In the beginning was the quantum field, and the quantum field was with God, and the quantum field was God. Identity was in the beginning with God. All particles were made by Him; and without Him was not any particle made that was made. In Him was physicality, and the physicality was the light of men.
This is what happens to Physics when they forget what "fallibilism" means.
Over the past decades, several philosophers have scrutinized this ‘Indiscernibility Thesis’ (IT) by providing various rigorous arguments in favor of it: similar elementary particles (same mass, charge, spin, etc.)—when forming a composite physical system—are indiscernible by quantum mechanical means. Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is thus refuted by QM—and perhaps is therefore not so metaphysical after all. This does not rule out conclusively that particles really are discernible, but if they are, they have to be discerned by means that go above and beyond QM, such as by ascribing Scotusian haecceitas to the particles, or ascribing sibling attributes to them from scholastic and neoscholastic metaphysics. Nevertheless, few philosophers have considered this move to save the discernibility of the elementary particles to be attractive—if this move is mentioned at all, and then usually only as a possibility and rarely as a plausibility. Mild naturalistic inclinations seem sufficient to accommodate IT in our general metaphysical view of the world. We ought to let well‐established scientific knowledge inform our metaphysical view of the world whenever possible and appropriate, and this is exactly what Schrödinger begged us to do. The only respectable metaphysics is naturalized metaphysics (see further Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1–38).
Over the past decades, several philosophers have scrutinized this ‘Indiscernibility Thesis’ (IT) by providing various rigorous arguments in favor of it: similar elementary particles (same mass, charge, spin, etc.)—when forming a composite physical system—are indiscernible by quantum mechanical means. Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is thus refuted by QM—and perhaps is therefore not so metaphysical after all. This does not rule out conclusively that particles really are discernible, but if they are, they have to be discerned by means that go above and beyond QM, such as by ascribing Scotusian haecceitas to the particles, or ascribing sibling attributes to them from scholastic and neoscholastic metaphysics. Nevertheless, few philosophers have considered this move to save the discernibility of the elementary particles to be attractive—if this move is mentioned at all, and then usually only as a possibility and rarely as a plausibility. Mild naturalistic inclinations seem sufficient to accommodate IT in our general metaphysical view of the world. We ought to let well‐established scientific knowledge inform our metaphysical view of the world whenever possible and appropriate, and this is exactly what Schrödinger begged us to do. The only respectable metaphysics is naturalized metaphysics (see further Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1–38).
Over the past decades, several philosophers have scrutinized this ‘Indiscernibility Thesis’ (IT) by providing various rigorous arguments in favor of it: similar elementary particles (same mass, charge, spin, etc.)—when forming a composite physical system—are indiscernible by quantum mechanical means. Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is thus refuted by QM—and perhaps is therefore not so metaphysical after all. This does not rule out conclusively that particles really are discernible, but if they are, they have to be discerned by means that go above and beyond QM, such as by ascribing Scotusian haecceitas to the particles, or ascribing sibling attributes to them from scholastic and neoscholastic metaphysics. Nevertheless, few philosophers have considered this move to save the discernibility of the elementary particles to be attractive—if this move is mentioned at all, and then usually only as a possibility and rarely as a plausibility. Mild naturalistic inclinations seem sufficient to accommodate IT in our general metaphysical view of the world. We ought to let well‐established scientific knowledge inform our metaphysical view of the world whenever possible and appropriate, and this is exactly what Schrödinger begged us to do. The only respectable metaphysics is naturalized metaphysics (see further Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1–38).
It didn't take Quantum Mechanics to call in to question the identity of indiscernables. Max Black did it quite convincingly without any reference to physics at all.
There is a certain sense in which one must adopt a "naturalized" metaphysics. But it goes so far beyond science that you would be left with intense problems confining oneself to purely "naturalized" metaphysics.
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Gedankenexperiment? Maybe more natural philosophy, though. Early QM/GR certainly involved a lot of sketchy abstractions. Modern formalisms took a while to kick into high gear.
If decoherence pays out, as it may be doing, maybe that'll count.
But when _J_ here is writing "Horseshit." I feel strongly inclined toward Rutherford's "physics is the only real science - the rest are just stamp collecting", for some reason...
