various Mideast catastrophes.
Not that I really think it would be hard to arrange a different infrastructure for our military there, but it would be really obvious when we started doing that, and Turkey would go berserk if it realized it was about to get shoved out of NATO.
Mostly because they'd immediately assume that was a precursor to recognizing a Kurdish state. Given how quick they are to start slinging artillery already, I'd expect things to get out of hand within days.
Not to mention that all the Strategic and geographical motivations we had for wanting them in in the first place still apply, especially with Russia spinning up "cold war 2 electric boogaloo". Short of Erdogan forming firing squads to shoot protesters in the streets NATO isn't going to boot Turkey out.
He's utterly torpedoed any shot they had at getting in the EU though.
Pretty sure Turkey isn't besties with Russia at the moment.
That's kinda my point? That and cutting off Russian passage through the black sea is pretty important to NATO.
There are up to 3 million refugees in Turkey which is basically the ace Erdoğan holds over Europe. Turkey could open its borders on both sides and flood Europe.
This is both politically and economically poison in the EU which gives Turkey a ton of space to maneuver.
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Speaking of that bomber, The American Conservative has a good article where they lay out the case that it was a false flag operation designed to get the Turkish people's support for a war. There has been a history of bombings and attacks right before elections and in some cases the stated motivation of the attackers is completely nonsensical (why would Kurds bomb a pro-Kurd parade?). Erdogan was also caught on tape two years ago planning a missile attack on the tomb of Suleyman, which is guarded by Turkish soldiers.
I bring up the possibility that it was a false flag almost every time there's a bombing in Turkey, but I'd really rather not be correct. The implications of an allied political leader willingly mass-murdering their own countrymen to go to war are terrifying.
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However, despite these dangers, I've come to think that the US was right to not let Kobane canton get completely destroyed by IS, to protect the KRG capital of Erbil from the 2014 assault, and to initially intervene in Sinjar. Past that things get a bit more nuanced, IMO - I think the intervention on the YPG's behalf in Syria, especially its later stages where the US helped them connect two cantons and expand into new areas, might be more problematic than the assistance given to the KRG in Iraq, which Baghdad gets some say over, in part because the US is simultaneously giving support to the central Iraqi government. But the YPG's advances in Syria have severely wounded IS in that country, so from that perspective it has gone pretty well. I'm curious to see whether or not the US will provide air support against IS if the YPG tries to connect Kobane and Afrin; Turkey will be pretty pissed if so.
Of course, this might require we modify our definitions of "puppet governments" and "puppet states"--the government of Democratic Afghanistan, after all, included local and even national leaders who had actively opposed to the Soviet government, and in extreme cases, continue to oppose them, but were seen as absolutely crucial to Kabul's survival. Units formally under the DRA's armed forces, on more than one occasion, actively exchanged fire with allies or even units of the Soviet military--not to mention other parts of the armed forces. We also know from Soviet archives that, especially in the later years, Kabul deliberately refuted instructions from Moscow, particularly on internal affairs (this was the beginning of the rollback of the socialist policies enacted by the Karmal government after his removal). It was a serious shitstorm after all.
This is actually one of the reasons cited for Kabul's ability to fight the Mujaheddin and other opposition forces to an effective standstill after the Soviet withdrawal--until Soviet financial and industrial support evaporated with the country itself...
But the standard description of the DRA was, in Washington and elsewhere, "a Soviet puppet state." Are we willing to consider it not one? There are valid points to either argument (the USSR, obviously, did not call it as such).
As I've mentioned in the past, there is a noteworthy distinction within puppet governments--there are times were Iraq barely has a functioning government at all, whether or not it is a puppet. A failed puppet government is still a puppet government, in the sense that it survives thanks to the involvement of its patron (or it might be beholden to multiple patrons). Of course, maybe that just means "puppet government" is more useful as a pejorative than an actual meaningful descriptor (how about "client state," or amid this sexy rival of medieval fantasy, "vassal kingdom"). It's not definitely not a perfect metaphor for the real-life object (though I suppose even a puppet doesn't do exactly what the puppeteer intends it to do), but then again, the arms of a government don't necessarily obey the head or heart of the same government either.
From what I have heard we have been very enthusiastic about arming the Kurds. I have heard of rebel groups complaining that the US does not do enough to arm them, but the Kurds are getting way more in weapons.
And of course none of that shit is just going to vanish once if the Syrian conflict ends.
They were followed by some Damascus blasts. ISIS is claiming responsibility.
I know the Syrian government has been pretty happy and optimistic lately about the way they have been taking land. They have been trying to put off a ceasefire, because things have been going pretty well.
But I don't know how the monster gets put back in its box at this point.
