So, it seems to me that the closest analogue to being asexual is having no sense of taste/smell. It doesn't prevent any normal functioning, you can still eat without tasting food. It doesn't really impair you in any way, other than in the cases of recognizing spoiled food or whatnot, which is extremely avoidable. It is only a problem because other people are experiencing something you are not - which is only a problem if you want it to be.
So, would people consider a lack of taste/smell to be a disorder? Should be be trying to cure that?
The only cases of lack of taste/smell I've heard about are acquired through certain drugs or smoking, so there is definitely a palpable sense of loss experienced by the affected person in many cases.
However, a lot of times deaf people don't consider themselves disabled, and some bioethicists have discussed the possibility of deaf people genetically selecting deaf babies.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
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JohnnyCacheStarting DefensePlace at the tableRegistered Userregular
If your libido doesn't bother you, its not a disorder. Simple.
By your argument "If X doesn't bother you, it's not a disorder".
And I don't think that is how disorders are defined.
It is a major criterion for how behavioral disorders are defined.
The actual criteria regarding disruption of function and lifestyle aren't 100% subjective and personal, though.
Say I'm a sexual compulsive and I'm engaging in dangerous sex in rest stops and I'm feeling up the patients in the coma ward where I work. I'm VERY happy with this state of affairs - do I have dysfunction? Or is it negated by my happiness?
If your libido doesn't bother you, its not a disorder. Simple.
By your argument "If X doesn't bother you, it's not a disorder".
And I don't think that is how disorders are defined.
It is a major criterion for how behavioral disorders are defined.
The actual criteria regarding disruption of function and lifestyle aren't 100% subjective and personal, though.
Say I'm a sexual compulsive and I'm engaging in dangerous sex in rest stops and I'm feeling up the patients in the coma ward where I work. I'm VERY happy with this state of affairs - do I have dysfunction? Or is it negated by my happiness?
Danger to others.
And illegal.
If you can control it, you're a criminal and you go to jail. If you can't control it, you're still a criminal, and will still go to jail, but you'll probably be eligible for psychiatric treatment once there.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If you can't feel pain and you break your leg and say it doesn't hurt and you don't need treatment, have you really broken your leg? I can only imagine that part of being asexual is not caring if you have sex - sort of by definition - so can you use a simple criteria of "do they mind being that way" to decide if there is dysfunction?
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If you can't feel pain and you break your leg and say it doesn't hurt and you don't need treatment, have you really broken your leg? I can only imagine that part of being asexual is not caring if you have sex - sort of by definition - so can you use a simple criteria of "do they mind being that way" to decide if there is dysfunction?
Yes. Yes you can. A slightly more complex criteria than what you've stated, but 150,000 medical professionals seem to agree.
And note I didn't say "no pain", I said "no loss of function".
Organic medical disorders such as a broken leg are not perfectly analogous to behavioral disorders without obvious organic etiology, largely due to our lack of understanding of the complexities of human behavior.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
the main problem I see is that people look at the -sexuality root and compare it to homosexuality, when really the -sexuality part means something totally different.
Asexuality means a lack of sexual desire. Homosexuality does not strictly mean sexual desire towards the same gender; it also includes a personal identity constructed around that desire. In other words, one label refers to sexual desire, while the other to sexual identity.
But mostly there needs to be a distinction between acquired asexuality which does not inform personal identity and congenital asexuality which maybe does.
I have been trying to say exactly this the entire thread. Go crosspost it!
If you were always asexual, you're probably okay with it.
If you acquired it through drug side effects or a disease affecting hormones then you're probably not.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
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JohnnyCacheStarting DefensePlace at the tableRegistered Userregular
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If you can't feel pain and you break your leg and say it doesn't hurt and you don't need treatment, have you really broken your leg? I can only imagine that part of being asexual is not caring if you have sex - sort of by definition - so can you use a simple criteria of "do they mind being that way" to decide if there is dysfunction?
Yes. Yes you can. A slightly more complex criteria than what you've stated, but 150,000 medical professionals seem to agree.
And note I didn't say "no pain", I said "no loss of function".
I guess the argument is that I don't know if we should just say writing off a huge part of life is "no loss of function" and /thread
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If you can't feel pain and you break your leg and say it doesn't hurt and you don't need treatment, have you really broken your leg? I can only imagine that part of being asexual is not caring if you have sex - sort of by definition - so can you use a simple criteria of "do they mind being that way" to decide if there is dysfunction?
Yes. Yes you can. A slightly more complex criteria than what you've stated, but 150,000 medical professionals seem to agree.
And note I didn't say "no pain", I said "no loss of function".
I guess the argument is that I don't know if we should just say writing off a huge part of life is "no loss of function" and /thread
The basic conundrum is that determining what is and is not a "huge part of life" is highly contentious. I played devil's advocate with this above because I personally feel that sex is a huge part of life. However, medicalizing a condition carries with it all sorts of social and political consequences. Attaching a medical label to a condition carries the risk that doctors might be using their legal and professional authority to promote their own values over those of the patient's to their detriment.
For example, many people would consider religion to be a huge part of life. If religion were suitably ensconced in academia, it would not be hard to imagine many of the arguments regarding asexuality being applied to a lack of religious faith. (Afiducia?) And then those who lack religious faith would be expected to undergo therapy to treat their afiducia.
Want a slightly less science fictionish, Handmaid's Tale example? Prior to the sexual revolution, it was believed by many in the mental health field that homosexuals were unable to maintain close relationships with people and they were missing out on the opportunity to marry and have children. From that perspective, "curing" homosexuality was held to be a legitimate psychiatric endeavor.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
In general, the need to equate an inability to enjoy every possible aspect of human experience with a dysfunction is a matter of ethnocentricism. Western society misses out on activities that non-Western societies enjoy, clearly all of Western society is dysfunctional? The glossary could use expansion.