But when _J_ here is writing "Horseshit." I feel strongly inclined toward Rutherford's "physics is the only real science - the rest are just stamp collecting", for some reason...
Nothing like Ad hominems and strawmen to keep you warm on a spring evening.
I think he meant "in actual academic practice", following the period natural philosophy and physics definitively parted ways. Let's say around Duhem, or Poincaré.
But when _J_ here is writing "Horseshit." I feel strongly inclined toward Rutherford's "physics is the only real science - the rest are just stamp collecting", for some reason...
Nothing like Ad hominems and strawmen to keep you warm on a spring evening.
Dude, what the hell. Am I besmirching your honor or something.
Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is thus refuted by QM—and perhaps is therefore not so metaphysical after all.
Horseshit.
I've got some bad news for you buddy, without resorting to Haecceaties, you can't really reinforce your opinion there. I'll be the first one on board for Identity of Indiscernables, but you got to face facts some times.
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
I would like to know: when was the last time philosophy of science led to an advance in physics?
It happens all the time. I can't provide you specific dates and times (unless you furnish me with dates and time for certain advances in theoretical physics).
Though there is a sense of the word "advance" where you are simply asking a nonsensical question. Analogous to: when was the last time physics told me I was beautiful?
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Leibniz’s metaphysical Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is thus refuted by QM—and perhaps is therefore not so metaphysical after all.
Horseshit.
I've got some bad news for you buddy, without resorting to Haecceaties, you can't really reinforce your opinion there. I'll be the first one on board for Identity of Indiscernables, but you got to face facts some times.
I'm happy to face the facts, so long as we do not construe "facts" as the inductions and abductions physicists make from color patches.
Edit: I mean, they can't even figure out if light is a wave or a particle, and yet they presume to have proven the guy who invented Calculus to be incorrect.
I think the definitive answer of what light is, is "wave-particle" and it is not in fact possibly either, and whilst mocking arrogant physicists is very fine, it does you no good to expose your own ignorance of basic modern physics than it is for a professional academic physicist to expose his own ignorance of professional academic philosophy of science by lashing out carelessly.
I think the definitive answer of what light is, is "wave-particle" and it is not in fact possibly either, and whilst mocking arrogant physicists is very fine, it does you no good to expose your own ignorance of basic modern physics than it is for a professional academic physicist to expose his own ignorance of professional academic philosophy of science by lashing out carelessly.
Okay, having skimmed the six pages of this thread and a bit about the Krauss dust-up. This remark seems relevant:
First, I think that Lawrence’s book makes a lot more sense when viewed as part of the ongoing atheism vs. theism popular debate, rather than as a careful philosophical investigation into a longstanding problem. Note that the afterword was written by Richard Dawkins, and Lawrence had originally asked Christopher Hitchens, before he became too ill — both of whom, while very smart people, are neither cosmologists nor philosophers. If your real goal is to refute claims that a Creator is a necessary (or even useful) part of a complete cosmological scheme, then the above points about “creation from nothing” are really quite on point. And that point is that the physical universe can perfectly well be self-contained; it doesn’t need anything or anyone from outside to get it started, even if it had a “beginning.” That doesn’t come close to addressing Leibniz’s classic question, but there’s little doubt that it’s a remarkable feature of modern physics with interesting implications for fundamental cosmology.
Casually speaking, there's a loose 'philosophy of science' that people do seem to adhere to, in a vague revealed-preference sort of way, that may not be philosophically rigorous but constitutes a plausible explanation for observed behavior nonetheless. Even for people whose profession it is to consider the place of scientific knowledge in wider epistemology, they might deny the possibility of certain knowledge of the external world, but they probably still want certain institutions and certain types of people to have designed and built the airplane they're boarding.
Call that the 'applied' philosophy of science, perhaps. Its standards are not very rigorous, but rigorous philosophy of science is difficult and technical and Feyerabend makes my head hurt so we work with a simpler stripped-down version In Real Life, and it really is an evolving standard that keeps up (somewhat) with advances in scientific knowledge, and it does possess massive importance insofar as we want justify who we should legitimately defer to in politically charged issues. Climate change, evolution, you know.