I mean the Syrian government is shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
The problem is the rebels are shitty. Lets just come out and state it. They torture the shit out of people, use chemical weapons and have no problem with indiscriminate killings.
And the problem with war is that once you start one, and once people get accustomed to solving their problems with violence, they tend to keep going until everybody involved is ground down to the point where they can no longer fight.
I know that Kerry and Lavrov have been optimistic about a ceasefire, but I am most decidedly not.
Absent larger changes to the situation, I'd go with no simply based on the fact that the region in question does not need to turn into an even bigger horrible death-filled clusterfuck.
There does not seem to me to be any theoretical path from said recognition to any kind of stability.
I could, of course, be way off base here - even successful offensives come at a cost, and if the loss of SAA soldiers becomes too great to maintain an offensive posture, or if foreign ground forces fighting alongside the government were to reduce their presence, things could turn around. But right now it looks like the combination of a relatively competent and motivated ground force and a powerful air force is simply too much for the rebels to handle as a conventional fighting force.
Thanks for the analysis.
I think the rebels might fold as far as conventional fighting goes.
I think unconventional might get a bit worse. A lot worse actually.
If KSA and the gulf and Turkey decide to keep pushing funds and weapons to the rebels, but with no AA then holding conventional ground is indeed probably impossible.
Large scale terrorist/guerrilla chaos seems more likely. Hell it's what the Saudi's/Pakistani's/Iranian's/Qatari's have been doing for decades.
I think magical christmasland scenario would be that the middle east could get their shit together for 5 minutes and fix their borders, figure out a solution to israel/palestine, and give the kurds the land they are running anyway. I know it's not going to happen but with much of the former british/french colonies currently not really being ruled in an effective way, it is probably about as good a time as any to redraw the lines.
Really the only ones who are going to flip shit are the turks, and well I personally don't give a crap about them (mostly erdogan). The iraqi government might complain but the U.S. government would just tell them to be quiet. I don't think iran would complain too much except for maybe the parts syria would lose. The kurds in iran are already very integrated in the society and I don't think they would want to secede northwest iran or anything. It would really be turkey that would be the biggest dissenter. The kurds would probably be more pro america just because of the support we've given them, and the u.s. might favor them over dealing with turkey.
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Iran would 100% flip it's shit too. You don't invite the creation of a state on your border with major ties to a region within your border like that.
"We'll recognize Palestine, if everyone recognizes Kurdistan."
Then sit back and watch the fun.
If the Syrian government maintains the advantage, I would not be surprised to see the rebels - with their U.S. supplied arms and training - fold themselves into ISIS proper. The rebel groups have maintained independence because they could each hold territory against Assad on their own, but a resurgent government will most likely lead to consolidation among the Sunni rebels, whose ideological differences are primarily centered around which government has thus far sponsored them.
The amount of head exploding would be interesting.
I can't see the leadership of JaN defecting to IS. Their allegiance to al-Qaeda seems pretty deeply rooted, and in some ways AQ regards IS as more of a threat than Russia/the US/Middle Eastern governments etc. If anything, in the near future I could see more rebel groups rallying around AQ than defecting to IS, since AQ has worked to maintain relationships and alliances with these groups and is present in strength in their areas. IS territory and rebel territory are also generally separated by government territory at this point (aside from today's new point of contact), which might help deter rebels joining IS en masse. On the other hand, JaN and Ahrar are being pummeled harder than anyone by the government offensives, and if they are degraded enough then their leadership's bitterness toward IS might not keep the rank and file from defecting. And declaring allegiance to IS doesn't require territorial contiguity. Plus, unification of the rebels and IS could be seen by some as the only way to prevent a Syrian government victory, and it may be that most rebels regard the latter outcome as the worst. Others, however, would probably rather surrender to the government than rebrand themselves as IS and continue the war.
So the scenario you describe doesn't sound entirely implausible to me. I don't think all of the rebels would ever join IS willingly, but if enough factions defected to reach a critical mass, some rebel territory could potentially morph into IS territory. Thing is, I think such an event could end up helping the government in the long term, even if it hurt them in the short term - external political and material support for the rebels would dissipate and international solidarity with the government would increase.
I'd hate to be the U.S. Presidential speechwriter who has to sell "The U.S., and its strong ally Al Qaeda, will destroy ISIS!" to the American people.
But apparently this isn't unique, legal repercussions against citizens criticizing Dear Leader are on the rise.
And they can't do shit.
(Note: these are not my true sentiments toward the president)
Agreed. It is never a good sign when countries start doing that.