The basic conundrum is that determining what is and is not a "huge part of life" is highly contentious. I played devil's advocate with this above because I personally feel that sex is a huge part of life. However, medicalizing a condition carries with it all sorts of social and political consequences. Attaching a medical label to a condition carries the risk that doctors might be using their legal and professional authority to promote their own values over those of the patient's to their detriment.
For example, many people would consider religion to be a huge part of life. If religion were suitably ensconced in academia, it would not be hard to imagine many of the arguments regarding asexuality being applied to a lack of religious faith. (Afiducia?) And then those who lack religious faith would be expected to undergo therapy to treat their afiducia.
Want a slightly less science fictionish, Handmaid's Tale example? Prior to the sexual revolution, it was believed by many in the mental health field that homosexuals were unable to maintain close relationships with people and they were missing out on the opportunity to marry and have children. From that perspective, "curing" homosexuality was held to be a legitimate psychiatric endeavor.
This is why I try to make the comparison organic. If you have odd behavior, and make the point that well, it's not hurting anyone and you don't mind it, people still say "well, it's odd, shouldn't that still be a disorder?"
The medical model of psychology makes a lot of sense, but at the minimum it needs to protect people from being forcibly labeled with X.
I mean, say you have ADD, only you do well in school and work, have perfectly excellent relationships, no complaints about your attention span, and plenty of ways to keep yourself in control and effective even if you do get a bit absent-minded. Then you don't have ADD, you have a measurably shorter than average attention span. What you measure is not necessarily the same as the disorder itself.
Edit: Oh oh!
Plus, there are at least a few non-sexual or at least extremely anti-sex cultures. The Shakers were completely asexual, and there is some tribe in Papa New Guinea that believes all sex is painful and embarrassing, and should only be done for the very minimum necessary procreation. They don't have close personal relationships or even romantic or familal love as we know it.
Now, admittedly these examples are rather small, but it seems like a very anti-sex or asexual culture would be by definition. Are these just examples of groupings of mentally damaged people? Or is there a cultural element?
This is why I try to make the comparison organic. If you have odd behavior, and make the point that well, it's not hurting anyone and you don't mind it, people still say "well, it's odd, shouldn't that still be a disorder?"
The medical model of psychology makes a lot of sense, but at the minimum it needs to protect people from being forcibly labeled with X.
I mean, say you have ADD, only you do well in school and work, have perfectly excellent relationships, no complaints about your attention span, and plenty of ways to keep yourself in control and effective even if you do get a bit absent-minded. Then you don't have ADD, you have a measurably shorter than average attention span. What you measure is not necessarily the same as the disorder itself.
Edit: Oh oh!
Plus, there are at least a few non-sexual or at least extremely anti-sex cultures. The Shakers were completely asexual, and there is some tribe in Papa New Guinea that believes all sex is painful and embarrassing, and should only be done for the very minimum necessary procreation. They don't have close personal relationships or even romantic or familal love as we know it.
Now, admittedly these examples are rather small, but it seems like a very anti-sex or asexual culture would be by definition. Are these just examples of groupings of mentally damaged people? Or is there a cultural element?
The Shakers weren't asexual, they were just celibate. They very much recognized the fact that humans have sexual urges and went to great lengths to keep those urges under control.
EDIT: And I would argue that, no, these people weren't mentally damaged, and that it was an explicitly cultural phenomenon. Actually, the two examples you listed - a religious society and a culture where sex is viewed very differently than our own, as almost textbook examples of culturally derived behavior.
There are two separate reasons for this attitude, and I hold them both equally.
Reason the first: If our culture is to improve, then it stands to reason that there will always be the avant guard who are a little bit ahead of everybody else. What is the Einstein quote? At first, the truth is ridiculed? Those who are tryingto exemplify a new lifestyle are going to be "abnormal" compared to the status quo. If abnormality is itself held as evidence of behavioral disease, then we risk exercising an atavistic status quo through the mechanisms of medicine and therapy.
Reason the second: Human survival and quality of life depends on diversity. We cannot all have the same outlook, or the same cognitive talents. Asperger's disease is a prime example of this: we need people in our culture who are highly logical, good at engineering and math, even if they don't have the same social skills as the rest of us. Some "diseases" - such as Asperger's - have benefits that balance the disadvantages, almost in the sense of a role playing game class. ("I put all my points in intelligence but I don't have any left for charisma.") If we're too quick to declare a condition a disease, then we risk homogenizing the diversity of the human race. But who can say that a condition's benefits balance the disadvantages? In general, a good place to start is to ask the afflicted because who is going to know better how much a condition handicaps you than those who suffer the condition themselve?
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
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JohnnyCacheStarting DefensePlace at the tableRegistered Userregular
edited March 2009
What I'm saying is that using a standard of harm or disruption is fine, but that standard can't always be subjective when part of what's affected by the matter under examination is your interest in it.
I think that's obvious and you have to look at it case by case rather then drawing, say, a sweeping analogy to homosexuality
It's just that in some portion of the afflicted it's either a symptom of or a coping mechanism for some deeper issue, and in those cases the afflicted aren't necessarily qualified to make terribly objective or informed decisions about it. I don't necessarily think it's wrong to take a slightly more proactive approach to it than most here seem to be suggesting. You can't really force treatment on people or anything, but it could be treated as in indicator that there is likely something more going on.