Then there's the actual philosophy of science, where we poke at scientists in the way a political philosopher regards politicians. It's a different world. Here Popper is widely disrespected instead, for starters. But what's wrong with compartmentalization? Everyone does it.
There's a tension in that there are now organized forces trying to formally advocate change in the former (c.f. Dawkins et al) instead of letting it bump along gently and they're not really talking to philosophers and get rather annoyed when the latter do what must seem like irrelevant nitpicking.
I think the definitive answer of what light is, is "wave-particle" and it is not in fact possibly either, and whilst mocking arrogant physicists is very fine, it does you no good to expose your own ignorance of basic modern physics than it is for a professional academic physicist to expose his own ignorance of professional academic philosophy of science by lashing out carelessly.
That's fair.
Edit: It just pisses me off.
I would suggest that dividing academia into Teams a la the OP, whose national honor you are obliged to defend, is not the best way to go about careful thought.
I think the definitive answer of what light is, is "wave-particle" and it is not in fact possibly either, and whilst mocking arrogant physicists is very fine, it does you no good to expose your own ignorance of basic modern physics than it is for a professional academic physicist to expose his own ignorance of professional academic philosophy of science by lashing out carelessly.
That's fair.
Edit: It just pisses me off.
I would suggest that dividing academia into Teams a la the OP, whose national honor you are obliged to defend, is not the best way to go about careful thought.
Unfortunately, given funding decisions, we are engaged in something of a battle that has very real impacts upon the livelihoods of various persons.
As a political matter, I suspect high physics is going to keep pointing out that they invented the nuclear goddamn bomb for the next couple of centuries, I'm afraid. As far as concrete accomplishments of abstract theory go, that one is pretty hard to beat. "So... what've we got from higher criticism of institutional science" was never going to win a funding battle.
Now, pretend that I have a system, described by S, and using some sort of magical tool I go in and pick up the L and R electrons and swap them without otherwise effecting the system. Because electrons are indistinguishable, the new system with L and R swapped is still characterized by S. These systems are trivially different: L and R swapped places. Yet, despite that, they are, as far as physics is concerned, identical systems.
What if we make this distinction:
1) Identical.
2) Functionally Identical.
It seems that physicists are talking about #2, rather than #1.
Does that seem fair to you?
You're going to have to explain what you mean by this distinction. What's the difference between "identical" and "functionally identical"?
Those 3Dss are not identical, since they are different colors, and in different locations. But they are functionally identical, with respect to their function of playing 3DS games.
My understanding is that, with the electron system, CpTHamilton claimed that after we moved the electrons around the systems were identical. But they weren't technically "identical" since the location-property was different.
To which he says that location isn't a relevant property.
That's fine. But it's still a property. It just isn't a property that is relevant to the FUNCTION of the system.
So, the systems are functionally identical, rather than identical.
But this is empty sophistry. You're defining "functionally identical" in terms of what "function" we assign a thing. Electrons don't have a "function". Unless you're invoking some kind of divine purpose, the term as you have defined it is meaningless for a fundamental particle.
More generally, electrons don't have a definite position to begin with, so your claim that they have a different "location-property" is questionable (CptHamilton has since explained this better than I was about to). I think you have this neat, orderly ideal concept of the universe where everything is somewhere even if we don't know where it is, and that is itself a philosophical position rather than a scientific one--which is to say, there's no reason at present to think that electrons really do have definite positions underneath that probability cloud.
Now, pretend that I have a system, described by S, and using some sort of magical tool I go in and pick up the L and R electrons and swap them without otherwise effecting the system. Because electrons are indistinguishable, the new system with L and R swapped is still characterized by S. These systems are trivially different: L and R swapped places. Yet, despite that, they are, as far as physics is concerned, identical systems.
What if we make this distinction:
1) Identical.
2) Functionally Identical.
It seems that physicists are talking about #2, rather than #1.
Does that seem fair to you?
You're going to have to explain what you mean by this distinction. What's the difference between "identical" and "functionally identical"?
Those 3Dss are not identical, since they are different colors, and in different locations. But they are functionally identical, with respect to their function of playing 3DS games.