Well, uh, you're pretty blatantly wrong about that one, State Department. They should have used some wishy washy language like "not the same organization as." Erdogan must have flipped his shit when he heard this.
we don't really need to worry about Turkey and Russia teaming up now. maybe Turkey went from "someone to keep happy to help keep Putin's dick out of this" to "goddamn it Erdogan you're as bad as Arabia"
The US has made several comments like this in the last couple weeks. I posted one, which was a blatant lie like this one a few pages back I think.
Turkey is indeed pissed, not sure what they'll do about it though.
al-Qaeda really manages to make things more complicated sometimes.
And as an added complication, Turkey is saying it might still shell YPG positions after the ceasefire takes effect.
edit - and the Sunday Times' foreign correspondent claims that Ahrar ash-Sham (the other major salafi-jihadist faction among the rebels) has declared that it won't participate in the ceasefire if Jabhat al-Nusra is attacked.
So the projected length of the ceasefire is roughly 6 hours.
The government obviously doesn't like Balaus or his movement, but has avoided cracking down hard on it, presumably due to its popular support and Damascus's desire to prevent a full rebellion in Suwayda. The rebels (at least the non-jihadist ones) have in the past tried to reach out to Balaus, but he has refused to advocate the government's overthrow or to support the rebellion, so they don't have great relations either, although they don't actively fight each other. It's also worth nothing that the Shaykhs of Dignity is only one political faction in Suwayda, and that better relations with the government in Damascus are advocated by some. Nonetheless, it's interesting to see leaders in a minority enclave of Syria forming local militias with neither government or rebel affiliation. People (myself included) often forget about Suwayda and Syria's significant Druze minority when considering the situation the country, but it's nice to read news coming out a place that's remained intact over the last five years, even if things are tense there.
edited for clarity
Iranians cast their ballots today, for the Majlis (parliament) and their Assembly of Experts. The election has already been controversial as large numbers of reformist candidates have been barred from running, including some big names that's sparked all sorts of claims and counter-claims. The election results can be seen as a barometer of Rouhani's performance, most especially with the nuclear deal and a general warming of relations with the west.
The "green revolution" of 2009 still looms over Iranian elections. The last presidential ones went fine, and these probably will too, but its a tumultuous time in Iran these days between conservatives and reformists.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35666107
And remember al-Sadr? The firey, anti-US shia cleric in Iraq, based in a huge Baghdad suburb, created his Mahdi Army militia in response to the US occupation. After a bunch of violence he ended up disbanding the militia and going to Iran in a quasi exile. He returned a few years ago to rebuild his political organization.
And, uh, I guess he's still pretty popular, as seen by a demonstration he organized against corruption:
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article62620372.html
Definitely worth a read if you've got the time, it's pretty lengthy but also well researched. The Saudi-Wahhabi pact has been an incredibly toxic and surprisingly resilient phenomenon over the last few centuries.
Everything is turning up Milhouse reformist.
These are still early results though, and I trust the Iranian government to run a fair election like.... honestly there is no comparison.
I do not trust the Iranian government to run a fair election.
I am lying.
There is no good news from Turkey.
To sum up.
Erdogan's supporters believe insane bullshit level conspiracies exist against him. That everybody is out to get our man and he should do whatever it takes to stop them.
The Turkish government's initial identification of the bomber turned out to be sloppy and they have had nothing but difficulty letting go of that first declaration.
Best line in the article
The Turkish-American alliance is fraying at the seams (I doubt the rest of NATO is particularly fond of Turkey at the moment either).
Oh and we have no idea where Turkey's foreign policy is going next. Probably nowhere good. Considering that Erdogan is very much the kind of guy who takes it personally if you don't agree with him and back him up with everything. Seriously, how the fuck did Turkey manage to elect Chris Christie?
But we know where the Turkish economy is going. To hell in a handbasket.
Not that I really think it would be hard to arrange a different infrastructure for our military there, but it would be really obvious when we started doing that, and Turkey would go berserk if it realized it was about to get shoved out of NATO.
Mostly because they'd immediately assume that was a precursor to recognizing a Kurdish state. Given how quick they are to start slinging artillery already, I'd expect things to get out of hand within days.
Not to mention that all the Strategic and geographical motivations we had for wanting them in in the first place still apply, especially with Russia spinning up "cold war 2 electric boogaloo". Short of Erdogan forming firing squads to shoot protesters in the streets NATO isn't going to boot Turkey out.
He's utterly torpedoed any shot they had at getting in the EU though.
Pretty sure Turkey isn't besties with Russia at the moment.
That's kinda my point? That and cutting off Russian passage through the black sea is pretty important to NATO.
This is both politically and economically poison in the EU which gives Turkey a ton of space to maneuver.
I bring up the possibility that it was a false flag almost every time there's a bombing in Turkey, but I'd really rather not be correct. The implications of an allied political leader willingly mass-murdering their own countrymen to go to war are terrifying.