You aren't necessarily doing anyone a favor by letting them spend a good chunk of their life alone, alienated from society in a thousand tiny ways(because sex and coupling are hugely socially significant), most likely neglecting all sorts of basic 'needs', and all the while ignoring some 2000lb gorilla waiting the next room over.
I don't know. Basically just if someone is going and getting treatment or assessment for some other issue, it would probably be better to think of it as a symptom rather than an orientation. Or like, it might not be a bad idea for someone who identifies himself as asexual to go and talk to someone more objective.
It doesn't necessarily merit treatment, but it's probably not a great idea to just assume it doesn't.
redx on
They moistly come out at night, moistly.
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JohnnyCacheStarting DefensePlace at the tableRegistered Userregular
edited March 2009
yeah, I think it's a severe enough departure to warrant at least a look to see if you really are happy and healthy that way.
A great many people who say they are totally happy with some state of being aren't.
Let me break it down a little more and reorganize it so it is easier.
A) The affected person cannot control it. It is not a behavior encouraged or demanded by the affected person's culture.
Ci) The affected person is distressed by it
Cii) it makes the person a danger to himself or others.
A and B are necessary conditions. They must both be true. (By extension, they are not sufficient conditions - it is impossible to have two necessary conditions where either one is sufficient.) In addition, either Ci or Cii must be true.
In boolean notation: (A AND B AND (Ci OR Cii))
That makes much more sense.
So,
A) asexuality cannot be controlled. asexuality is not encouraged or demanded.
Ci) asexual people are not necessarily distressed
Cii) asexual people are not a danger to their self or others.
I think Cii could be argued for if we take "others" to be the species as a whole and sexual reproduction to behoove the species as a whole. One could make an evolutionary argument and say that asexuality, the absense of procreation, is fundamentally detrimental to the continuation of the species.
The only other issue I have is with "B) It is not a behavior encouraged or demanded by the affected person's culture." At the very least I think this worded poorly. I'd say it as:
"If a behavior is contrary to a cultrual norm then that behavior may be a disorder".
Mostly because, as someone said earlier, "appreciation of football" is something of a cultural norm. But one would not say that one who does not appreciate football has a disorder. So I think it sensible to classify disorders with regard to cultural norms, but I think we need further articulation of the sorts of cultural norms and the severity of these norms.
It's just that in some portion of the afflicted it's either a symptom of or a coping mechanism for some deeper issue, and in those cases the afflicted aren't necessarily qualified to make terribly objective or informed decisions about it. I don't necessarily think it's wrong to take a slightly more proactive approach to it than most here seem to be suggesting. You can't really force treatment on people or anything, but it could be treated as in indicator that there is likely something more going on.
You aren't necessarily doing anyone a favor by letting them spend a good chunk of their life alone, alienated from society in a thousand tiny ways(because sex and coupling are hugely socially significant), most likely neglecting all sorts of basic 'needs', and all the while ignoring some 2000lb gorilla waiting the next room over.
I don't know. Basically just if someone is going and getting treatment or assessment for some other issue, it would probably be better to think of it as a symptom rather than an orientation. Or like, it might not be a bad idea for someone who identifies himself as asexual to go and talk to someone more objective.
It doesn't necessarily merit treatment, but it's probably not a great idea to just assume it doesn't.
Sure. I totally agree. With JC up there, too.
On an individual level, it means asking questions, getting to know the person. In a therapeutic context, it would require the care provider to get to know the person's history. In a personal context, if you're a close friend of the person in question then presumably you'd have the opportunity to ask those questions.
On a larger scale, it means we need more information on the majority of cases and the various factors that can distinguish pathological asexuality from nonpathological sexuality. It was only through observation of homosexuals in various contexts that the medical establishment saw that gay people could hold intimate relationships and be emotionally fulfilled. Similarly, we learned what was best for the majority of transgendered people by observing them - we found that TGs do better when allowed to live as their desired gender rather than trying to get them to accept their biological sex.
That said, I do want to point out that something being a product of a disorder or trauma does not make it a disorder itself. I say this for largely personal reasons: a lot of people (though not the majority by any stretch) who get into BDSM & kink do so because it's a way of dealing with past trauma or sexual abuse; I'm not going to tell those people that their behavior is unhealthy just because its source is unhealthy. Likewise, in the cases where asexuality was the product of abuse we still need to keep in mind that treating the trauma may not result in a return of sexual desire and such people aren't necessarily sick for failing to have sexual desire.
In short, I don't think "fruit of the poisoned tree" always applies in psychology - it should be judged on a case-by-case basis with an open mind, as JC stated above.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
The only other issue I have is with "B) It is not a behavior encouraged or demanded by the affected person's culture." At the very least I think this worded poorly.
It may be worded poorly. It was a paraphrasing of a specific phrase from the WHO position statements on mental health and I can't remember what the original phrasing was.
But basically it's an attempt to take into account the patient's context when judging their behavior. For instance, while cutting yourself might be a symptom of emotional trauma here in the US, in a culture with ritual scarification it is not. Likewise, killing another human being might be a symptom of emotional disturbance in San Francisco, but not necessarily for a soldier in Iraq.
This is not to say that killing a human being or engaging in ritual scarification is not morally wrong. These guidelines do not inform a moral judgment. These behaviors might still be wrong even if they are not diseases.
Feral on
every person who doesn't like an acquired taste always seems to think everyone who likes it is faking it. it should be an official fallacy.