My understanding is that, with the electron system, CpTHamilton claimed that after we moved the electrons around the systems were identical. But they weren't technically "identical" since the location-property was different.
To which he says that location isn't a relevant property.
That's fine. But it's still a property. It just isn't a property that is relevant to the FUNCTION of the system.
So, the systems are functionally identical, rather than identical.
But this is empty sophistry. You're defining "functionally identical" in terms of what "function" we assign a thing. Electrons don't have a "function". Unless you're invoking some kind of divine purpose, the term as you have defined it is meaningless for a fundamental particle.
More generally, electrons don't have a definite position to begin with, so your claim that they have a different "location-property" is questionable (CptHamilton has since explained this better than I was about to). I think you have this neat, orderly ideal concept of the universe where everything is somewhere even if we don't know where it is, and that is itself a philosophical position rather than a scientific one--which is to say, there's no reason at present to think that electrons really do have definite positions underneath that probability cloud.
There still is some meaningful sense in which we can say something like "that electron is over there." Even if there is a vague range of places. So it's not the case that every electron is everywhere, right? So there must be some manner of location that they have. Even if it is just the location of the cloud.
Also, it's the case that electrons are diffentiated, right? Does it make sense to claim that there are, for instance, 4 electrons over there? Now, in principle, we may not be the kind of thing that can tell them apart. And for some it may be the case that they occupy the same vague region, but surely not for all of them. Also, do we know for certain that they do not have discrete locations, or is that a product of our epistemic limitations? I truly don't know.
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
As a political matter, I suspect high physics is going to keep pointing out that they invented the nuclear goddamn bomb for the next couple of centuries, I'm afraid. As far as concrete accomplishments of abstract theory go, that one is pretty hard to beat. "So... what've we got from higher criticism of institutional science" was never going to win a funding battle.
This comic shows a lack of understanding about what exactly it is that, at least, Philosophers do. I have never once in my entire academic career even discussed what it means to be a human being aside from the obvious "you have x list of properties." There is still this persistent idea that even the majority of philosophy is preoccupied with the question of human meaning, or the meaning of human life. Which I have literally never talked about in an academic setting.
"The only way to get rid of a temptation is to give into it." - Oscar Wilde
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
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surrealitychecklonely, but not unloveddreaming of faulty keys and latchesRegistered Userregular
stuff like the qualia debate is pretty close
and things like the edges of qualiadom begin to wander dangerously into testable territory, where no philosopher likes to tread
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JuliusCaptain of Serenityon my shipRegistered Userregular
Yet this does nothing to further your argument that logic and fact only exist because philosophy says they exist, and that without philosophy I could make no pronouncement of fact. Your response doesn't even attempt to answer the actual question, instead going off on a tangent about deductive reasoning. Not only that, you use examples that at the time we lacked the technology to observe, completely ignoring things like the foundations of geometry and algebra being laid thousands of years before philosophy was a codified branch of study.
I dunno what you mean by codified branch of study, but what makes a fact a fact is an entirely philosophical distinction that has been revised countless times over the centuries.
As someone earlier said, there must be a distinct and recognized gap between implied philosophy, aka how humans think, and academic philosophy. You refuse to make that distinction, and want to place implied philosophy under the ownership of academic philosophy. Implied philosophy was happening, and continues to happen, in a total vacuum of academic philosophy. Just as the foundations for the math and science disciplines was laid in a total vacuum of academic philosophy. Small children who are learning to deduct and reason are doing implied philosophy, and have no idea what academic philosophy is, or even that humans actually study what seems to them to be a completely natural way to tackle the world.
Why must there be a gap? Is there a meaningful gap for all other fields of study between "implied" and academic?
While it can't be argued that the study of philosophy has certainly enhanced our study of math and science, and has given us amazing academic logical frameworks and forced us to confront the ethics of our science, to imply that math and science wouldn't exist if philosophy had not "given us" fact, just isn't correct. The foundations of these things were being laid long before anyone decided to actually study how we made reasoned decisions.
What? No. The moment we started thinking that factual knowledge was important (i.e. furthering our understanding of the world) we started thinking about what made facts facts.