Girlfriend here: It's only a disorder if it bothers you or interferes with having a happy life. That's the key rule for things like this when it comes to psychology. It didn't bother me at all. Sexuality is very fluid. Some people are horny, like, all the time. Most of us knew a guy like that in middle or high school. Some people just... never are. Until certain activities transpired (I got kissed at a bus stop), I had literally never had any sexual urges. That's just.. how I was. It wasn't a disorder. It was just where I fell on the scale of sexual urges. So.. I wouldn't say orientation, it's a bit different than that. But just as some people are hypersexual, some are asexual. And if they don't have a problem with it in either case, then it is not one. If they do in either case, then it is. And they can seek help.
The only other issue I have is with "B) It is not a behavior encouraged or demanded by the affected person's culture." At the very least I think this worded poorly.
It may be worded poorly. It was a paraphrasing of a specific phrase from the WHO position statements on mental health and I can't remember what the original phrasing was.
But basically it's an attempt to take into account the patient's context when judging their behavior. For instance, while cutting yourself might be a symptom of emotional trauma here in the US, in a culture with ritual scarification it is not. Likewise, killing another human being might be a symptom of emotional disturbance in San Francisco, but not necessarily for a soldier in Iraq.
This is not to say that killing a human being or engaging in ritual scarification is not morally wrong. These guidelines do not inform a moral judgment. These behaviors might still be wrong even if they are not diseases.
So they're very overtly making an appeal to some understanding of normalcy within a particular context.
Yes, since it's understood that when you lack definite physiological markers, defining something as abnormal will by definition be subjective and therefore we should probably make note of context. The medical model can only be so strong before we start doing things that psychology has done in the past and is not proud of.
Yes, since it's understood that when you lack definite physiological markers, defining something as abnormal will by definition be subjective and therefore we should probably make note of context. The medical model can only be so strong before we start doing things that psychology has done in the past and is not proud of.
I tend to think that to be effective psychology needs to grow a pair and start doing those things again. If one desires to diagnose a problem as a problem rather than as a subjective interpretation of a factual occurence then one needs to start cutting some people up to see how they tick.
But that's a whole new argument.
It just seems like someone with a M.A. or Ph. D in psychology would be smart enough to recognize how absurd their enterprise is. "We're going to say that you have a psychological disease because you are not acting in a manner akin to 85% of those within a similar context to you."
Yes, since it's understood that when you lack definite physiological markers, defining something as abnormal will by definition be subjective and therefore we should probably make note of context. The medical model can only be so strong before we start doing things that psychology has done in the past and is not proud of.
I tend to think that to be effective psychology needs to grow a pair and start doing those things again. If one desires to diagnose a problem as a problem rather than as a subjective interpretation of a factual occurence then one needs to start cutting some people up to see how they tick.
But that's a whole new argument.
It just seems like someone with a M.A. or Ph. D in psychology would be smart enough to recognize how absurd their enterprise is. "We're going to say that you have a psychological disease because you are not acting in a manner akin to 85% of those within a similar context to you."
Really, psychology? Really?
_J_, do you really want to argue for your own forced commitment?
'Cause I can get insufferable pedantry in the DSM-V.
Edit: Also, christ. Can people not hold A and B and C in their head at the same time? Or recognize that "psychological disease" is often only relevant in the context of the medical model and not an objective factual entity?
Yes, since it's understood that when you lack definite physiological markers, defining something as abnormal will by definition be subjective and therefore we should probably make note of context. The medical model can only be so strong before we start doing things that psychology has done in the past and is not proud of.
I tend to think that to be effective psychology needs to grow a pair and start doing those things again. If one desires to diagnose a problem as a problem rather than as a subjective interpretation of a factual occurence then one needs to start cutting some people up to see how they tick.
But that's a whole new argument.
It just seems like someone with a M.A. or Ph. D in psychology would be smart enough to recognize how absurd their enterprise is. "We're going to say that you have a psychological disease because you are not acting in a manner akin to 85% of those within a similar context to you."
Really, psychology? Really?
_J_, do you really want to argue for your own forced commitment?
'Cause I can get insufferable pedantry in the DSM-V.
Edit: Also, christ. Can people not hold A and B and C in their head at the same time? Or recognize that "psychological disease" is often only relevant in the context of the medical model and not an objective factual entity?
Well then what is a psychological disease?
And if there's one thing I'm good at it's getting around my own forced commitments.
Frankly, it depends on your model. And it's very, very complicated.
And before you go getting all asstastic about how psych is sooo lazy I will remind you that modern psychological practice is maaaaybe 100 years old, 150 at most. Medicine has had 4000 years, and it's easier.
Hm, I'm looking at the article I was thinking of posting bits of, and frankly I don't feel like retyping it. I'll see if I can find it online.
It's rather long, but the basic point is that there are at least 6 continuum that affect your modeling of a psychiatric disorder, and a bunch of possible models.
1.)Causalism Versus Descriptivism
Should psychiatric disorders be categorized as a function of their causes (causalism) or their clinical characteristics (descriptivism)?
2.)Essentialism Versus Nominalism
Are categories of psychiatric disorder defined by their underlying nature (essentialism), or are they practical categories identified by humans for particular uses (nominalism)?
3.)Objectivism Versus Evaluativism
Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matter ("something is broken and needs to be fixed") (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?
4.)Internalism Versus Externalism
Should psychiatric disorders be defined solely by processes that occur inside the body (internalism), or can events outside the skin also play an important (or exclusive) defining role (externalism)?
5.)Entities Versus Agents
Should psychiatric disorders be considered to be "things" people get, or are they inseparable from an individual’s personal subjective makeup?
6.)Categories Versus Continua
Are psychiatric disorders best understood as illnesses with discrete boundaries (categorical) or the pathological ends of functional dimensions (continuous)?
PasserbyeI am much older than you.in Beach CityRegistered Userregular
edited March 2009
Skimmed over some of this and reading Qingu's GF's comments on it, I think that explains some of it clearly (from a female perspective). For many women I know, myself included, a kind of context needs to be there. When I'm single my libido goes down to zero, I just have no desire for sex.
As a sort of side note, I vaguely remember learning something in my psych 101 class (yeah, yeah, I know, 101) about the differences between male and female libidos. That females tend to be more dependent on what they're thinking of, their emotional or situational context, whereas males tend to be more stimulated by visuals, though of course there's a big area of overlap between those two "extremes".
And before you go getting all asstastic about how psych is sooo lazy I will remind you that modern psychological practice is maaaaybe 100 years old, 150 at most. Medicine has had 4000 years, and it's easier.
I don't think it laziness so much as being absurd. If a doctor says "Hey, you have a tapeworm." they can cut you open, remove the tapeworm, put it in a jar, and then say "Here's the tapeworm which was inside of you."
I don't know what psychology would ever be able to put into a jar to account for the phenomena which it purports to account for.
That's why I like Freud. He wasn't trying to find shit which could be put into a jar. He was utilizing a Cartesian view of the mind to talk about the unconscious. That's keen.
But it seems to me that modern psychology is trying to get to the point of medicine's ability to put things in jars.
And so either we get "Freud was right" and psychology will never have anything to put into a jar because it deals with an incorporeal mind. Or modern psychology is right and they'll get things to put in jars, but then we'll lose the manifest image of humanity and have to admit that we're all little pre-programmed biological machines which perform certain tasks based upon our wiring.
You like Freud? You realize he was, you know, wrong? Not just about how to treat his patients, but about basic facts of their daily lives and personal history.
Also, Behavioralism already was stamped down, came back, and was then stamped down. Believe me, these discussions have happened and are happening.
Edit: And well, modern psychology is actually moving away from the medical model, not towards it. And part of that is precisely because cognitive psych is allowing us to discover how complicated thought is.
You like Freud? You realize he was, you know, wrong? Not just about how to treat his patients, but about basic facts of their daily lives and personal history.
Also, Behavioralism already was stamped down, came back, and was then stamped down. Believe me, these discussions have happened and are happening.
I contend that Freud was right.
I don't like Behaviorism. It just seems like one of the only viable options.
I'll also admit that I mostly hate philosophy of Mind for this very reason: It's the most god damned retarded fucking thing ever. It is impossible to have a conversation with someone who does philosophy of Mind if only because their ontology is so fundamentally fucked up. Freud had a sensible ontology. Behaviorism had a sensible ontology. Contemporary philosophy of mind is just plain fucking insane with regard to its amalgamated bullshit ontology.
So we can couch psychological conversations in this sort of behaviorist style or this contextual style. But eventually I'm going to want to know what your ontology is. And that's when it'll all fall apart.
_J_ on
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
You like Freud? You realize he was, you know, wrong? Not just about how to treat his patients, but about basic facts of their daily lives and personal history.
Also, Behavioralism already was stamped down, came back, and was then stamped down. Believe me, these discussions have happened and are happening.
I contend that Freud was right.
I don't like Behaviorism. It just seems like one of the only viable options.
I'll also admit that I mostly hate philosophy of Mind for this very reason: It's the most god damned retarded fucking thing ever. It is impossible to have a conversation with someone who does philosophy of Mind if only because their ontology is so fundamentally fucked up. Freud had a sensible ontology. Behaviorism had a sensible ontology. Contemporary philosophy of mind is just plain fucking insane with regard to its amalgamated bullshit ontology.
So we can couch psychological conversations in this sort of behaviorist style or this contextual style. But eventually I'm going to want to know what your ontology is. And that's when it'll all fall apart.
What.... what are you even referring to? What is "philosophy of Mind"?
What do you mean when you say Freud's mostly BS completely out-of-his ass descriptions of etiology of behavior were "right"? Is it just because they seem right?
What.... what are you even referring to? What is "philosophy of Mind"?
It's an area of philosophy which deals with questions of what the mind is, what consciousness is, what sorts of things can have minds and be conscious, whether mental activity is reducible to physical activity, whether mental events and physical events can cause one another, and so on.
What.... what are you even referring to? What is "philosophy of Mind"?
It's an area of philosophy which deals with questions of what the mind is, what consciousness is, what sorts of things can have minds and be conscious, whether mental activity is reducible to physical activity, whether mental events and physical events can cause one another, and so on.
Ah, well. Okay. I don't quite see what that has to do with modern psychological research and practice...
Well, I should say I see exactly what it has to do with that, but feel the need to point out that though philosophers dealing with mental states and psychologists share a playing field we're not actually the same.
What do you mean when you say Freud's mostly BS completely out-of-his ass descriptions of etiology of behavior were "right"? Is it just because they seem right?
I think they are consistent with the ontology he presents and the understanding of Mind he presents.
To bring this back to the question of asexuality: To discern whether or not asexuality is a "disorder" one has to have an understanding of both sexuality and disorders. Sexuality will cohere with one's ontology, one's understanding of the nature of beings as sexual. Disorders, as well, will come from one's understanding of psychology which will be based, one hopes, upon an ontological understanding of the human being.
So, said simply, to answer the question of whether asexuality is a orientation or a disorder one first has to understand all of those terms as well as have an ontological understanding of those beings which those terms concern.
Said even simpler: To answer this question one first has to know what a "person" is. And I do not think psychology, as a whole, has that yet. Hell, I'm pretty sure no one has that yet.
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MrMisterJesus dying on the cross in pain? Morally better than us. One has to go "all in".Registered Userregular
Ah, well. Okay. I don't quite see what that has to do with modern psychological research and practice...