Brian Leiter wrote:
Very good physicists tend to be very good at physics, and I, at least, am inclined to the view that if you want to know what really exists, it's better to ask a scientist than a philosopher. But it's not obvious that even talented physicsts are very smart about other matters, such as those that require conceptual clarity, subtle distinctions, reflectiveness about presuppositions, and the appreciation of logical and inferential entailments of particular propositions. More than anything, I hope Krauss's tantrum and its aftermath will help disabuse the culture of the myth that being good at physics means being good at thought.
Love this quote. The best physics teachers I have had were not the best experimentalists. Physics departments ignore people that can synthesize ideas well and present them to others, probably because they are too busy staring at their own shoelaces and avoiding eye contact.
Brian Leiter wrote:
Very good physicists tend to be very good at physics, and I, at least, am inclined to the view that if you want to know what really exists, it's better to ask a scientist than a philosopher. But it's not obvious that even talented physicsts are very smart about other matters, such as those that require conceptual clarity, subtle distinctions, reflectiveness about presuppositions, and the appreciation of logical and inferential entailments of particular propositions. More than anything, I hope Krauss's tantrum and its aftermath will help disabuse the culture of the myth that being good at physics means being good at thought.
Love this quote. The best physics teachers I have had were not the best experimentalists. Physics departments ignore people that can synthesize ideas well and present them to others, probably because they are too busy staring at their own shoelaces and avoiding eye contact.
And that is why Feynman and Tyson are super awesome.
It's a silly question. Philosophy is not about discovering new particles, it's about the nature of science.
Yes. So: what has knowing more about the nature of science, contributed to advances in science (acknowledging that this is not its main purpose - just the purpose a lot of people care about)? Popper made its mark on how scientists think about themselves but nothing else has.
But this is empty sophistry. You're defining "functionally identical" in terms of what "function" we assign a thing. Electrons don't have a "function". Unless you're invoking some kind of divine purpose, the term as you have defined it is meaningless for a fundamental particle.
More generally, electrons don't have a definite position to begin with, so your claim that they have a different "location-property" is questionable (CptHamilton has since explained this better than I was about to).
Of course they have a location! If they can be observed, then they have a location in which they are observed. Furthermore, the electrons in this battery in my room are in a different location than the electrons in a battery in, say, Florida. Moreover, the electrons in my car battery not only have the location within the car battery, and various wires / bulbs within the car, but their locations change when my car's location changes.
Maybe we're disagreeing about what "location" means, and that's fine.
I think you have this neat, orderly ideal concept of the universe where everything is somewhere even if we don't know where it is, and that is itself a philosophical position rather than a scientific one--which is to say, there's no reason at present to think that electrons really do have definite positions underneath that probability cloud.
Again, the electrons in this battery are in a different location than the electrons in that battery, if only in terms of function.
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JuliusCaptain of Serenityon my shipRegistered Userregular
It's a silly question. Philosophy is not about discovering new particles, it's about the nature of science.
Yes. So: what has knowing more about the nature of science, contributed to advances in science (acknowledging that this is not its main purpose - just the purpose a lot of people care about)? Popper made its mark on how scientists think about themselves but nothing else has.
It's explicitly not it's purpose. Science advances science. No philosopher would consider themselves a Popperian falsficationist, with good reason, nowadays but that doesn't mean we advanced physics. It's not the point, let the scientists do the science.
Economics has done nothing to advance physics either, does that make it useless?
As a political matter, I suspect high physics is going to keep pointing out that they invented the nuclear goddamn bomb for the next couple of centuries, I'm afraid. As far as concrete accomplishments of abstract theory go, that one is pretty hard to beat. "So... what've we got from higher criticism of institutional science" was never going to win a funding battle.
This comic shows a lack of understanding about what exactly it is that, at least, Philosophers do. I have never once in my entire academic career even discussed what it means to be a human being aside from the obvious "you have x list of properties." There is still this persistent idea that even the majority of philosophy is preoccupied with the question of human meaning, or the meaning of human life. Which I have literally never talked about in an academic setting.
I've talked about it in various classes, but we also offer ways to answer the question.
The comic doesn't appreciate the degree to which different systems / rubrics can be offered, and have been offered, to answer the question.