Well, I should say I see exactly what it has to do with that, but feel the need to point out that though philosophers dealing with mental states and psychologists share a playing field we're not actually the same.
There's some cross-pollination: for instance, Paul and Patricia Churchland have taken results from cognitive science and used them to argue for Eliminative Materialism--which states, roughly, that our commonsense theory of mental states and events, as described by terms such as pain, belief, desire, envy, and so on, is fundamentally defective. Similarly, I think that philosophy of mind has, in the past, informed the underlying theories of psychologists, although I don't really have any examples. Except Freud, apparently.
But none of this really has to bear on _J_'s objection. Which, as far as I can tell, is a "get off my porch" tirade without much substance.
But none of this really has to bear on _J_'s objection. Which, as far as I can tell, is a "get off my porch" tirade without much substance.
No, by all means, let psychology take that porch away.
But I still want to know what one thinks a human being is when one does psychology. Because the answer to that question will influence the whole conversation.
1) Human beings are biological machines programmed to act in a certain manner. Sometimes the machine breaks. Enter psychology.
2) Human beings are self-determining entities with mind states correspondent to brain states.
3) something else.
4) Something else.
What is a person? Or, what is that which psychology studies? Are we looking at brains or minds?
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The only cases of lack of taste/smell I've heard about are acquired through certain drugs or smoking, so there is definitely a palpable sense of loss experienced by the affected person in many cases.
However, a lot of times deaf people don't consider themselves disabled, and some bioethicists have discussed the possibility of deaf people genetically selecting deaf babies.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
The actual criteria regarding disruption of function and lifestyle aren't 100% subjective and personal, though.
Say I'm a sexual compulsive and I'm engaging in dangerous sex in rest stops and I'm feeling up the patients in the coma ward where I work. I'm VERY happy with this state of affairs - do I have dysfunction? Or is it negated by my happiness?
I host a podcast about movies.
Danger to others.
And illegal.
If you can control it, you're a criminal and you go to jail. If you can't control it, you're still a criminal, and will still go to jail, but you'll probably be eligible for psychiatric treatment once there.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
If your disorder is dangerous to others and illegal? That's causing you direct harm and some amount of grief.
But look at it this way: If someone breaks their leg, and they experience no pain, no loss of motion, no danger of bone fragments, no loss of bone density, and absolutely no degradation of function at all, have they actually broken their leg?
It becomes academic to say someone has a disorder when it does absolutely nothing to impact their well-being.
If you can't feel pain and you break your leg and say it doesn't hurt and you don't need treatment, have you really broken your leg? I can only imagine that part of being asexual is not caring if you have sex - sort of by definition - so can you use a simple criteria of "do they mind being that way" to decide if there is dysfunction?
I host a podcast about movies.
Yes. Yes you can. A slightly more complex criteria than what you've stated, but 150,000 medical professionals seem to agree.
And note I didn't say "no pain", I said "no loss of function".
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
If you were always asexual, you're probably okay with it.
If you acquired it through drug side effects or a disease affecting hormones then you're probably not.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
I guess the argument is that I don't know if we should just say writing off a huge part of life is "no loss of function" and /thread
I host a podcast about movies.
The basic conundrum is that determining what is and is not a "huge part of life" is highly contentious. I played devil's advocate with this above because I personally feel that sex is a huge part of life. However, medicalizing a condition carries with it all sorts of social and political consequences. Attaching a medical label to a condition carries the risk that doctors might be using their legal and professional authority to promote their own values over those of the patient's to their detriment.
For example, many people would consider religion to be a huge part of life. If religion were suitably ensconced in academia, it would not be hard to imagine many of the arguments regarding asexuality being applied to a lack of religious faith. (Afiducia?) And then those who lack religious faith would be expected to undergo therapy to treat their afiducia.
Want a slightly less science fictionish, Handmaid's Tale example? Prior to the sexual revolution, it was believed by many in the mental health field that homosexuals were unable to maintain close relationships with people and they were missing out on the opportunity to marry and have children. From that perspective, "curing" homosexuality was held to be a legitimate psychiatric endeavor.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
The medical model of psychology makes a lot of sense, but at the minimum it needs to protect people from being forcibly labeled with X.
I mean, say you have ADD, only you do well in school and work, have perfectly excellent relationships, no complaints about your attention span, and plenty of ways to keep yourself in control and effective even if you do get a bit absent-minded. Then you don't have ADD, you have a measurably shorter than average attention span. What you measure is not necessarily the same as the disorder itself.
Edit: Oh oh!
Plus, there are at least a few non-sexual or at least extremely anti-sex cultures. The Shakers were completely asexual, and there is some tribe in Papa New Guinea that believes all sex is painful and embarrassing, and should only be done for the very minimum necessary procreation. They don't have close personal relationships or even romantic or familal love as we know it.
Now, admittedly these examples are rather small, but it seems like a very anti-sex or asexual culture would be by definition. Are these just examples of groupings of mentally damaged people? Or is there a cultural element?
EDIT: And I would argue that, no, these people weren't mentally damaged, and that it was an explicitly cultural phenomenon. Actually, the two examples you listed - a religious society and a culture where sex is viewed very differently than our own, as almost textbook examples of culturally derived behavior.
There are two separate reasons for this attitude, and I hold them both equally.
Reason the first: If our culture is to improve, then it stands to reason that there will always be the avant guard who are a little bit ahead of everybody else. What is the Einstein quote? At first, the truth is ridiculed? Those who are tryingto exemplify a new lifestyle are going to be "abnormal" compared to the status quo. If abnormality is itself held as evidence of behavioral disease, then we risk exercising an atavistic status quo through the mechanisms of medicine and therapy.