And if philosophy serves to enhance thought, then it has done a great deal for science. (Duh.)
Lest I say "playing Profession Layton serves to enhance thought, therefore it has done a great deal for science". Well, no, it doesn't work that way.
Oh, come on.
Philosophers can clarify language and the arguments composed in that language. Philosophers can offer metaphysical / ontological / epistemological critiques of the claims made by various scientists. When a physicist claims to have answered the question, "How do we get something from nothing?" a philosopher can come along and explain, using simple terms and hand puppets, what "nothing" means.
Or, when a science-oriented person claims that electrons do not have a "function", someone trained in philosophy can offer a conception of "function", such that one could speak of electrons as having functions.
Posts
Yeah.
I wonder how science explains science.
e: as in, is it in fact the dominant view
This is what happens to Physics when they forget what "fallibilism" means.
It didn't take Quantum Mechanics to call in to question the identity of indiscernables. Max Black did it quite convincingly without any reference to physics at all.
There is a certain sense in which one must adopt a "naturalized" metaphysics. But it goes so far beyond science that you would be left with intense problems confining oneself to purely "naturalized" metaphysics.
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
Horseshit.
you mean other than birthing physics?
Edit: And providing the logical tools used by physics.
Edit: And providing the ontological / metaphysical theories utilized by physicists?
Edit: Oh, and math.
If decoherence pays out, as it may be doing, maybe that'll count.
But when _J_ here is writing "Horseshit." I feel strongly inclined toward Rutherford's "physics is the only real science - the rest are just stamp collecting", for some reason...
Nothing like Ad hominems and strawmen to keep you warm on a spring evening.
Dude, what the hell. Am I besmirching your honor or something.
I've got some bad news for you buddy, without resorting to Haecceaties, you can't really reinforce your opinion there. I'll be the first one on board for Identity of Indiscernables, but you got to face facts some times.
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
I mean 'the last time' as in when was the most recent time anyone is aware of.
It happens all the time. I can't provide you specific dates and times (unless you furnish me with dates and time for certain advances in theoretical physics).
Though there is a sense of the word "advance" where you are simply asking a nonsensical question. Analogous to: when was the last time physics told me I was beautiful?
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
I'm happy to face the facts, so long as we do not construe "facts" as the inductions and abductions physicists make from color patches.
Edit: I mean, they can't even figure out if light is a wave or a particle, and yet they presume to have proven the guy who invented Calculus to be incorrect.
That's a special kind of hubris, right there.
Edit Edit: Invented calculus in 1675, by the way.
That's fair.
Edit: It just pisses me off.
Casually speaking, there's a loose 'philosophy of science' that people do seem to adhere to, in a vague revealed-preference sort of way, that may not be philosophically rigorous but constitutes a plausible explanation for observed behavior nonetheless. Even for people whose profession it is to consider the place of scientific knowledge in wider epistemology, they might deny the possibility of certain knowledge of the external world, but they probably still want certain institutions and certain types of people to have designed and built the airplane they're boarding.
Call that the 'applied' philosophy of science, perhaps. Its standards are not very rigorous, but rigorous philosophy of science is difficult and technical and Feyerabend makes my head hurt so we work with a simpler stripped-down version In Real Life, and it really is an evolving standard that keeps up (somewhat) with advances in scientific knowledge, and it does possess massive importance insofar as we want justify who we should legitimately defer to in politically charged issues. Climate change, evolution, you know.
Then there's the actual philosophy of science, where we poke at scientists in the way a political philosopher regards politicians. It's a different world. Here Popper is widely disrespected instead, for starters. But what's wrong with compartmentalization? Everyone does it.
There's a tension in that there are now organized forces trying to formally advocate change in the former (c.f. Dawkins et al) instead of letting it bump along gently and they're not really talking to philosophers and get rather annoyed when the latter do what must seem like irrelevant nitpicking.
I would suggest that dividing academia into Teams a la the OP, whose national honor you are obliged to defend, is not the best way to go about careful thought.
Unfortunately, given funding decisions, we are engaged in something of a battle that has very real impacts upon the livelihoods of various persons.