Reason the second: Human survival and quality of life depends on diversity. We cannot all have the same outlook, or the same cognitive talents. Asperger's disease is a prime example of this: we need people in our culture who are highly logical, good at engineering and math, even if they don't have the same social skills as the rest of us. Some "diseases" - such as Asperger's - have benefits that balance the disadvantages, almost in the sense of a role playing game class. ("I put all my points in intelligence but I don't have any left for charisma.") If we're too quick to declare a condition a disease, then we risk homogenizing the diversity of the human race. But who can say that a condition's benefits balance the disadvantages? In general, a good place to start is to ask the afflicted because who is going to know better how much a condition handicaps you than those who suffer the condition themselve?
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
I think that's obvious and you have to look at it case by case rather then drawing, say, a sweeping analogy to homosexuality
I host a podcast about movies.
You aren't necessarily doing anyone a favor by letting them spend a good chunk of their life alone, alienated from society in a thousand tiny ways(because sex and coupling are hugely socially significant), most likely neglecting all sorts of basic 'needs', and all the while ignoring some 2000lb gorilla waiting the next room over.
I don't know. Basically just if someone is going and getting treatment or assessment for some other issue, it would probably be better to think of it as a symptom rather than an orientation. Or like, it might not be a bad idea for someone who identifies himself as asexual to go and talk to someone more objective.
It doesn't necessarily merit treatment, but it's probably not a great idea to just assume it doesn't.
A great many people who say they are totally happy with some state of being aren't.
I host a podcast about movies.
That makes much more sense.
So,
A) asexuality cannot be controlled.
Ci) asexual people are not necessarily distressed
Cii) asexual people are not a danger to their self or others.
I think Cii could be argued for if we take "others" to be the species as a whole and sexual reproduction to behoove the species as a whole. One could make an evolutionary argument and say that asexuality, the absense of procreation, is fundamentally detrimental to the continuation of the species.
The only other issue I have is with "B) It is not a behavior encouraged or demanded by the affected person's culture." At the very least I think this worded poorly. I'd say it as:
"If a behavior is contrary to a cultrual norm then that behavior may be a disorder".
Mostly because, as someone said earlier, "appreciation of football" is something of a cultural norm. But one would not say that one who does not appreciate football has a disorder. So I think it sensible to classify disorders with regard to cultural norms, but I think we need further articulation of the sorts of cultural norms and the severity of these norms.
Sure. I totally agree. With JC up there, too.
On an individual level, it means asking questions, getting to know the person. In a therapeutic context, it would require the care provider to get to know the person's history. In a personal context, if you're a close friend of the person in question then presumably you'd have the opportunity to ask those questions.
On a larger scale, it means we need more information on the majority of cases and the various factors that can distinguish pathological asexuality from nonpathological sexuality. It was only through observation of homosexuals in various contexts that the medical establishment saw that gay people could hold intimate relationships and be emotionally fulfilled. Similarly, we learned what was best for the majority of transgendered people by observing them - we found that TGs do better when allowed to live as their desired gender rather than trying to get them to accept their biological sex.
That said, I do want to point out that something being a product of a disorder or trauma does not make it a disorder itself. I say this for largely personal reasons: a lot of people (though not the majority by any stretch) who get into BDSM & kink do so because it's a way of dealing with past trauma or sexual abuse; I'm not going to tell those people that their behavior is unhealthy just because its source is unhealthy. Likewise, in the cases where asexuality was the product of abuse we still need to keep in mind that treating the trauma may not result in a return of sexual desire and such people aren't necessarily sick for failing to have sexual desire.
In short, I don't think "fruit of the poisoned tree" always applies in psychology - it should be judged on a case-by-case basis with an open mind, as JC stated above.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
It may be worded poorly. It was a paraphrasing of a specific phrase from the WHO position statements on mental health and I can't remember what the original phrasing was.
But basically it's an attempt to take into account the patient's context when judging their behavior. For instance, while cutting yourself might be a symptom of emotional trauma here in the US, in a culture with ritual scarification it is not. Likewise, killing another human being might be a symptom of emotional disturbance in San Francisco, but not necessarily for a soldier in Iraq.
This is not to say that killing a human being or engaging in ritual scarification is not morally wrong. These guidelines do not inform a moral judgment. These behaviors might still be wrong even if they are not diseases.
the "no true scotch man" fallacy.
So they're very overtly making an appeal to some understanding of normalcy within a particular context.
I tend to think that to be effective psychology needs to grow a pair and start doing those things again. If one desires to diagnose a problem as a problem rather than as a subjective interpretation of a factual occurence then one needs to start cutting some people up to see how they tick.
But that's a whole new argument.
It just seems like someone with a M.A. or Ph. D in psychology would be smart enough to recognize how absurd their enterprise is. "We're going to say that you have a psychological disease because you are not acting in a manner akin to 85% of those within a similar context to you."
Really, psychology? Really?
_J_, do you really want to argue for your own forced commitment?
'Cause I can get insufferable pedantry in the DSM-V.
Edit: Also, christ. Can people not hold A and B and C in their head at the same time? Or recognize that "psychological disease" is often only relevant in the context of the medical model and not an objective factual entity?
Well then what is a psychological disease?
And if there's one thing I'm good at it's getting around my own forced commitments.
And before you go getting all asstastic about how psych is sooo lazy I will remind you that modern psychological practice is maaaaybe 100 years old, 150 at most. Medicine has had 4000 years, and it's easier.
Hm, I'm looking at the article I was thinking of posting bits of, and frankly I don't feel like retyping it. I'll see if I can find it online.
Edit:Here we go
It's rather long, but the basic point is that there are at least 6 continuum that affect your modeling of a psychiatric disorder, and a bunch of possible models.
1.)Causalism Versus Descriptivism
Should psychiatric disorders be categorized as a function of their causes (causalism) or their clinical characteristics (descriptivism)?
2.)Essentialism Versus Nominalism
Are categories of psychiatric disorder defined by their underlying nature (essentialism), or are they practical categories identified by humans for particular uses (nominalism)?
3.)Objectivism Versus Evaluativism
Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matter ("something is broken and needs to be fixed") (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?
4.)Internalism Versus Externalism
Should psychiatric disorders be defined solely by processes that occur inside the body (internalism), or can events outside the skin also play an important (or exclusive) defining role (externalism)?
5.)Entities Versus Agents
Should psychiatric disorders be considered to be "things" people get, or are they inseparable from an individual’s personal subjective makeup?
6.)Categories Versus Continua
Are psychiatric disorders best understood as illnesses with discrete boundaries (categorical) or the pathological ends of functional dimensions (continuous)?
As a sort of side note, I vaguely remember learning something in my psych 101 class (yeah, yeah, I know, 101) about the differences between male and female libidos. That females tend to be more dependent on what they're thinking of, their emotional or situational context, whereas males tend to be more stimulated by visuals, though of course there's a big area of overlap between those two "extremes".
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I don't think it laziness so much as being absurd. If a doctor says "Hey, you have a tapeworm." they can cut you open, remove the tapeworm, put it in a jar, and then say "Here's the tapeworm which was inside of you."
I don't know what psychology would ever be able to put into a jar to account for the phenomena which it purports to account for.
That's why I like Freud. He wasn't trying to find shit which could be put into a jar. He was utilizing a Cartesian view of the mind to talk about the unconscious. That's keen.
But it seems to me that modern psychology is trying to get to the point of medicine's ability to put things in jars.
And so either we get "Freud was right" and psychology will never have anything to put into a jar because it deals with an incorporeal mind. Or modern psychology is right and they'll get things to put in jars, but then we'll lose the manifest image of humanity and have to admit that we're all little pre-programmed biological machines which perform certain tasks based upon our wiring.
Also, Behavioralism already was stamped down, came back, and was then stamped down. Believe me, these discussions have happened and are happening.
Edit: And well, modern psychology is actually moving away from the medical model, not towards it. And part of that is precisely because cognitive psych is allowing us to discover how complicated thought is.
True, but as a rule the presumption is on the side of the person talking about their own state of affairs, absent significant indicators otherwise.
I contend that Freud was right.
I don't like Behaviorism. It just seems like one of the only viable options.
I'll also admit that I mostly hate philosophy of Mind for this very reason: It's the most god damned retarded fucking thing ever. It is impossible to have a conversation with someone who does philosophy of Mind if only because their ontology is so fundamentally fucked up. Freud had a sensible ontology. Behaviorism had a sensible ontology. Contemporary philosophy of mind is just plain fucking insane with regard to its amalgamated bullshit ontology.
So we can couch psychological conversations in this sort of behaviorist style or this contextual style. But eventually I'm going to want to know what your ontology is. And that's when it'll all fall apart.
Wait, so you're arguing against modern psychological practice because you're a dualist? What are you, from the middle ages?
What.... what are you even referring to? What is "philosophy of Mind"?
What do you mean when you say Freud's mostly BS completely out-of-his ass descriptions of etiology of behavior were "right"? Is it just because they seem right?
It's an area of philosophy which deals with questions of what the mind is, what consciousness is, what sorts of things can have minds and be conscious, whether mental activity is reducible to physical activity, whether mental events and physical events can cause one another, and so on.
Ah, well. Okay. I don't quite see what that has to do with modern psychological research and practice...
Well, I should say I see exactly what it has to do with that, but feel the need to point out that though philosophers dealing with mental states and psychologists share a playing field we're not actually the same.
My philosophical proclivities are.
I think they are consistent with the ontology he presents and the understanding of Mind he presents.
To bring this back to the question of asexuality: To discern whether or not asexuality is a "disorder" one has to have an understanding of both sexuality and disorders. Sexuality will cohere with one's ontology, one's understanding of the nature of beings as sexual. Disorders, as well, will come from one's understanding of psychology which will be based, one hopes, upon an ontological understanding of the human being.
So, said simply, to answer the question of whether asexuality is a orientation or a disorder one first has to understand all of those terms as well as have an ontological understanding of those beings which those terms concern.
Said even simpler: To answer this question one first has to know what a "person" is. And I do not think psychology, as a whole, has that yet. Hell, I'm pretty sure no one has that yet.
There's some cross-pollination: for instance, Paul and Patricia Churchland have taken results from cognitive science and used them to argue for Eliminative Materialism--which states, roughly, that our commonsense theory of mental states and events, as described by terms such as pain, belief, desire, envy, and so on, is fundamentally defective. Similarly, I think that philosophy of mind has, in the past, informed the underlying theories of psychologists, although I don't really have any examples. Except Freud, apparently.
But none of this really has to bear on _J_'s objection. Which, as far as I can tell, is a "get off my porch" tirade without much substance.
No, by all means, let psychology take that porch away.
But I still want to know what one thinks a human being is when one does psychology. Because the answer to that question will influence the whole conversation.
1) Human beings are biological machines programmed to act in a certain manner. Sometimes the machine breaks. Enter psychology.
2) Human beings are self-determining entities with mind states correspondent to brain states.
3) something else.
4) Something else.
What is a person? Or, what is that which psychology studies? Are we looking at brains or minds?