In an ideal world, though, you'd be correct.
More generally, electrons don't have a definite position to begin with, so your claim that they have a different "location-property" is questionable (CptHamilton has since explained this better than I was about to). I think you have this neat, orderly ideal concept of the universe where everything is somewhere even if we don't know where it is, and that is itself a philosophical position rather than a scientific one--which is to say, there's no reason at present to think that electrons really do have definite positions underneath that probability cloud.
There still is some meaningful sense in which we can say something like "that electron is over there." Even if there is a vague range of places. So it's not the case that every electron is everywhere, right? So there must be some manner of location that they have. Even if it is just the location of the cloud.
Also, it's the case that electrons are diffentiated, right? Does it make sense to claim that there are, for instance, 4 electrons over there? Now, in principle, we may not be the kind of thing that can tell them apart. And for some it may be the case that they occupy the same vague region, but surely not for all of them. Also, do we know for certain that they do not have discrete locations, or is that a product of our epistemic limitations? I truly don't know.
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
This comic shows a lack of understanding about what exactly it is that, at least, Philosophers do. I have never once in my entire academic career even discussed what it means to be a human being aside from the obvious "you have x list of properties." There is still this persistent idea that even the majority of philosophy is preoccupied with the question of human meaning, or the meaning of human life. Which I have literally never talked about in an academic setting.
"We believe in the people and their 'wisdom' as if there was some special secret entrance to knowledge that barred to anyone who had ever learned anything." - Friedrich Nietzsche
and things like the edges of qualiadom begin to wander dangerously into testable territory, where no philosopher likes to tread
That's not the point of philosophy of science.
It's a silly question. Philosophy is not about discovering new particles, it's about the nature of science.
Fucking qualia.
Like having your high roommate take an interest in your work.
I dunno what you mean by codified branch of study, but what makes a fact a fact is an entirely philosophical distinction that has been revised countless times over the centuries.
Why must there be a gap? Is there a meaningful gap for all other fields of study between "implied" and academic? What? No. The moment we started thinking that factual knowledge was important (i.e. furthering our understanding of the world) we started thinking about what made facts facts.
Love this quote. The best physics teachers I have had were not the best experimentalists. Physics departments ignore people that can synthesize ideas well and present them to others, probably because they are too busy staring at their own shoelaces and avoiding eye contact.
And that is why Feynman and Tyson are super awesome.
Yes. So: what has knowing more about the nature of science, contributed to advances in science (acknowledging that this is not its main purpose - just the purpose a lot of people care about)? Popper made its mark on how scientists think about themselves but nothing else has.
Gotta be more specific than this:
Lest I say "playing Profession Layton serves to enhance thought, therefore it has done a great deal for science". Well, no, it doesn't work that way.
most obvious fan would be hawking
I'm pretty sure electrons have a function.
Of course they have a location! If they can be observed, then they have a location in which they are observed. Furthermore, the electrons in this battery in my room are in a different location than the electrons in a battery in, say, Florida. Moreover, the electrons in my car battery not only have the location within the car battery, and various wires / bulbs within the car, but their locations change when my car's location changes.
Maybe we're disagreeing about what "location" means, and that's fine.
Again, the electrons in this battery are in a different location than the electrons in that battery, if only in terms of function.
It's explicitly not it's purpose. Science advances science. No philosopher would consider themselves a Popperian falsficationist, with good reason, nowadays but that doesn't mean we advanced physics. It's not the point, let the scientists do the science.
Economics has done nothing to advance physics either, does that make it useless?
I've talked about it in various classes, but we also offer ways to answer the question.
The comic doesn't appreciate the degree to which different systems / rubrics can be offered, and have been offered, to answer the question.
Oh, come on.
Philosophers can clarify language and the arguments composed in that language. Philosophers can offer metaphysical / ontological / epistemological critiques of the claims made by various scientists. When a physicist claims to have answered the question, "How do we get something from nothing?" a philosopher can come along and explain, using simple terms and hand puppets, what "nothing" means.
Or, when a science-oriented person claims that electrons do not have a "function", someone trained in philosophy can offer a conception of "function", such that one could speak of electrons as having functions.
For example.